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ABSTRACT 
There is a growing current trend in the management manipulation of published financial results evidenced 
by the increasing emergence of high-profile cases of deceptive financial reporting which continuously 
undermines the financial reporting function.  
While previous studies evaluate financial communications in general without appreciating the granular 
differences between different industries or institutions, this study advances the need to study the ways 
companies communicate in different industries to enable commensurate comparisons. To do this, this 
study draws and evaluates insights from research in the areas of institutional theory, institutional logic, 
isomorphism, impression management, earnings management, deception, financial statement fraud, and 
linguistic analysis. Overall, this study focuses on advancing the research on psycholinguistics in financial 
communications at the institutional level, to work in tandem with financial models. This has the potential 
for evaluating linguistic changes in those communications at an early stage, to illuminate red flags before 
a crime takes place, and enable the investment community through auditors to manage and prevent 
corporate fraud.  
To create differentiation in the financial communications of industry groups, this study empirically tested 
the industry characteristics established in prior studies for differentiating between high and low discretion 
industries. Specifically, this study conducted a comparative analysis on the measurement of managerial 
discretion intra-industry in the United Kingdom, with the view of obtaining the predictive validity of the 
underlying model originally tested in the United States of America. This study applied the resulting 
evidence in testing the differential financial narratives of high and low discretion industries, in the UK, 
both in the context of published annual reports and through the narratives of analysts meetings. The 
results of this study showed that the financial communications of companies can better be evaluated and 
understood in the context of the institutional environment to which each belongs and in the economic 
contexts they are faced with. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 
1.1 Overview 
There is a growing trend in the management manipulation of published financial results evidenced by the 
increasing emergence of high-profile cases of deceptive financial reporting which continuously 
undermines the financial reporting function. Furthermore, in recent cases of the liquidation of some 
historically profitable companies in the London market such as Carillion, Patisserie Valerie, and Thomas 
Cook, a common theme among them has been the absence of timely warnings or reports that informed 
their imminent collapse1. Historically, the main focus of studies conducted in the accounting and auditing 
domain has been on evaluating and auditing the financials of corporate firms where models for assessing 
earnings management have been developed. The great core of all previous studies are premised on 
differentiating fraud from non-fraud companies, based on the financials of companies that were found to 
have been fraudulent. As a result, this approach potentially misses a whole sector of companies who 
were not found out, even if they have been deceptive or even fraudulent without being detected.  
In such a context, this study assumes that all companies may be suspect and should be equally validated 
for differential features, without which companies which may have lied and deceived their investors would 
be categorised as non-fraudulent and will thereby present precedential features as being truthful. 
Consequently, they are likely not to be discovered using the models currently developed and will 
consequently impact negatively on the economy. Contemporarily, one of the developing research areas 
in the field of Accounting is the evaluation of the financial communications of corporate organisations. 
Previous studies on the evaluation of corporate narratives have focused on several topics of interest such 
as the association between tone at the top and financial reporting aggressiveness (Patelli & Pedrini, 
2015), mining annual reports for hidden cues of deception (Craig, Mortensen, & Iyer, 2013; Goel & 
Gangolly, 2012), top management’s tone change in corporate narratives (Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat & 
Segal 2010), impression management and corporate narratives (Merkl-Davies, Brennan, & McLeay, 
2011), leader’s impression management during organisational decline (Chng, Rodgers, Shih, & Song, 
2015), amongst others.  
                                                          
1 For example, Carillion PLC made an end of year trading statement in early December 2016, stating that performance was 
meeting expectations, they expected strong growth in revenue and operating profit and also expected net borrowing to reduce.  
In May 2017 the CEO announced at the AGM, that they had made an encouraging start to the year.  The Company then 
issued a trading update to the market in July 2017, in which the previous announcements, noted above, were effectively 
reversed.  The share price collapsed by 90% on that day.  The company went into liquidation six months later in January 2018, 
becoming the largest ever trading liquidation in the UK (Carillion’s upbeat update under microscope, 2018).  
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Historically, the predominant approach in these prior studies has been on independently evaluating the 
financial communications of individual corporate organisations, without much emphasis on the need to 
assess each organisation’s corporate narratives within the context of the industry, or institutional 
environment that regulates their operating logic. Given this apparent paucity within the burgeoning 
research field of financial communication and on the critical understanding of this connecting area, the 
approach of this study is to incorporate the insights from the theory of institutions and organisations in 
the differential evaluation of the financial communications of the top management of corporate 
organisations in different industries and contrasting economic contexts. 
In addition, while previous studies evaluate financial communications in general without appreciating the 
granular differences between different industries or institutions, this study advances the need to study 
the ways companies communicate in different industries to enable commensurate comparisons. Overall, 
this study focuses on advancing the research on psycholinguistics in financial communications at the 
institutional level, to work in tandem with financial models. This has the potential for evaluating linguistic 
changes in those communications at an early stage, to create red flags before a crime takes place, and 
enabling the investment community through auditors to manage and prevent corporate fraud.    
Institutions have been defined as “a system of norms that regulate the relations of individuals to each 
other” (Parsons, 1990, p.327), which also defines expectations as to the modality of such relations (Scott, 
2014). According to Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin and Suddaby (2013), organisations can either be 
regulated by the logic internal to each organisation or by that imposed by the external environment. 
Specifically, from the perspective of the external environment regulating the logic that guides the 
behaviours of organisations, Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2013) posit that organisations become similar or 
isomorphic in their behavioural pattern. Consequently, as organisations interact over time, they develop 
certain isomorphic traits which creates an institutional logic that regulates the behaviour of the 
organisations affiliated to such institutions.  
As such, the logic that regulates an institution shapes the rational behaviours of individual organisations 
to the extent that they become loosely coupled from their technical core (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), organisations ensure they conform to the logic imposed on them 
from their external environment owing to the need to maintain legitimacy of their operations. In view of 
this, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) defined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
reality” (p. 804). 
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Therefore, the values and beliefs shared by organisations within an institutional environment results in 
an isomorphic situation where organisations have similar identities and operate in similar forms. 
Consequently, these shared values and beliefs manifest in the structuring of symbols such as language, 
signs, and gestures, which subsequently shape the meanings attributed to events and activities (Scott, 
2014). In the same vein, based on the theoretical understanding that the logic that regulates organisations 
in one institutional environment will be entirely different from those of organisations in another institutional 
environment, the standpoint of this study is that such differences in logics will be manifest in their use of 
language while communicating their social and economic reality. For the purpose of differentiating 
between the logics of different institutions, this study adopts the insights from Hambrick and Finkelstein’s 
(1987) discretion theory.  
According to Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), the amount of discretion afforded to organisations within 
an institutional environment influences organisational outcomes. Based on the measure of several 
objective industry characteristics, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) found that companies can either be 
categorised into a high discretion industry or a low discretion industry. For organisations in a high 
discretion industry, the locus of control is at the discretion of the top management. On the other hand, 
where the locus of control is at the discretion of the external environment or forces outside the domain of 
organisations, such organisations are classified as belonging to a low discretion industry. In view of this, 
Bligh and Kohles (2014) emphasise that it is possible to understand the dynamics of individual 
organisations belonging to institutional groups through their choice of language. Hence, the rationale of 
this study is to evaluate the choice of language in the financial communications of organisations informed 
by the level of discretion afforded to them by their institutional environment.     
1.2 The Research Question 
As noted, the theory on institutions and organisations posits that different logics regulate organisations 
in different institutional environments. This study, therefore, focuses on the psycholinguistic analysis of 
the financial communications of companies across various industries. To facilitate this, the financial 
communications of companies delivered by the Chief Executive Officers (the CEOs) are employed in 
evaluating their differential language features. The rationale for focusing on the financial communications 
of CEOs is based on the insight that the communication of the CEO of company is “a fundamental vehicle 
of leadership” (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 4), which serves to reflect the priorities of CEOs, their mindset, 
and perceived charisma (Amernic, Craig & Tourish, 2010). Similarly, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) 
posit that the leadership and organisational values of corporate entities can be understood through the 
lexical features of CEO communications. In the same vein, Mahadeo (2006) conceives that the language 
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of the top management of an organisation creates an “atmosphere” that stipulates the behaviour of social 
actors within an organisation (p.1).  
As emphasised by Amernic et al. (2010), the narrative language of the CEO of an organisation is a 
fundamental and direct manifestation of top management language. Interestingly, the narratives of CEOs 
have been found to carry valuable and predictive information concerning circumstances surrounding an 
organisation, which can signal potential financial and going-concern issues (Craig et al. 2013).  Based 
on insights from the aforementioned prior studies, the primary research question of this study is to 
evaluate whether the psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of companies differ 
significantly between varying institutional contexts.  
Consequently, the overarching question this study aims to answer is whether the linguistic features of the 
financial communications of the CEOs of companies are different across various industries and in 
contrasting economic contexts, with the primary critical aim of evaluating the financial communications of 
individual organisations in light of those of competitors within the same industry classification. To answer 
this research question, the following supplementary questions will be evaluated. First, by drawing and 
evaluating insights from research in the domain of discretion originally conducted in the United States of 
America (the USA), this study tests whether the underlying predictive model for differentiating between 
industries, in the context of the discretion afforded to them, can be replicated, tested, and validated for 
companies operating in the United Kingdom (the UK).  
Therefore, the first question this study aims to answer is to test whether the model for measuring the 
overall discretion can be used to classify companies in the UK as either belonging to the high discretion 
industry or low discretion industry, in line with the results presented for companies in the USA. If so, the 
second question focuses on testing whether the extant theory on psycholinguistics and the techniques 
used in analysing language features provide thematic indicators for differentiating between the financial 
communications of companies in high discretion industry from those in the low discretion industry. Lastly, 
consequent on the second question, the third question focuses on evaluating the language features of 
companies in each of the industry groups during periods of favourable financial performance results and 
unfavourable financial performance results. Specifically, it evaluates how companies use language during 
good times in comparison to periods when they face imminent financial difficulty.  
1.3 Development of Hypotheses, the Corpora, and the Tools 
To answer these questions, this study hypothesises that a non-engaging, complex, resolute, and 
optimistic language is more likely to be associated with companies in a high discretion environment. On 
the other hand, it hypothesises that a language that is engaging and which aligns to the common 
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knowledge of the stakeholder community is more likely to be associated with companies in a low 
discretion environment. To test the hypotheses of this study, the empirical analysis measures the 
language features in CEO letters from a sample of FTSE350 companies trading on the London Stock 
Exchange over a five-year period. Specifically, the CEO letters to shareholders are divided into CEO 
letters to shareholders of companies in the high discretion industry and for those in the low discretion 
industry. In addition, this study measures the language features of CEO discussions with investment 
analysts. All the transcripts of CEO letters to shareholders are either collected from the Bloomberg Data 
or directly from the websites of each company. For the analysts’ discussions, the transcripts of CEO 
contributions are collected from Bloomberg Data alone.  
Several reasons motivate the choice of CEO letters and their discussions with analysts. According to 
Patelli and Pedrini (2015), CEO letters serve as a fundamental vehicle of corporate leadership. In the 
same vein, Amernic et al., (2010) posits that CEO letters provide a reflection of the priorities, mindset, 
and perceived charisma of a CEO. Similarly, Patelli and Pedrini (2015) emphasise that through the letters 
written to shareholders by CEOs, it is possible to assess their business vision, understand a firm’s 
competitive advantage, evaluate the strategic priorities of top management, interpret financial results and 
other achievements, and most importantly, be able to identify threats and opportunities (p. 4). To further 
justify the selection of CEO letters, Courtis (1998) affirms that of the other sections of corporate annual 
reports, the CEO letters are the most read section. 
While the reliability of the content of CEO letters has been questioned due to the possibility of being used 
for rhetorical manipulation (e.g. Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Fiol, 1995), 
they serve the purpose of this study in evaluating them for impression management purposes. On the 
other hand, the rationale for selecting transcripts of CEO discussions with analysts is due to the possibility 
of ascertaining their authorship and the potential for understanding the true reflection of the cognitions of 
CEOs (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Fiol, 1995). These communication narratives form the corpora of this 
study, while they also enable the assessment of the language features of different text genres used in 
financial communications.  
To measure the thematic indicators of these CEO letters and their discussions with analysts, this study 
adopts the computer-aided text analysis provided by DICTION 7 (hereafter, DICTION) to measure for the 
five Master Variables of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, REALISM, and OPTIMISM. For the 
purpose of obtaining validity for the use of DICTION, the language features of another text analysis tool 
– Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), are compared alongside those of DICTION. Lastly, to 
measure the readability of the financial communications of the two industry groups, this study adopts the 
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readability measures known as Flesch Reading Ease (hereafter, Reading Ease or Readability Score) and 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades (hereafter, Readability Grades).   
1.4 The Research Objectives (Purpose of Study) 
With the extant theory on organisations and institutions, this study aims to advance the research on the 
evaluation of financial communications of companies using an interdisciplinary approach. Therefore, the 
critical goal of this study is to evaluate the language differences used in the financial communications of 
companies in different industry and economic contexts, and based on the findings, to offer a conceptual 
framework as to the implications these language features might signal for the stakeholder community in 
understanding these financial communications in different industry and economic contexts, within which 
companies operate. To do this, this study draws and evaluates insights from research in the areas of 
institutional theory, institutional logic, isomorphism, impression management, earnings management, 
deception, financial statement fraud, and linguistic analysis. Based on the findings of this study, it aims 
to derive thematic tests to inform the development of theory on the evaluation of corporate narratives, 
future professional practice in the areas of audit and corporate governance, and assist regulatory 
authorities in their oversight roles as it relates to the financial reporting function.   
1.5 Relevance of Study 
This study is of interest to the research community in the domain of the language analysis of corporate 
narratives because it stands to better explain the need to evaluate the financial communications of 
companies in the context of their institutional environment and prevailing economic circumstances. In 
view of this, it stands to explain how the potential differences in financial communications are made 
manifest through the linguistic features of those corporate narratives. This is also important to 
shareholders and potential investors because their goal is to effectively make sound economic decisions 
on their investments based on the financial communications they receive from the top management of 
their companies. Furthermore, the task of this study is also important to assurance providers such as 
auditors and entity risk assessors, because their task is to effectively investigate and provide assurance 
on the true and fair view of the information provided by top management on the performance of their 
companies, which has impact on the integrity of the financial reporting function.  
In addition, it is also of interest to regulatory authorities because their task is to ensure companies provide 
as much information as possible to the markets, which should be true and fair, comprehensive and 
comprehensible to the stakeholder community. Lastly, in this era of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine 
Learning, the results of this study present the possibility for automated computer text mining systems to 
develop algorithms to predict potential earnings manipulation and imminent financial disasters. Overall, 
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this study stands to advance the need to incorporate computer-aided text analysis in the evaluation of 
the financial communications of companies. In sum, a computational approach for evaluating the financial 
communications of companies in different industry and economic contexts offers researchers, the 
investment community, assurance providers, and regulatory authorities a number of exciting avenues of 
interest.         
1.6 Situating the Study 
This study differs from the approach of prior studies on the evaluation of corporate narratives because it 
discusses the psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of companies in the context of 
their industry classification and in light of the institutional environments that shape their actions. The 
approach of this study is to better understand the influence of industry factors such as the level of 
discretion afforded to them on organisational outcomes, expressed through the financial communications 
of companies in different industry and economic contexts. Taken as a whole, this study fills the gap in 
research on the need to consider the financial communications of companies in the context of their 
institutions. To do this, this study builds on existing research by replicating and validating the underlying 
model for measuring the level of discretion in the context of UK industries. It follows with the evaluation 
of the psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of companies in different industry groups 
during good and bad times, as well as measuring the readability of the different text genres that convey 
the message in those financial communications.  
Accordingly, the lexical analysis in this study is based on the CEO letters to shareholders and their 
discussions with analysts. The rationale for choosing CEO letters is based on the standpoint that it is a 
fundamental and direct manifestation of top management language (Amernic et al., 2010), as well as 
conveying direct expressions of tone at the top (Li, 2008). While CEO letters are often thought to reflect 
multiple authorship with the potential to be managed and thoroughly edited by public relations specialists 
(Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Bowman, 1984), non-evaluative statements such as CEO discussions 
with analysts are more likely to reflect managerial cognitions, while evaluative statements such as CEO 
letters to shareholders are more likely to reflect impression management (Fiol, 1995). This study adopts 
the two financial communications channels as two different text genres for the purpose of evaluating their 
lexical features, with the view of assessing their likelihood for rhetorical manipulation.   
1.7 Structure of the Study 
The succeeding chapters in this study are organised as follows. In Chapter Two, this study presents the 
theoretical framework and reviews the extant literature in the areas of Institutional Theory, Institutional 
Logic, Institutional Leadership, Isomorphism and Legitimacy, Impression Management, Earnings 
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Manipulation, and Deception in the Context of Financial Statements. Next, in Chapter Three, this study 
presents the methodological framework used in formulating the eight major hypotheses and sub-
hypotheses (discussed in Chapter Four) informed by the thematic indicators of the five Master Variables 
of DICTION, the measure of Tone in financial communications, measures of Readability in corporate 
narratives, and testing for the language features of different text genres used in financial communications. 
Chapter Four focuses on the development of the hypotheses formulated for testing using the tools 
discussed in Chapter Three. Subsequently, Chapter Five presents the empirical framework, discusses 
the empirical analysis conducted, and the critical findings of the study. Lastly, in Chapter Six, this study 
draws conclusions, offers implications for theory, practice, and the regulatory environment, as well as 
directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework adopted for the purpose of this study. As 
aforementioned in the introduction chapter, one notable gap in previous studies on the evaluation of the 
financial communications of companies is the absence of studies on the evaluation of those 
communications in the context of their institutional environments. Accordingly, this chapter begins by 
reviewing the extant literature on organisations and their institutions with the view to understanding how 
individual organisations derive their behaviours from their enabling institutions, which are enforced 
through organisational leaders. It is followed with the review of how the behaviour of organisational 
leaders differ across industry groupings and how they use the discretion afforded to them in influencing 
organisational outcomes. These outcomes are communicated through some vehicles of corporate 
communications, with the potential for being used for impression management, earnings management, 
and fraudulent financial reporting purposes. This chapter concludes with the review of existing 
computerised text analysis techniques established for the purpose of evaluating the financial 
communications of companies for signals that help in unravelling the aforementioned purposes. 
2.1 Introduction to Organisations, Institutions and Institutional Theory 
Institutions have been defined as “a system of norms that regulate the relations of individuals to each 
other” (Parsons, 1990, p.327), which also defines expectations as to the modality of such relations (Scott 
2014). On the one hand, an institution is seen as a body of organisations regulated by the same logic in 
the course of conducting their operational activities. This perspective posits that there is an external force 
that influences, directs and, sometimes, enforces deterrent measures on the activities of individual 
organisation within a particular logic, for the purpose of preserving the founding principles of such 
institution. This aspect of the phenomenon is seen as the external environment culminating into an 
institution (Scott, 2014). On the other hand, an organisation in itself can also be seen as an institution 
that generates sets of norms, principles, templates of actions, and logic that prescribes the direction its 
internal participants should follow in the course of performing their duties, and in representing the 
organisation. This aspect of the phenomenon is seen as the organisation being an institution in itself 
(Scott, 2014). Accordingly, a set of theory that explains the interactions among the participants within an 
organisation, and also, the interaction between an organisation and its environment is termed institutional 
theory. 
Institutional theory, is a vibrant and regularly researched area in the social sciences. A phenomenon 
which originated from the analysis of organisations, its intersection and intercourse with organisational 
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studies from its beginning in the 1970s, have cut across the spheres of diverse organisational fields with 
significant transformations in the areas of management theory, institutional economics, social movement 
theory and organisational sociology, with strong impacts on neighbouring areas of political studies of 
institutions and administrative studies of accounting and international business (Scott, 2014). In 
particular, the studies on institutional theory have focused on the fields of economics, political science 
and sociology. Accordingly, “The work done in the past have been sources of intellectual capital for the 
more recent research” (Amarante, 2016, p.2). The late 1970s was a period when significant contributions 
were being made on building coherent conceptual frameworks on institutional and organisational theory 
supported by diligently conducted empirical research (Greenwood et al., 2013), which portrays the 
responses of institutional theory to empirical anomalies, as March and Olsen (1984) state “what we 
observe in the world is inconsistent with the ways in which contemporary theories ask us to talk” (p.747).  
Within this time frame, some enduring perspectives within organisational theory of contingency theory, 
resource dependence theory, population ecology theory, transaction costs theory and institutional theory 
were initiated. Whilst institutions and institutional processes had been examined before the 1970s, as 
emphasised by Hirsch (2013), the introduction to the term ‘institution’ originated from Parsons’ (1956) 
classic essay on the three analytic levels in the study of organisations. Post-Parsons’ classic essay, the 
term ‘institution’ was not joined with the term ‘theory’, rather, it implied a recognised ground where political 
actions and change were possible. As stated by Stinchcombe (1997, p.2): “Institutions were created by 
purposive people in legislatures and international unions, and in pamphlets of business ideologists”. That 
being said, in the framework of Parsons’ (1956) approach, the coordination and control of a firm’s work 
is done at managerial or administrative level, nevertheless, the actual work is executed at the firm’s 
technical level. The body that serves to protect the activities of a firm against any external influence are 
those at the managerial level. Hence, top managers within firms strive to influence the enactment of laws 
in a way that protects the logic on which their firms operate. Nevertheless, laws and regulations are 
involuntarily formed outside the domain of firms - at the institutional level - with the enforcement of such 
regulations discharged in the markets and external environments in which these firms operate.  
Accordingly, from Parsons’ (1956) institutional perspective, there is a two-way mutual correlation between 
a firm and its external environment. The institution was seen as a political world dominated by lobbyists, 
trade unions and other interest groups who met with regulatory authorities to negotiate over rules that 
would structure their firms’ behaviour. The motive for such mutualism was to mobilise power for the 
attainment of the goals of an organisation, albeit, “subject to the overall control of an institutionalized 
value system in the society and its subsystems” (Parsons, 1956, p.225). On the other hand, the external 
environment, notably the regulatory authorities, ensure that organisations conform with set standards in 
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such a way that the individuals and organisations conform with regulations while the vested interest of 
providing the resources to maintain the machinery of governance is secured.  
In view of this, Hirsch (1975) noted that the possibility of understanding the reaction of a firm to its external 
environment was completely new. Prior understandings in organisation studies have focused primarily 
on the operations within organisations on individual and group actions. Subsequently, researchers began 
to create new levels of analysis, to contend that organisations are intrinsic systems that can be analysed 
as such, and that they can be fundamental actors in larger systems (Amarante, 2016). This insight 
facilitated the understanding of the proactive, active and reactive nature of organisations in their wider 
environment. In addition, it provided the opportunity to examine and understand how the firm could strive 
to influence a change to a regulation from being an adverse constraint to a more adaptable contingency 
and, subsequently, a variable subject to manipulation (Thompson, 1967). Consequently, organisations 
individually strove to beat the prevalent regulations, ensure their continuous presence in the market, and 
having a recognised actor between the organisations and the society (Hirsch, 2013). 
The various theories on organisations, institutions and institutionalisation have various constructs and 
contexts (Greenwood et al. 2013; Hall & Taylor, 1996), with notable variants on the analysis of institutions 
identified through three basic schools of thought: rational choice institutionalism; historical institutionalism 
and organisational or sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This spans across decades and 
covers a wide range of disciplines, representing an approach distinct to the study of social, economic and 
political phenomena. The study of institutions, which has a long history, gains its roots from the analysis 
of the formation and structuring of organisations, which, unsurprisingly has raised concerns on the 
proliferation of theoretical paradigms which have flooded the conceptualisation of organisation theories 
(Greenwood et al. 2013). Nonetheless, the overarching questions of organisation theory focus on 
understanding organisations, with an emphasis on how and why organisations behave as they do and 
the consequences of such behaviours. Therefore, organisational institutionalism is the application of the 
institutional perspective to the analysis of those questions (Greenwood et al. 2013).  
In an early study on organisation studies, Veblen (1919) attempted the definition of institutions as the 
“settled habits of thoughts common to the generality of man” (p.239). In another attempt, Kingsley Davis 
defined institutions as “a set of interwoven folkways, mores and laws built around one or more functions” 
(1949, p.71). Subsequently, studies on organisations and institutions have revolved around the areas of 
Sociology, Economics and Politics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Furthermore, while much of early 
institutionalisms focused in the traditional perspective of institutions as centralised and informal 
structures, there is a renaissance on the perception of institutions beyond the classical institutional theory 
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to neo-institutional organisation theory which portrays institutions as peripheral with symbolic role of 
formal structure.  
Emphasised by Dobbin (1994, p.123), “Neo-institutional approaches to organizations are part of 
a much wider intellectual endeavor that problematizes modernity, and questions the social origins 
of the whole constellation of institutions and at the same time seeks to grasp not the universal 
laws that generate social practices, but social practices that generate universal laws and, in 
organization theory, attendant management prescriptions.”  
Generally, there are two different conceptions of organisations in the fields of Economics and Sociology. 
In Economics, organisations were seen as typical, but not distinctive, independent units. On the other 
hand, in Sociology, organisations were conceived as tools for implementing agendas set externally. 
These new approaches helped to recognise the much more loosely coupled networks and alliances which 
have become prevalent in the study of institutions. Historically, most of the work had placed emphasis on 
the relational and material aspects in environments which made organisations compete for limited 
resources for their going concern based on the materials available for work, the power-dependence 
relations and competition for limited resources (Scott, 2014). However, contemporary research leans 
towards the symbolic aspects of the environment influencing organisation behaviour as opposed to the 
material aspects.  
In the context of this study, the approach is to draw insights from the field of organisational sociology, 
particularly in the analysis of the processes through which institutions influence and shape organisational 
structure, behaviour, and action (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Accordingly, this study reviews the various 
insights on old and new views of institutional theory with the aim of arriving at a central view of how an 
organisation can either be seen as an institution in itself making its own rules and values, or as a 
respondent to the logic or rules in a defining external environment. From the former view, it would mean 
that an organisation is likely to act in dissimilar ways from other organisations if it derives the logic of 
control within itself. In contrast, for organisations that are regulated by similar logic derived from an 
external environment, they are likely to act in similar ways and maintain similar identity over time 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). Consequently, this study reviews how organisations become similar and act 
in predictable ways by considering the logic that regulates organisations within a specific institutional 
field. By creating a link between the powerful influence of institutional logic and how such influence 
creates similarity, or in other cases the dissimilarity of actions among organisations in different 
institutional fields, this study critically reviews the link between the level of discretion afforded to 
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organisations in response to the logic regulating the institutions within which corporate organisations 
derive meanings, values, and actions.  
In sum, this study reviews the literature on organisations and institutions, how the logic prevalent in 
institutions make organisations to be similar, isomorphic, or even dissimilar in nature, the classification of 
organisations in accordance to the level of discretion afforded to them which is used as a determinant of 
the responses of organisations to the defining logic in their external environment. In view of this, this 
study considers how the logic regulating organisations within an institutional field becomes 
institutionalised or diffused in the internal affairs of organisations through the leadership of the top 
management of corporate organisations, which is made manifest in their choice of language in 
communicating their responses to the circumstances surrounding them. It follows with the evaluation of 
the extant literature on the financial communications of organisations and how the leadership of corporate 
organisations in different institutional fields or industries use the discretion afforded to them in 
communicating to their stakeholders. This will entail evaluating the literature on the use of corporate 
communications for purposes such as impression management, earnings manipulation, which may 
subsequently lead to financial statement fraud. 
Accordingly, the structure of this literature review chapter is as follows: the next section focuses on the 
background review of organisations and institutions, followed by the literature on institutional logic and 
isomorphism. Next is the link between institutional logic and managerial discretion theory, and how they 
differ across industry or institutional groups. It follows with the review of the literature on institutional 
leaderships in different institutional fields and their place in diffusing into organisations the logic set in 
their defining external environment. Subsequently, this study reviews the literature on organisational 
leaderships’ use of impression management and earnings management tactics conveyed through the 
vehicle of corporate communications, which may be useful for assessing signals of financial distress and 
in cases of fraudulent financial reporting.      
2.2 Organisational and Institutional Theory – A Background Review 
The study of institutions is one with a long history in the analysis of organisations with notable foundation 
in Philip Selznick’s empirical analyses of organisations and the institutional environment (Selznick, 1948, 
1949, 1957), which placed emphasis on the functioning of an institution with respect to the integration of 
organisations with other various organisations in a social setting through universalistic rules, contracts 
and authority (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). Building from this early insight on institutions and 
institutionalism, a new approach to the analysis of institutions emerged in the 1970s through the work of 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977), who emphasised the role of culture and cognition in 
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institutional analysis. In their study, by adopting a macro-perspective of institutional analysis, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) emphasised the role of modernisation in rationalising take-for-granted rules, resulting in 
Isomorphism in organisations’ formal structure – a situation where organisations have similar identity and 
operate in similar forms.  
Consequently, in the quest for legitimacy in operations, organisations had to align themselves with the 
requirements of the external environment which by implication coerced parts of organisations to be 
loosely coupled from the primary objective for which they were established. In view of this, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) extended the early insight on institutionalism by focusing on isomorphism from the macro 
level of the society to the level of organisational fields with specific emphasis on the coercive, normative 
and mimetic sources of isomorphism. In their study, they viewed cognition from the perspective of mimetic 
isomorphism, the behaviour of individuals in response to cultural rationalisation. This became adopted 
by neo-institutionalists in rejecting rationality as the justifiable explanation for the structure of 
organisations, with a new emphasis on legitimacy rather than efficiency as the reason for the success 
and going-concern of organisations (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
The various empirical studies conducted by Scott, Reuf, Mendel, and Caronna (2000); Thornton and 
Ocasio (1999); and Haveman and Rao (1997) created a contemporary approach towards the analysis of 
institutions by introducing institutional logics as defining the content and meaning of institutions. Although 
the views of these empirical studies on institutional logics shared common ground with DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983, 1991); Meyer and Rowan (1977); and Zucker (1977), on the concerns of how cultural norms 
and cognitive structures mould organisational structures, nevertheless, they differ from them in significant 
ways. Isomorphism no longer becomes the central focus be it in the global system, society, or 
organisational fields, rather, attention is now focused on the effects of differentiated institutional logics on 
individuals and organisations in broader contextual structures in markets, industries and industry sectors. 
Similarly, in the context of this study, the focus is on the effect of differentiated institutional logics on 
organisational outcomes in the context of the industries they operate in and the impact of the discretion 
afforded to them on organisational outcomes. However, prior to exploring the various segments of 
institutional theory that inform the approach of this study, it is informative to critically review the literature 
on these Isomorphic and Institutional Logic phenomena from its foundational years during the early 20th 
century.    
In the words of Rivers (1914), “human beings do not pursue the course of their daily lives and 
perform the complicated actions of social life merely as automata conforming to the institutions 
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and customs into which they have been born. There remains a vast field of study in the ideas, 
beliefs, emotions, and sentiments which act as the immediate motives of these actions” (p.595).  
Consequently, people are motivated to act in certain ways which could be to conform unwittingly to certain 
conventions or to imitate norms prevalent in societies, that is, they operate within a social framework 
shaped by a set of cultural and historical forces. Veblen (1909) posited that, though, much behaviour was 
governed by habit and convention, institutional characters vary as the scenery of an institution varies in 
the course of the individual’s conduct and habitual relations to their fellows in a group. In the same vein, 
organisations act in response to norms and standards that guide their operations regardless of whether 
or not they created those standards, and more importantly, whether or not those norms promote the 
objectives of the individual organisations. In a similar purview, Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) posit 
that the degree to which organisations conform to the norms in their external environment depends on 
the level of discretion afforded to them.  
With the view of conforming to institutional norms, morality and the need to obtain legitimacy of actions 
become the primary motivating factors for institutionalising action rather than instrumental concerns, with 
a primary motive for obedience to an institutional norm vested in the moral authority imposed on the 
individual (Parsons, 1990), the conformity of the individual, to those standards, not necessitated by 
expediency or self-interest, but by their belief in a value standard (Scott, 2014). However, Alexander 
(1983, p.242) noted, in line with Veblen (1909) that though institutions regulate the interaction among 
individuals and define what the nature of the relations ought to be (Parsons, 1990), too much emphasis 
is placed on cultural patterns by overemphasising the “control exerted by values over conditions” with 
less emphasis on the importance of interests, instrumental action and rational choice on individual actions 
in a societal context.  
Accordingly, Spencer (1910) viewed society as an organic system which evolves over time. The 
adaptation of this system in varying contexts was achieved through the workings of specialised organs 
structured as institutional subsystems. From the assertion of Spencer (1876; 1896; 1910), the anatomy 
of a society is a combination of institutions acting in a codified manner to uphold the generic culture and 
conventions of the larger society. Consequently, Van de Ven (1993, p.142) in the analysis of institutional 
economics argued that institutions prevalent at specific times come into existence as imperfect and 
pragmatic solutions to reconcile past conflicts.  They consist of a set of predetermined rights and duties, 
with a recognised authority charged with the enforcement of the rights and duties, and some degree of 
adherence to collectively acceptable norms of prudent reasonable behaviour, as “the concept of 
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institutions seems better than any other to convey the notion of segments or parts of the normative order” 
(Davis, 1949, p.71).  
Similarly, Sumner (1906) viewed institutions as a combination of a concept and a structure. The concept 
expresses the purposes and functions of the institution while the structure is established to embody the 
idea of the institution and to be the umpire through which the idea is put into action in constituent 
organisations. Nevertheless, an institution is not to be regarded as independent and external to individual 
action or behaviour; a system of action is seen to be institutionalised to the degree that individual actors 
in a recurring interaction orient their actions to a uniform set of normative standards and value patterns, 
thereby creating a need-disposition in the individual actor’s own personality structure (Parsons, 1951). 
Consequently, institutions are, in themselves, developed and preserved through continuous interactions 
among individuals because “the individual is always the cause as well as effect of the institution” (Cooley, 
1956, pp.313-314). As a result, there is an interdependence between social actors and actions, with 
social actors and social structures. Accordingly, the society evolves progressively from individual actions, 
transforming at various stages, into full-fledged institutions, and the evolution processes can either be 
‘crescive’ – evolution through instinctive actions over long periods of time such as languages -, or 
‘enacted’ – the outcome of rational intention and invention such as written constitutions.   
2.2.1 The Three Pillars of Institution 
In the words of Karl Marx, “men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they 
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted by the past” (Marx, 1852/1963 in Scott, 2014, p. 55). This statement 
draws strength from the old institutional perspective that behaviour is generated as a response to an 
external stimulus – an institution. In simple terms, there is little or no influence an organisation has in 
controlling or eliminating the exerted influence an external force has towards defining how its operations 
are structured. These elements of influence can be regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive in nature 
that provide stability and meaning to social life, through associated activities and resources that guide 
behaviour and resist change (Scott, 2014). They form a continuum moving “from the conscious to the 
unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken for granted” (Hoffman, 1997, p.36). Accordingly, an 
organisation tends to remain consistent over time – unless its accompanying institution undergoes 
incremental or revolutionary change - in the pattern it interacts, communicates, and remains relevant in 
the social world. This includes how its image is preserved through continuous management of the 
impression that it conforms to the established regulations, norms and culture prevalent in its social, 
economic and political world. In the context of this study, this insight particularly informs the standpoint 
that organisations may be motivated to manage the impression that they conform to their defining 
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institutional logic, with the aim of maintaining legitimacy and to be seen as consistently conforming to the 
values of their institutional field.  
From the regulative-pillar perspective, institutions are established to constrain and regularise behaviour 
through rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities (Scott, 2014); they ensure the shift of interests 
for the purpose of impacting certain behaviours and reinforcing specific practices (Meyer, Greenwood, 
Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008). By implication, the formation of rules, inspection of the various 
organisations’ conformity, and by extension, the possibility for the manipulation of sanctions – rewards or 
punishments –, to ensure future compliance or induce deterrence, portray the capacity of the regulatory 
processes. The institutional logic on which the regulative pillar is established is such that individuals craft 
rules that are thought to advance their interests, and individuals conform to rules as they seek to obtain 
the rewards of adherence or avoid the sanctions attributable to non-compliance (Scott, 2014).  
Simon (1997) posited that in the process of acceptance into an organisational membership, individual 
members are expected to conform to specified organisational value premises to guide their decisions. 
Thereby, behaviour in organisations becomes rational because discretion on choices is constrained and 
the conduct of individuals are guided by rules (Scott, 2014). A corporate entity seeking to be listed on a 
recognised stock exchange must be willing to subscribe to and abide by the rules and regulations set by 
securities and exchange regulators. Consequently, the regulators craft ‘performance programmes’ to 
guide routine behaviour and ‘search programmes’ to comply when faced with unusual tasks, with most 
behaviours in organisations governed by performance programmes – prescribed routines which guide 
individuals confronted with recurring demands.  
As a result, those routines significantly reduce the discretion subscribers would take so that they make 
few choices and become circumscribed to the choices they do make, which ultimately motivates them to 
behave rationally (Simon, 1997), including seeking all forms of impression that they comply with set rules, 
even if they are not compliant to the rules set to guide their actions. However, it should be noted that 
rather than operating in an authoritative and exogenous way, there is a tendency that many rules and 
regulations are sufficiently controversial or unclear that they do not provide clear prescriptions for conduct 
(Scott, 2014). Consequently, rules become better conceived as a mechanism for sense-making and 
collective interpretation (Weick, 1995), focusing more on normative and cognitive than coercive elements 
for its effect (Suchman & Edelman, 1996).   
The second pillar – the normative pillar - considered to be lower in values than the regulative pillar, places 
emphasis on the normative rules that suggest a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life (Scott, 2014). Normative systems comprise both values and norms with the former implying the 
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conception of the favoured or the desirable, in conjunction with the formulation of standards to which 
prevalent structures or conducts can be compared and assessed, while the latter specify how things 
ought to be done or suggesting how specified actors are supposed to behave, defining legitimate means 
to pursue valued ends. These systems create expectations and commonality of actions that are held by 
salient actors in similar situations.  
Consequently, the consideration of norms in individual actions oscillate between the logic of 
‘appropriateness’ versus the logic of ‘instrumentality’ (p.65), that is, the balance in selecting the 
appropriate behaviour given a certain situation and the adoption of a choice of behaviour which serves 
the best interest of the individual. Similar, but not adequate to the regulative pillar, confronting normative 
systems and deviating from common values can evoke feelings with the violation of norms which include 
principally a sense of shame or disgrace. Alternatively, for those who exhibit compliance or attainment of 
norms, feelings of respect and honour, as the conformity to or violation of norms connote a significant 
measure of self-evaluation: heightened remorse or effects on self-respect, which provide powerful 
inducements to comply with normative expectations.  
Hence, it is arguable to state that, in organisations with expected levels of performance, such 
performance levels tend to be a normative system where an attainment of below or above such 
expectation attract the view of incompetence or competence, respectively, of those charged with the 
responsibility for maintaining the expectations of the stakeholders. It is a usual norm that shareholders of 
a business entity expect their investments to not attract losses but profits, as such, any declared 
performance by the management of such entity which fails to attain the least expected return, may be 
attributed to the incompetence of the management board in ensuring the profitability of their investments. 
Consequently, the management board, on the other hand, devise all forms of strategies to create the 
impression, internalised and imposed through pressure, that they meet such expectations to avoid the 
shame of incompetence and may in extremis use deceptive means to construct unrealistic, or potentially, 
fraudulent results for the purpose of earning the respect and honour of the stakeholders.  
Thirdly, the cultural-cognitive pillar emphasises the elements of institutions that focuses on the centrality 
and impact of culture and cognition on organisational behaviour. This pillar deals with the shared 
conceptions that comprises “the nature of social reality and create the frames through which meaning is 
made” (Scott, 2014, p. 67). Specifically, it informs the contemporary effort of explaining institutions from 
the neoinstitutionalism perspective within sociology and organisational studies. Be that as it may, the 
rationale behind the cultural-cognitive explanation of individual behaviour is that a collection of 
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internalised symbolic representation of the external world is responsible for the response of an individual 
to the external world of stimuli.  
The action of an individual is a function of the internal representation of their external environment 
(D’Andrade, 1984, p. 88). Accordingly, this informs the structuring of symbols - through words, signs and 
gestures –, and shapes the meanings attributed to objects and activities. Subsequently, interactions 
among individuals create shared meanings and, thus, are maintained and adopted to interpret the 
contemporary stream of events (Scott, 2014). In a similar vein, the degree to which the leadership of an 
individual organisation conforms to shared meanings can be measured through the level of commonality 
(Hart & Carroll, 2015) in their communications in comparison to those of other organisations in a similar 
institutional field or industry sector.   
On the cognitive aspect of organisational response to external stimulus, prior studies reveal that cognitive 
frames develop into diverse information-processing activities. From prioritising the attention given to 
various information, the modality for encoding such information, how it is retained, retrieved, and 
organised into memory, to how meanings will be attached to it, thus affecting predictions, judgements, 
evaluations, and inferences (Fiol, 2002; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Meindl, Stubbart, & Porac, 1996). From 
the cultural viewpoint, the focus is on the semiotic dimensions of culture, viewed as both subjective beliefs 
and symbolic systems, where the symbolic systems are viewed as objective and external to individual 
actors (Scott, 2014). Accordingly, symbolic processes work to construct social reality, define social actors 
and social actions. For cultural-cognitive explanation of organisational behaviour, the compliance of 
individual organisation to the cultural frameworks occurs when other types of actions are inconceivable, 
creating the pathway for routines based on the manner in which things were conducted in the past.  
In conclusion, although central to the proposition that organisational behaviour is a function of the 
imposing influence of institutions, nevertheless, it is important to note that the resources that sustain an 
organisation are internally generated while rules and norms are preserved and modified through human 
behaviour (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006). This is particularly manifest in the affirmation of Stinchcombe 
(1997) that: 
“The guts of institutions is that somebody somewhere really cares to hold an organization to the 
standards and is often paid to do that. Sometimes that somebody is inside the organization, 
maintaining its competence. Sometimes it is an accrediting body, sending out volunteers to see 
if there is really any algebra in the algebra course. And sometimes that somebody, or his or her 
commitment is lacking, in which case the center cannot hold, and mere anarchy is loosed upon 
the world” (p. 18).  
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Accordingly, the pressures on, and the interests and desires of individuals are shaped by institutional 
forces structuring the possibilities for action and behaviour which could result in the persistence or change 
of such behaviour. On the other hand, macro-institutional effects create search programmes and 
performance programmes for meaning-making through standardised and normative processes of 
classification and categorisation. These processes of performance and meaning-making are recursive 
and self-reinforcing (Colyvas & Powell, 2006).  
Contemporarily, the interpretivist school of institutional thinking (Meyer, 2003; Zibler, 2002) have posited 
that the early institutional theory approach devotes too much effort in explaining and justifying the 
diffusion patterns of institutions while neglecting the impact the diffusion processes have in the originating 
and the adopting context of institutions (Meyer, 2013). Accordingly, one of the fundamental assumptions 
of the Schützian legacy is that “action is meaningful and that meaning is constituted through rules that 
are specific to the social field” (Meyer, 2013, p. 521). This insight is reinforced by Whetten (2009) who 
emphasised that there is need to approach institutional analysis from the perspective of comparative 
organisational study, to provide more focus on organisations and how they vary across different sectors 
(Amarante, 2016), with the objective of understanding action from the subjective meaning of the actor.  
Consequently, the micro-sociological approach proposed by Schutz focused on how actions are 
constituted by ordinary members of the society and how those actions shape the everyday world they 
live in and the conditions and principles to which intersubjectively shared meaning is instituted, and as a 
matter of consequence, how common understanding is made possible (Schütz, 1962). This gives more 
regard to the interactive construction of social meaning and knowledge rather than those subjectively 
imposed by the constitutional regulations. In similar vein, this study draws on the Schützian approach in 
the evaluation of the financial communications of corporate organisations in light of the institutions they 
belong to, how they differ from one institutional field to another, and their language use in similar industry 
or economic contexts.  
Returning to the literature on organisations and institutions, the phenomenological approach to 
institutions elaborated that individuals work with typifications of actions, situations and persons which are 
a product of continuous interaction and communication (Meyer, 2013); “they portray typical actors and 
identities, recognize typical actions and assign typical meanings” (p.521). For the purpose of interpreting 
and understanding the situation they are confronted with, individuals are motivated to draw on the recipe 
knowledge that is provided by the everyday social world they live in. This recipe stock of knowledge, built 
up by individuals from the experiences of their predecessors and preceding events, is shared to different 
contexts they come across in their routine activities. Accordingly, all preferences and interests, 
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rationalities, choices among alternatives and decisions which are ever imaginable lie within these 
borders; also inclusive, are all forms of innovations and ingenious responses that could be devised by 
these individuals when faced with crises and unprecedented shocks which triggers reactions that could 
sometimes lie between what is legal and what is moral. Hence, the selection of actions outside of these 
borders may be as a result of an individual organisation operating with a higher level of discretion 
(Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) or merely being a social deviant from the institutional norm (Thornton 
& Ocasio, 2013).  
Nevertheless, the reciprocity of individual action which is typified and scripted and the peculiarity of the 
individual actor expected to perform this script is core to the standpoint that institutions are constitutive 
for social actors and actorhood. This buttresses the claim of organisational institutionalism against 
rational choice models which stipulates that the preferences and interests of individual actors are a 
function of, and do not precede, the institutional order to which they belong. Instead of institutions serving 
actors in fostering their individual or collective interests, attainable through institutionalisation, not only 
patterns of premeditated interactions are instituted, but also peculiar social categories of actors, whose 
social identities, interests and worldviews only makes meaning within the accumulated body of social 
knowledge that gives shape to them (Meyer, 2013;). This leads to the concept of institutional logic.  
2.3 Institutional Logic and Isomorphism 
The concept of institutional logic can be clearly understood through the context of institutional theory and 
institutional analysis (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). The term was introduced by Alford and Friedland (1985) 
for the purpose of describing the contradictory practices and beliefs dominant in the institutions of 
contemporary western societies. They view three contending institutional orders of capitalism, state 
bureaucracy, and political democracy as significant factors that structure how individuals and 
organisations engage in political struggles. These indispensable factors have varying practices and 
beliefs that shape their behaviours in various contexts (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). Furthermore, Friedland 
and Alford (1991) developed this concept by exploring the interrelationships between individuals, 
organisations, and the society. They view institutions as “supraorganizational patterns” of operations 
founded in materialistic and symbolic systems through which individuals and organisations make their 
experiences meaningful, by producing and reproducing their material lives (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013, p. 
101).  
By rejecting the individualistic and rational choice standpoints alongside the macro structural viewpoints, 
they posited that each of the institutional orders possess a fundamental and central logic that propels its 
organising principles, as well as supplying the social actors with a vocabulary of motive and a sense of 
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identity. Accordingly, these practices and symbols become accessible to individuals, groups, and 
organisations to manipulate and be deployed to their own self-interest (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In view 
of this, the central institutions of the society - the bureaucratic state, the capitalist market, religion, 
households – each has a peculiar and defining central logic that sets the boundary for both the ends of 
individual behaviour, as well as the means for exhibiting the behaviours making the individuals, 
organisations and society the constituent part of the institutions. Nevertheless, in the process of 
institutions constraining the discretion and actions of individuals, groups and organisations, they also 
provide the cultural resources for the continuous transformation of the identities of the social actors, 
including organisational leaders. Consequently, the defining industry characteristics of companies in say 
the oil and gas industry and their reactions to an external stimulus, for example government regulation, 
would be different to the industry characteristics and responses of organisations in the computer 
programming industry. 
In another study, Jackall’s (1988) ethnographic analysis of ethical conflicts in corporations described 
institutional logic as a contingent set of rules, premiums and sanctions, developed through experience 
and in a complicated manner which people in specific contexts produce and reproduce, in such a manner 
as to enable the regularisation and prediction of their behaviour in an accompanying perspective. This 
creates a perspective for which a particular social world works. This aligns with the view of Friedland and 
Alford (1991) in suggesting institutional logics as an embodiment of various practices, maintained and 
recreated through cultural and or normative assumptions and political struggles. Accordingly, Thornton 
and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) defined institutional logic, based on the concepts of Jackall (1988) and 
Friedland and Alford (1991), as the “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality”. Based on this 
definition, institutional logics creates a connection between individual agency and cognition and socially 
crafted institutional practices and regulatory structures. With the views of Friedland and Alford (1991) 
being structural and symbolic, Jackall’s (1988) view is both structural and normative. In view of this, 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999) integrated, as the three indispensable and complementary dimensions of 
institutions, the structural (coercive), normative and symbolic (cognitive) systems, rather than 
independent coercive, normative and cognitive carriers as proposed by alternative approaches. 
The proposition of prior research provides precursors towards exploring and advancing the institutional 
logics approach, based on the interdependence of a set of logics that create some context for 
understanding the influence of the society on the actions of an individual in a specific domain (Boltanski 
& Thévenot 1991; DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 1987, 1993). Common with these studies is the analysis of 
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conflicting institutional logics without an encompassing focus on isomorphism. Fligstein (1993) proposed 
three competing conceptions of control that define the corporate governance of structurally and 
operationally large industrial firms in the manufacturing, marketing and finance industries. For Fligstein 
(1993), what shaped the formation of these competing conceptions or logics of action are the various 
intra-organisational power and field-level or industry-level struggles to influence and dictate market 
competition and to challenge state legislation towards the attainment of their individual or corporate 
objectives.  
The choice of the leadership style by the top management of a corporate organisation is influenced by 
their experience in and what they rationalise internally as best for the organisation. Similarly, at the lower 
level of management, employees battle it out amongst themselves in their quest to rise to the top echelon 
of the corporation in a world of continuous organisational and professional innovation, significant 
economic and industrial change, within an accompanying powerful state (Chandler, 1962). Subsequently, 
Fligstein (1993) argues that the primary carriers of the contending control conceptions are the individual 
executives, nevertheless, the conceptions may not be totally institutionalised, and this is due to the fact 
that none of the alternative conceptions of control in institutional logics became dominant (Kim, 1999).  
In a prior study, Boltanski and Thévenot (1991) apply a classification of cultural collections that present 
different justifications to understand the way people disagree, take compromise, and sort out lasting 
agreements. The perception is on culture being a social resource used strategically by individuals, with 
culture seen beyond just a motivating factor towards action, but also a tool that provides justification for 
actions. They also illustrated in various scenarios of interactions that legitimacy of action changes based 
on the context in which it is negotiated and evaluated, with “the ideal types being six different worlds – 
the inspired, domestic, fame, civic, market and industrial” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013, p. 103). Compromise 
of what is legitimate becomes fragile when backed up with ingenious groundwork to support them in the 
specific arrangements of the individual organisational field. Individual actors could be placed in 
incongruent and compromising situations by putting together or transposing elements combined from the 
different worlds, which could create a need to manage the impression held on them.  
Furthermore, emerging contemporary perspectives on the pursuit of attention by organisations focus on 
how organisational reactions and responses to economic and social stimuli are mediated by decision 
makers in the top management of organisations (Ocasio, 1995, 1997). Various theoretically and 
empirically provided concepts and mechanisms provide explanations to the moderation of organisational 
attention by institutions. In the theoretical analysis of the responses of organisations to economic 
adversity, Ocasio (1995) proposed that the allocation of attention to alternative blueprints for perceiving, 
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interpreting, evaluating and responding to environmental circumstances is influenced by the institutional 
logic with which the organisational field is identified. Accordingly, organisations and individuals are 
provided with rules and conventions through the logics guiding their organisational field for deciding the 
allocation of attention to potential problems, the preference of solutions and the linkage of solutions to 
commensurate problems (March & Olsen, 1976).  
In view of this, the mechanisms through which institutions generate attention emanate through a set of 
values established on legitimacy which are adopted through commonality of responses of organisations 
within the same organisational field; the criticality of the potential problems and the relevance of the 
solutions to the survival of the organisational field and the global economy.  In addition, the provision and 
indoctrination of the understanding of decision makers with respect to their interests and identities which, 
consequently, provide the motivation for action within a confined decision premise. This was particularly 
the case with the responses of some financial institutions and regulatory authorities during the 2007-2008 
economic crisis where the legitimacy of the action of government to bailout certain banks was based on 
the need to rescue the global economy from collapsing. Consequently, stakeholders like taxpayers were 
made to believe that such a move was in their own interest and that the failure to use the taxes paid by 
them to bailout such institutions would have a ripple effect on their livelihood in the long-term, thereby 
creating a confined premise for such stakeholders to accept the decision of the government. This 
illustrates the nature of institutional and or organisational leaders in the use of attention and various 
techniques to create an impression that their actions are legitimate and justifiable over time. It is, 
therefore, beneficial to review the literature on institutional leadership and legitimacy.   
2.4 Institutional Leadership and Legitimacy 
One of the early insights on institutional analysis, the study of institutional leadership, examines the role 
of agency in the analysis of institutions. An approach introduced by Philip Selznick, it focuses not only on 
describing how organisations become institutions but also on the characteristics of the leaders of these 
organisations (Washington, Boal & Davis, 2013). This form of leadership is different from traditional 
leadership as it focuses on the promotion and protection of premeditated values (Selznick, 1957). In the 
contemporary study of Washington et al. (2013), they exemplify the extension of the original ideas of 
Selznick on institutional leadership by considering their contribution to institutionalisation processes. In 
addition, they also examined the three functions of institutional leaders, firstly to be the management of 
the internal consistency of an organisation which explains the commitment of leaders to the values and 
mission of their organisations. Secondly, the development of external supporting mechanisms to 
legitimise the actions of the organisation; and to overcome external enemies through the use of 
instrumental agency. Finally, hierarchical and instrumental power with a future leaning vision with respect 
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to organisational leadership as opposed to institutional leadership (p.723). With further extensions to 
Selznick’s work, scholars have added more insights in understanding institutional leadership.  
Tengblad (2004) examined the role of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) which he posits as managing the 
internal and external expectations imposed on organisations. This is considered with specific emphasis 
on how CEOs manage the financial expectations imposed on them by the environment and sometimes 
self-imposed due to their individual charisma and precedent successes. The finding of this study was on 
the incremental use of organisational culture as a powerful management and communication tool. 
Companies selected for this study used booklets and brochures to transmit messages on the desired 
state of affairs by crafting corporate mission and vision statements, with numerous efforts committed 
towards spreading these messages down the organisational chain of command, and also to external 
stakeholders (Tengblad, 2004, p. 592). Tengblad argued that CEOs often resorted to deploying the 
mission statement of a firm as a way of making known the financial expectations and corporate objectives 
of the organisation. Accordingly, CEOs attempted not just to paint a favourable picture of their 
organisations but also wanted to demonstrate that they were committed to doing all they could to improve 
the financial outlook of their organisation. Similar to the conclusion of Selznick (1957), Tengblad (2004) 
posits that CEOs in his study devoted enormous resources in managing the external expectations of their 
firms, nevertheless, this management did not amount to changes to the organisation as a whole.  
In view of this, it is evident that the management of organisations play a vital role in developing the vision 
and mission of their firms. Nevertheless, while the process of setting the vision of an organisation is a 
strategic function (Boal & Schultz, 2007; Nutt & Backoff, 1997), it is also, from an institutional perspective, 
an inherently political function. The visions crafted for organisations result in the generation of stories, 
myths and ceremonies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which creates a remembrance of past accomplishments 
and also the reinforcement of the vital values of an organisation (Bolman & Deal, 2013). Accordingly, 
stories are generated from those past accomplishments of an organisation which tend to serve as 
precedents for understanding the social world in which the organisation operates. These precedents help 
to create an understanding of the rationale behind corporate actions and the reasons behind visible 
behaviour (Berry, 2001). Consequently, successors in organisational leadership develop a new collective 
story based on the exchanges among leaders of an organisation – past and present – which further 
creates and evolves a social learning system for maintaining internal consistency, which is an essential 
technique for organisational leaders to balance the past, present and future actions in an organisation. It 
is such acts of creating, telling and retelling of significant stories in an organisation that promotes the 
connection of the organisation’s past, present and the future. Furthermore, ceremonial events are also 
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vital tools through which internal consistency is promoted in an institutional or organisational setting 
(Bolman & Deal, 2013).  
Washington, Boal and Davis (2013) examined the speech given during the farewell address delivered to 
the Corps of Cadets at West Point on May 12, 1962, which portrays the strategies used by institutional 
leaders in taking advantage of ceremonial traditions to symbolically shape the behaviours of individuals. 
In the same vein, they examined the cadet motto of ‘Duty, Honour, Country’ which powerfully defines the 
historical identity of the United States Military Academy (USMA) as well as guiding the behaviour of the 
graduates of the USMA for the rest of their lives (Boal & Schultz, 2007; Ellis & Moore, 1974). The military 
code in its line emphasised these three words as what “…reverently dictates what you want to be, what 
you can be, what you will be…” (Duffy & Carpenter, 1997, p. 197-200). These words signify how 
institutional leaders focus on the transmission of the character, mission and values of an organisation to 
potential future leaders to ensure they remain consistent with their founding principles.  
Furthermore, the speech contains a reminder of the need to reinforce the commitment of the military to 
these values in a way as to “…cherish them, and pass them on to those who will follow after you…” 
(Thomason, 1971, p.1). In view of this, it is also notable that in the corporate business context, the 
leadership of corporate entities ensures that new recruits in organisations are infused with the founding 
principles, mission and vision statements and with the so-called ‘modus operandi’ of a firm, through 
intensive induction programmes which creates an identity in those recruits, by making them distinct from 
the staff of other organisations. In the long run, the staff of such firms are reminded of their commitment 
to these principles through on-the-job training and retraining programmes. Consequently, these principles 
become the sworn-identity for driving the present and future conduct of the members of organisations. 
Accordingly, institutional leaders partake in structuring an autobiographical pattern of the historical 
accounts of their organisations in a way that produces a coherent picture of the identity of an organisation, 
the roles of the leaders within their organisation, the realities of organisational life, as well as preparing 
the organisation to effectively respond to, sometimes unprecedented, future environmental changes 
(Washington, Boal & Davis, 2013, p. 726). Consequently, institutional leaders frame an identity for 
themselves that ensures the continuity between past accomplishments with future goals and actions. By 
considering the development of the vision of an effective leader, Strange & Mumford (2005) discovered 
that vision emerged in a situation where institutional leaders reflected on the fortunes of past 
accomplishments and resultant behaviours in developing mental models for the future. This process of 
forming the vision induces leaders to employ a descriptive mental model of the organisation. The model 
articulates the defining themes and relationships that prescribe actions and influence outcomes, with 
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specific consideration on organisation members’ experience to suggest a prescriptive model for situations 
yet to be encountered by the organisation and its members. Consequently, the level and structure of 
coherence demanded by the life story schema in conjunction with the story telling act connote the vision 
formation process ongoing within organisations.   
Furthermore, in the process of maintaining coherence for an organisation - with respect to its enduring 
values, predetermined expectations, and clearly defined responsibilities, which are manifested in the 
organisation’s vision statement – opportunities arise for institutional leaders to define the approach to 
undertake on behalf of an organisation to tackle future circumstances. Even though all participants within 
an organisation setting partake in the formation of the story of an organisation, there are powerful 
individuals within institutional leadership that produce narratives which serve as precedents for other 
participants to follow (Czarniawska, 1997). This renders the audience passive contributors in the process 
of setting the direction an organisation pursues. Consequently, the level of discretion and control held by 
the leader of an organisation over the formation of the story telling process, and the way individual 
participants interpret and legitimise the organisation’s path over time determine the level of control 
organisational leaders hold on the vision formation process.  
Accordingly, the attainment of the mission of an organisation and its consequent behaviours are 
significantly influenced by the level of control held and discretion afforded to an organisational leader. 
Although there are varying levels of experience possessed by individuals within an organisation, there is, 
however, a unique position reserved for organisational or institutional leaders to influence the critical 
feedback on the evaluation of past mental models in the vision formation process. The wealth of 
experience from the background of an institutional leader is significantly essential in developing the 
descriptive mental models of the future actions of an organisation. Also, the experience of the leader with 
the structured models is developed on an ongoing basis as they are confronted with the demands of 
contemporary organisational circumstances, which consequently influences the development of current 
mental models (Washington et al. 2013).  
In view of this, the life story of an institutional leader culminates in the formation of the vision of an 
organisation as well as influencing the life story of the organisation itself and those of its individual 
participants. It is arguable that the leaders of corporate organisations - especially the for-profit 
organisations – usually have predetermined personal objectives they aim to attain, and as such, a story 
about their personal career achievements is built right from their inclusion in the operations of the 
organisation, which ultimately influences the vision they set for their organisations. In view of this, the 
personal vision of the institutional leaders is attained through the machinery of the corporate vision of 
28 | P a g e  
 
organisations. Accordingly, the need for coherence in both the stories of the institutional leader’s and 
organisation’s stories suggest that the position and power of an institutional leader imply the impartation 
of their own meaning and sense-making to the organisation (Washington et al. 2013). By extension, the 
meanings to actions and events are processed through the lenses of thematic and causal coherence with 
respect to the histories of the institutional leader and the organisation.  
From the study carried out by Greiner (2002), it was observed that the head of General Electric, Jack 
Welch taught a course on Leadership and Values about seven times a year to highly-promising middle-
level managers. In addition, while it was observed that about sixty percent of the senior level courses 
were taught by corporate leaders, Welch himself often stood in front of the group while those courses 
were taught. This is a form of instilling the image of the leader in the minds and thoughts of aspiring 
middle-level managers, to aim at idolising the top leader and to follow the prescribed pathway towards 
rising to the top leadership positions in organisations. Consequently, the prescribed pathway provides a 
potent technique for maintaining the internal consistency of the participants within organisations to carry 
forward the guiding principles of organisations. As well as ensuring internal consistency, organisations 
also develop external supporting mechanisms for the purpose of maintaining their survival and obtaining 
legitimacy for their actions.  
This survival requires the maintenance of balance between stability and flexibility (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1998). While it is essential to use the mechanisms of story-telling and vision-setting to maintain internal 
consistency and enhance long-term stability in organisations, without it, it would be difficult for 
organisations to retain knowledge of past events. Consequently, a lack of such knowledge creates a 
cyclical state of flux where an organisation finds it difficult to move any significant distance from its 
founding base. This is due to the absence of any basis for evaluating new innovations. In order to 
overcome this inertia problem, institutional leaders serve as cognitive network brokers (Burt, 1992). 
Through continuous interaction with a wide range of networks, the internal and external boundaries of 
the organisation, institutional leaders are encouraged to devise new ideas to solve old problems as well 
as discover new problems to which known or knowable ideas can be applied (Kraatz & Moore, 2002). In 
view of this, one of the ways in which institutional leaders ensure their survival is through the maintenance 
of the legitimacy of their actions. Legitimacy as defined is the “generalized perception that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It is the perception organisations hold in believing that 
their actions or inactions do not contravene any guiding principle.  
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Accordingly, in the business world, there are certain accounting principles that guide the reporting 
process of financial and non-financial activities for the purpose of promoting the common understanding 
and comparability of the performances of firms in similar sectors. The legitimacy of reporting activities in 
those firms is ensured when they do not go out of the stipulated boundaries set in those principles. In 
view of this, this study posits that the commonality of reporting processes among similar firms is likely to 
ensure the legitimacy of their reporting actions. In view of this, institutional theory enables the 
understanding that as companies become embedded in the economic and institutional environment, it 
becomes easy to conclude on the cultural meanings, ideals and norms that have been ratified by the 
society as acceptable. These norms become the flexible guiding principle that dictate the actions of 
companies in the process of pursuing congruence with the society and in the legal environment 
(Washington et al. 2013).  
Accordingly, organisations and their accompanying practices are founded upon three forms of legitimacy: 
normative, regulatory and cognitive legitimacy (Scott, 2001). The normative legitimacy connotes new 
practices that are consistent with the values of the institutional environment; the regulatory legitimacy is 
attained when new practices are supported by existing rules and legislations; while cognitive or cultural 
legitimacy is fostered when new practices are connected to wider belief systems within the institutional 
environment. Legitimacy, in general, is attained when an organisation receives endorsement and support 
by a segment of the society significantly large enough to guarantee its effectiveness and survival (Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, an organisation does not need the absolute support of the entire populace 
but of the segment of the society powerful and influential enough to remain legitimate in the face of 
external attacks. Consequently, as organisations ingeniously use procedures socially acceptable to 
address potentially controversial actions, an organisation becomes well positioned to manage the 
impression that it conducts its activities in a rational and legitimate way (Scott, 1987a).     
In view of the aforementioned, there is a relationship between the legitimacy of organisations or 
institutions and those attempting to lead them. For the purpose of understanding the nature of institutional 
leadership, it is important to take into consideration the core meaning and significance of the term 
institution (Selznick, 1957, p. 4). Several attempts have been made to clearly distinguish between an 
organisation and institution. According to Selznick (1957, p. 5), organisations are “a rational instrument 
engineered to do a job”, they are set up to fulfil the existential reasons for the creation of institutions. 
Institution on the other hand is “a natural product of social needs and pressures – a responsive, adaptive 
organism” (p. 5). Accordingly, it is arguable that the flaw in the actions of organisations set the machinery 
for the creation of institutions. The responsive and adaptive nature of institutions connote, to a great 
extent, the influence the actions of organisations have on the creation of institutions.  
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Similarly, it also means that as institutions respond to the latest actions of organisations, boundaries are 
set to regulate such actions until new actions not covered under prevalent legislations are discovered by 
regulatory institutions. Pressure is thereby mounted on organisations to either conform to the level of 
compliance expected from institutions, or to seek to take advantage of grey areas not covered by 
legislations. Consequently, the pressures imposed on organisations are identifiable from two sources – 
the external or wider environment and the internal activities within organisations. One of such pressures 
imposed on organisations from the external environment is the restriction on the degree of discretion 
afforded to organisational leaders in influencing organisational outcomes (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 
1997). The presence of such pressures create administrative ideologies which are potent techniques for 
communicating and ensuring self-defence (Washington et al. 2013). These techniques culminate into 
what organisational leaders deploy in overcoming external enemies.    
Accordingly, one of the tasks of organisational or institutional leaders is to intuitively use all resources at 
their disposal to overcome the pressures coming from the external or wider environment. Friedland and 
Alford (1991) suggest that there are various belief systems through which organisational fields operate, 
and which also differ fundamentally with respect to their content and the logic guiding their existence, 
central assumptions, ordering principles and subsequent operations. Contrarily, Washington, Forman, 
Suddaby, and Ventresca (2005) argue that there is a possibility several institutions compete to take 
control over an organisational field with different sources of interests and identities. By assessing the 
tactic of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), they further argued that institutions defend 
themselves against external enemies. In view of this, such defence is structured to protect against the 
shutting down of their current practice (Washington et al. 2013). Similarly, Oliver (1992) argues that when 
a persistent institutionalised practice is threatened, there is a likelihood of decline in the functional 
necessity of the practice. Consequently, organisations engage all forms of techniques to protect against 
any form of practice that threatens the core activities that define their common existence. These threats 
can be in the form of political pressures – changes in laws or regulations; technical pressures – practices 
from innovation; or social practices – that is when organisations decide to stop performing certain 
practices (Washington et al. 2013).   
In a study on the politics prevalent in traditional medicine, Patterson (2007) identified the vehement 
attacks launched by practitioners of traditional medicine on contemporary chiropractic medicine. In the 
guise of using basic science laws to regulate the general medical profession, all practitioners of medicine 
had to pass a set of science benchmarks that was apparently difficult for chiropractic medicine to pass, 
and this was clearly known to the traditional medicine community. Old guards of an institutionalised 
setting thereby make it difficult for new entrants to change the ancient landmarks set by the pioneers of 
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such institutions. Similarly, new entrants are faced with difficult conditions to meet before being 
recognised in established institutions. This usually occurs as old guards try in all possible ways to limit 
the level of discretion afforded to member organisations, prevent the diffusion of the power and ensure 
right of pioneer organisations to lead institutions. Accordingly, the conditions placed for the recognition 
of new entrants significantly impose pressure on them and positions the old guards as external enemies 
that must be conquered by all means deployable, including the management of impression. Furthermore, 
another form of attack originates from the fragmentation of the population from which institutional 
practices originate (Zucker, 1987). Owing to the legitimacy of institutions being identifiable with a specific 
segment or given population of a society, the breakdown of such population – either politically or socially 
-, reduces the support for the population and its practices. 
As aforementioned, institutional leaders are motivated to intuitively deploy all resources available to them 
in the course of managing their organisations and defending them against pressures coming from the 
external or wider environment. However, ensuring the management of organisations with the view of 
attaining predetermined organisational outcomes or overcoming external expectations is a function of the 
level of discretion afforded to organisational leaders (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). From the literature 
on organisational or institutional leadership, the establishment and reinforcement of the culture within 
organisations is perpetuated through the leadership of organisations, especially the Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs). Accordingly, the actions of the leadership of organisations through the CEOs can 
provide insight on the level of discretion afforded to them in the course of influencing organisational 
outcomes. It follows that as organisations belong to and are regulated by logics in different institutional 
fields (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013), so are the levels of discretion afforded to the managers of organisations 
in different institutional fields in influencing organisational outcomes (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; 
Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987; McClelland, Liang, & Barker III, 2010). 
Furthermore, insights from the literature on organisational and institutional leadership suggests that 
member organisations of a defining institution must align to the logic of their institution by attending to 
similar stimuli and producing similar responses, in order to maintain the legitimacy of their actions 
(Suchman, 1995).  
In the context of this study, these various insights suggest that as the leaders of corporate organisations 
are bound by the principle of legitimacy to act within the scope of the discretion afforded to them, it is 
possible to demarcate them according to the level of discretion afforded to them in influencing 
organisational outcomes. In addition, owing to the standpoint that organisational leaders may likely deploy 
ingenious means and resources for managing the impression that they conform to the logic (e.g. the level 
of discretion) guiding their defined institutions, the language used in communicating to stakeholders on 
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their level of conformity to such expectations can be revealing of the tactics used in managing those 
impressions (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). One of such potential resources is the use of language in 
a way that they maintain both the legitimacy of their actions and in the communication of the performance 
results of their company. In view of this, it is vital to review the interplay between corporate leadership, 
the discretion afforded to corporate managers in attending to external factors, and impression 
management in their corporate communications. Accordingly, the next section follows with the 
introduction of the literature on attentional homogeneity and industry-level discretion, a theory that helps 
classify organisations into two major institutional fields of high and low discretion industry groups.  
2.5 Attentional Homogeneity and Industry-Level Discretion 
The leadership (also referred to as top executives) of different organisations within the same industry 
classification often share similar understandings about their firms and environments (Abrahamson & 
Fombrun, 1994; Hambrick, 1982; Huff, 1982, 1990; Porac, Thomas & Badden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 
1993; Spender, 1989; Walsh, 1995). Consequently, these top executives share homogenous or 
isomorphic cognitive traits which may have significant consequences for industries and member 
organisations. However, authors differ on the possibility of these consequences to either be beneficial or 
harmful (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). One of the pessimistic views of the consequences argues that 
an industry could be blinded to external challenges when it possesses a high level of homogeneity 
(Halberstam, 1986). In Halberstam’s study, he claimed that the U.S auto traders in the 1970s overlooked 
important competitive challenges threatening the auto industry because of their narrow focus. 
Consequently, their homogenous responses limited their capacity to forge innovative ways to preserve 
their relevance in the global auto industry.  
On the other hand, proponents of the beneficial consequences of high level homogeneity or isomorphism 
posit that the concentration of attention, by the top executives of firms, to the same defining logic in their 
firms and environments, will enable them to respond to the logic in a similar pattern, as well as recognise 
the same threats to their industry (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1992). As a result, these firms become more 
motivated to galvanise their common interests in opposing these threats, and understand the rationale 
for collective action in opposing those threats. Furthermore, the collectiveness of actions of organisations 
in their cognitive responses may inhibit industry rivalry, owing to the potential ability of top managers in 
correctly interpreting the strategic moves and counter-moves of their rival organisations (Porter, 1980, p. 
21). In summary, top managers’ isomorphic responses or cognitive homogeneity have potential harm or 
benefit for an industry as a whole, or even both. The potentially significant consequences of cognitive 
homogeneity may span across an entire industry, the member organisations that form such industries, 
and the top executives that manage them (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
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Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that cognitive homogeneity is not absolute across all industries. Some are 
quite heterogeneous, with top executives portraying differences in their cognition (Abrahamson & 
Fombrun, 1994; Walsh, 1995). Prior research reveals that, in the offshore pumps industry for example, 
the cognition models of top managers tended to be heterogeneous (Daniels, Johnson, & De Chartony, 
1994). Similarly, Reger and Palmer (1996) discovered that the increment of the environmental dynamism 
in the banking industry in the 1980s led to increased heterogeneity in the constructs contemplated by the 
top executives in their industry sector. However, Abrahamson and Hambrick, (1997) note that the factors 
that necessitate the similarity or dissimilarity in the cognitive responses of top executives in an industry 
are relatively unknown. Hence, as there is potential for cognitive homogeneity to have significant impact 
on the health and survival of firms and entire industries, the need to commit research efforts towards 
understanding its determinants cannot be overemphasised. 
An important debate among organisation theorists is to contend the distinction between the determinants 
of organisational outcomes as either a function of strategic choice (Child, 1972), or environmental 
selection (Aldrich, 1979, Hannan & Freeman, 1977). For the purpose of establishing a common ground 
between these two conflicting standpoints, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) proposed two arguments. 
On the one hand, they argued that top executives have significant differences in the amount of discretion, 
or latitude of action they are afforded in influencing organisational outcomes. In tandem with this, they 
also argued that the level of discretion possessed by top executives varies widely from industry to 
industry, based on the institutional logic predominant in those industries. This view stems from the idea 
that if discretion confers diverse options to organisations within an industry, then it is logical to 
hypothesise that it also negatively impacts on the homogeneity of managerial attention levels of the 
different organisations in such industry (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Nelson, 1991). On the other 
hand, they argued that the degree of managerial discretion is not a function of random events, rather, a 
product of specifiable and objective industry determinants.  
In the seminal work of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), they argued that tripartite level factors affect 
managerial discretion – the industry-, organisational-, and individual-level factors. From the industry level, 
otherwise termed industry-level discretion, they proposed that the determinants at this level of analysis 
influence the entire amount of discretion afforded managers in an industry. In view of this, the deviation 
by top executives from the industry discretion is a function of individual determinants, which stems from 
the cognitive complexity of the top executives or political acumen; as well as diverse firm determinants, 
such as the size of the organisation, availability of resources, or even age. As aforementioned, discretion 
is not absolute (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), hence, industry and organisational factors are capable of 
greatly influencing or shaping a manager’s discretion level. Hence, discretion is also partly resident in the 
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cognitive capacity of a top executive (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). From the work of Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987), six industry-level factors that influence industry-level discretion were noted, which 
were further categorised into two segments. From the first segment, the determinants are quasi-legal 
constraints, powerful external forces, and industry structure (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). 
These are considered to influence managerial discretion and are enforced through powerful stakeholders.  
For quasi-legal constraints Abrahamson and Hambrick, (1997) exemplified that the level of discretion 
possessed by top executives is restricted by an array of governmental actors such as the courts, 
regulators, or state legislators. Similarly, the influence of powerful stakeholders such as powerful 
suppliers and buyers can limit the discretion of managers. Accordingly, the more the power exercised by 
the regulatory environment, the less the industry-level latitude of action afforded the top executives of an 
industry. For the industry structure, it is thought that, the limited competition in oligopolistic industries 
enhances the awareness and responsiveness of powerful competitors to each other’s strategic choices, 
thereby, limiting discretion. Conversely, there is less confinement in fragmented industries, thereby, 
affording the executives of those firms more freedom to act, leading to a relatively higher level of 
discretion. Accordingly, this current study adopts the insight that if discretion is limited in an industry as a 
result of oligopolistic competition, the discretion available in their operational and financial 
communications will be so limited that, any deviation by any participating organisation from the industry 
norm could provide insights for investigating atypical and potentially deceptive communication.  
From the second segment of industry-level determinants, the factors affecting industry-level discretion 
are product differentiability, market growth, and demand instability (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
These determinants influence industry-level discretion through the instrumentality of ambiguity in means-
ends relations (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Accordingly, the higher the level of ambiguity, the more 
the likelihood for top executives to explore a wide variety of attempted means to achieve these various 
ends (Barnard, 1968; Thompson, 1967).  Simply put, the greater the likelihood for industry conditions to 
cause ambiguity or lack of clarity in unusual circumstances, the more the number of alternatives afforded 
to top executives in an industry and the greater the latitude of action in the selection of alternatives 
unknown to the stakeholders (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). This theoretical standpoint 
particularly informs the rationale of this study to propose that because of the significantly high level of 
ambiguity in some industries, such as the computer programming industry, with accompanying flexible 
regulation and weak control environment, the member organisations are afforded the platform for a 
greater number of choices or discretion. To the extent they report their performances in a way that the 
stakeholders are not accustomed to, otherwise termed aggressive or hard corporate communication.  
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Conversely, with a significantly low level of ambiguity in product differentiability, low market growth, and 
higher demand satiability in some industries, such as the crude petroleum and natural gas industry, with 
accompanying rigid regulation and strong control environment, the member organisations are afforded a 
restricted number of choices or discretion to the extent they report their performances in a narrow, 
predictable and easily understood, standard, or normative format, otherwise termed conservative or soft 
corporate communication. In sum, these theoretical standpoints inform the possibility of linking the logic 
that enables organisations to be either homogenous (isomorphic) or heterogeneous in their behaviours 
to the level of discretion afforded to them in the industry they are classified.   
2.5.1 The Interlink Between Institutional Logic, Isomorphism and Industry-Level Discretion 
The literature on Isomorphism posits the concept to be a situation where organisations have similar 
identity and operate in similar forms, which provides an array of processes in which an organisation 
develops the conscious necessity to be like other firms in the same industry categorisation (Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, Cho, & Jackson, 2004). Consequently, in the quest for legitimacy in both the existence and 
operations of organisations, individual firms had to align themselves with the requirements of the external 
environment, which by implication coerced parts of organisations to be loosely coupled from the central 
logic for which they were established. Interestingly, this view aligns with the analysis carried out in 
Wangrow, Schepker, and Barker III (2015) and McClelland, Liang, and Barker III, (2010) where the level 
of discretion afforded organisations could determine the level of isomorphic pressure they face to act 
either in a prescribed or proscribed manner. This isomorphic pressure determines the direction of the 
responses of the organisations to the external stimuli.  
In addition, the theory on isomorphism posits that firms regulated by the same or similar institutional logic 
are expected to behave in a similar way when confronted by a stimulus from the external environment. 
The theory on institutional logic, which further explains isomorphism, is based on the theoretical 
foundation that there are various organisational fields and that different organisational fields are regulated 
by differing institutional logic. Specifically, institutional logic provides explanation to the thought that 
different organisations within the same industry classification will be regulated by similar logic, which will 
be different from the institutional logic that regulates firms in an entirely different industry classification. 
Accordingly, as different organisational fields are regulated by different institutional logics, it is expected 
that the responses of the firms within the same industry classification to an external stimulus will be 
isomorphic, albeit, different from the responses of the firms in a different organisational field or industry 
classification. Nevertheless, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the responses of the firms within the 
same industry classification depends on the degree of discretion afforded to those organisations in their 
respective industries (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997), hence the need to interlink industry discretion and 
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attentional homogeneity (isomorphism) or heterogeneity in the quest to understanding organisational 
behaviour.  
Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) posit that industries differ in how homogenous or heterogeneous they 
are with respect to the cognitions and behaviours of their top management teams (TMT). Their study, 
based on the concept of discretion, argue that the lesser the level of discretion afforded to organisations 
in an industry, the more the similarity or homogeneity in their attention patterns. In contrast, the more the 
level of discretion afforded to organisations in an industry classification, the more varied or heterogeneous 
their attention patterns will be (p. 513). From prior research, it was established that the members of top 
management of organisations classified within the same industry often share similar logic about their 
organisations and environments (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Hambrick, 1982; Huff, 1982, 1990; 
Porac, Thomas, & Badden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993; Spender, 1989; Walsh, 1995). 
Consequently, the responses of top managers within the same industry become homogenous or 
isomorphic, (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997), nevertheless, the homogeneity or isomorphism of such 
responses is dependent on the level of discretion afforded in the industry category (Wangrow, Schepker, 
& Barker III, 2015; McClelland, Liang, & Barker III, 2010). Although a lot of contemporary research work 
has been conducted on the concept of discretion, it is by far a 21st century concept. It derives its 
conceptual roots from the early 1970s with particular traits in the field of Sociology.  
Researchers of management studies have long attempted to develop models for identifying the specific 
circumstances that motivate organisation managers to alter organisation decisions, actions, and 
performance (Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker III, 2015). While research efforts had been directed towards 
understanding the role of constraints in the ability of organisations and top managers to make decisions 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), the conceptualisation 
of discretion was not established until the seminal work of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987). In their work, 
they conceptualised and articulated the idea of ‘managerial discretion’ which, subsequently, drew 
research attention that then formally developed a model for understanding the factors that afford top 
executives with the ability to influence organisational outcomes. Basically, discretion can be defined as 
the latitude of action afforded to a decision maker (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987), or a group of 
organisations (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) in a given situation for the purpose of influencing a target 
outcome.  
As a result, a high level of discretion affords leaders with a wider range of options (Campbell, Campbell, 
Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012), and greater action alternatives (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). As 
top managers are hired in management positions to ensure the achievement of the goals of organisations, 
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as well as improving organisational performance and effectiveness (Barker III, Patterson Jr, & Mueller, 
2001), it is critically important to understand the effect of the latitude of action afforded to them, and, 
specifically, to understand how such discretion manifests in their financial reporting function in the quest 
to influence positive or mitigate negative organisational outcomes.  Accordingly, this study draws insights 
from institutional theory and institutional logic, the concept of discretion and how they inform 
organisational behaviour in the context of different industry classifications, for the purpose of 
understanding the effect of institutional logic and available discretion on the commonality or divergence 
in the behaviours of organisations with respect to their financial communications.  
Returning to the work of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), they posit that there are sources to discretion 
which manifest at three levels – the individual, the organisation, and the task or external environment. It 
is noteworthy that while discretion is a general concept that addresses the latitude of action available to 
an individual or a group, it is often used interchangeably with managerial discretion. For the purpose of 
gaining clarity, discretion can be explained from the individual level as managerial discretion; 
organisational discretion from an organisation level of analysis; and as industry discretion from the 
industry level of analysis (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). A majority of managerial discretion research 
directs attention to the role of the task environment, or industry characteristics, in creating and explaining 
managerial discretion. However, recent contemporary research efforts are directed towards 
understanding the microfoundations of discretion as it relates to the individual level of analysis, calling for 
the exploration of the opportunities available to better understand how a manager’s acumen or 
psychological attributes influence their discretion level (Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker III, 2015).  
Of particular importance to this study is the adoption of the industry level of analysis of discretion towards 
evaluating the financial communication patterns of organisations in different industries or institutional 
settings. This is not done to undermine the tremendous opportunities available at the organisation and 
individual levels of analysis, but, to corroborate the thematic literature on institutional theory with the 
industry level analysis on discretion, for the purpose of facilitating the comparative analysis of the financial 
communication patterns across industry categories. Hence, the need to use the industry level of 
discretion analysis rather than at organisational or individual level. Interestingly, a combination of similar 
organisations forms an industry, and by extension, the combination of the leadership of those similar 
organisations forms the leadership of their defining industry.  
While it is emphasised that this study adopts the industry level of discretion analysis, managerial 
discretion is used interchangeably as industry discretion based on the premise that a combination of the 
discretions of the top managers in organisations within the same industry category form the aggregate 
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discretion in that particular industry. As a constituent part of the stepped research process this study will 
investigate the deviation by discrete organisations, in their financial communication patterns to evaluate 
differences from those of their competitors within the same industry category. This entails conducting 
additional organisation level analyses, other than at the industry level, to substantiate the proposition that 
such deviation could signal variant and potentially deceptive financial communication.  
Historically, a long debate in organisation studies concerns the degree to which rational or strategic 
choice (Child, 1972), rather than environmental selection (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) 
determines organisational outcomes. The substantive studies conducted on managerial discretion 
bridges the gap between two previously conflicting views in organisational theories: population ecology 
and strategic choice (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). The theorists on population ecology argue that 
organisations are inertial and constrained by internal and external pressures (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). 
On the one hand, internal pressures have been highlighted to include non-transferable personnel and 
capital investments in plant, property and equipment, while, on the other hand, external pressures include 
legal and fiscal entry and exit barriers, limitations on available information, and an organisation’s desire 
to obtain legitimacy within its domain (Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker III, 2015). Conversely, theorists on 
rational or strategic choice contend that the strategies calculatedly chosen by top management shape 
organisational outcomes (Andrews, 1971). The latter view confers discretion on managers to determine 
an organisation’s long-term goals and objectives and implement courses of action, with the discretion to 
diversify or discontinue its current activities (Chandler, 1962). Strategic choice theorists view organisation 
decision makers to be powerful enough to initiate structural change, determine the environmental domain 
on which to compete, and alter performance metrics (Child, 1972).  
Subsequently, these conflicting views were reconciled by Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) discretion 
model by noting that many discretion forces act on a continuum, rather than solely classifying a decision 
as an outcome of either strategic choice or based on environmental selection. Therefore, the discretion 
afforded to an industry is enabled or constrained based on the extent to which each discretion force 
exists. For instance, in industries where the CEOs have an internal locus of control, there will be greater 
pursuit of innovation and greater risky decisions, while organisations are more likely to imitate the actions 
of their competitors in industries where the locus of control is from the external environment (Miller, Kets 
de Vries, & Toulouse, 1982). In view of this, it can arguably be deduced that there is likely to be a 
promotion of innovative or aggressive responses in an industry where the locus of control is internalised 
by the CEOs of those organisations, while there is likely to be restriction to conservative responses 
among organisations in an industry where the locus of control is derived from the external environment. 
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Therefore, in the context of this study, the standpoint is that the nature of the responses of organisations, 
regardless of the organisational field to which they belong, is manifest in different behavioural patterns 
including their communications, corporate reporting, including the choice of language in their corporate 
financial reporting function. It is proposed that in industries dominated by aggressive innovation with the 
CEOs having internal locus of control, the financial communication style adopted in those industries will 
be revealing of the semantics that signal aggressive, hard, unclear or unfamiliar communications. On the 
other hand, in industries dominated by conservativeness with the external environment claiming the locus 
of control, the financial communications style adopted in those industries will be revealing of the 
semantics that signal conservative, soft, clearly understood or familiar communications.  
As aforementioned, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) contended that industry-, organisational-, and 
individual-level factors affect managerial discretion (cited in Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker III, 2015). The 
determinants at the industry-level affect the general amount of latitude of action that will be afforded to 
managers in an industry – a term referred to as industry-level discretion. Subsequently, the determinants 
at the individual level, such as the psychological traits (Wangrow, Schepker, & Barker III, 2015), the 
cognitive complexity or political acumen (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997) of a manager, as well as 
different organisational determinants, such as age, size, or resource availability, determine the degree to 
which a manager deviates from the industry tendency. Nevertheless, discretion is not absolute (Hambrick 
& Finkelstein, 1987), and, although the industry and organisational factors may greatly influence a 
manager’s discretion, as conditioned by the social and cultural context of institutional theory and 
isomorphic practice, a manager’s latitude of action also depends on the resident psychological traits 
within the manager. To replicate and further advance the seminal work conducted by Abrahamson and 
Hambrick (1997), this study focuses on industry-level discretion, in order to understand how it affects the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity in the financial communications of organisations at the industry level of 
analysis. For the purpose of creating a thorough foundation for the rationale of the research, this study 
reviews and adopts the six industry level determinants, noted by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), which 
shape industry level discretion.  
As discussed above, the six factors are categorised into two groups. The first tripartite have been 
identified to be industry structure, quasi-legal constraints, and powerful external forces. They affect 
discretion through the agency of powerful stakeholders (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). For 
industry structure, the nature of competition determines the level of discretion afforded to organisations 
within such industry. For instance, in oligopolistic industries, “powerful competitors are both aware and 
responsive to each other’s strategic moves” (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). As a result, these 
powerful competitors limit each other’s strategic choices, thereby, constraining discretion.  
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On the other hand, top managers in fragmented industries are less likely to be constrained by oligopolistic 
norms, followership, and bargains, and are more likely to be afforded the discretion to act on their own, 
and hence have relatively higher discretion. For quasi-legal constraints, the discretion of managers within 
an industry category can be constrained by the strength of the control environment and an array of 
governmental or political forces such as regulators, state legislators, trade unions, or courts.  Similarly, 
powerful stakeholders in the form of powerful buyers and suppliers can limit a manager’s latitude of action.  
Consequently, the more the strength of powerful actors over an industry, the less the latitude of action 
afforded the executives of the organisations within the industry classification.  
The second tripartite of industry-level factors that affect industry-level discretion are product 
differentiability, market growth, and demand instability (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). These 
factors affect the latitude of action in an industry through the instrumentality of ambiguity in means-ends 
relations (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Accordingly, the higher the level of ambiguity in those relations, 
the greater the likelihood for managers to consider a vast array of means or alternatives to different ends, 
and the more the likelihood for stakeholders to legitimise a broad variety of attempted means to various 
ends (Barnard, 1968; Thompson, 1967). The more the conditions in an industry legitimise or cause 
ambiguity, the more the number of alternatives available to organisational managers in an industry and 
the higher the discretion. Hence for the purpose of substantiating the effect of isomorphism and 
discretion, as it relates to organisational behaviour, this study further reviews the effect of industry-level 
discretion on the attentional homogeneity of organisations in the same industry classification. This 
dimension of analysis was postulated by Abrahamson and Hambrick, (1997). Hence, this study adds this 
layer of analysis on how industry-level determinants affect the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of the responses of managers in an industry. 
Abrahamson and Hambrick, (1997, p. 514) define attentional homogeneity as “the degree of similarity in 
the foci of attention of top managers across organizations”. They argue that the latitude of action afforded 
managers of organisations differ widely from industry to industry. As emphasised by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987), some industries are tolerant of managers exploring a wide variety and change in 
managerial actions, while others constrain the alternatives available for managerial actions. Accordingly, 
it is logical to argue that if the conferment of options is dependent on the level of discretion, then it must 
also provide the diversity of alternatives that managers attend to (Nelson, 1991). The central argument 
of Abrahamson and Hambrick, (1997) is that the degree of latitude of action available in an industry will 
be negatively associated with the homogeneity of the managerial attention pattern in the industry (p. 514). 
As a matter of replication, this study is also premised on the same argument. Furthermore, there is strong 
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empirical support for the proposition that the cognitive measures of top managers in different but similar 
firms within an industry can be quite similar or homogenous.  
In a study of three British industries, Spender (1989) found that “an altogether surprising degree of 
homogeneity amongst the constructs being applied by managers…in each industry” (cited in 
Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 515), with the commonly held models labelled as ‘industry recipes’. In 
another study, Hambrick (1982) concluded through environmental scanning in three industries that, “a 
common body of knowledge appears to exist within an industry…which is disseminated through media 
equally available to and used by executives within the industry” (p. 167). Similarly, Huff (1982, p. 125) 
argued, in a conceptual paper, that an “industry is defined by shared or interlocking metaphors or world 
views”. In addition, Marcus and Goodman (1986), Goodman (1988), and Newell (1989) have studied the 
longitudinal transitions of the airline, steel, and banking industries in the United States of America, 
respectively, and they concluded that in each industry, a well-articulated industry knowledge or logic had 
been established that the top managers of the organisations in the respective industries had great 
difficulty to deviate from.  
Subsequently, whether it happens across individuals or groups, the research and theory on cognitive 
homogeneity has been criticised for inadequately conceptualising the cognitive contents that are shared 
among individuals or groups; what it means for the contents to be shared; and the determinants and 
implications of such sharing (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). First, with 
respect to the content of what is being shared, the dominant proposition among cognitive theorists in the 
management domain is that top executives are continuously confronted by unclearly defined events and 
trends (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). Second, on the basis of the meaning attached to sharing an 
attention pattern, Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) noted that such sharing can vary by degree (Daniels, 
Johnson, & De Chernatony, 1994; Porac, Thomas, & Badden-Fuller, 1989; Porac & Thomas, 1990; Reger 
& Palmer, 1996; Walsh, 1995). Similar to the standpoint of Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997), this study 
adopts the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis that the use of language in communications can be revealing of the 
cognitive categories that individuals select, in order to attend to the world around them (Sapir, 1944; 
Whorf, 1956).  
As a result of top executives’ lexicons providing shape and revelation of what they attend to, the extent 
to which the common lexicons are shared among top managers of organisations in an industry reveal the 
degree of the attentional homogeneity across these managers. Although Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) 
did not provide commentary on the potential consequences of industry-level discretion on cognitive 
homogeneity of top executives within the same industry, Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997, p. 516) 
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argued that top executives not only have differing levels of discretion over rational decisions they make, 
they also possess varying amounts of discretion over what they choose to attend to. Thus, industry factors 
that constrain discretion at the industry level also reduce the variety of alternatives available to managers 
within an industry, thereby causing greater attentional homogeneity (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
Specifically, managers are presented with a less multifaceted environment when faced with industry 
factors that constrain managerial discretion than the industry factors that liberalise managerial discretion. 
On the one hand, top managers in very low discretion environments are presented with very few 
environmental facets to attend to (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). As a result, either through conscious 
or unconscious efforts, top executives tend to constrain their responses to a similar few facets, causing 
a high degree of attentional homogeneity among them. On the other hand, top managers in very high 
discretion environments are presented with diverse environmental facets with which to attend to. As 
emphasised by Reger and Palmer (1996), the boundedly rational nature of top managers in these 
environments does not enable them to respond to every facet, with the unlikelihood for them to respond 
to all the same facets. Consequently, attentional homogeneity tends to be low across managers.  
To further lend credence to the standpoint of this study, this work considers the effect of the first tripartite 
industry-level determinants – quasi-legal constraints, industry structure, and powerful external 
stakeholders – on isomorphic response or attentional homogeneity, as described by Hambrick and 
Finkelstein (1987). Accordingly, it is understood that top executives tend to direct their responses towards 
powerful regulators in highly regulated industries, thereby raising the degree of their isomorphic 
responses. This is usually the case of industries where there is a mandatory ‘comply or explain’ rule that 
regulates the operations of some organisations in certain industries.   
Conversely, top executives are more likely to consider a wide range of alternatives in less regulated 
industries, thereby reducing attentional homogeneity. Furthermore, with respect to environments of 
powerful external forces and industry structure, top executives tend to follow in the steps of a few 
oligopolists or powerful distributors, suppliers, or customers, thereby causing greater isomorphic 
responses (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). This is similar to the arguments for the second tripartite of 
effect of industry level determinants – product differentiability, market growth, and demand instability – 
on isomorphic response. With respect to product differentiability, a commodity product that is less 
differentiable in a specific industry influences the direction of the attention of all managers to identical 
product features and customer expectations, thereby causing a greater level of isomorphic response. On 
the other hand, top managers are more likely to adopt varied responses to customer taste when there is 
high product differentiability within an industry, thereby causing diverse patterns of responses.  
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Similarly, there is the likelihood that top managers will pay attention to diverse opportunities and market-
trend indices in industries where there is high market growth and product or demand instability, thereby 
causing low level of attentional homogeneity or isomorphic response. In summary, this study argues that 
industry-level discretion affects isomorphic responses across industries, to the extent that it is possible 
to examine how aggressive or conservative the industries are in their operations, such as in the use of 
less prudent or conservative accounting practices, among others, which, subsequently, manifests in their 
financial communication patterns. These financial communication patterns, this study argues, can be 
revealing of the criminogenic exposure of such industries enabled by the level of discretion resident in 
those industries, particularly in the high discretion industries. 
2.5.2 Measuring Industry-Level Discretion  
In the quest to introduce a rating system for discretion across industries, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) 
adopted qualitative metrics to rank high, medium, and low discretion industries. They established 
computer programming and software companies, chemicals, and natural gas distribution companies as 
high-, medium-, and low level discretion companies, respectively (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 
531). It is noteworthy that using a qualitative measure in any research has the potential to be limiting, 
owing to the presence of subjectivity in the mind of an observer. Emphasised by Abrahamson and 
Hambrick (1997), the use of a qualitative approach, although limiting, provides researchers with a reliable 
measure of discretion in industries that have clarity in their degree of discretion. This approach is reliable 
where all industry determinants “point to essentially the same conclusion” (p. 518). By contrast, it is 
difficult to use a qualitative approach to measure discretion in less extreme industries or in industries 
where the determinants of discretion do not clearly align. In addition, this approach raises the concern on 
the reliability of approach. As a norm, there is an inherent requirement for qualitative assessments to 
demand a significant element of interpretation and judgment, owing to the expectation that the qualitative 
measurement of an industry’s latitude of action by one researcher can be entirely different from those of 
other researchers.  
In order to mitigate these potential obstacles, this study adopts the measurement of discretion at the 
industry-level as determined in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). In their work, they measured industry-
level discretion by obtaining the ratings of scholars in strategy and organisation theory, which was latter 
corroborated with the ratings of security analysts in a major investment bank (Abrahamson & Hambrick 
(1997). The comprehensive procedure towards providing evidences of the validity and reliability of their 
approach are presented in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). In the quest to gain validity for this 
qualitative approach to measuring discretion, they formed an academic panel that consisted of every 
author of articles in the ‘Academy of Management Journal’, ‘Academy of Management Review’, 
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‘Administrative Science Quarterly’, ‘Management Science’, and ‘Organisation Science’, published 
between 1988 and 1991, which cited the seminal work of Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987).  
Accordingly, this approach ensured the inclusion of only panel members that were familiar with the 
concept of discretion. Although 14 of the 15 academic experts submitted usable responses, however, 
they found a quite strong inter-rater reliability in the responses of the panel members. By adopting a 7-
point Likert scale – with 1 = extremely little executive discretion; 4 = medium/moderate executive 
discretion; and 7 = extremely high executive discretion (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 518) –, in 
conjunction with Shrout and Fleiss’s (1979) analytic guide, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) found the 
overall interclass correlation coefficient and reliability of industry means to be 0.57 and 0.95, respectively. 
The latter is well above the acceptable range of 0.70 to 0.80.  
Returning back to their methodology, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) noted that due to the advantages 
of greater familiarity with numerous industries by the academics, and their conceptual understanding of 
discretion, there was a need to assess their accuracy as judges of the industries they were required to 
evaluate. Accordingly, with the need to corroborate their ratings, Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 
obtained independent ratings from an additional group of experts – security analysts.  Subsequently, 
Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) corroborated this measurement scale by introducing the ratings of 
expert security analysts “who specialized in the 14 industries in a major investment bank” (p. 518). Similar 
to the 7-point Likert scale used in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995), they found a high correlation 
(Spearman r = 0.83) between the mean academic ratings and those of the analysts in the industries. To 
further establish construct validity Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) tested for the correlation between 
the ratings and objective determinants of industry features emphasised by Hambrick and Finkelstein 
(1987) as determinants of discretion. They found the various industry features as adequate explanation 
for the large proportion of variance in the ratings of the academic panels (R2 = 0.49) and the ratings of 
expert security analysts (R2 = 0.48).  
The results from the panel of academics were strongly corroborated by a similar, although very limited, 
analysis using the data from the security analysts. In sum, the results (shown in Appendix 9) from the 
ratings by security analysts contain coefficients that are strikingly similar with those obtained from the 
models derived from the academic panel. In addition, the correlations between the ratings of the industry 
analysts and the objective characteristics of an industry are highly similar to those based on the data 
obtained from the academic panel (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995, p. 1435). Therefore, there is 
sufficient evidence from the two independent groups of security analysts and academics to posit that they 
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both factored, to a large extent, the same industry characteristics by assigning them similar weights and 
in arriving at an overall evaluation of industry discretion.  
More importantly, the predictive validity of the panel ratings is enhanced by the fact that they did not 
receive any industry data prior to receiving the questionnaire issued to them. This not only provided the 
basis for unbiased assessment of industry discretion, “but also sheds light on the ability of such assessors 
to accurately characterize disparate industries on dimensions of conceptual importance” (Hambrick & 
Abrahamson, 1995, p. 1438). In view of this, the consistency between the ratings of these two groups of 
evaluators gives further assurance of convergent validity (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Although it is 
arguable that this measurement approach was established over two decades ago.  However, it was 
replicated in Hambrick and Quigley (2014) and, McClelland, Liang, and Barker III (2010) to further lend 
construct validity and reliability to the qualitative assessment of discretion. The formula for measuring 
industry discretion is given as: 
Industry discretion = 4.344 + (0.1209 × R&D Intensity) + (0.1519 × Advertising Intensity) 
– (0.004 × Capital Intensity) + (0.0596 × Sales Growth Rate). 
(See McClelland, Liang, and Barker III 2010, p. 1273). 
Table 2.1: Industries and their Discretion Scores 
US SIC Code Industry Name Discretion Score 
1311 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 2.33 
1040 Gold and Silver Ores 2.42 
4213 Trucking Local 2.73 
6331 Fire Marine and Casualty Insurance 2.92 
4512 Certified Air Transportation 3.23 
6211 Security Brokers and Dealers 4.27 
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity 4.33 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 4.62 
3663 Radio and Television Communication Equipment 5.17 
3841 Surgical and Medical Instruments 5.41 
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 5.54 
3570 Electronic Computing Equipment 5.77 
7812 Motion Picture Production 6.08 
7372 Computer Programming and Software 6.38 
Source: Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997, p. 531).  
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Building on the extant literature reviewed on institutional theory and how the logic in institutions differ one 
from another, the next line of review focuses on the interplay between corporate leadership and corporate 
communications. Specifically, the next line of review of literature focuses on how corporate managers 
use language to attend to their institutional environment. Subsequently, it follows with the review of the 
potential for impression management tactics to be included in their corporate communications. 
Accordingly, the next section focuses on the link between corporate leadership and corporate 
communications.  
2.6 Corporate Leadership and Corporate Communications  
The study of leadership and corporate communications has had significant impact in understanding how 
the leadership of organisations deploy various communications and or use linguistic resources in 
response to environmental expectations. Margaret Mead the renowned cultural anthropologist, is 
purported to have said, “What people say, what people do, and what they say they do are entirely different 
things” (as attributed in Bligh & Kohles, 2014, p. 142). Similarly, what leaders say, what leaders do, and 
what leaders say they do, provide rich insights into individual, organisational, and group issues with 
respect to how they deploy their linguistic resources in response to external stimuli. As pointed out by 
Jameson (2009), the 2008-2009 global economic downturn, corporate scandals, and financial disasters 
are often more communication problems than regulatory, ethical or technical problems.  
Similarly, Bligh and Kohles (2014) call for more focus of research efforts on the understanding of 
leadership communications across different contexts spanning different historical time periods. They posit 
that such research focus has the capacity to enhance the understanding of communication processes 
that underlie organisational outcomes, which are not popularly assessed through the lens of leader 
communications. As a response to that call, this study aims to create an understanding of the 
communications of the CEOs of companies in different industry and economic contexts and how they 
use language to express their industry and economic circumstances spanning different historical time 
periods, on the basis of the discretion afforded to them.  
Traditionally, language has been attributed to be a critical foundation for the leadership process, and 
scholars have contended that communication processes and discourse provide the fundamental 
foundation for the relationship between business leaders and their employees (Barge, Downs, & Johnson, 
1989; Conger, 1991; Fairhurst, 1993; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997; Komaki & 
Citera, 1990). Smircich and Morgan (1982) posit that leadership is a socially constructed, interactional 
phenomenon through which the reality of other individuals is framed, defined or influenced by certain 
individuals. Accordingly, such framing can be examined through verbal and textual language, thereby 
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providing resourceful opportunities for scholars to examine leadership in contextually based, yet often 
unobtrusive ways (Bligh & Kohles, 2014, p. 144).  
It is noteworthy that within the literature on communication, the interaction analysis of organisational 
leaders creates extensive pathways into examining time and context, including monitoring leaders and 
archiving their interactions, measuring leader interactions over a period of time, and examining leader 
talk, language, content, and discourse (Barge et al., 1989; Barge & Schlueter, 1991; Bligh & Kohles, 
2014, p. 142; Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst & Chandler, 1989; Fairhurst, Rogers, & Sarr, 1987; Fairhurst & 
Sarr, 1996; Komaki & Citera, 1990), nevertheless, the full integration of communication literature into 
leadership and management literatures is yet to be conducted (Fairhurst, 2007).  
Some of the insights on leadership communications focus on advancing the knowledge of what effective 
leaders say, how they say it, the frequency of what they say, what they fail to say, as well as what 
destructive or manipulative leaders say, and how they say it (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). Bligh and Kohles, 
(2014) also argue that new insights into the process of leadership can be obtained through the analysis 
of business leaders’ communications, thereby providing scholars with the basis for examining what 
constitutes influence, without constraining the definition of leaders by their roles in organisations- at a 
single point in time or through a single perspective.  
Subsequently, studies have explored the choice of words and phrases to make inferences about the 
motives or ideas of a leader. Specifically, linguistic markers have been used to assess the thinking styles 
and emotional states of individuals (Zullow, Oettingen, Peterson, & Seligman, 1988), as well as the 
transition in their leadership style when faced with a defining or precipitating event, such as a crisis (Bligh, 
Kohles, & Meindl, 2004a). Consequently, a leader’s selection of words can be particularly revealing of 
their motives, intentions, and underlying assumptions, and can have significant effects on organisational 
outcomes such as credit ratings, public approval ratings, and financial market reputation (Bligh & Hess, 
2007).  
In view of this, it is imperative to avoid instant inferences on leaders’ communications that are one-offs. 
Therefore, inferences should be drawn from communications that span across a wide scope of time, and 
of how leaders respond to, change, develop, or vary their communications throughout their tenures or 
careers (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). Hunter, Bedell-Avers, and Mumford (2007, p. 440) note that although 
singular events could characterise the reaction of organisation leaders, in itself, “leadership is rarely, if 
ever, the result of a sole action or behavior”, rather, organisational leadership is a continuous process, 
an array of activities and exchanges that come into play under varied circumstances and over periods of 
time (Day, 2000). Unfortunately, in the process of gathering information pertaining to leadership 
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processes, what is often lost or ignored are the cognitive and communication-oriented activities that 
inform the evolution of leadership communication across contexts and time (Hunter et al., 2007).  
Similarly, the significant role of situational changes is often disregarded in favour of the behavioural 
consistencies in leaders’ communication across time and context (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). Hence, it is 
imperative to explore leaders’ communication in a systematic, longitudinal, and comparative way, so as 
to avoid hiding, disguising, or mitigating the richness and contextual aspects of the conditions surrounding 
leaders’ communications. For instance, Bligh et al. (2004a) explored the impression that opportunity for 
charismatic leadership is enhanced in times of crisis, as they often produce situations that increase the 
levels of anxiety, uncertainty, and psychological distress in the stakeholders of an organisation. In their 
study of the rhetorical content of the speech of President George W. Bush in response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, they found that the crisis that ensued did affect the communication pattern of the President to 
the Americans. Also, their findings suggest that the President’s rhetoric became increasingly charismatic 
subsequent to the attacks, while incorporating higher levels of aggression in speech towards the 
perpetrators of the crime and aspects of endearment towards the American public.  
In a similar vein, Seyranian and Bligh (2008) examined the theory of how charismatic leaders deploy 
communications towards introducing social change aimed at influencing the social values of their 
followers in a three-phase sequence (Fiol, Harris, & House, 1999). By adopting the sequence set 
postulated by Fiol et al. (1999) on a sample of six speeches from each of the 20th-century US Presidents, 
they found that the charismatic nature of these US Presidents seemed to be patterned along a three-
phase model of social change, where they placed emphasis on their similar identity with their followers 
while they used negation in the second phase. In summary, across all phases, the sample US Presidents 
increasingly used active and tangible language. Also, throughout their presidential tenures, the 
charismatic US Presidents deployed more rhetoric that portrayed concrete imagery and focused more on 
inclusion, with reduced language connoting abstract conceptual thoughts and virtues as compared to 
non-charismatic presidents (Bligh & Kohles, 2014, p. 153). This approach facilitates the comparisons 
across individual leaders that assume the same office or to assess the differences among leaders in their 
utilisation of language in both similar and unique ways.   
Similar to cross-leader comparisons is the importance of conducting cross-cultural comparisons across 
leaders’ communications. In prior studies, scholars have engaged computer-aided text analysis 
algorithms to assess the degree to which extant theory or empirical findings establish inferences across 
cultural, historical, and or political contexts (Hart, 1984, 1987; Hart & Childers, 2004; Hart & Sawyer, 
2003; Hart, Jarvis, Jennings, & Smith-Howell, 2004). Similarly, Bligh and Robinson (2010) assessed the 
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rhetoric of Mahatma Gandhi in comparison with some presidential figures and social movement leaders 
to examine potential consistencies in charismatic leadership, and whether these emerged across cultural 
contexts and historical time periods. They also discovered that across all three of their leader samples, 
the intolerability by those leaders of the current situation were articulated using charismatic themes while 
appealing to the values and moral justifications. Furthermore, the speeches of Gandhi portrayed 
comparable levels of language that placed emphasis on the similarity of his beliefs with those of his 
followers. It also emphasised his followers’ worth, the links between the past and future, and abstract, 
intangible themes when compared with those of other leaders, thereby providing the suggestion that 
some unique elements of a leader’s persuasive communication may be particularly revealing of cultural 
and historical differences (Bligh & Kohles, 2014).  
Furthermore, in the prior study of Bligh and Hess (2007), they discovered that in times of adverse 
economic situations, Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of US Federal Reserve communicated using 
words that signified less certainty with reduced amount of active language. However, in his 
communications during the defining period, there was an increase in his use of present tense, thereby 
indicating more focus on current concerns. On the other hand, during times of economic prosperity, Alan 
Greenspan’s choice of words indicated a stronger sense of certainty. Bligh and Hess (2007) inferred that 
such transition in language patterns likely assisted the public in placing their economic situations in 
context, which could also signal the effectiveness of the leadership of Greenspan.  
Accordingly, these forms of approach to leaders’ communications allow the direct comparison of the 
linguistic style in a leader’s communication in a tripartite way – before, during and after a precipitating 
event, or throughout the lifetime or tenure of a leader. Similarly, within-leader studies enhance the 
exploration of the potential influence of time and situational changes within single or multiple leaders 
(Bligh & Kohles, 2014). In view of this, it is important to devise a comparative analysis of the different 
leaders within an organisation (or among organisations within the same industry category) having the 
same context, with specific emphasis on how each leader responds to changes and expectations in their 
institutional or external environment, with the potential for the management of impression that they 
conform to those changes and expectations. Accordingly, the next section focuses on the review of extant 
literature on impression management in the communications of individuals and teams, with specific 
emphasis on how they respond to changes and expectations in their institutional or external environment.   
2.7 Impression Management – The Psychology of Individuals and Teams 
Impression management is the process by which individuals or groups attempt to create, maintain, 
protect, or otherwise control the perception people have towards them (Chng, Rodgers, Shih, & Song, 
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2015; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995). The various theories on 
impression management build on Goffman’s (1959) foundational research, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life. The core assumption in the literature on the management of impression and presentation 
of self is that individuals, including groups of people, have an inherent interest in controlling how they are 
being perceived and evaluated by others, and that under specific circumstances, they are motivated to 
manage such impressions (Goffman, 1959; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). Accordingly, 
these impressions are structured to maximise potential benefits or to minimise potential costs (Leary & 
Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). The arising benefits could be obtaining deceptive advantage over 
other people or obscuring information from those that have the legal rights to such information, while the 
minimisation of potential costs, in this context, could be to avoid the embarrassment and potential 
repercussion of attaining less than predicted expectations.  
Research on the management of impression gradually accelerated following the ground-breaking study 
conducted by Goffman in 1959. Notable studies have been conducted in the fields of sociology, social 
psychology, organisational behaviour, management, political science, and criminology. Since Goffman, 
impression management has been defined negatively by some authors, as a form of interpersonal 
manipulation which takes place in a very confined setting or related to a limited set of behaviours. This 
assertion supports the common misconception that impression management is a strategy used by 
individuals for the purpose of obtaining undue advantage over others or primarily for purposes of 
deception. Historically, impression management used to be viewed as a bad, self-interest-oriented 
manipulation of others for one’s own purposes. Nevertheless, self-interest is only a component part of 
many reasons for impression management, as it can be used both to help others and sometimes to harm 
them (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995).  
Contrarily, contemporary perspectives towards impression management research view the phenomenon 
as very broad and common, and as a core part of all interpersonal social interactions (Rosenfeld, 
Giacalone, & Riordan, 1994). Although the term “impression management” connotes a phenomenon 
which is disturbingly Machiavellian, nevertheless, it is a known assertion that the manner in which 
individuals present themselves influences the course of their social interactions. As Weatherly and Beach 
(1994, p. 416) note that “our motives are not necessarily dark and manipulative…Although impression 
management surely can be used for unprincipled ends, more frequently it serves fairly benign aims”.  
Subsequently, the positive perspective of impression management has been labelled as the expansive 
view (Schlenker & Weigold, 1992), while referring to the more limited, nefarious, Machiavellian 
perspective, as the restrictive view of impression management (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995, 
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p. 6). Accordingly, it is the broader, more encompassing, humane and expansive view of impression 
management that proposes that individuals engage all forms of impression-imposing strategies to help 
them achieve their objectives – whether premeditated or not -, which are conducted both individually or 
collectively as a group. In view of this, impression management could be imposed consciously or 
unconsciously in an automatic or habitual way. While it is arguable that the management of impression 
is done for the purpose of protecting self-image, it could also be used for the purpose of pleasing 
significant audiences (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995).   
However, it is arguable that what seems pleasing to the audience is not entirely beneficial to them in real 
terms. It is possible to manage the impression of a loss-making corporate entity as being profitable for 
the purpose of avoiding a negative reaction from the market, with the view of maintaining a favourable 
share price. That being said, it becomes pleasing – in the short term - for the stakeholders to receive 
positive news from their investments. Nevertheless, in the long-run, it may not serve them any benefit for 
the value of their investments may crash, with potential for the liquidation of their company, at the 
revelation of any fraudulent reporting or significant financial misstatements. Furthermore, the expansive 
view towards impression management also posits that individuals engage impression management 
strategies not just to control the perception of others, but also to measure what they think about 
themselves (Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995). Individuals could thereby strive to persuade the 
external audience of their competence as much as they also become persuaded by their own internal 
audience.  
A concept emphasised by Erving Goffman, impression management involves attempts to create meaning 
and purpose for instances of social interactions, which provides structure of actions and preconceived or 
expected reactions from others. It connotes a form of mutual ritual that facilitates the smoothening of 
social interactions with the underlying objective of avoiding embarrassment, and the need to respond 
positively to pressures imposed on them from the external environment. Individuals are stage performers 
with the task of playing different roles in different circumstances for the purpose of constructing social 
identities. These identities are communicated through verbal and nonverbal behaviours which can be 
consciously controlled while others such as eye contact and posture are often involuntarily expressed 
(Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995). The notion is that impression management words become 
more effective when backed up with impression management deeds. Of particular importance to this 
study is the aspect of literature than informs the verbal cues of impression management in accounting 
narratives.  
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2.8 Accounting Narratives and Impression Management 
With the relevance of the phenomenon in different aspects of communication, this section focuses on the 
placement of impression management tactics in financial communications. Historically, the literature on 
impression management gains its foundation from social psychology. It has its influence in all areas of 
human endeavour, it is therefore no surprise that the phenomenon has been applied in the field of 
Accounting (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; Chng et al. 2015). Most notable of the adaptation of the 
insights on impression management is in the context of accounting communication. The rationale behind 
the use of impression management strategies is to enable the formation of an impression by 
organisations with the motive of appealing to the attention of their target audiences (Gioia, Schultz, & 
Corley, 2000; Goffman, 1959; Schlenker, 1980), which include but are not limited to shareholders, 
stakeholders, the general public, and the media (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). In the process of 
constructing a desirable impression image by an organisation or through its representatives, the outcome 
could be either success or failure. Although the success or failure of impression management strategies 
have their individual impacts, nevertheless, it is its success that has dominated the literature on 
impression management.  
With respect to accounting narratives, the successful application of impression management strategies 
can undermine the veracity and quality of information included in financial reports, with the potential of 
influencing the economic decisions of its stakeholders which may result in capital misallocations (Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, impression management tends to induce wider social and 
political consequences, with individuals and organisations seeking for ingratiation and unwarranted 
support from non-financial stakeholders and the external environment (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; 
Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1995). As a result, the external environment becomes the puppet that 
individuals and organisations manipulate as they seek to promote the image of self to present in different 
circumstances.  
Traditionally, financial communications are both quantitative and qualitative in nature, however, they are 
predominantly quantitative. Accordingly, the qualitative aspects are published through written narratives 
known as ‘soft’ or unquantified information. In addition, these qualitative aspects are included in annual 
reports, accounting textbooks, official disclosures by accounting bodies, and legal verdicts pertaining to 
accounting issues (Jones & Shoemaker, 1994). Although it has been established through research that 
quantitative information in accounting disclosures are the subject of manipulation by management 
representatives (Beneish 1997,1999; Beneish, Lee, & Nichols, 2013), nonetheless, the qualitative 
information included are also ingeniously targeted by top management to hide deception (Purda & 
Skillicorn, 2015).  
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Based on the standpoint that impression management in accounting narratives may impact the veracity 
of accounting information, it is imperative for the users of corporate reports to understand the tenets and 
the placement of impression management in accounting narratives. This is to assist and or call forth the 
investigative instincts of the users in detecting potential deception particular to accounting narratives 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Accordingly, the prospect of stakeholders’ capital misallocations is 
minimised as they become more aware of the impression management techniques of management 
representatives. In the context of this study, and similar to the approach in the study by Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies (2013), impression management is reviewed with reference to four different perspectives: 
the economic, psychological, sociological, and critical. Furthermore, these perspectives conceptualise 
the management of impression in terms of reporting bias, self-serving bias, symbolic management, and 
ideological bias. 
In addition, seven communication techniques used in the management of impression in corporate 
narratives are reviewed. In the context of accounting narratives, the impression conveyed by the top 
management of a company to their stakeholders may either correspond to an ostensible reality, the 
amplification of desirable aspects of their company, or in concealing less desirable aspects, with the view 
of manipulating the perceptions of their target audiences (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000). In view of this, 
and for the purpose of understanding attempts by top managers in the management of the perceptions 
of their audiences, the concept of impression management is applied in the context of corporate financial 
communications, specifically in the assessment of financial performance (Clatworthy & Jones, 2001, 
2003, 2006; Courtis, 2004a; Rutherford, 2003).   
Although impression management in social psychology is applied to individuals, the phenomenon is 
adopted at an organisational or industry level in the context of accounting narratives (Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2013). Accordingly, organisational audiences with respect to the business and accounting 
contexts are narrowly defined to consist of shareholders and financial intermediaries, or more broadly as 
stakeholders and the external environment. A narrow perspective towards conceptualising impression 
management focuses on various attempts by top management towards the manipulation of the 
perception of shareholders in the course of measuring the financial performance of their organisation 
(Clatworthy & Jones, 2001, 2003, 2006; Courtis, 2004a, Rutherford, 2003). In contrast, a broader 
systems-oriented theory approach adopts a different paradigm towards analysing managerial impression 
management attempts in the context of social and environmental performance, with a wider view of the 
impact of impression management on the stakeholder community, as opposed to the narrow view of the 
influence of impression management on company shareholders alone. It is this broader level of analysis 
that informs the position that the leaders of corporate organisations not only seek to manage the 
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perceptions of their company’s shareholders, but also for purposes that ensure the legitimacy of their 
operations and continuous recognition in an institutional environment (Breton & Côté, 2006; 
Hooghiemstra, 2000; Linsley & Kajuter, 2008).  
It is noteworthy that the understanding of the attempts by organisations in seeking legitimacy and 
appealing to the approval of the stakeholders in their external environment aligns to the institutional theory 
perspective adopted for this study. It reviews the aspects of impression management that informs the 
understanding of how organisations seek to maintain legitimacy in the context of the institution they 
belong within, as well as align to the logic that guides their institutions. By adopting the wider systems-
oriented theory, this study moves from the narrow shareholder perspective to a wider stakeholder 
perspective in the course of understanding the rationale for impression management by members of top 
management, through the leadership of the Chief Executive Officer. Accordingly, in the context of this 
study, the stakeholders of an organisation are conceived as the external or institutional environment 
which the top management will seek all forms of impression management tactics in an attempt to 
manipulate their perceptions. In sum, this entails the management of the reputation, image, and 
legitimacy of an organisation in an institutional environment.  
2.9 Impression Management and Organisational Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy  
Previous studies have highlighted reasons for the use of impression management strategies (Breton & 
Côté, 2006; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Linsley & Kajuter, 2008). Some of its very frequent use is in an effort 
to restore the reputation, image, or legitimacy of an organisation when faced with crisis or potential 
significant change, especially during adverse financial performance (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Courtis, 
2004a), organisational decline (Chng et al., 2015), corporate scandals (Linsley & Kajuter, 2008), 
expectation of positive reaction to annual report narratives from the capital market (Yekini, Wisniewski, 
& Millo, 2016), environmental disasters (Hooghiemstra, 2000), and major corporate reorganisation (Arndt 
& Bigelow, 2000; Ogden & Clark, 2005). Most often than not, impression management is used to seek 
acceptance from organisational audiences concerning the exceptional or one-off nature of the 
circumstances surrounding a company’s negative financial performance, for the purpose of viewing a 
financial scandal as an isolated event, and also to convince the audience of the validity, legitimacy or 
necessity of reorganisation (Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012).   
Furthermore, the need for organisations to establish, maintain, and restore image, reputation, and 
legitimacy play important roles in understanding both the perceptions of the organisational audiences and 
those of the leaders of the organisations (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 7; Deephouse & Carter, 
2005, p. 329). According to Highhouse, Brooks, and Gregarus (2009), reputation connotes a temporally 
55 | P a g e  
 
stable evaluative judgment of organisations as a whole in an institutional context, with the view of 
maintaining such reputation in the midst of the competitors within an industry classification (Deephouse 
& Carter, 2005, p. 331). On the other hand, the concept of image addresses the dynamic perception of a 
specific area of distinction such as the image of an organisation in capital markets, including investment 
or corporate social responsibility image (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 7; Highhouse et al., 2009, p. 
1489)  
Lastly, legitimacy connotes a shared judgement and agreed-upon values used in assessing the 
conformity of organisational behaviour and the normative appropriateness of such behaviours to the logic 
guiding an institution (Highhouse et al., 2009, p. 1487). While reputation and image focus on the 
evaluation of organisations, legitimacy is concerned with the acceptability of organisations with respect 
to the norms and rules set in an institution (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; Deephouse & Suchman, 
2008). Hence, impression management entails the construction of an impression with respect to the 
quality or normative appropriateness of organisational structures, processes, practices, or outcomes 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 7). Overall, the three concepts have been coined in Brennan and 
Merkl-Davies (2013) as organisational reputation, organisational image, and organisation legitimacy. To 
provide an overview of these three concepts, Table 2.2 below shows the key aspects, and definitions of 
the concepts. Subsequently, it follows with the review of the four perspectives on impression 
management.  
Table 2.2: Organisational reputation, image and legitimacy 
Concepts Key aspects Time dimension 
Organisational reputation Whole organisation Short-term 
 Quality Stable 
 Evaluation  
   
Organisational image Aspect of the organisation (e.g. investment image) Short-term 
 Quality Dynamic 
 Evaluation  
   
Organisational legitimacy Whole organisation or industry Long-term 
 Social norms and rules Stable 
  Appropriateness   
Adapted from Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013, p. 8)  
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2.10 The Four Perspectives on Impression Management 
In prior study by Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013), they identified the differentiation of four broad 
perspectives on impression management that dominate accounting research which are: economic, 
psychological, sociological, and critical. Table 2.3 provides an overview of the differences between the 
four perspectives on impression management which are further conceptualised along two dimensions 
(adapted from Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 10). These dimensions are with respect to the 
underlying theories, assumptions about the factors that motivate the use of impression management by 
top executives, the underlying concept of impression management, the focus of analysis, and the 
consequences of impression management in the business world (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 9). 
On the one hand, the economic and social psychological perspectives of impression management focus 
on the use of impression management by top executives for the purpose of protecting an investment 
image and to manage the perceptions of their shareholders and financial stakeholders, on matters 
concerning the financial performance of an organisation (Brennan & Merkel-Davies, 2013). 
Consequently, the successful implementation of impression management techniques have potential for 
influencing short-term capital misallocations (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
Table 2.3: Differences between the four perspectives across two dimensions 
Perspectives Underlying theories Motivation for impression management  
Economic Agency theory Maximise compensation 
   
Psychological Attribution theory Win social and material rewards and avoid sanctions 
   
Sociological Stakeholder theory Attract social and material resources and support 
 Legitimacy theory  
 Institutional theory  
   
Critical Political Economy Gain and maintain power 
  Critical theories   
Adapted from Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013, p. 10) 
 
On the other hand, the sociological perspective on impression management focuses on the use of 
impression management for the purpose of advancing corporate social and environmental responsibility, 
image, and legitimacy (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). This perspective is concerned with the use of 
impression management for the purpose of influencing the perceptions of organisational audiences on 
the measurement of an organisation’s social and environmental performance, and more importantly, the 
compliance of organisations to the logic, social norms and rules that guide their institution. Consequently, 
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as organisational audiences, through impression management, become convinced by the compliance of 
their organisation to institutional norms, it results in the accordance of legitimacy to the operations and 
deeds of top executives in the presence of stakeholders and the entire institutional environment (Brennan 
& Merkl-Davies, 2013). Notably, this perspective is relevant to the approach of this study on the need to 
evaluate the corporate financial communications of an individual organisation in the context of the 
institution it is classified, with the view of ascertaining the legitimacy of such communications in an 
institutional environment.  
Lastly, the critical perspective on impression management is concerned with attempts by top executives 
in obtaining power for the purpose of influencing organisational audiences’ perceptions of corporate 
influence and control (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). If successful, such impression management 
motive results in hegemony which, in the context of corporate financial reporting entails persuading 
organisational audiences to support the positions of top executives on organisational outcomes out of 
their own free will (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Accordingly, the perspective adopted in the 
understanding of impression management impacts the explanation for the motives underlying the 
phenomenon and the way it is conceptualised with respect to reporting bias, self-serving-bias, symbolic 
management/decoupling, or ideological bias (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 10). Although the 
economic and psychological perspectives of impression management dominate accounting research 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013), the sociological perspective as adopted in this study advances the 
evaluation of managerial and/or organisational impression management in the context of institutions. 
Notably, Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013) conclude that of the four perspectives on impression 
management, the sociological and critical perspectives are under-researched. As a response, this study 
focuses on assessing the sociological perspective of impression management as a vital underlying factor 
for the management of impression by top executives, with the view of maintaining legitimacy in an 
institutional environment. Accordingly, the next sections focus on the detailed review of the four 
perspectives on impression management.     
2.10.1 The Economic Perspective on Impression Management 
Historically, most prior studies on accounting narratives and impression management focused on agency 
theory assumptions (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), it is 
assumed that managers exercise judgement so as to “alter financial reports to … mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company” (p. 368). Hence, impression 
management is conceived as opportunistic managerial attempts resulting from asymmetries in 
information between top executives and investors (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). By focusing on the 
prevailing economic circumstances, either favourable or unfavourable, and the placement of tone in 
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corporate financial communications, Brennan and Merkl-Davies (2013) emphasise that the top 
management of an organisation’s underlying motive for impression management will be to either 
underscore favourable organisational performances or to obfuscate unfavourable organisational 
performances.  
As unfavourable organisational performances have the potential to create conflicts between top 
executives and their shareholders, top management are more likely to devise means of manipulating 
shareholders’ perceptions of such performances and their future prospects, with the view of diverting 
attention from financial distress (Tennyson, Ingram, & Dugan, 1990). The corporate financial 
communication channels become potent vehicles for conveying a desirable impression, with the aim of 
presenting a self-interested view of corporate performance (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2013; Clatworthy & Jones, 2006, p. 493; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). Consequently, top 
executives introduce reporting bias into corporate narratives for diverse purposes including attracting 
increased compensation, specifically through managerial stock options (Rutherford, 2003; Courtis, 
2004a). By definition, reporting bias involves “selecting the information to display and presenting that 
information in a manner that is intended to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements” 
(Godfrey, Mather, & Ramsey, 2003, p. 96). This is manifest in the manipulation of the presentation and 
disclosure of both verbal and numerical information. On the one hand, the manipulation of verbal 
information in corporate narratives could take the form of reading ease manipulation, thematic 
manipulation, rhetorical manipulation, visual and structural manipulation, and the attribution of 
performance. On the other hand, the manipulation of numerical information in corporate narratives could 
take the form of performance comparisons, visual and structural manipulation, as well as earnings 
management (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 12). 
2.10.2 The Psychological Perspective of Impression Management  
For the psychological aspects of impression management, prior studies based on this perspective replace 
the economic view of top executives, who use the corporate reporting function solely on cost-benefit 
analysis, with a social psychological view which incorporates “social relations inherent in the decision 
context into consideration” (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 12). Under this perspective, the behaviour 
of top management is considered as embedded in and a function of the relationships between top 
executives and their organisational audiences, hence, inherently social in character (Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2013). According to Allport (1954), impression management is a product of “the actual, imagined, 
and implied presence” of the audiences of an organisation that demand the accountability of managers. 
To fulfil this responsibility, corporate reports serve as the mechanism for meeting accountability 
obligations, with the aim of using them to address the concerns of the external environment. In view of 
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this, managers use the conditions of accountability to manage the impression of their audiences in 
anticipation of an evaluation of their actions and decisions, primarily, by shareholders (Brennan & Merkl-
Davies, 2013). 
Accordingly, the psychological perspective of impression management informs top management’s use of 
self-serving bias in anticipation of the assessment and appraisal of their performance by shareholders 
and other stakeholders, with the aim of obtaining rewards and the avoidance of sanctions (Frink & Ferris, 
1998). The concept of self-serving bias is explained through the lens of attribution theory which focuses 
on people’s explanations of events (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). The attribution of actions and events 
by an individual becomes biased as they take credit for success and deny responsibility for failure 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; Knee & Zuckerman, 1996). In the context of corporate financial 
communications, self-serving bias involves the attribution of favourable financial performance to internal 
factors such as managerial acumen, and shifting the blame for unfavourable financial performance to 
external circumstances, with the view of influencing the perceptions of investors on those performances 
(Aerts, 1994, 2001; Aerts & Cheng, 2011; Clatworthy & Jones, 2003; Hooghiemstra, 2008).          
2.10.3 The Sociological Perspective of Impression Management 
As the term suggests, this perspective focuses on the underlying motive for impression management 
owing to the structural constraints imposed on organisations either by different stakeholders or by the 
external environment at large (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). From this perspective, impression 
management is conceived either as a response to the expectations and concerns of different stakeholder 
groups or as a response to pressure from the external environment relating to a precipitating event or 
controversial issue, or as arising from inconsistencies between organisational and institutional norms and 
values (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). In order to mitigate any form of inconsistencies between 
organisations and their institutions, top executives strive to gain or restore the legitimacy of their 
organisations by seemingly aligning the norms and values of their organisations with those shared as 
common logic, norms, and values regulating their institution. This aligns with the theory of organisations 
and institutions in that, to ensure the legitimacy of operations and continuous survival, organisations 
regulated by similar logic in an institution often decouple themselves from their individual organisational 
values with the view of aligning to the common values of their defining institution (Thornton & Ocasio, 
2013).   
Although it is not always stated in explicit terms, legitimacy is a social construct in the sense that it refers 
to “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Brennan 
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& Merkl-Davies, 2013; Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Traditionally, the principle of legitimacy is conceptualised 
from either a strategic or an institutional perspective (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). By drawing insights 
from agency theory, the strategic view regards legitimacy as an operational resource carefully crafted 
and employed for the purpose of attaining organisational goals (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013; 
Suchman, 1995). From a structure point of view, the institutional perspective considers legitimacy as “the 
collective awareness and recognition of an organization’s practices as acceptable, appropriate and 
desirable” (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 24; Suchman, 1995). Similarly, from the institutional 
perspective, Breton and Côté (2006) note that legitimacy “resides in people’s minds” (p. 512), and it 
becomes ratified by the organisational audiences once they adjudge organisational practices as 
congruent with institutional rules, norms, and values.  
Furthermore, prior studies on impression management have identified a variety of communication choices 
deployed by top management for the purpose of establishing or re-establishing legitimacy. These 
communication choices can be grouped in light of the underlying concept of legitimacy which can be 
either strategic or institutional (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) note that from 
the strategic point of view, impression management is conceptualised as symbolic management. 
Specifically, symbolic management involves the selection of language choices which have the potential 
for making organisations appear to respond to the concerns of stakeholders or appear to align to the 
norms and expectations of the external environment (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). It follows that the 
top executives of corporate organisations facing major threats on their legitimacy engage in symbolic 
management by creating a separation between their organisations and negative or unfavourable events 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013), such as downward pressure on the global economy and the occurrence 
of financial fraud in their organisation.  
As the sociological perspective on impression management stems from institutional theory, impression 
management is seen as decoupling from the norms and values of individual organisations with the aim 
of coupling with the common values of an institution (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The decoupling entails 
rendering the structures and processes within organisations so they are conceived as conforming to 
social and institutional norms and rules (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Consequently, decoupling 
manifests through the espousal of socially acceptable goals, redefining means as ends and ceremonial 
conformity (Linsley & Kajuter, 2008). Specifically, one of the ways of redefining means as ends could 
entail the justification of the upward valuation of non-current assets on the basis of the adoption of a new 
accounting policy or introduction of a new accounting standard. In similar vein, ceremonial conformity 
involves the adoption of specific practices considered to align with rational behaviour, although they may 
likely not have the capacity to improve organisational practices, such as public sector organisations 
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adopting private sector management accounting practices and schemes for evaluating performance 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 26).  
2.10.4 The Critical Perspective of Impression Management 
  Prior studies that adopted the critical perspective focused on the management of impressions in 
attending to controversial issues and events that threaten the legitimacy of an organisation (Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2013), such as privatisation (Craig and Amernic, 2004a, 2008), unfavourable financial 
circumstances (Amernic & Craig, 2000), corporate financial scandals (Craig & Amernic, 2004b), and 
transformational changes (Amernic, Craig, & Tourish, 2007). For this perspective, the direction of analysis 
is on the manner in which top management use language to convince their stakeholders on the validity, 
legitimacy or necessity of organisational changes, with the aim of portraying financial scandals as one-
off events, or to persuade them of the exceptional nature of the prevailing circumstances that serve as 
precursor to negative financial performance (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Emphasised by Brennan 
and Merkl-Davies (2013), “language use in corporate documents is never innocent, because it is used to 
achieve a variety of economic, social and political goals” (pp. 26-27). Thus, such language is “as 
ideologically saturated … text[s] which wear [their] ideological constitution overtly” (Kress, 1993, p. 174).  
These various insights align with the position of this research in contending the great core approach of 
all previous empirical studies premised on classifying fraud and non-fraud studies, based upon 
companies that were found to have been fraudulent. This study argues that such classification is likely to 
be erroneous due to the potential of missing out on a whole sector of companies that were not found out. 
The position of this study is that all companies are suspect and should be equally validated for differential 
communication and linguistic traits. In conjunction with other detection models, this can be conducted by 
evaluating the financial communications of corporate organisations for some seven impression 
management communication choices (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). 
2.11 Seven Impression Management Communication Choices 
There is the potential for the management of impressions to be incorporated into top management 
communications, and this is more likely to occur as accounting standards do not stipulate the choice of 
wording in the accounting policies and notes to the audited financial statements (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 
2013). In Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007), seven categories of language choices used in impression 
management were identified as reading ease manipulation, rhetorical manipulation, thematic 
manipulation, visual and structural manipulation, performance comparisons, attribution of performance, 
and choice of earnings number – which may serve as precursor to earnings management (Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 13). These communication choices are reviewed hereafter. 
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First, with respect to reading ease manipulation, top management use this technique in making 
accounting narratives more difficult to read and understand, with the aim of concealing unfavourable 
financial information (Li, 2008; Smith & Taffler, 1992). By adopting predefined readability scores, the ease 
or difficulty of accounting narratives can be measured using readability indices such as Flesch Reading 
Ease, Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade. These readability indices are used to compare a calculated 
score with “predetermined standards of written materials graded according to difficulty” (Courtis, 1995, p. 
5), ranging from reading materials for children to scientific articles (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). One 
of the prominent measures, the Flesch Reading Ease score, is calculated using word and sentence 
length. It measures the reading ease or difficulty of a text using a 100-point scale. Accordingly, the higher 
the calculated score, the easier it is to read and understand the text, with a score between 60 and 70 
considered as optimal for the comprehension of a text (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013, p. 14). Second, 
for attempts to rhetorically manipulate the content of accounting narratives, the top management of an 
organisation may structure their performance results using rhetorical devices (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 
2013). In the examination of the rhetorical effects of discourse, Hyland (1998) argues that the creation of 
the ethos of the CEO as a professional, competent, trustworthy, authoritative and sincere person are 
critical elements in establishing credibility in communication.  
Third, the thematic manipulation of accounting narratives involves overstating favourable performance 
results and understating unfavourable performance results (Clatworthy & Jones, 2001, 2003; Smith & 
Taffler, 1995, 2000; Staw et al., 1983). Fourth, visual emphasis and structural manipulation entails 
framing the placement of favourable information in accounting narratives, including placing too much 
emphasis on such information (Bowen, Davis, & Matsumoto, 2005). In addition, this form of manipulation 
could take the form of concealing bad news in middle passages of text within documents (Courtis, 1998), 
the highlighting of text (Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin, & Pierce, 2009), the use of colour (Courtis, 2004b), 
and repetition (Courtis, 1996; Davison, 2008). Fifth, the manipulation of performance comparisons 
involves tactical selection of the performance results of preceding years as benchmarks for comparison, 
with the aim of portraying firm performance in the best possible way (Lewellen, Park, & Ro, 1996; Schrand 
& Walther, 2000; Short & Palmer, 2003). 
Sixth, the attribution of performance focuses on the impression management techniques that top 
management use for the purpose of either claiming credit for favourable organisational outcomes or 
shifting the blame on external factors for unfavourable organisational outcomes (Baginski, Hassell, & 
Hillison, 2000; Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Lastly, Johnson and Schwartz (2005) studied earnings 
choice or selectivity, and it entails the judicious selection of a favourable earnings figure to disclose in 
accounting narratives, including pro forma earnings (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). This current study 
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argues that both the management of impression in accounting narratives and the selection of impression 
management communication choices are potent precursors to earnings management. Accordingly, the 
next line of review focuses on the literature on earnings management.  
2.12 Earnings Management in Financial Communications 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) emphasised that the separation of ownership from the control of public 
companies creates an agency problem between the principals (shareholders) and the agents 
(managers). As a result, the top executives of those companies might not reveal the truth owing to the 
high contrasting costs between top executives and firms, the bounded rationalities of shareholders that 
do not enable them to comprehend the actions of managers, and the information asymmetry resulting 
from the costly communication in the market (El Diri, 2018, p. 1; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Ronen & Yaari, 
2008; Walker, 2013). Accordingly, the top management of a company may resort to exercising discretion 
over financial reporting that can take the form of earnings management, provided it is performed within 
the purview of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (El Diri, 2018; Fama, 1980; Harris & 
Raviv, 1979; Strong & Walker, 1987; Walker 2013).  
From the theoretical perspectives of previous studies, contemporary research has introduced three 
different groups of motives for earnings management behaviour including contracting motives that arise 
from inadequacies in the terms of contract between a firm and its stakeholders, capital market motives 
that are associated with stock market inefficiencies, and third-party motives driven by the need to conform 
to the expectations of the external environment which, subsequently, influences the cost of making 
information available in the market (El Diri, 2018; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). The literature on 
earnings management has separately studied these underlying motives and identified a number of factors 
specific to each group (El Diri, 2018). With respect to contracting motives, previous studies have identified 
management remuneration, CEO turnover, corporate governance, managerial acumen, and loans as 
motivating factors for earnings management (Boone, Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Defond & Francis, 
2005; Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, & Mcvay, 2013; El Diri, 2018; Godfrey, Mather, & Ramsay, 2003; Iatridis & 
Kadorinis, 2009; Laux & Laux, 2009; Yu, 2008).  
On motives related to capital markets, the influence of the stock market, mergers and acquisitions, 
issuance of equity, new listings and cross-listings, meeting or beating a benchmark, insider trading, and 
the effect of analysts have been identified as motivating factors for earnings management (El Diri, 2018, 
p. 1; Efendi, Srivastava, & Swanson, 2007; Fan, 2007; Kothari, 2001; Lang, Smith Raedy, & Wison, 
2006). Lastly, from the external motives perspective, the impact of industry, regulations, accounting 
standards, industrial diversification, political environment and country-specific policies have been 
64 | P a g e  
 
identified as motives for earnings management (Bagnoli & Watts, 2000; Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; 
El Diri, 2018, p. 2; Goldman & Slezak, 2006; Jiraporn, Kim, & Mathur, 2006). Of particular importance to 
this study is the perspective of external motives for earnings management as it aligns to the analysis of 
the impact of institutions or external environment on organisational behaviour.  
Accordingly, El Diri (2018) defines earnings management as within the GAAP exercise of management 
discretion over external financial reporting function facilitated through the abuse of some deficiencies in 
contract terms, the bounded rationalities of shareholders, and the asymmetry of information in markets, 
through some economic decisions, a change in accounting policies or treatment of some items, or other 
sophisticated methods (p. 2). Hence, the purpose of earnings management is to disclose earnings in a 
way different from what is known to top management with the view of achieving private benefits while 
distorting the economic decisions of stakeholders, however, such exercise of managerial discretion may 
not always be harmful to the stakeholder community (El Diri, 2018). Although earnings management has 
been studied from different perspectives, overall, its review in this study aims to evaluate the 
phenomenon in light of the impact of institutional or external pressures and industry factors that motivate 
earnings management by the top executives of a firm. Historically, this phenomenon has been identified 
as the underlying reason for some of the corporate financial scandals of large companies like Enron, 
Satyam, Adelphia, WorldCom and Tyco, and subsequently resulted in the failure of those companies.  
To obtain a proper understanding of earnings management in the context of this study, the next sections 
start by providing a brief review of different definitions of earnings management using a four-stage 
process introduced in El Diri (2018) by focusing on its characteristics, conditions, activities, and target 
audience (p. 5). It follows with attempts to differentiate between earnings management and other 
concepts like impression management, and how earnings management serves as precursor to financial 
statement fraud. 
It is noteworthy that no single definition of earnings management exists in the extant literature on the 
phenomenon (El Diri, 2018). However, various efforts have been made to mainly define earnings 
management as the intentional manipulation of the financial reporting process with the aim of achieving 
specific targets (El Diri, 2018). In the context of this study, three approaches to the definition of earnings 
management inform the institutional perspective of this study. Mulford and Comiskey (2005) define 
earnings management as “the active manipulation of earnings toward a predetermined target, which may 
be set by management, a forecast made by analysts, or an amount that is consistent with a smoother, 
more sustainable earnings stream” (p. 3). Similarly, Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) define the 
phenomenon as the exercise of “managerial discretion over accounting choices and operating cash flows” 
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(p. 493). More recently, Walker (2013) defines earnings management as “the use of managerial discretion 
over (within GAAP) accounting choices, earnings reporting choices, and real economic decisions to 
influence how underlying economic events are reflected in one or more measures of earnings” (p. 446).  
These three definitions emphasise common themes or phrases which are: the exercise of managerial 
discretion; and the need to conform to, meet or exceed institutional expectations. In the context of this 
study, these two themes are particularly essential to the understanding of how the top executives of 
individual corporate organisations within an institutional setting use the amount of discretion afforded to 
them in influencing the financial reporting process, with the aim of meeting or exceeding the expectations 
of the stakeholders in their institutional environment. In view of this, this study posits that the pressure to 
meet or exceed the expectations of the stakeholder community serves as an underlying motive for top 
executives to engage in earnings management.  
While other definitions not covered in this study may offer better explanation with different perspectives 
on earnings management, nonetheless, the various definitions commonly emphasise how managers 
engage in the manipulation of the earnings of their firms (El Diri, 2018). To mention but a few, the literature 
on earnings management emphasises the recognition of accruals by applying different accounting 
principles (Baber, Kang, & Li, 2011; Walker, 2013), smoothing earnings with the intention of decreasing 
their volatility over time (Coffee Jr, 2004; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Walker, 2013), and the use 
of other sophisticated methods such as using derivatives and special purpose entities (Giroux, 2004; 
Feng, Gramlich, & Gupta, 2009; Petrovits, 2006).  
In addition, definitions from previous studies have highlighted the motives that drive managers towards 
the management of earnings (El Diri, 2018), which may be at the contracting level (Laux & Laux, 2009), 
capital market level (Gelb & Zarowin, 2002; Kothari, 2001), and the external level such as the influence 
of regulators and competitors (Goldman & Slezak, 2006; Jones, 1991). Although significant efforts have 
been made to define and explain earnings management, it has always been confused with other 
phenomena like impression management (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007); and financial statement fraud 
(Dechow & Skinner, 2000). The next sections look at differentiating between earnings management and 
the other concepts mentioned.  
With respect to the difference between earnings management and impression management, the latter is 
a combination of techniques used by firms to opportunistically manage the discretionary aspects of 
narrative disclosures with the intention of distorting the perceptions of stakeholders, to influence their 
economic decisions on the basis of information asymmetry between the agents and the principals (El 
Diri, 2018, p. 10; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). While impression management entails the manipulation 
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of the narrative aspects of financial reports, earnings management focuses on exercising managerial 
discretion over the numerical aspects of the earnings components of financial statements (El Diri, 2018, 
p. 11). 
 Similar to earnings management, impression management entails the exercise of the discretionary 
powers of top executives in financial reporting for the purpose of hiding critical information about the 
underlying economic performance indices of a firm that ultimately have the potential to mislead and 
influence the perceptions of the users of financial reports and, hence, leads to short-term capital 
misallocation (El Diri, 2018, Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). With both earnings management and 
impression management, the underlying assumption is that both activities are based on the inefficiencies 
in markets resulting from the bounded rationalities of different users in the stakeholder community (El 
Diri, 2018). Nevertheless, while earnings management activities entail the manipulation of the numerical 
aspects of financial statements that have the potential to influence the perception of future cash flows, 
impression management relies only on the disclosure of the narrative aspects of financial reports (El Diri, 
2018). In view of this, managing the impression of narrative disclosures can be seen as a more indirect 
way of manipulating the perceptions of stakeholders than earnings management. However, it may involve 
high risk especially with the increasing amount of narrative disclosures that occupy more than half of a 
firm’s annual reports and that may prove difficult to read, be monitored and regulated (El Diri, 2018, p. 
11; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
With respect to the difference between earnings management and financial statement fraud, the former 
may take place through the application of aggressive or conservative accounting provisions within the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that usually happens towards the end of an accounting 
period, such as increasing or decreasing the estimation of some provisions (El Diri, 2018).  In addition, it 
may take the form of some aggressive or conservative economic decisions that top management may 
employ at any time during an accounting period to influence cash flows, such as delaying or accelerating 
the recording of revenue (El Diri, 2018). Furthermore, earnings management may result in understating 
or overstating the reported earnings within a fiscal period, and can be considered to be pernicious if it 
results in decreasing firm value or beneficial if it allows signalling additional information about a firm in 
the foreseeable future (El Diri, 2018). However, earnings management does not involve any violation of 
accounting principles (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Ronen & Yaari, 2008), nevertheless, it may serve as a 
precursor to financial statement fraud (El Diri, 2018).  
In contrast, financial statement fraud involves a violation of GAAP and can be committed by top 
management within or after a fiscal year, with the view of either increasing or decreasing the reporting 
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earnings of a firm (El Diri, 2018, p. 10). In this sense, financial statement fraud “follows aggressive 
earnings management behaviour” (El Diri, 2018, p. 10), as such, it is regarded as extremely aggressive 
in comparison to earnings management (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). 
In sum, financial statement fraud is always seen as harmful to a firm and its stakeholders (El Diri, 2018).  
As noted previously, three major theories (as shown below in Figures 2.1 and 2.2) have been highlighted 
that explain the underlying motives for earnings management: the contracting motives, capital market 
motives, and external or third-party motives. Of particular importance to this study is the external, 
institutional or third-party motives perspective as it provides the basis for discussing the interests and 
influence that the stakeholder community have on a firm, which have the potential to interfere in the way 
it communicates information to the stakeholders (El Diri, 2018; Ronen & Yaari, 2008; Walker, 2013). 
Accordingly, the next sections follow with a review of the external or third-party motives for earnings 
management which can then serve as precursor to financial statement fraud.  
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Figure 2.1 The relation between the theoretical framework and earnings management motives. 
Source: El Diri (2018, p. 64)  
Although the need to meet or exceed predetermined benchmarks (Graham et al., 2005) and the influence 
of analysts’ forecasts (Ronen & Yaari, 2008) are categorised as capital market motives for earnings 
Figure 2.2 External or Third-Party Motives for Earnings Management 
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management, this study draws insights from these capital motives in conjunction with the clearly classified 
external motives of earnings management, such as the influence of industry norms and values, and the 
presence of industry competitors. Accordingly, the next sections follow with a review of the influence of 
benchmarks and analysts’ forecasts on earnings management. It follows with a review of the influence of 
the expectation of conformity to industry norms and values, and the presence of industry competitors on 
earnings management in financial communications.  
With respect to the pressure to meet or beat a benchmark, the top management of a firm may be 
motivated to engage in earnings management (El Diri, 2018). According to El Diri (2018), benchmarks 
are meant to mitigate the risks attached to information asymmetry between a firm and the market, which 
can take the form of earnings of prior years, zero earnings, or analysts’ forecasts (Xue, 2003). 
Furthermore, the top management of a firm may be motivated to meet analysts’ forecasts because they 
reflect the expectations of the general market which affords a firm more credibility in the market should 
those expectations be met or exceeded (Graham et al., 2005).  
In addition, firms that are classified within the same industry generally have similar institutional logic 
(Thornton & Occasion, 2013), and are identifiable through legal and financial incentives (El Diri, 2018). 
Therefore, they tend to consider the behaviour of other similar firms in that industry when making their 
decisions (Kallunki & Martikainen, 1999; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Popp, Toms, & Wilson, 2003). In a 
similar vein, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) emphasise that there is a positive correlation between earnings 
management activities of a firm and the levels of comparable activities in the same industry. On the other 
hand, different industries develop on the basis of differentials in the resources available to them, which 
ultimately determine their distinct industry structures and institutionalised characteristics, and contribute 
to the differences in performance and profitability between them (Mcgahan & Porter, 1997; Popp et al., 
2003).  
Consequently, the differences in managerial incentives and discretion between the different industries 
results in the variation in the type and degree of earnings management activities adopted in each sector 
(Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000; Gu, Lee, & Rosett, 2005). Specifically, Gu et al. (2005) note that firms 
operating in industries with a high level of managerial discretion have more potential to engage in 
earnings management than those with a low level of managerial discretion. Overall, the various insights 
above provide evidence that aggressive earnings management serve as precursor to deception in 
financial communications. This leads to the review of the literature on deception and its context in financial 
reporting.  
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2.13 Deception  
Deception is defined as an intentional and conscious attempt to convince someone of a particular subject 
the liar believes to be untrue, which varies in different contexts (Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015). The 
context of relationships is different with varying levels of stakes, hence some lies told in some contexts 
are considered trivial and inconsequential while others are serious and have debilitating consequences, 
thereby demanding more rigorous need for their detection. From all forms of crime, be it terrorism crime, 
immigration crime or financial crime, those charged with the responsibility of providing regulatory or 
oversight roles strive to detect deception (Granhag et al., 2015). Accordingly, for the purpose of detecting 
such serious lies, researchers have been studying how liars respond and how those lies could be 
detected. In view of this, there are various methods but with four notable approaches towards deception 
detection. Investigators could approach the detection of deceit by measuring the physiological responses 
of the subjects of investigation; through the observation of their behaviour; by analysing their speech; or 
measuring activities around their brain region (Granhag et al., 2015). Traditionally, the assumption was 
that what aids the detection of deception was the essential element of fear of being detected (Trovillo, 
1939). Subsequently, there have been developments to the methods used in deception detection 
covering verbal, non-verbal and physiological techniques, with recent introduction of the cognitive 
approach to the detection of deceit, which is in contrast to the more conventional anxiety-based 
approaches.  
One prominent approach towards the detection of deceit which has a long history is the analysis of speech 
content. It is suggested that, with a combination of some physiological and behavioural cues, a subject 
of deception ‘does not answer questions, or they give evasive answers; he speaks nonsense’ (Trovillo, 
1939, p. 849). Similarly, in the acknowledgment of Tardieu, a French forensic expert, ‘quantity of detail’ 
is one of the characteristics to be considered in ascertaining the veracity of allegations in sexual abuse 
cases involving children (Lamers-Winkelman, 1999). However, it is not clear as to how the element of 
‘quantity of detail’ would assist in distinguishing truth from deception in statements made by adults. It is 
unclear if the amount of detail is a true measure of truth or deception. Owing to the fact that corporate 
organisations are headed by experienced top executives in specific industry groups, with majority of them 
having mastered the principle of public relations, it is arguably unreliable to endorse the veracity of their 
statements by mere reliance on the ‘quantity of detail’ in such statements.  
Nonetheless, the inability of some of the early propositions in successfully distinguishing between truth 
and deception has not undermined the search for verbal cues to deceit. there is a sustained search for 
those cues that help in identifying deception, with a substantial number of studies having been found to 
be diagnostic for deceit (DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, and Cooper, 2003; Masip, 
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Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Vrij, 2008). Whilst it is possible to measure some verbal cues in 
isolation, most of them are combined as verbal veracity assessment tools towards unravelling deception, 
some of which are: Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN), 
Management Obfuscation Hypothesis, Interpersonal Deception Theory, amongst others. Prior to 
assessing these various deception detection techniques, it is noteworthy to explore the reasons why 
people lie and why they remain unnoticed, the frequency of lying, and the targets of deception 
On the reasons why people lie, it is arguably conventional to view lies as being told to gain material 
advantage over others or to avoid the possibility of creating materialistic loss on the targets of deception. 
This form of deception could be labelled as selfish, disruptive to social life, and hurtful to the target 
audience (Vrij, 2008). It is stereotypical for the popular press (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & 
Epstein, 1996) and individuals (DePaulo, 2004; Kowalski, Walker, Wilkinson, Queen, & Sharpe, 2003; 
Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006) to have a negative view of lying. Nevertheless, it is also valid that 
there are psychological reasons why people lie, and that those lies typically receive more understanding 
(Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, 2002). This view reflects on the work of Goffman (1959) who pointed to the 
potential theatrical capability of individuals, behaving as actors on a set stage. In the same vein, it lends 
credence to one of the reasons why lies remain unnoticed: individuals do not proactively attempt to detect 
them because they are sceptical of the consequences of knowing the truth, a phenomenon referred to as 
the ‘Ostrich Effect’ (Vrij, 2008, p. 2).  
Accordingly, the reasons why individuals are not motivated to know the truth are classified into at least 
three categories. First, the target audience of deception might sometimes find fabricated disclosures to 
sound more pleasant than the knowledge of the truth, with ignorance preferable in such cases (Vrij, 2008). 
Second, individuals sometimes do not attempt to investigate whether or not they are susceptible to or 
apparent victims of deception, owing to the fear of the consequences of knowing the truth. In the same 
vein, a victim of deception may try to avoid having the knowledge of the truth especially when there are 
future benefits derivable from the perpetrator, and the consequences of revelation of the truth far 
supersede the need to discover the truth. Similarly, in a corporate business context, this study argues 
that stakeholders would rather not push to investigate suspicions of earnings management in a bid to 
avoid crashing the market value of their investments, which is the consequence of proof of fraudulent 
financial misstatements. Third, potential victims of deception do not want to investigate any suspicion of 
lies because they might be clueless on what to do if they came to discover the truth (Vrij, 2008), hence, 
they prefer to remain ignorant.  
72 | P a g e  
 
Goffman’s (1959) study advances insights from contemporary studies with many having argued that the 
presentation of self which is offered to others in daily life is not the true self, but one that is edited (Allen 
& Gilbert, 2014; DePaulo, 2004; DePaulo et al., 1996, DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, 
& Cooper, 2003; Feldman, Forrest, & Happ, 2002; McCornack, 1997; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975). 
Accordingly, the edited version of self considers the public perception of the perpetrator and how they 
wish to be seen. Individuals lie to avoid the possibility of embarrassment attributable to the revelation of 
their inadequacies and errors, while it is also possible to lie for the purpose of protecting others with the 
intent to avoid deliberately hurting their feelings (Vrij, 2008). Hence, in a bid to protect continuous social 
interaction, individuals lie for various reasons, albeit, motivated through the need: to benefit self – which 
is the case of occupational fraud -; or for the benefit of self, a group or an organisation – which is the 
case of corporate fraud -, to gain advantage or avoid debilitating costs; and for materialistic or 
psychological reasons, especially with creating a positive impression on others (Vrij, 2008, p. 19).  
With respect to other-oriented lies, the perception is that such lies are told for the benefit of other people, 
to make them appear better, to protect them from incurring undeserved materialistic loss, punishment or 
experiencing psychological damage (Vrij, 2008). This could be the case of top executives of corporate 
institutions denying allegations of fraud in other to save them from public embarrassment – personal 
benefit, or for the purpose of preventing negative market reactions on the wealth of their shareholders at 
the revelation of the truth – the benefit of others. Social lies are considered to benefit mutual relations, 
which satisfy both self-interests and those of others. With this theoretical and empirical background on 
deception, it is imperative to evaluate some prominent theories and methods for analysing deceptive 
discourse, some of which are: Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), Scientific Content Analysis 
(SCAN), Management Obfuscation Hypothesis, Interpersonal Deception Theory. 
2.13.1 Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is a method developed within Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), 
which is used to assess the truthfulness of a child’s testimony in sexual offences (Granhag et al., 2015). 
However, CBCA has been applied successfully in several different contexts including accounting 
research (Humpherys, Moffit, Burns, Burgoon, & Felix, 2011). The overarching rationale of CBCA, as 
originally hypothesised by Undeutsch (1982), is that there are differences, with respect to the content and 
quality, between statements derived from recollections of actual experience and those based on 
fabrication or fantasy (Granhag et al., 2015). In CBCA, trained investigators assess the presence or 
absence of a set of 19 criteria (shown below in Table 2.4). It follows that the veracity of a verbal statement 
is strengthened with the presence of each criterion. Therefore, truthful statements based on genuine 
personal experience will contain more of the constituent elements measured by CBCA than fabricated 
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reports, with the scores attributable to each element subject to both cognitive and motivational factors 
(Köhnken, 1989, 1996, 2004). 
Table 2.4: Criteria-Based Content Analysis (Vrij, 2008, p. 208) 
NO THE CRITERIA-BASED CONTENT ANALYSIS CRITERIA 
  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1 Logical structure 
2 Unstructured production 
3 Quantity of details 
    
  SPECIFIC CONTENTS 
4 Contextual embedding 
5 Descriptions of interactions 
6 Reproduction of conversation 
7 Unexpected complications during the incident  
8 Unusual details 
9 Superfluous details 
10 Accurately reported details misunderstood 
11 Related external associations 
12 Accounts of subjective mental state 
13 Attribution of perpetrator's mental state 
    
  MOTIVATION-RELATED CONTENTS 
14 Spontaneous corrections 
15 Admitting lack of memory 
16 Raising doubts about one's own testimony 
17 Self-deprecation  
18 Pardoning the perpetrator 
    
  OFFENCE-SPECIFIC ELEMENTS  
19 Details characteristic of the offence  
 
In the context of accounting research, only some of the criteria of CBCA are currently amenable to 
computerised text analysis techniques including quantity of details (Granhag et al., 2015, Vrij, 2008), and 
words that describe feelings, time and space (Humpherys et al., 2011). Furthermore, CBCA is based on 
the hypotheses that truthful statements will contain more unusual details, more superfluous details, more 
overall details, with more references to time, space, and feelings than statements that are deceptively 
crafted (Granhag et al., 2015; Humpherys et al., 2011). In view of this, statements derived from actual 
experiences should contain more contextual embedding than statements based on deception (Granhag 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, it remains unclear if these same cues will be of significance in the context of 
corporate financial communications. For example, corporate financial communications may not be 
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reflective of references to feelings, but testing for the quantity of affect words have the potential for 
differentiating between fraudulent and non-fraudulent financial communications (Humpherys et al., 2011). 
This line of thought applies to the inclusion of any of the language features hereafter discussed.   In 
addition, as a technique developed within SVA, a Validity Checklist – comprising 11 issues (shown below 
in Table 2.5) - is applied to evaluate whether or not certain external factors affect CBCA scores. Through 
systematic analysis of the identified external factors noted in the Validity Checklist, an investigator is 
enabled with the possibility of exploring and considering the alternative interpretations of the CBCA 
outcomes, instead of strictly adhering to the theoretical interpretation of each criterion. Consequently, the 
affirmative response given to each external factor raises a question about whether or not the CBCA 
outcome remains valid (Granhag et al., 2015, p. 11).  
Table 2.5: The Validity Checklist (Vrij, 2008, p. 214) 
1. Inappropriateness of language and knowledge  
2. Inappropriateness of affect 
3. Susceptibility of suggestion 
4. Suggestive, leading, or coercive questioning 
5. Overall inadequacy of the interview 
6. Questionable motives to report 
7. Questionable context of the original disclosure or report 
8. Pressures to report falsely 
9. Inconsistency with the laws of nature 
10. Inconsistency with other statements 
11. Inconsistency with other evidence 
 
For the purpose of this research, the external factors of the Validity Checklist that specifically inform the 
rationale of this study are the interviewee’s ‘susceptibility of suggestion’ when faced with questions from 
the investigative press; the ‘pressure to report falsely’ when dealing with stakeholders that seek for above-
average-market-returns; ‘inconsistency with the laws of nature’, which is a measure of the plausibility or 
implausibility of described events or future predicted performance; ‘inconsistency with other statements’, 
which is conducted by considering whether there are significant elements in corporate narratives which 
contradict or are inconsistent with another statement made by top executives; and ‘inconsistency with 
other evidence’, which is a measure of whether or not major elements in the statements of members of 
top management team align with reliable physical evidence or other concrete evidence, which is usually 
the case of comparing qualitative information with quantitative sections of corporate reports. 
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2.13.2 Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) 
Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) is a unique version of CBCA which hypothesises that both truthful 
persons and deceivers have similar intention of convincing their target audience of their truthfulness 
(Granhag et al., 2015; Humpherys et al., 2011; Vrij, 2008). As a matter of procedure, this technique 
adopts written statements authored by the subject of an investigation to avoid the risk of contamination 
by other parties. In corporate financial reporting context, this principle is particularly useful in the 
assessment of truthfulness of corporate reports, owing to the fact that the investigative press, external 
auditors, and financial reporting regulatory authorities are not involved in the writing of financial reports, 
thereby eliminating any possibility of the reports, subject to their scrutiny, being contaminated.  
However, in the business context, some corporate reports are either written or proof-read by Public 
Relations Companies (P.R Companies) to prevent top management from releasing sensitive information 
to the public, which would likely negatively affect the outlook of their client organisation (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997). Therefore, it would be helpful to compare edited evaluative statements of top 
management (annual reports) with extemporaneous non-evaluative statements (discussions with 
analysts, conference call, prospectuses) made by them, for the purpose of differentiating between 
linguistic cues of the two forms of statements.  
2.13.3 Management Obfuscation Hypothesis (MOH) 
The corporate financial communications disclosed by top management are inherently difficult to read 
(Humpherys et al., 2011). However, according to the Management Obfuscation Hypothesis (MOH), 
financial communications that contain unfavourable financial performance results should be even more 
difficult to read and understand (Bloomfield, 2002). According to Bloomfield (2002), top management will 
have an incentive to dissimulate or obfuscate unfavourable financial performance results if they so desire, 
to delay the response of the market to the unfavourable news. It is expected that when a company 
performs poorly, there is an incentive for management to cover up the unfavourable performance in order 
to delay stock price reactions, by decreasing the readability of their financial communications (Li, 2008).  
As an extension of Bloomfield’s incomplete revelation hypothesis, MOH states that information that is 
costly to extract and process will not manifest immediately in market prices, hence, it provides the 
potential for management to delay market price reaction by manipulating the readability of financial 
communications and making them more costly to analyse (Humpherys et al. 2011). In a similar vein, Li 
(2008) emphasises that top management of poorly performing firms wish to hide unfavourable financial 
performance results by decreasing their readability and comprehensibility. McNamara, Graesser, 
McCarthy, & Cai, (2014) used the Flesch Reading Ease to operationalise and measure readability. The 
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Flesch Reading Ease takes into consideration sentence complexity (as measured by average sentence 
length) and word complexity (as measured by average word length) to determine the readability of a text. 
It follows that longer sentences and longer words are proxy measures for complexity and should occur 
either during periods of unfavourable financial performance results (Bloomfield, 2002) or when fraud is 
present (Humpherys et al., 2011).   
2.13.4 Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) 
Interpersonal Deception Theory is mainly concerned with deceptive interchanges dyadic and dialogic 
(Humpherys et al., 2011). However, the developers of IDT provide many insights into the applicability of 
IDT, for the purpose of assessing the behaviour of deceivers in non-interactive, decontextualised, and 
asynchronous settings in which documents like annual reports are published (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
Interpersonal Deception Theory combines principles from interpersonal communication and deception to 
deduce a series of propositions that predict the behaviours of senders and receivers of a message in an 
interactive context (Humpherys et al., 2011, p. 587). These series of propositions are with respect to 
context and relationship, strategic activities conducted prior to communication, effect of the 
communication on sender’s deception and fear of detection, effect on the cognition of the receiver, and 
interaction patterns (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Two important assumptions of IDT are that deceptive 
communication is goal-oriented and that deceptive individuals want to minimise taking responsibility for 
their deceit if it becomes discovered. In the context of corporate financial reports, the CEO and members 
of top management team are personally held responsible for the financial reporting function of their 
company.  
Therefore, to reduce the risk associated with the content of financial communications documents that 
bear the signatures of top executives, they would seek to minimise the number of claims or definitive 
statements made in those documents (Humpherys et al., 2011). This behaviour would be more important 
and manageable in annual reports, a communication vehicle that gives top executives more flexibility and 
opportunity to edit and re-edit the content of annual reports, including the use of public relations experts 
in crafting and managing information disclosed to the stakeholder community. In the context of this study, 
this is important in evaluating the differences in the language features of the communications of top 
executives in monologue (annual reports) and dialogue/interactive settings (discussions with analysts).  
Another important assumption of IDT is that deceptive individuals strategically manipulate information 
while trying to attain their goals, which can be accomplished by managing the completeness of a 
message, its truthfulness and relevance (Humpherys et al., 2011). It follows that truthful persons and 
deceivers alike try to manage their image, but companies engaged in earnings management or fraud will 
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more likely engage in impression management (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013) by trying to deceptively 
present their company in a more positive light than is necessary. On the other hand, non-fraudulent firms 
will be more inclined to include unfavourable information in their reports if necessary (Humpherys et al., 
2011). 
In sum, these different theories and methods for differentiating between truthful and deceptive statements 
provide a framework for understanding the strategic and non-strategic placement of deceptive behaviours 
in financial communications. These behaviours can emanate from a routine earnings management 
behaviour which, if aggressively institutionalised, may lead to fraudulent financial reporting. Hence, the 
next section focuses on a brief review of the literature on deception in the context of financial reporting – 
otherwise known as financial statement fraud.    
2.14 Deception in the Context of Financial Reporting – Financial Statement Fraud 
Deception is a phenomenon which has attracted a lot of research effort, especially in the psychological 
domain. As emphasised above, it entails the intentional effort to communicate information for gain to a 
target individual, which the perpetrator knows is untrue. Accordingly, in the process of communicating 
among individuals, the basis on which the confidence of the parties to the communication rests is ‘trust’. 
Hence, deception is an action which violates that trust. With the possibility that the concept is adapted 
with various synonyms in different research domains, in the context of business and finance, deception 
is simply regarded as fraud. Accordingly, the use of ‘fraud’ as a suitable terminology in this study. That 
being said, it is imperative to review the concept of fraud in generic terms and as it relates to accounting 
and finance. Fraud has been defined in different ways. According to Webster’s New World Dictionary, 
fraud is defined as “the intentional deception to cause a person to give up property or some lawful right”. 
This definition suggests the perpetrator possesses some influential and or authoritative position to 
deceitfully obtain another’s lawful possession, however, fraud is also possible where an individual of a 
lower rank deceives the top management of an organisation as in the case of employee fraud. 
In the UK jurisdiction, what connotes fraud is defined by the Fraud Act 2006 as an act which involves 
false representation; failure to disclose information when there is a legal duty to do so and; the abuse of 
position (Campbell, 2007). With this perspective in the definition of fraud and the insights from the legal 
domain, it is evident that fraud is not an error. While there is the instance where erroneous acts could 
mislead others to their disadvantage, a fraudulent act is not a product of error. This means that fraud is 
not a consequence of uncontrollable complications and unavoidable occurrences, but such that is crafted 
with the intent to obtain criminal advantage from others. With the consequences emanating from fraud, 
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various estimates have been generated in times past. In business and accounting domain, a common 
fraud stereotype is the financial statement fraud.  
2.14.1 Financial Statement Fraud 
Defining financial statement fraud (FSF) in clear and absolute terms is difficult owing to the difficulty in 
discerning FSF from authoritative statements or pronouncements, primarily because the accounting 
profession only adopted the word ‘fraud’ in its professional pronouncements in the 1990s (Rezaee & 
Riley, 2010). The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) define FSF as “the intentional, 
deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data which is misleading and, when 
considered with all the information made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her 
judgment or decision” (cited in Rezaee & Riley, 2010, p. 5). In addition, the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Reporting considers FSF to be an “intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, 
that results in materially misleading financial statements.” (Treadway, 1987, p. 2, cited in Rezaee & Riley, 
2010, p. 5) From the various definitions considered, a common theme on fraud, specifically financial 
statement fraud, is the recurrence of the phrase “deliberate deception”, with a proven intent to cause 
harm, injury, or damage.  
Financial statement fraud, fraudulent financial statement, and top management fraud have been used 
interchangeably, primarily because, it is the corporate responsibility of management to prepare and 
publish reliable financial reports, and also due to the fact that the responsibility for ensuring the fair 
presentation, integrity and the quality of financial reporting process is vested in the management of an 
organisation (Rezaee & Riley, 2010). According to the United States Department of Justice, corporate 
fraud is broadly classified into: accounting fraud or financial fraud, self-dealing by corporate insiders, and 
obstructive conduct (cited in Rezaee & Riley, 2010). On the aspect of accounting fraud, it entails the 
falsification of accounting information by manipulating accounting records to mislead investors, with 
schemes such as swap transactions, capitalising expenses, deferred expenses, and accelerated revenue 
(Rezaee & Riley, 2010, p. 6).  Self-dealing, on the other hand, involves members of top management 
misappropriating corporate assets such as personal expenses charged as company costs, loans granted 
to top executives with no intention to repay. Lastly, top management also engage in obstructive conduct 
by providing false testimony in depositions to regulatory authorities, providing false witness and testimony 
in the course of criminal investigations, and failure to provide documents required in subpoena (cited in 
Rezaee & Riley, 2010).    
Furthermore, FSF differs in nature, course, and determinants across various jurisdictions. The 
manipulation of earnings by management to deceive unsuspecting investors is particularly common in 
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the United States, while in mainland Europe, the majority of FSF schemes border on intentionally devising 
strategies that benefit controlling shareholders to the detriment of minority shareholders (Rezaee & Riley, 
2010). Regardless of whatever scheme is frequently used in any jurisdiction, the board of directors, audit 
committee, external auditors, and the regulatory authority are presented with challenges capable of 
affecting the global economy. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of FSF strategies in any jurisdiction makes 
it challenging for fraud prevention and detection methods applied in one jurisdiction to be effective in 
others.   
2.14.2 Financial Statement Fraud Detection 
In the review of literature on fraud, the phenomenon has been generally defined as the use of 
misrepresentations or criminal deception to gain unjust advantage on a target audience. In addition, 
human ingenuity seems to contribute to the variety of fraud schemes devised in the contemporary 
business world. In the same vein, globalisation creates the propensity for fraudulent conducts in the 
business domain to have large scale impacts globally. This is evident in the discovery of financial fraud 
in Enron, followed by the subsequent revelation of fraud in the corporate reports of companies like Tyco, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, Satyam, among others. This continuous perpetration and unravelling of financial 
fraud shows that it has become a critical phenomenon in the business arena, a reason for the enactment 
of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 in the USA. 
As a constituent part of information forensics, the detection of fraud has become indispensable in an 
effort to safeguard the interests of businesses and their stakeholders. Traditionally, it is within the 
expertise of financial analysts and assurance providers such as auditors to conduct financial fraud 
detection. In the course of analysing financial reports, financial analysts use financial metrics to measure 
the solvency, profitability, growth, among other measures, between several periods and among industry-
related firms, for the purpose of performing full and diligent audit procedures. Although the detection of 
financial fraud is dominant in the context of financial statement fraud, nevertheless, it is also applicable 
to detect fraudulent practices related to insurance payment claims, credit card transactions, mortgage 
claims, and web-based financial transactions (Bose, Piramuthu, & Shaw, 2011). Accordingly, with the 
advancement in information technology and decision sciences, advanced models in quantitative research 
have been developed, with specific emphasis on the development of automated processes that help 
minimise the use of manual operations in the detection of fraud.  
Established for financial fraud detection are tools useful for data analysis such as Bayesian belief 
networks, self-organising maps, discriminant analysis, regression, clustering, decision trees, neural 
networks, support vector machines, among others. Common to all the quantitative fraud detection models 
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is the use of a variety of disclosures in financial statements or financial transactions as viable inputs, of 
which the outputs have been used to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent organisations or 
to predict the likelihood of a company adopting fraudulent financial practices. It is noteworthy that, in 
addition to the well-established quantitative fraud detection models, contemporary research in the 
detection of financial statement fraud have adopted the mining of the qualitative sections of financial 
reports to determine the existence of fraud in textual corporate disclosures. Accordingly, the rationale is 
that fraudulent financial statements may be a precursor to financial fraud, such that financial statements 
may be perpetrated by deploying linguistic techniques to hide deception in the textual sections of 
corporate reports.    
2.15 Fraud Detection – Contemporary Qualitative Fraud Detection Approaches  
2.15.1 Qualitative Fraud Detection Techniques 
In comparison to the quantitative fraud detection models, the use of financial narratives are relatively less 
numerous (Minhas & Hussain, 2016). A comprehensive literature review by Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
(2007) provide an approach for analysing the narrative sections of corporate reports using manual/semi-
automated content analysis approaches. Accordingly, seven core strategies were found which have 
potential for impression management in corporate narratives. Emphasised and adopted in Minhas and 
Hussain (2016) are two pertinent strategies: the obfuscation of bad news and emphasis placed on good 
news. In the former strategy, the proposition is that managers can be motivated to obfuscate bad news 
by limiting the clarity of textual information in corporate reports, such that the information contained 
therein is more costly to extract, consequently, making it difficult for poor performance to be reflected 
instantly in market prices. Hence, bad news can be obfuscated by manipulating rhetoric or through the 
increased difficulty of reading.  
Similarly, deploying rhetorical language has been used to conceal poor corporate performance through 
the use of passive voice, pronouns, and metaphor. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) argue that “what 
firms say” is not more important than “how they say it”, a term known as the management obfuscation 
hypothesis. Prior studies in this context use the Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, 
or Gunning Fog Score to pick up the constructs of rhetorical language, for the purpose of measuring the 
readability of corporate reports (Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, & Segal, 2010). In the latter strategy, the 
proposition is that managers can overly emphasise on good news by manipulating the thematic 
constructs of corporate reports, a strategy considered as the “Pollyanna principle” which explains how 
emphasis can be placed on good news as well as the simultaneous concealment of bad news (Minhas 
& Hussain, 2016).  
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In a previous study, Li (2006) examined the information in the qualitative sections of annual reports to 
determine the risk sentiment of annual reports used in the prediction of future earnings and market 
returns. He conducted his study by counting the frequency of words that are associated with risk or 
uncertainty in annual reports. He found that an emphasis on risk by top executives in annual reports is 
associated with lower future earnings. This suggests that the investment community underreacts to the 
textual portion of annual reports made available to the public. Similarly, Tetlock (2007) explored the 
relationship between media content and activities in the stock market by assessing investor sentiment 
extracted from a popular Wall Street Journal column (Goel & Gangolly, 2012). By measuring the 
pessimism index based on words derived from the General Inquirer (GI) dictionary, he found that high 
media pessimism predicts downward pressure on stock prices followed by a return to fundamentals, and 
unusually high or low pessimism predicts high market trading activities (Goel & Gangolly, 2012, p. 77).  
Furthermore, Li (2008) examined the relationship between the readability of annual reports and the 
performance of firms and earnings persistence. By using both the fog index from computational linguistics 
and the length of document (Goel & Gangolly, 2012, p. 77) as measures of readability, he found that it is 
more difficult to read and understand the annual reports of firms with lower earnings. In contrast, firms 
with annual reports that are easy to read and understand have more persistent positive earnings. This 
suggests that top executives may be deliberating manipulating the readability of annual reports to 
obfuscate unfavourable financial performance results.  
In another study, Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, and Pathak (2010) analysed the Management Discussion & 
Analysis (MD&A) sections of corporate annual reports to predict fraud and bankruptcy. They formed a 
dictionary of discriminating concepts from MD&As which could differentiate between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent firms. They found that 75% of the time, their method could differentiate between fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies, while 80% of the time the same approach could differentiate between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. To improve their classification technique, they combined qualitative 
data with quantitative data. The result showed an increase in the prediction accuracy to 81.97% for fraud 
and 83.87% for bankruptcy (Goel & Gangolly, 2012, p. 77). 
Also, Goel, Gangolly, Faerman, and Uzuner (2010) examined the qualitative sections of the annual 
reports using a Natural Language Processing (NLP) tool and explored the language features that have 
the potential for differentiating between fraudulent and non-fraudulent annual reports. To proactively 
identify ways to detect fraud, they created a methodology using support vector machines, a supervised 
machine-learning technique (Goel & Gangolly, 2012, p. 78). They found that the employment of language 
features is effective in the detection of fraud. In addition, they were able to improve the classification 
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accuracy of fraud detection models from the baseline results of 56.75% accuracy, using a ‘bag of words’ 
approach, to 89.51% accuracy when they combined linguistically motivated features. They found 
systematic differences in the communication and writing style of the annual reports of fraudulent 
companies (Goel & Gangolly, 2012).  
Humpherys et al. (2011) examined 202 publicly available financial disclosures to assess the language 
features that can help identify the use of fraudulent language in fraud committed by top management. 
They found that fraudulent financial communications use more activation language, words, pleasantness, 
imagery, references to groups, and less lexical diversity than non-fraudulent companies (Goel & 
Gangolly, 2012). Their results suggest that the authors of fraudulent financial information have the 
potential to write more to appear credible, while communicating less in actual content. Furthermore, Goel 
& Gangolly (2012) examined the implications of the language features of annual reports for potential 
fraud. They found that six categories of language cues are associated with fraudulent financial 
communications which are: the use of complex sentences, difficulty of reading and comprehension, the 
use of positive tone, passive voice, language of uncertainty, and the use of adverbs (p. 87). 
Lastly, Purda and Skillicorn (2015) used a ‘bag of words’ approach in their fraud detection study by 
broadening comparisons of qualitative and quantitative fraud detection models and examined the 
possible benefits of investigating the change in a firm’s language use from one reporting period to the 
next in the identification of fraudulent financial reporting. They developed a language-based method for 
fraud detection using the words in the MD&A sections of annual and interim reports. For the purpose of 
eliminating bias in the classification between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies, they trained their 
model on Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) by using a decision-tree approach to 
establish a rank-ordered list of words from the MD&A sections that are considered as best for 
distinguishing between fraudulent and non-fraudulent reports. Based on the top 200 words generated 
from the list, they used Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to predict the status of each report and assign 
it a probability of truth, an approach that achieved a correct classification rate of 82%. In addition, their 
method provided first indication that the inclusion of interim financial reports and a temporal measure of 
deviations in the language use by companies in previous periods may provide incremental power in the 
timely identification of fraudulent reports.    
Taken as a whole, the need to detect potential fraudulent financial reporting has invoked the instincts of 
researchers in the field of accounting in exploring the various linguistics analysis techniques available for 
this purpose. In view of this, this study reviews the literature on the analysis of language and computerised 
content analysis of corporate communications.  
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2.15.2 Linguistic Analysis – The Content Analysis of Corporate Communications 
One of the prominent terminologies for expressing the use of automation in the analysis of corporate 
communications is Computer-aided Text Analysis (CATA) (Bligh & Kohles, 2014), a method that 
demonstrates enormous potential for advancing the study of leadership communications. Bligh and 
Kohles (2014) emphasise the need to seek for innovative ways towards utilising textual information from 
diverse sources such as annual reports, transcripts from meetings, statements to shareholders, in order 
to move beyond the traditional study of leadership communication in the fields of management and 
organisational psychology. In view of this, this study reviews the use of CATA in comparing the 
communications of organisational leaders across different contexts and historical time periods, through 
the medium of prior studies that have adopted this approach. With notable strengths and weaknesses of 
CATA techniques, this study argues that CATA represents an important technique in unravelling potential 
rhetorical manipulation of corporate communications by organisational leaders in a wide variety of 
leadership contexts. This is particularly important in the context of impartially comparing between or 
among leaders across institutions and in specific situations.  
This current study argues that the study of the communications of organisational leaders across different 
contexts and historical time periods can provide critical understanding of the processes of communication 
that underlie organisational outcomes. These outcomes such as the communication of the performance 
results of organisations are not commonly examined from the perspective of leadership communications. 
In view of this, this study reviews prior studies that have considered a wide range of data sources, 
variables, and approaches that can be adopted in studying the communications of organisational leaders, 
and to review the inherent advantages and disadvantages of using automated techniques like CATA in 
unravelling linguistic cues embedded in the communications of corporate leaders. Subsequently, this 
study will emphasise the need to evaluate leaders’ communications in the refined granular context of 
their institutions and prevalent circumstances. 
Traditionally, language has been considered as a significant foundation for the process of leadership 
(Bligh & Kohles, 2014), and scholars in the fields of management and organisational psychology have 
argued that the interlink between the leaders of organisations and their followers is fundamentally rooted 
in the processes of communication and discourse (Barge et al., 1989; Conger, 1991; Bligh and Kohles, 
2014; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Insch et al., 1997; Komaki & Citera, 1990). In view of this, this study argues 
that CATA can provide the evaluation of the linguistic strategies organisational leaders use in 
communicating to the users of financial information. Accordingly, this study posits that content analysis 
techniques and several other innovative technologies can be applied in the study of corporate 
communications, through the continuous utilisation of textual data from different sources such as CEO 
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letters to shareholders, transcripts from conference calls and analysts’ discussions, and other executive 
speeches. Lastly, this study adopts the techniques provided by CATA to assess what organisational 
leaders say during periods of good and bad organisational outcomes. 
2.16 Communication in Organisational Leadership 
Organisational leadership is a phenomenon that is socially constructed, a medium through which some 
individuals strive to structure, define, or sometimes influence the reality of other individuals (Smircich & 
Morgan 1982). An important part of the structuring of such communication can be linked through oral and 
written language, a process which offers invaluable opportunities for researchers in the fields of 
management and organisational psychology to study leadership communications in contextually based 
situations, yet using unobtrusive approaches (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). Furthermore, the advancement in 
technology provides automated approaches towards studying the communications of organisational 
leaders across various contexts and over historical time periods. Importantly, the analysis of corporate 
communications by organisational leaders continues to provide the medium for analysing the 
communication of leaders, by obtaining their oral or written statements and evaluating them within the 
time and context that they occur, an approach that has been used in prior studies (Barge & Schlueter, 
1991; Barge et al., 1989; Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst & Chandler, 1989; Fairhurst & Sarr, 1996; Fairhurst 
et al., 1987; Komaki & Citera, 1990).  
Although the techniques provided using CATA have great potential for identifying linguistic features of 
larger discourses, the focus of this study is on evaluating the financial communications of organisational 
leaders in the context of institutional theory. Specifically, these techniques provide both macro- and micro- 
levels of analysis of specific vocabularies, comparable components, and dimensions of the use of 
language that is well suited to identifying and comparing the embedded meanings of the linguistic choices 
of organisational leaders. The discourse analysis and thematic or content analysis of a text provides a 
higher level of the analysis of language use in financial information, by exploring how and why the use of 
language represents the view of organisational leaders with respect to the organisations they lead, which 
provides the potential for revealing and understanding the underlying and unstated assumptions (Bligh & 
Kohles, 2014). It is noteworthy that although CATA provides techniques that can assist in discourse 
analysis (talk-in-interaction) and content (thematic) analysis of text, nevertheless, the focus of this study 
is on the interpretive aspects of text provided by content analysis techniques. This would require the 
interpretive skills of the researcher and subsequently provides a higher level of analysis.  
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2.16.1 An Overview of Computerised Content Analysis 
As a research methodology, CATA provides an investigatory insight into the symbolically rich 
communications used by organisational leaders in various contexts, making it an invaluable tool for 
studies on corporate communications in the field of business and management. One of the core reasons 
for using, in this study, computerised content analysis of text is to assist with the probing of text with much 
increased depth and subtlety (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). This approach is based on the assumption that the 
choice of specific words employed by an organisational leader in their financial communications can be 
particularly revealing of the themes that they intend to convey to users of such information. In their study, 
Bligh and Robinson (2010) argued that the choice of words by John F. Kennedy to the American citizens 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis gave a direct reference to the need to change the status quo in the face 
of opposition. Cited in Bligh and Kohles (2014, p. 146), Kennedy said: “This sudden, clandestine decision 
to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately provocative and 
unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country.” Accordingly, the content 
analysis of this statement would potentially provide language cues that are revealing of the vocabulary 
of change.  
In addition, a number of prior studies have engaged the utilisation of the choice of words and phrases to 
suggest conclusions about the motives or ideas of organisational leaders. In the same vein, linguistic 
analysis techniques have been used to examine the style of thinking and the emotional states of some 
individuals (Zullow et al., 1988), as well as the change in their leadership styles in response to a defining 
occurrence, such as a crisis (Bligh et al., 2004a). In the study by Bligh et al., (2004a), they examine 
language constructs such as the measure of collectiveness in the speeches of President George W. Bush 
before and after the terrorist attacks of 11th September, 2001. In their analysis, they found the use of 
more collective language after the crisis than they did in the speeches prior to the attacks (Bligh & Kohles, 
2014). Accordingly, these prior studies suggest that the specific choice of words by the leader of an 
organisation can be critically revealing of their motives, intentions, and underlying assumptions, with 
potential for significant effects on measurable outcomes such as credit ratings, market capitalisation, and 
share price (Bligh & Hess, 2007). In the same vein, this change in the use of language in the face of a 
defining event is particularly significant in the context of this study for understanding the language 
features of the CEOs of companies when reporting good or bad financial performance results.  
With respect to the advantages and disadvantages of using computerised content analysis for the 
financial communications of organisational leaders, Bligh and Kohles (2014) provide an overview of some 
of the benefits and limitations attributable to select language analysis tools. Despite the strengths and 
weaknesses, Bligh and Kohles (2014) emphasise that CATA remains a highly systematic and reliable 
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technique, as well as being cost-effective and well-suited for processing large amounts of data. 
Consequently, it is also well-suited for comparing large numbers and various forms of corporate 
communications at a relatively micro level of detail. More importantly, the use of CATA techniques can 
provide an additional alternative when it is either not feasible or too prohibitive to use human coders due 
to limitations attributable to time or financial resources. In a comparative study on the differences between 
CATA and human coders, Morris (1994) concluded that there is the likelihood for both methods to be 
equally effective, however, with the potential for differences in results and conclusions when conducting 
higher levels of analysis.  
Furthermore, he concluded that human coders are more likely to be sensitive to larger contextual cues 
when analysing text in paragraphs than those provided by CATA. Similarly, the results of comparing 
between human coders and CATA techniques on the rhetoric of President George W. Bush prior to and 
after the terrorist attacks of 11th September, 2001 show significant positive correlation for all the 
constructs examined between the two methods, with the exception of ambivalence. This discrepancy 
could be because of the operation of CATA at a much more micro-level of detail, a trend human coders 
may not perceptually recognise. In addition, Bligh et al. (2004b) highlight that the prevailing circumstances 
(i.e. the prominent role of the American President in the unpopular war In Iraq) surrounding the time of 
coding could have influenced the minds of the human coders in their ratings of the level of ambivalence 
in the speeches of the President. Consequently, Bligh and Kohles (2014) recommend that studies that 
aim to examine the broader, more abstract constructs of language at higher levels may consider the 
fundamental trade-off between the added reliability, stability, comparability, and cost-effectiveness of 
CATA and the additional construct validity and subjectivity provided by human coders.  
Nonetheless, CATA has been criticised on the grounds of separating words from their initial context, a 
point that necessitates applying caution in its use (Bligh & Kohles, 2014). Similarly, Bligh and Robinson 
(2010) point out the need to pay attention to challenges attributable to potential loss of translation in the 
use of computerised content analysis. It is possible to lose the representation and colloquial forms of 
important constructs due to cross-cultural translation of certain words. In view of this, texts must be 
carefully reviewed before processing them using computerised text analysis tools, so as to preserve their 
localised meanings. In the same vein, this need to retain the colloquial forms of words is applicable to the 
process of converting words in British English into either Old English or American English. In sum, there 
are various software packages that can be used for computerised text analysis, including those needed 
for “qualitative data input, data management, data coding, analysis, visualization, text mining, and 
archiving” (Bligh & Kohles, 2014, p. 148). With respect to data input, the software packages available for 
this use assist with creating text files from files in print or audio format. Software packages for data 
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management assist with organising text from different formats such as Adobe pdf, image, Microsoft Word, 
or video documents. In addition, certain software packages assist with the coding of certain aspects of 
text, image, or video files to categorise their contents for subsequent analysis. With respect to data 
visualisation, the software packages available for this purpose allows for the visual representation of the 
data by using network diagrams or other types of images. Lastly, software packages for data archiving 
assist with organising and compressing data files for the purpose of preserving them for future use (Bligh 
& Kohles, 2014). It is noteworthy that although these functions are exclusive for some of the software 
packages, yet, they provide multiple functions that can be found in other computerised text analysis tools. 
In summary, this chapter provided a review of literature from various fields of study needed for the 
construction of testable hypotheses with the view of answering the overarching research question. The 
next chapter focuses on the discussion of the aims and objectives of this study, the core and 
supplementary research questions, the research methodology, research methods, and the discussion of 
the corpora and software tools adopted for this study.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Following on from the review of relevant literature that provides insights for the approach of this study, 
this chapter begins with a discussion of the research aims and objectives. It follows with the discussion 
of the core research question and supplementary research questions. Next is a brief discussion on how 
the theory adopted for this study influences the development of the research hypotheses tested in this 
study. Thereafter, various research philosophies are discussed with the justification of the specific 
philosophy adopted for this study. Subsequently, the research methodology and research methods are 
discussed. This chapter concludes with the discussion of the corpora and tools adopted for this study and 
the processes undertaken in the collection of data and the selection of samples in line with the predefined 
selection criteria.    
3.1 Research Aims and Objectives 
In the context of the field of Accounting, one of the increasing areas of research is in the domain of 
accounting narratives. Historically, the approach towards the research on corporate narratives has been 
predominantly on individual corporate organisations and their respective communication patterns, without 
much emphasis on the study of each organisation’s corporate financial communications within the context 
of the industry or institution it is affiliated with. In view of this, this research aims to advance the work on 
evaluating and contrasting linguistic patterns in corporate financial communications across companies 
and industries, drawing on insights from research in the areas of institutional theory, institutional logic, 
isomorphism, and impression management. Accordingly, the proposition of this research is that 
organisations in different industries are governed by institutionalised logic peculiar to each industry. 
Based on this logic, industries within institutions become similar over time and communicate in an 
isomorphic pattern.  Therefore, it is possible to ascertain, through the analysis of linguistic patterns among 
organisations, whether or not an organisation shows the tendency to be deceptive in the manner they 
communicate with their stakeholders, in a way different from their competitors. The aims of this research 
therefore are: 
 To review the literature in the areas of Institutional theory, Isomorphism and Legitimacy, 
Impression Management, Deception, Financial Statement Fraud, and Linguistic Analysis. 
 To draw and evaluate insights from research in the area of institutional logic in categorising 
companies according to the discretion afforded to them. In view of this, the literature and 
empirical studies in the area of industry discretion will be adopted in classifying companies as 
either belonging to a high discretion industry or a low discretion industry.  
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 With the literature and extant theory on psycholinguistics, to overlay the conceptual frameworks 
and develop hypotheses regarding industry-level discretion, especially relating to corporate 
financial communications during good and bad times and deception detection in corporate 
accounting narratives.  
 To derive thematic tests to inform future professional practice in the areas of audit and corporate 
governance. 
3.2 Research Questions 
The study reported in this work is an analysis of the linguistic features of the Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) of companies across various industries, with the overarching aim of ascertaining whether they 
differ from their competitors within the same industry classification. This overarching question was 
structured in different phases of research questions.  
First, by drawing and evaluating insight from research in the area of managerial discretion studies 
predominantly conducted in the United States of America (USA), this research aims to test whether the 
predictive model for measuring overall industry discretion can be adopted, replicated, tested, and 
validated for companies in the United Kingdom (UK). The first phase of question is to test whether the 
predictive model can be used to classify companies as either belonging to the high discretion industry or 
low discretion industry, in line with the results presented for the US industries (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 
1997; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland et al. 2010).  
Consequent on the outcome of the first research question, the second question focused on testing 
whether the extant theory on psycholinguistics and linguistic analysis techniques provide indicators for 
differentiating the linguistic features of companies in the high discretion industry from the linguistic 
features of companies in the low discretion industry, using testable hypotheses.  
Third, consequent on the outcome of the second research question, the third question focused on 
assessing the linguistic features of each industry classification during favourable and unfavourable 
financial performance periods. Accordingly, the third question focused on understanding how the 
companies in each industry classification use language in communicating their financial performance 
results during favourable and unfavourable periods.  
3.3 Construction of Theory 
In this study, the overarching research approach is to adopt the various understandings from institutional 
theory sources from which organisational behaviour is structured. From the literature considered, it is 
evident, from the perspective of institutional theory, that there are two sources that influence the 
behaviour of organisations – from within the firm itself and its external environment. In addition, the theory 
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on isomorphism posits that firms regulated by the same or similar institutional logic are expected to 
behave in similar ways when confronted by a stimulus from the external environment. Consequently, the 
theory on institutional logic, which further explains isomorphism, is based on the theoretical foundation 
that there are various organisational fields and that different organisational fields are regulated by differing 
institutional logic. Specifically, institutional logic provides explanation to the thought that different 
organisations within the same industry classification will be regulated by a similar logic, which will be 
different from the institutional logic that regulates firms in an entirely different industry classification. 
Accordingly, as different organisational fields are regulated by different institutional logics, it is expected 
that the responses of the firms within the same industry classification to an external stimulus will be 
isomorphic, albeit, different from the responses of the firms in a different organisational field or industry 
classification. The nature of the responses of organisations, regardless of the organisational field to which 
they belong, is manifest in different ways including their communication, reporting, or linguistic pattern. 
Accordingly, with the theoretical underpinning that similar organisations act in similar ways, including their 
use of language, and thereby, as suggested in this research their use of language will be determined by 
logic regulating the industries to which they belong. Therefore, the deviation by any member organisation 
within an industry classification from the central logic of its defining organisational field could be as a 
result of innovation, one-off responses to isolated events, or potential deception. Furthermore, based on 
the understanding that organisations within the same organisational field act in similar ways, different 
from those in another organisational field, the overarching standpoint of this study proposes that the 
differences will be manifest in their use of language to communicate the performance levels of their firms. 
In view of this, this study proposes that with the level of discretion available in any industry, it impacts the 
performance indices and the mode of communication adopted by the member organisations in a given 
industry.  
For this purpose, this study adopts the perspective of the liberty afforded to organisations in their quest 
to use industry discretion in directing the affairs of an organisation. This discretion or latitude of action, 
this study proposes, influences how aggressive or conservative their performance indices are, which 
expectedly will be manifest in their choice of reporting language. Therefore, this study focuses on 
categorising select industries as either aggressive/hard or conservative/soft with respect to financial 
communications. Accordingly, this study adds a layer to prior research conducted on industry discretion 
by equating aggressive or hard financial communications with a high level of discretion within an industry, 
while associating conservative or soft financial communications with low level of discretion prevalent in 
an industry. Consequent to this proposition, it is imperative to distinguish between the categorisation of 
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industries as having either aggressive/hard or conservative/soft financial communication style, through a 
review of the literature and relevant empirical findings on the effect of discretion.  
3.3.1 Implication of Discretion on Research Hypotheses Development 
In this study, the aim is to create a clear dichotomy between the financial communications of companies 
in the high and low discretion industries, with potential for investigating differentiated signals to deceptive 
financial reporting. In order to do this, this study adopts the insights on discretion to classify some 
organisations as belonging to the high discretion industry category, while on the other hand, classifies 
some organisations as belonging to the low discretion industry. Prior research provides the insight that 
the discretion afforded to an industry is enabled or constrained based on the extent to which each 
discretion force exists. Furthermore, Miller et al. (1982) affirmed that in industries where the CEOs have 
an internal locus of control, there will be greater pursuit of innovation and greater risky decisions, while 
organisations are more likely to imitate and create a sense of community/identity with competitors in 
industries where the locus of control is from the external environment. Consequently, it is possible to 
understand the dynamics within an individual or organisation through their choice of words (Bligh & 
Kohles, 2014; Craig et al., 2013).  In view of this, this study proposes that in industries dominated by 
aggressive innovation, with the CEOs having internal locus of control, the financial communication style 
adopted in those industries will be revealing of the semantics that signal aggressive, unclear and complex 
financial communications. On the other hand, in industries dominated by conservative followership with 
the external environment claiming the locus of control, the financial communication style adopted in those 
industries will be revealing of the semantics that signal conservative and clearly understood financial 
communications. For the purpose of this research the organisations with internal locus of control are 
equated as belonging to the high discretion industry, while those with external locus of control are equated 
as belonging to the low discretion industry.  
3.4 Research Philosophy 
Undertaking a research study requires the conscious or unconscious adoption of a number of types of 
assumption (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This entails assumptions about human knowledge (epistemological 
assumptions), those concerning realities encountered while conducting a research study (ontological 
assumptions), and the degree to which the values of a researcher influence a research process 
(axiological assumptions). As a result, these assumptions inevitably influence the understanding of the 
research questions, the selection of research methods and the interpretation of research findings (Crotty, 
1998). Accordingly, the focus of this section is to outline the philosophical choices made for this study 
and to justify their adoption rather than available alternatives. In addition, it outlines the selected research 
methodology and data collection techniques.   
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In order to distinguish between the philosophical choices selected for this study and alternative research 
philosophies, consideration was given to the differences in assumptions that underpin individual 
philosophies. Accordingly, three types of research assumptions were considered for this study and they 
are with respect to ontology, epistemology, and axiology. According to Saunders et al. (2016), ontology 
refers to a set of “assumptions about the nature of reality” (p.127). These assumptions shaped the way 
in which the objects of study within this research were evaluated. In the context of this study, the 
ontological assumption was that the selection of actions by an organisation cannot be solely attributable 
to the principle of rational choice, but rather that, every organisation derives meanings and actions from 
the logic that regulates the institution to which each belongs. This study argues that this logic has impact 
on the conduct of organisations within an industry category, and their responses to this logic can be 
evaluated in the context of their financial communications. Consequently, the actions and specifically the 
financial communications of organisations should be evaluated from the perspective of the vocabulary 
and linguistics used in the industry to which they belong, rather than conclude that each organisation 
rationally selects its own vocabulary without considering the language used in the industry to which it 
belongs. This ontological assumption influenced the decision to evaluate the financial communications 
of organisations in the context of institutional theory. 
With respect to epistemological assumptions, this focuses on assumptions made about knowledge, what 
constitutes knowledge that is acceptable, valid, and legitimate, and how such knowledge can be 
communicated to others (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). In the context of business and management, the 
multidisciplinary nature of this field of study means that various forms of knowledge including those 
derived from numerical data to textual data and visual data, from empirical facts to subjective 
interpretations, and including narratives, stories and fictional accounts can all be considered legitimate 
(Saunders et al. 2016, p. 127). Consequently, different business and management research studies 
would require different epistemologies including those based on narratives (Gabriel, Gray, & Goregaokar, 
2013). Accordingly, the availability of a multiplicity of research philosophies in this field makes available 
a much greater choice of methods than are available in other academic disciplines.  
Nevertheless, this has implications for diverse strengths and weaknesses attributable to the multiple 
philosophical assumptions that underpin business and management research. For example, the 
assumption of positivists is that objective facts offer the best scientific evidence and is likely to influence 
the choice of quantitative research methods. The subsequent research findings drawn from quantitative 
research methods have a higher likelihood to be considered as objective and generalisable than those 
from qualitative research methods (Saunders et al. 2016). On the other hand, qualitative research findings 
generated from interpretivist assumptions offer a rich and complex view of organisational realities, which, 
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otherwise, would have been crunched in numbers as in the case of quantitative methods under positivist 
assumptions. In the context of this study, the epistemological assumption considered legitimate for this 
research is in the realm of interpretivism due to need to understand the richness of the textual information 
provided in the financial communications of organisations.  
Lastly, axiological assumptions relate to the impact of researcher values and ethics in the research 
process (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 128). Heron (1996) argues that human action is guided by individual 
values. Furthermore, he argues that there is the demonstration of axiological skill by researchers in being 
able to articulate their views as the basis for making judgements on both the selection and conduct of 
research projects. The choice of research philosophy reflects the values of the researcher. This also 
becomes manifest in the choice of data collection techniques (Saunders et al. 2016). In the context of 
this study, one of the core values held by the researcher is that information is a powerful tool in the 
business community, especially in capital markets. It is very important for as much information as possible 
to be provided to users of financial information so they are able to make informed economic decisions. 
Furthermore, such information should not be too complex for stakeholders to read and understand, as 
their investments decisions will be properly guided with clear and concise financial information.  
As aforementioned, the field of business and management draws philosophical assumptions from 
multidisciplinary fields of study. Although this offers a wide range of philosophical and methodological 
choices, it also implies that business and management research philosophies are spread across a 
multidimensional set of continua (Niglas, 2010) between two opposing extremes of objectivism and 
subjectivism (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 128).  
3.4.1 Objectivism versus Subjectivism  
The viewpoint of objectivists is that social and physical phenomena exist in an independent way, with 
universal and enduring traits. In view of this, it is plausible to approach their study in the same way as 
natural scientists would study nature (Saunders et al. 2016). Epistemologically, the approach of 
objectivists towards research is to unravel the truth about the social world, through the instrumentality of 
observable, measurable facts, towards making generalisations about the universal social reality. With 
respect to axiological assumptions, since the premise is that social actors and social entities exist 
independently, the guiding principle of objectivists is to separate their personal values from their research 
activity, which they argue, could create bias in their findings. They therefore strive to detach themselves 
from their values and beliefs throughout the process of research (Saunders et al. 2016).  
In contrast, subjectivism posits that social reality is derived from the perceptions and consequent actions 
of individuals or social actors. From the perspective of ontology, subjectivism embraces nominalism. In 
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its highest form, nominalism considers that through the use of language, conceptual categories, 
perceptions, and consequent actions, the order and structures of social phenomena are created through 
studies conducted by researchers (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 130). Nominalists hold that there is no other 
underlying reality to the social world than what social actors attribute to it. Accordingly, it would be 
reasonable to consider multiple realities rather than a single reality that is the same for everyone due to 
the differences in individual experiences and diversities in the perception of reality (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979). From another perspective, a less extreme version of Nominalism is known as Social 
Constructionism. This emphasises that the construction of reality is facilitated as social actors engage in 
social interaction, which results in the creation of partially shared meanings and realities. In contrast to 
the underlying assumption of objectivists who seek to unravel universal facts and general rules governing 
social behaviour, subjectivists aim to explore and understand various opinions and narratives that can 
provide explanation for different social realities of social actors (Saunders et al. 2016). It is the position 
of subjectivists that it is somewhat impossible to detach personal beliefs and values in the course of 
actively interpreting social data (Saunders et al. 2016), a condition that calls for a researcher to engage 
in radical reflexivity (Cunliffe, 2003). 
 In the context of this study, the underlying standpoint is that organisations create their own meanings 
and realities through social interactions within the industry they are affiliated to. This study argues that 
there is no set of rules that can be applied universally to all organisations in the corporate world and that 
the responses of each organisation are expected to align to the rules or logic that regulates the specific 
institution they belong to. As a result, individual organisations either create their own logic and rules or 
respond to a logic set by an external institution. On the one hand, some organisations respond to 
meanings and realities out of the externally-created logic that regulates the institution to which each 
belongs. On the other hand, some organisations are either so powerful or have greater latitude of action 
to create their own meanings and realities. This study takes the subjectivist position to seek to understand 
the different meanings and realities of corporate organisations, in order to make meaningful sense of and 
understand their motives, actions, and intentions. Furthermore, it posits that the meanings and realities 
of these corporate organisations are produced through interactions among participants within their 
affiliate institutions.  
It is noteworthy that with different philosophical assumptions are certain research paradigms that cannot 
be overemphasised. In the course of differentiating and selecting between appropriate research 
philosophies for research undertakings, researchers engage with certain political or ideological 
orientations while investigating the social world (Saunders et al. 2016). Similar to the dichotomy of the 
objectivism-subjectivism dimension, this political or ideological dimension is subdivided into two opposing 
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extremes. Burrell and Morgan (1979) term these two extremes as the ‘sociology of regulation’ and 
‘sociology of radical change’ (cited in Saunders et al. 2016, p. 132). On the one hand, the regulative 
perspective emphasises the need for the regulation of social institutions and social actors. It assumes an 
underlying cohesiveness and unity of social structures and social systems, a dominant perspective in 
much of research in the field of business and management (Saunders et al. 2016). Accordingly, the 
rationale for adopting a regulative perspective in any business and management research is to seek to 
propose improvements in the affairs of organisations within the framework of an existing mode of 
operation, rather than radically challenge the current position. On the other hand, the radical change 
perspective aims to fundamentally question the existing mode of operation in organisations, and through 
research, offer insights that would help change organisational and social worlds (Saunders et al. 2016). 
In view of this, a radical change researcher seeks to approach research from the viewpoint of overturning 
an existing organisational state of affairs, a position that is often considered as visionary and utopian, 
which is concerned with what is possible as alternatives to an existing mode of operation (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). In the context of this study, both perspectives were considered in recommending the 
regulation of certain aspects of the mode of communication of organisations whilst also proposing radical 
change in other operational areas.  
In their book Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Burrell and Morgan (1979) create the 
combination of the objective-subjective continuum with a regulation-radical change continuum, to form a 
matrix of four distinct and competing paradigms of organisational analysis (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 132). 
As explained by Burrell and Morgan (1979), a paradigm is a set of underlying and taken-for-granted 
assumptions, a basis for establishing the frame of reference, mode of theorising and modalities of working 
in which a group operates (Saunders et al. 2016). Of particular interest to this study are two competing 
paradigms – the functionalist paradigm and the interpretive paradigm. The functionalist paradigm stems 
from the objectivist and regulation dimensions, and is mostly used in business and management 
research. The underlying rationale of this paradigm is one that seeks to offer rational explanations and 
develop sets of recommendations within existing structures. A key assumption of this research paradigm 
is to consider organisations as “rational entities, in which rational explanations offer solutions to rational 
problems” (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 134). For example, a study based on the functionalist paradigm could 
focus on evaluating the financial communication strategies of an organisation, to assess its impact and 
make recommendations for improvement. Any study in this dimension is most likely to be based on a 
positivist research philosophy, an approach referred to as positivist-functionalist (Saunders et al. 2016).  
On the other hand is the interpretive paradigm, an extension to the interpretivism research philosophy. It 
focuses on the way individuals seek to make meaning of the social world, an attempt to understand the 
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fundamental meanings attached to organisational life. Furthermore, the interpretive paradigm seeks to 
discover irrationalities in organisational behaviour, rather than emphasising the rationality of actions. 
Similar to the illustration above, a study based on the interpretive paradigm could focus on evaluating the 
financial communications of an organisation, to assess especially its bad performance through cues 
provided in its corporate reports which may not be apparent to the users of the financial information. This 
is likely to lead to studying organisational politics and the way in which corporate organisations are 
managed. This perspective focuses on becoming involved in understanding the everyday activities of 
corporate organisations and to explain what is going on rather than changing the current position 
(Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). Accordingly, this study primarily adopts the interpretive paradigm with the 
aim of evaluating the financial communications of corporate organisations, to understand the certain 
linguistic markers which provide insights on what is going on in such organisations rather than changing 
their current position. This is further informed by reviewing some of the major philosophies in business 
and management research. 
3.5 Major Research Philosophies 
This section reviews three of the major philosophies used in business and management research: 
positivism, pragmatism, and interpretivism (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 135). Table 3.1 shows the 
comparison of the three research philosophies reviewed for this study.  
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Table 3.1 Comparison of three research philosophies in business and management research 
Ontology Epistemology Axiology Typical Methods 
Positivism 
Real, external, 
independent 
One true reality 
(universalism) 
Granular (things) 
Ordered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scientific method  
Observable and 
measurable facts  
Law-like 
generalisations 
Numbers 
Causal explanation and 
prediction as 
contribution 
 
 
 
 
Value-free research 
Researcher is detached, 
neutral and  
independent of what is 
researched 
Researcher maintains 
objective stance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Typically Deductive 
highly structured, large 
samples, measurement. 
typically quantitative 
methods of analysis, but 
a range of data can be 
analysed 
 
 
 
 
 
Pragmatism  
Complex, rich, 
external 
‘Reality' is the 
practical 
consequences of 
ideas 
Flux of processes, 
experiences and 
practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Practical meaning of 
knowledge in specific 
contexts 
‘True' theories and 
knowledge are those 
that enable successful 
action 
Focus on problems, 
practices and relevance 
Problem solving and 
informed future practice 
as contribution 
 
 
 
 
Value-driven research 
Research initiated and 
sustained by researcher's 
doubts and beliefs 
Researcher reflexive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following research 
problem and research 
question 
Range of Methods: Mixed, 
Multiple, etc 
Emphasis on practical 
solutions and outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretivism 
Complex, rich 
Socially constructed 
through culture and 
language 
Multiple meanings, 
interpretations, 
realities 
Flux of processes, 
experiences, 
practices 
 
Theories and concepts 
too simplistic 
Focus on narratives, 
stories, perceptions and 
interpretations 
New understandings 
and worldviews as 
contribution 
 
 
 
Value-bound research 
Researchers are part of 
what is researched, 
subjective 
Researcher interpretations 
key to contribution 
Researcher reflexive 
 
 
 
 
Typically inductive. 
Small samples, in-depth 
investigations, qualitative 
methods of analysis, but a 
range of data can be 
interpreted 
 
 
 
 
 
Extracted from Saunders et al. 2016, p. 136.  
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3.5.1 Positivism  
This philosophical assumption is based on producing strictly scientific empirical methods designed to 
yield pure data and facts without being influenced by researcher bias and human interpretation as shown 
in Table 3.1. To adopt a positivist position would mean viewing organisations and other social entities as 
tangible in the same manner as physical objects and natural phenomena are tangible. From an 
epistemological perspective, the aim would be to discover observable and measurable facts and 
regularities to produce credible and meaningful data (Crotty, 1998). According to Gill and Johnson (2010), 
this would entail seeking causal relationships in research data and to produce law-like generalisations 
similar to those created by natural scientists. This can be used to explain and predict behaviour and 
events in organisations (Saunders et al. 2016). 
The different fields in the natural sciences have developed from the understanding of the world beginning 
with the collection of data followed by making observations prior to the formulation and testing of 
hypotheses. Subsequently, the development of hypotheses leads to the gathering of facts rather than 
subjective interpretations which would provide the foundation for subsequent hypothesis testing. In 
addition, positivists strive to maintain neutrality and detach themselves from their beliefs and values so 
as to avoid influencing their research findings (Crotty, 1998). This is a plausible standpoint for positivists 
as they deal with measurable and quantifiable data. In sum, to facilitate replication, there is the likelihood 
for positivist researchers to use a highly structured methodology (Gill & Johnson, 2010).  
3.5.2 Pragmatism 
According to Kelemen and Rumens (2008), the philosophical assumption of Pragmatism asserts that the 
relevance of research concepts is a function of their ability to support action. The rationale of Pragmatism 
is to strive to create reconciliation between the philosophical positions of objectivism and subjectivism, 
facts and values, knowledge created from accurate and rigorous procedures, and different contextualised 
experiences (Saunders et al. 2016). This is attained by giving consideration to theories, ideas, concepts, 
testable hypotheses, and research findings, not in an abstract manner, but rather from the perspective of 
their functionality as instruments of imagination and action, and in terms of their practical implications in 
specific contexts. Ontologically, reality is of great importance to pragmatists due to the fact that the 
practical implications of ideas, and knowledge is valued for successfully conducting enabling actions.  
This reflexive process of inquiry into research is driven by the values of the researcher, which is initiated 
by creating a sense of doubt and a feeling that something is not right or out of place, and which helps in 
having the basis for the formulation of belief when the problem becomes resolved (Elkjaer & Simpson, 
2011; Saunders et al. 2016). In sum, the philosophical position of pragmatism is the recognition of 
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different ways of interpreting the world while conducting research rather than having a single and 
universal way of viewing it, thereby focusing on the possibility of having multiple realities. However, this 
does not mean that multiple research methods are used by pragmatists, rather they adopt any method 
or methods that enable the collection of credible, well-founded, reliable, and relevant data that advance 
research practice (Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). 
3.5.3 Interpretivism 
The research focus of interpretivists is to study the meanings created by social actors about their social 
world. Interpretivism is formed from different strands, most notably hermeneutics, phenomenology, and 
symbolic interactionism (Crotty, 1998; Saunders et al. 2016, p. 140). Rather than emulating the research 
approach of natural sciences in the study of the physical world, Interpretivism argues that social actors 
and their social worlds should be studied from the perspective of social sciences and in their own 
contexts. As different social actors from different cultural backgrounds, under diverse circumstances and 
at varying times construct different meanings, creating and experiencing different social realities, 
interpretivists become critical of attempts by positivists to discover definite, universal rules that apply to 
all social actors (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 140). Accordingly, the standpoint of interpretivists is that deep 
insights and rich meanings in the behaviour of social actors are lost if the complexity in such behaviour 
is reduced totally to a series of universal laws.  
In view of this, interpretivist research aims at creating new, richer insights and interpretations of social 
worlds and contexts (Saunders et al. 2016, p.140). For research practice in the field of business and 
management, this entails studying organisations from the perspectives of different groups of social actors. 
In the context of corporate organisations, interpretivists would argue that the manner in which the CEOs 
of these corporate organisations see and experience the business world are different, to the extent that 
they can be considered as experiencing different business realities. If research practice focuses on 
generalising the experiences that are common to all at all times, without giving consideration for 
experiences that are specific to individual organisations, much of the richness of the differences between 
them and their specific circumstances will be lost, and the view of the organisation that the study delivers 
will reflect this (Saunders et al. 2016, pp. 140-141). Furthermore, the complexity in organisational 
differences are not simply limited to different functions in organisations. The CEOs of different 
organisations from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds may experience their organisations in 
different ways, therefore it would be inadequate to interpret what appears on the surface to be the same 
thing, rather such interpretation ought to be based in specific contexts.  
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In sum, interpretivists strive to take consideration for this complexity by collecting data on what constitutes 
meanings in the context specific to organisations. For phenomenologists, the focus is to study the lived 
experiences of social actors facilitated through the recollection and interpretation of those experiences 
(Saunders et al. 2016). On the side of hermeneutics, the focus is to study cultural artefacts such as texts, 
images, stories, symbols, among others, while symbolic interactionists consider meaning as a 
phenomenon that emerges from social interactions among people with focus on the observation and 
analysis of those interactions such as conversations (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 141). The emphasis of 
interpretivists is on the significance of language, culture, and history in the creation of realities and 
meanings (Crotty, 1998), which shapes the understanding, interpretations, and experiences of 
organisational and social worlds (Saunders et al. 2016, p. 141). With this focus on the complexity in 
organisations, the richness of their multiple interpretations, the processes involved in meaning-making, 
the philosophical assumption of interpretivism is explicitly subjectivist (Saunders et al. 2016). 
Axiologically, it implies that there is the recognition of the possibility for the values and beliefs of an 
interpretivist to play an important role in the interpretation of research materials and data.   
In the context of this study, the philosophical position of interpretivists was adopted. The position of this 
research is that corporate organisations emanate or belong to different institutional worlds. These 
corporate organisations are managed by different corporate actors from different cultural backgrounds, 
operating under different circumstances, at different times and making different meanings. Thereby, 
creating and experiencing different business realities which become manifest in their financial 
communications. In view of this, corporate organisations and the institutions to which they belong should 
not be studied as the physical world where law-like generalisations are applied to all corporate actors and 
actions. Furthermore, this study holds that universal rules alone do not regulate the behaviour of 
corporate organisations, rather, they also respond to rules and meanings or the logic created in the 
context of the institution to which they belong. Hence, in order to not lose the complexity in the meanings 
created by corporate organisations, this study argues that it is meaningful to assess and understand 
these realities and meanings in the context of the institution to which each corporate organisation is 
classified or affiliated to, rather than generate universal procedures for evaluating their business realities, 
in this case the realities embedded in their financial communications. In addition, of importance to this 
study is the consideration of appropriate research methodology. 
3.6 Research Methodology 
There are many different methodologies used in social sciences. Building on the research philosophy 
adopted for this study– interpretivism, this study reviewed competing research methodologies prior to 
selecting one. Of the many research methodologies available (Quinlan, Babin, Carr, Griffin, & Zikmund, 
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2015, pp. 144-150), this study reviewed the following methodologies: narrative analysis, discourse 
analysis, and content analysis. With respect to narrative analysis, this methodology is used when the 
research focus is on gathering and analysing narratives (Quinlan et al., 2015). The data gathered from 
narratives and analysed are usually in the form of accounts of personal experiences that a researcher 
obtains from an individual that lived such experiences. This approach is used in a two-way communication 
setting such as in interviews and the analyses of data derived from consumers on marketing and 
consumer behaviour. Narrative analysis can be used in the analysis of textual data, in written or visual 
text (Quinlan et al., 2015). A core underlying principle of this methodology is the analysis of narratives 
told to the researcher by the person who has had the experience. In the context of this study, this 
methodology is inappropriate as the texts analysed are secondary data obtained from credible sources – 
company websites and Bloomberg Data sources. Accordingly, the researcher had no influence on the 
structuring of the questions or moderating the interview sessions that produced the data collected and 
analysed.  
With respect to discourse analysis, this methodology facilitates the identification and analysis of 
discourses in the social world (Quinlan et al., 2015). According to Fairclough (1995), the discourses 
gathered as data can be in different formats such as written texts, oral statements, or cultural artefacts. 
To some extent, discourse analysis is appropriate in the context of this study, however, it provides lesser 
coverage for all the data and analysis structures than those provided by content analysis. In the context 
of this study, discourse analysis did not provide coverage for a mixed method approach adopted for this 
study. With respect to content analysis, this research methodology is used in the analysis of the content 
of any text. It can be used to evaluate the tone of a text, including both the explicit and latent content of 
texts (Quinlan et al., 2015, p. 148). Furthermore, this methodology can be used when analysing the 
frequency of specific words, or phrases, or ideas or concepts as they appear in the text being analysed. 
This can entail the analysis of the placement of words within the text of specific aspects and elements of 
the communication (Quinlan et al., 2015). In addition, this methodology is useful in examining the strength 
of the communication, through the emphasis placed on certain aspects of the communication. The texts 
analysed can be in the form of documents from websites, transcripts from interviews or transcripts of 
speeches, conversations, conference calls, among others. Although content analysis is traditionally a 
quantitative methodology, it can draw on either quantitative or qualitative data, or on a mixture of both 
(Quinlan et al., 2015, p. 148). Accordingly, the robustness of this methodology for a mixed method 
analysis justifies its appropriateness for this study.  
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3.7 Research Methods  
A mixed methods approach was adopted for this research. From the aforementioned structure of the 
research questions, data on companies that met the pre-selection criteria were collected and analysed 
using appropriate statistical tools towards validating the predictive model for measuring overall industry 
discretion score obtained from the analysis of US companies with those tested for UK companies. 
Furthermore, much emphasis was placed on the qualitative analysis of data on accounting narratives 
using various analysis tools provided in Microsoft Office, DICTION 7.0 text analysis software, Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software package, and International Business Machines (IBM) Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Statistics. In addition, in order to ensure robust analyses of the data, 
effort was made to investigate the language features of the companies in each industry classification, for 
further quantitative analysis of the qualitative data. At all levels of analysis, independent samples testing 
of statistical significance was conducted. While a paired t-test is suitable for comparative or matched 
samples, independent t-test of statistical significance is fit for contrastive purposes (McNamara et al. 
2014). Specifically, Kruskal-Wallis independent non-parametric t-test of statistical significance was 
adopted at all levels. The rationale for conducting this type of t-test was due to the research objective of 
contrasting between the financial communications of companies in the high and low discretion industries.  
Accordingly, this study adopted and tested for all the five Master Variables of DICITON 7.0 text analysis 
software towards assessing the language features of the companies in both the high and low discretion 
industries. In addition, the sub-features of each of the five Master Variables were analysed across the 
two industry classifications for the purpose of collecting the sub-features that show significant statistical 
results in line with stated hypotheses. In order to gain internal validity for the use of DICTION 7.0, a 
complementary text analysis software, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), was selected to obtain 
the language features that compare with those of DICTION 7.0. This was done to assess whether or not 
the results obtained can be tested for validity and reliability regardless of the text analysis software 
paradigm chosen. Finally, non-parametric testing of statistical significance was conducted to differentiate 
the results obtained for companies in the high discretion industry from those in the low discretion industry. 
In addition, z-scores were computed to ascertain the deviation of the scores of each industry from the 
normalised scores established for each text analysis software. 
3.8 Discussion of the Software – DICTION 7.0 and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 
This section focuses on the description of the textual analysis tools adopted for this study with 
accompanying justification for their inclusion. The rationale for discussing the tools employed for this 
study was to explain what the tools are; what they do; why they can be trusted; and their appropriateness 
for this study. Accordingly, the primary textual analysis tool employed for this study is DICTION 7.0. 
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Validation was provided to ensure that this tool did what it was supposed to do, by providing both intrinsic 
or internal validity and extrinsic or external validity. In view of this, this study turned to a complementary 
textual analysis tool known as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). The rationale for the selection 
of LIWC was to obtain intrinsic or internal validity for the use of DICTION. Although there is a wide variety 
of textual analysis tools available in discourse science, LIWC arguably has the most comparable history, 
availability and breadth of interest to this study. Lastly, this study employed the use of a simple 
computational tool provided in Microsoft Word towards computing the readability statistics of the 
documents used in this study. Specifically, the textual analysis measures adopted from Microsoft Word 
are statistics on Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level. In order to obtain extrinsic or 
external validity for the three textual analysis tools, this study considered the provision of evidence in 
terms of the widespread use and acceptance of these tools in discourse science and studies on Applied 
Natural Language Processing (ANLP). The description of these three textual analysis tools, as well as 
consideration for internal and external validity are explained hereafter.  
Recent developments in discourse processing and computational linguistics have made it possible for 
researchers to develop a wide range of sophisticated and powerful indices (McNamara et al., 2014). 
These indices have been gathered together in a textual analysis tool called DICTION 7 (Hart & Carroll, 
2015), developed by Professor Roderick P. Hart, Professor of Communication and Government at the 
University of Texas at Austin and Professor Craig E. Carroll, visiting researcher at the Stern School of 
Business at New York University (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 1). DICTION 7 is a scientific method for 
assessing the tone of a verbal message (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 1). It functions by searching a text file 
for five general lexical features and their thirty-five sub-features from which they are constituted. This is 
facilitated by searching through a 10,000-word corpus and up to thirty user-generated custom dictionaries 
purposely built per research objective. Accordingly, the word-lists built into DICTION dictionaries are 
employed to search a text for language features indicative of certain five Master Variables, which are 
CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, OPTIMISM, REALISM, and COMMONALITY. These five Master Variables are 
composed through the conversion of all subaltern variables to z-scores, combining them by simple 
addition and subtraction, and then adding a constant of 50 to avoid producing negative numbers (Hart & 
Carroll, 2015, p. 4). For example, in calculating COMMONALITY, DICTION standardises six variables 
and then adds or subtracts them ([Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport] – [Diversity + Exclusion + 
Liberation]), adds a constant of 50, and then gives a slight statistical modification by referencing 
DICTION’s normative database. In sum, these five Master Variables provide the most general 
understanding of a specific text and any study reporting results from DICTION can be directly compared 
to any other study reporting DICTION results. This makes it more dependable and more useful than other 
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textual analysis tools reporting raw scores only (Hart & Carroll, 2015). Further detail on DICTION and 
related published research is given in Appendix 3b. This wide variety and wealth of successful empirical 
studies provide compelling reason and evidence that DICTION is an ideal tool for assessing the features 
of text.  
Of particular interest to this study are the following Master Variable measures of DICTION 7 – 
COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, REALISM, and OPTIMISM. More importantly, the core 
Master Variable that aligns to the research question of this study is COMMONALITY. From the literature 
considered on Institutional Theory, the standpoint is that an organisation within an industry classification 
is regulated by the institutional logic predominant in such industry. Consequently, organisations become 
isomorphic in the way they operate owing to the logic that regulates their activities. In sum, isomorphism 
is a situation where organisations have similar identity and operate in similar forms. Accordingly, these 
shared conceptions among organisations manifest in the structuring of symbols – through language, 
signs, and gestures, and subsequently shape the meanings attributed to objects and activities. The 
interaction among individuals creates shared meanings, which produces a confined latitude of action by 
individual organisation, for which the deviation from the shared meanings by any of the individual 
organisation could signal diverse possibilities such as decoupling from the central logic of its defining 
industry, major business or corporate reorganisation, or even deception.  
However, the common understanding of organisations within an institution could change altogether in the 
long-run, especially during a major reorganisation or shift in the global economy. Subsequently, the new 
logic becomes sustained across time and place, continuously transformed in an often rather subtle way 
and becomes apparent after a considerable period of time (Colyvas & Powell, 2006). Similarly, the level 
of discretion afforded organisations within an industry could also influence the level of agreement to, or 
deviation from, their central institutional logic. Accordingly, the rationale for adopting the Master Variable 
COMMONALITY for this study was the measure it provided, which made it possible to assess the 
language use of companies within the two industry group classifications that signified agreement to or 
deviation from the values of their respective industries. Furthermore, the other Master Variables of 
DICTION 7 were also measured using testable hypotheses.  
With respect to Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), it is a textual analysis tool “designed to identify 
social and psychological phenomena” (McNamara et al. 2014, p. 170). It utilises a wide variety of word 
lists or dictionaries to produce the percentage of words in a text that can be used as representative of 
specific psychological categories (McNamara et al. 2014; Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, & Blackburn, 
2015). The 2015 version of LIWC provides approximately 90 word categories. However, these 90 word 
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categories are also grouped into broader dimensions. Some of these broader dimensions are linguistic 
words (e.g., pronouns), psychological processes (e.g., positive emotion, negative emotion), personal 
concerns (e.g., work, leisure, home), paralinguistic dimensions (e.g., speech disfluencies), time 
orientations (e.g., past focus, present focus, future focus), cognitive processes (e.g., certainty) drives 
(e.g., achievement, risk), and punctuations (e.g., comma, period). For example, the dictionary of 
“personal concerns” consists of lexical terms such as “work”, “home”, and “money”. Given a simple text 
such as “I work from home to earn some money,” LIWC would record a textual value of 37.5 for “personal 
concerns”: (dictionary words/total words) × 100; which is (3/8) × 100 = 37.5.  
The LIWC software has the capability to process written or transcribed verbal text stored as a digital, 
machine-readable file in one of several formats, including plain text, Portable Document Format (PDF), 
Rich Text Format (RTF), or standard Microsoft Word files (Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 2). In the course of 
processing a file, LIWC2015 accesses a single text file, a group of files, or texts within a spreadsheet and 
processes each sequentially. Once a text processed is analysed, approximately 90 output variables are 
produced as a single line of data to an output file. This includes the name of the file and word count, “4 
summary language variables (analytical thinking, clout, authenticity, and emotional tone), 3 general 
descriptor categories (words per sentence, percent of target words captured by the dictionary, and 
percent of words in the text that are longer than six letters), 21 standard linguistic dimensions (e.g., 
percentage of words in the text that are pronouns, articles, auxiliary verbs, etc.), 41 word categories 
tapping psychological constructs (e.g., affect, cognition, biological processes, drives), 6 personal concern 
categories (e.g., work, home, leisure activities), 5 informal language markers (assents, fillers, swear 
words, netspeak), and 12 punctuation categories (periods, commas, etc..” (Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 2).  
Notably and in sum, the core element of the text analysis strategy of this software is the LIWC2015 
Dictionary. This Dictionary is composed of approximately 6,400 words, select emoticons, and word stems. 
Each dictionary input additionally specifies one or more word categories or subdictionaries (Pennebaker 
et al. 2015). In addition to the instance aforementioned on the dictionary of “personal concerns”, the word 
“cried” is a constituent of five word categories: sadness, overall affect, negative emotion, past focus, and 
verbs (Pennebaker et al. 2015, pp. 4-5). Therefore, once the word “cried” is discovered in a given target 
text, the scale scores for each of the subdictionary elements is incremented. Furthermore, a lot of the 
LIWC2015 categories are listed hierarchically. For instance, all words implying “sadness”, by definition, 
are constituents of a broader “negative emotion” category, as well as the “overall affect words” category 
(Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 2). With respect to words such as “hungry” the dictionary includes the stem 
“hungr*”, which allows the inclusion of any target word that matches the first five letters to be counted as 
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an ingestion word (including hungry, hungrier, hungriest). Hence, the asterisk specifies the acceptance 
of all letters, hyphens, or numbers following its appearance (Pennebaker et al. 2015). 
Similar to other textual analysis tools like DICTION 7, LIWC2015 operates on a variety of norms used in 
processing a text file within different contexts. Specifically, LIWC2015 has six different norms for 
processing a text file. The norms are Blogs, Expressive Writing, Novels, Natural Speech, New York (NY) 
Times, and Twitter (Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 9). For the purpose of this study, no specific norm was 
solely adopted. The reason for this is that, “LIWC2015 version captures, on average, 86 percent of the 
words people use in writing and speech” (Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 10). None of the norms aligned 
exclusively to the corpora used in this study – annual reports and analysts’ discussions. Accordingly, the 
Grand Means and Mean Standard Deviations were adopted as the separate categories are really quite 
divergent from either CEO Letters or Analyst Meetings genres. The Grand Means and Mean Standard 
Deviations enabled some comparisons to be drawn across the different norms. In addition, the inclusion 
of the Standard Deviation of the Grand Means enabled the testing for whether text data results of this 
study were within the range of one or two Standard Deviations. Further detail on LIWC software and 
related published research is given in Appendix 3a. 
Of particular interest to this study are the following measures of LIWC2015 – Tone, First Person Singular 
Pronoun, First Person Plural Pronoun, Positive Emotion, Negative Emotion, Certainty, Achievement, 
Risk, Past Focus, Present Focus, and Motion. These 11 language categories of LIWC2015 were selected 
as they aligned, by definition, to some of the sub-features of the five Master Variables of DICTION 7. The 
rationale for their selection was to provide validity for the sub-features of DICTION that aligned to those 
of LIWC2015. For example, the results for the use of ‘Certainty’ language category of LIWC2015 by 
companies in the two industry groupings were compared with those provided by the CERTAINTY Master 
Variable of DICTION. This was conducted to check whether the two similar measures across the two 
textual analysis tools provided similar results for reliability and validity purposes.  
With respect to Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, they are readability 
measures used in discourse science in assessing how easy or difficult it is to understand a textual 
information (McNamara et al. 2014, p. 13; Klare, 1974-1975).  With respect to Flesch Reading Ease, it is 
a statistical formula developed by Rudolph Flesch in 1943 as an objective measurement of readability or 
comprehension difficulty (Flesch, 1948). The formula was based on a count of three elements of language 
namely average sentence length in words, number of affixes, and number of references to people (Flesch 
1948, p. 221). It uses a rating scale ranging from 0 to 100 as shown in the Table 3.2. The internal validity 
of Flesch Reading Ease has been established in five independent studies. The formula ratings of 
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textbooks in psychology agreed substantially with ratings provided by students and teachers (Stevens & 
Stone, 1947); the formula scores of specially edited radio news, newsmagazine, and Sunday news-
summary copy were found to be more readable than comparable newspaper reports (Foreign News, cited 
in Flesch, 1948); advertisements were rated to be more readable by the Flesch formula, and also showed 
higher readership figures (Flesch, 1947); and simplified articles with the aid of the formula resulted in 
increased readership in two consecutive split-run tests (Murphy, 1947, Murphy & Stone, 1947). With 
respect to its external validity, this measurement has been applied in several studies and in the 
development of Coh-Metrix (McNamara et al. 2014).  
With respect to Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, it is a metric based on the word length and sentence 
length (McNamara et al., 2014). A metric used in assessing the level of education that would be required 
to read and understand a piece of textual information. The grade level increases as the words and 
sentences increase in length (McNamara et al., 2014, p. 13). Therefore, the grade level that would be 
required to read and understand a piece of text increases as the words and sentences used in a text 
increase in size. This is reasonably psychological as longer words tend to be less frequently used in the 
English Language, such that readers have less worldly knowledge about these words. Consequently, 
longer words and longer sentences tend to place a greater cognitive demand on the working memory of 
a reader, hence, increasing comprehension difficulty (McNamara et al., 2014).  As with Flesch Reading 
Ease, the internal validity of Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade has been established in Coh-Metrix text 
analysis tool in McNamara et al. (2014). Notably, the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Grade Levels have an inverse relationship as shown in Table 3.3. The higher the Reading 
ease score of a text, the lower the grade level or level of education it would be required to understand 
the same text. It follows that the level of education that would be required to understand a piece of text 
increases as the Reading ease score reduces.  
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Table 3.2 Pattern of "Reading Ease" Scores 
"Reading Ease" 
Score 
Description of 
Style 
Typical 
Magazine 
Syllables per 
100 Words 
Average Sentence  
Length in Words 
0 to 30 Very Difficult Scientific 192 or more 29 or more 
30 to 50 Difficult Academic 167 25 
50 to 60 Fairly Difficult Quality 155 21 
60 to 70 Standard Digests 147 17 
70 to 80 Fairly Easy Slick-fiction 139 14 
80 to 90 Easy Pulp-fiction 131 11 
90 to 100 Very Easy Comics 123 or less 8 or less 
Source: Flesch (1948, p. 230). 
Table 3.3 Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Levels 
Score School level Notes 
100.0-90.0 5th Grade Very easy to read. Easily understood by an average 11-year-
old student. 
90.0-80.0 6th Grade Easy to read. Conversational English for consumers. 
80.0-70.0 7th Grade Fairly easy to read. 
70.0-60.0 8th & 9th Grade Plain English. Easily understood by 13- to 15-year-old students. 
60.0-50.0 10th to 12th Grade Fairly difficult to read.` 
50.0-30.0 College Difficult to read. 
30.0-0.0 College Graduate Very difficult to read. Best understood by university graduates. 
Extracted from Klare (1974-75). 
Of particular importance to this study are the readability statistics provided in Microsoft Word. This 
Microsoft tool provided readability statistics on Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability 
Grade Level for the documents used in the study. All the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of 
companies in both high and low discretion industries were assessed for their readability statistics using 
the Microsoft Word proofreading tool.       
3.9 Data Collection and Sample Selection 
For the purpose of this study, there were three phases of data collection and sample selection. For the 
first phase, relevant data were collected for companies that met the selection criteria towards validating 
the predictive model for calculating the overall industry discretion scores for companies in the UK. As 
aforementioned, the predictive model adopted and tested for this study was a pioneer model empirically 
tested in the US for differentiating between high and low discretion industries. Hence, for the purpose of 
ensuring the reliability and validity of the model in the UK context, relevant data on UK companies were 
collected and tested. To do this, this study adopted a firm’s primary four-digit Standard Industrial 
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Classification (SIC) code as an identifier of industry affiliation. Accordingly, the overarching aim of testing 
for the predictive validity of the underlying model was to assess whether the firms registered in the UK 
environment will have the same or similar levels of discretion as those of their counterparts in the US.  
In the context of this study, the classification of firms into high discretion and low discretion industries 
was based on replicating the selection procedure of companies. The companies were selected using 
similar four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes used in Hambrick and Abrahamson 
(1995). It is noteworthy that in the context of this study, some of the SIC codes were not exactly the same 
as those used in identifying the firms in the USA, nonetheless, they produced similar classification of 
firms as those in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). In view of this, the companies selected for this study 
were those with SIC codes and in FTSE 350 companies (reported as active only in the focal industry) in 
the Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database for the period 2012-2016. The rationale for choosing FTSE 
350 companies – an index made up of the constituents of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 -, is based on 
the convention that the FTSE 350 Index represents large and mid-cap stocks that are traded on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), which are considered to pass screening for size and liquidity (Russell, 
2019). This screening process captured, as Table 3.4 shows, a diverse group, with a combination of 
young and old, consumer- and industrial- product, manufacturing, and service industries. Accordingly, 
the data collected for all the companies that met the selection criteria are details on the four objective 
indicators established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). These indicators were used in establishing 
a regression equation for measuring industry discretion. This is given as: 
Industry discretion = 4.344 + (0.1209 × R&D Intensity) + (0.1519 × Advertising Intensity) 
– (0.004 × Capital Intensity) + (0.0596 × Sales Growth Rate). 
As stated above, the objective indicators are Research and Development (R&D) Intensity, Advertising 
Intensity, Capital Intensity, and Market Growth (also known as Annual Sales Growth Rate). Specifically, 
the relevant data collected for measuring Research and Development (R&D) Intensity were a firm’s 
details on Research and Development Expenses and Sales figures. Accordingly, R&D Intensity was 
measured as [(R&D Expenses ÷ Sales) × 100]. Second, the relevant data collected for measuring 
Advertising Intensity were a firm’s details on Advertising Expenses and Sales figures. Accordingly, 
Advertising Intensity was measured as [(Advertising Expenses ÷ Sales) × 100]. Third, the relevant data 
collected for measuring Capital Intensity were a firm’s details on Net Value of Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (PPE) and Number of Employees. Accordingly, Capital Intensity was measured as [(Net Value 
of Property, Plant, and Equipment ÷ Number of Employees) × 100]. Lastly, the relevant data collected 
for measuring Market Growth was Average Annual Sales Growth Rate (reported as a percentage) of 
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each firm in all the industries. Accordingly, Market Growth was measured as [(Y1 Sales – Y0 Sales) ÷ Y0 
Sales]. All data collected for calculating the overall industry discretion score covered the relevant periods 
2012-2016. Specifically, the number of companies in the low discretion industry that met the predefined 
selection criteria was 37, while there were 49 companies in the high discretion industry. Consequently, 
the average number of Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ firms in either high or low discretion industry was 
43.  
Table 3.4 Details on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code per Industry. 
SIC 
Code 
Industry Hambrick & 
Abrahamson 
(1995) 
Abrahamson & 
Hambrick 
(1997) 
Current study2 
1040 Gold and Silver Ores    
1311 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas    
2731 Book publishing    
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations    SIC Code 2830 
3312 Blast furnaces and steel mills    
3570 Electronic Computing Equipment    SIC Code 3500 
3663 Radio and TV Communication Equipment    SIC Code 3660 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices    
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity    SIC Code 3800 
3826 Engineering and Scientific Instruments    
3841 Surgical and Medical Instruments    
3944 Games and toys    
4213 Trucking (except local)    
4512 Certified Air Transportation    
6211 Security Brokers and Dealers    
6331 Fire Marine and Casualty Insurance    
7812 Motion Picture Production    SIC Code 7800 
7372 Computer Programming and Software    SIC Code 7370 
 Total Number of Industries 17 14 15 
 
The second phase of data collection focused on obtaining the transcripts of corporate financial 
communications (annual CEO letters to shareholders and CEO periodic discussions with analysts) of 
companies that met the selection criteria. These financial communications transcripts were tested for 
their language features provided in DICTION 7.0 and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC).  
Accordingly, the selection criteria was for all the companies selected to have CEO letters to shareholders 
in annual reports and CEO contributions in analysts’ discussions for the relevant periods 2011-2015 or 
                                                          
2 Six of the SIC codes used in this study vary from those used in prior studies. Given the reduced number of companies in the 
UK in comparison to those in the USA, it was necessary to broaden the code to the next SIC level in the fourth digit of the SIC 
code e.g. 2834 was broadened out to the higher level code of 2830 (significant at the first three digits SIC) which includes 
other pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. This was necessary to combine the few companies (at an upper level) in the 
UK to match up with those in the USA. 
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2014-2018. The second relevant period, 2014-2018, was adopted for companies that did not have 
published CEO letters and CEO contributions in analysts’ discussions during the first relevant period 
2011-2015. In cases where there were no CEO letters or CEO contributions in analysts’ discussions, the 
transcripts of the members of top management representing the CEO were collected. However, for all 
the companies selected, the CEOs were represented just 10 times over the course of the 5-year period. 
Table 3.5 Summary Table of Documents Analysed 
Low Discretion Industry AR AD High Discretion Industry AR AD 
Acacia Mining Plc  13,046 71,897 AstraZeneca Plc  7,582 105,284 
Antofagasta Plc  11,266 42,401 Aveva Plc  14,645 31,643 
Cairn Energy Plc  6,257 21,971 Chemring Group Plc  9,694 36,819 
Centamin Plc 7,125 50,397 Cineworld Group Plc  14,623 40,398 
Connect Group Plc  6,921 29,769 Consort Medical Plc  17,553 18,406 
EasyJet Plc  22,289 51,737 Dechra Pharmaceuticals Plc  7,799 26,812 
EnQuest Plc  11,474 49,250 Essentra Plc  16,244 83,301 
Evraz Plc  9,886 12,487 Dialight Plc  6,752 16,857 
Fresnillo Plc  10,044 33,816 Genus Plc  5,561 30,200 
Hochschild Mining Plc 6,368 37,149 GlaxoSmithKline Plc  6,162 139,102 
Informa Plc  14,989 57,466 Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc  6,162 28,780 
International Consolidated Airlines 8,109 90,718 Indivior Plc  9,476 47,994 
Investec Plc  12,273 52,173 ITV Plc 11,753 74,984 
London Stock Exchange Plc  7,377 59,990 Meggit Plc  5,669 45,628 
NEX Group Plc 9,800 23,572 Microfocus International Plc 28,423 14,321 
Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc  5,761 29,939 Mitie Group Plc  11,159 37,893 
Pearson Plc  9,303 59,595 Oxford Biomedica Plc  4,513 12,763 
Petropavlovsk Plc  12,148 15,794 Playtech Plc  16,749 59,746 
Premier Oil Plc  8,013 25,678 Porvair Plc  4,636 15,466 
RELX Plc  5,761 65,377 QinetiQ Group Plc  10,488 43,840 
Royal Dutch Shell Plc  5,833 154,519 Renishaw Plc 8,140 19,021 
Royal Mail Plc  18,165 66,996 Rotork Plc  8,981 47,761 
TP ICAP  10,511 32,832 Shire Plc  7,532 95,463 
Tullow Oil Plc  7,160 85,574 Smith & Nephew Plc  3,574 66,427 
Vedanta Resources 6,630 41,907 Smiths Group Plc  9,751 51,470 
Wizz Air Holdings 12,931 32,260 Spectris Plc  5,483 48,052 
BP Plc  5,964 153,641 Spirent Communications Plc  5,537 62,400 
Hunting Plc  5,663 46,403 The Sage Group Plc  9,874 39,085 
Lamprell Plc  6,261 35,577 TT Electronics Plc  13,081 19,973 
John Wood Group Plc  5,908 45,622 Vectura Group Plc  3,705 37,265 
Total Words Analysed  283,236 1,576,507   291,301 1,397,154 
Total Documents Analysed 150 344   150 299 
AR = Annual Reports  
AD = Analysts Discussions      
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Table 3.5 shows the number of words and documents analysed for the two types of finaicnal 
communications documents for all the companies across the two industry groupings that met the 
selection criteria. The selection criteria produced a total of 300 CEO letters in annual reports, subdivided 
as 150 CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports for each discretion level - High and Low industry 
group, over the five-year period. With respect to analysts’ discussions, the selection criteria produced a 
total of 643 CEO discussions with analysts in earnings conference calls. Specifically, companies in the 
high discretion industry had 299 earnings conference calls, while those in the low discretion industry had 
344 conference calls over the five-year period. All the transcripts of CEO letters to shareholders were 
either collected from the Bloomberg Data or directly from the websites of each company. For the analysts’ 
discussions, the transcripts of CEO contributions were collected from Bloomberg Data alone. The 
analysts’ discussions for each company were extracted using the search facility provided by Bloomberg 
Data. 
From the search box, the title ‘Events Calendar: All events’ or ‘EVTS’ was entered which produced all the 
event types and details of a company’s earnings calls, earnings releases, corporate access, analyst 
marketing, among others. From this facility, the ‘earnings calls’ option was selected and the ‘securities 
search’ was customised to search for the earnings calls of each of the companies used in this study. In 
addition, the ‘date’ function was adjusted to search for all earnings calls between the relevant periods, 
either 2011-2015 or 2014-2018. Accordingly, the files generated from the search processes were 
downloaded. Once texts in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions were downloaded and saved, all 
texts in the corpus were manually cleansed of headers, names of authors (the CEO), and other features 
of the text that were not part of the discourse (dates, copyright statements, among others). However, all 
the transcripts of CEO contributions were collected in their original form without making corrections to 
grammatical errors and speech disfluencies. To select companies on either side of the discretion groups, 
the criteria set was that they must have published annual reports and held discussions with analysts in 
the relevant periods. Of the initial number of companies extracted from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ 
database, 60 companies were selected, with 30 companies each on either side of high or low discretion 
industries having met the selection criteria. In sum, the data tested for this study involved 943 transcripts 
of CEO communications, i.e. (150 CEO letters + 299 CEO discussions with analysts) for companies in 
the high discretion industry and (150 CEO letters + 344 CEO discussions with analysts) for companies in 
the low discretion industry. Table 3.6 shows the details of the years of data collected for each company 
for the two relevant periods.  
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Table 3.6 Details of the Periods of Financial Communications Collected for Each Company. 
No. Low Discretion Industry Period High Discretion Industry Period 
1 Acacia Mining Plc  1 AstraZeneca Plc  1 
2 Antofagasta Plc  1 Aveva Plc  2 
3 Cairn Energy Plc  1 Chemring Group Plc  1 
4 Centamin Plc  1 Cineworld Group Plc  2 
5 Connect Group Plc  1 Consort Medical Plc  2 
6 EasyJet Plc  1 Dechra Pharmaceuticals Plc  1 
7 EnQuest Plc  1 Essentra Plc  1 
8 Evraz Plc  1 Dialight Plc  2 
9 Fresnillo Plc  1 Genus Plc  1 
10 Hochschild Mining Plc 1 GlaxoSmithKline Plc  1 
11 Informa Plc  1 Hikma Pharmaceuticals Plc  1 
12 International Consolidated Airlines 1 Indivior Plc  2 
13 Investec Plc  1 ITV Plc 1 
14 London Stock Exchange Plc  1 Meggit Plc  1 
15 NEX Group Plc 1 Microfocus International Plc 2 
16 Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc  2 Mitie Group Plc  1 
17 Pearson Plc  1 Oxford Biomedica Plc  1 
18 Petropavlovsk Plc  1 Playtech Plc  1 
19 Premier Oil Plc  1 Porvair Plc  2 
20 RELX Plc  1 QinetiQ Group Plc  1 
21 Royal Dutch Shell Plc  1 Renishaw Plc  2 
22 Royal Mail Plc  2 Rotork Plc  1 
23 TP ICAP  2 Shire Plc  1 
24 Tullow Oil Plc  1 Smith & Nephew Plc  1 
25 Vedanta Resources 1 Smiths Group Plc  1 
26 Wizz Air Holdings 2 Spectris Plc  1 
27 BP Plc  2 Spirent Communications Plc  1 
28 Hunting Plc  2 The Sage Group Plc  1 
29 Lamprell Plc  2 TT Electronics Plc  2 
30 John Wood Group Plc  2 Vectura Group Plc  1 
Period 1: 2011 – 2015, Period 2: 2014 - 2018 
The third phase of data collection and sample selection was limited to the results observed after testing 
for the language features of the financial communications of the companies that met the predefined 
criteria explained in phase two of data collection and sample selection. At the stage, relevant data were 
collected from the results already produced from testing conducted in phase two. The overarching aim 
was to test and compare the language features of the companies during favourable and unfavourable 
financial performance periods. For the purpose of this study, the favourable financial performance periods 
were termed as “good times”, while the unfavourable financial performance periods were termed as “bad 
times”. For the purpose of differentiating between good and bad times, the Actual Net Income of the 
companies in both low and high discretion industries were compared with Consensus Net Income 
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Estimates for each of the relevant periods 2011-2015 (for 43 companies) and 2014-2018 (for 17 
companies).  
The comparison between the Actual Net Income and Consensus Net Income Estimates creates another 
measure known as Net Income Surprise. For the purpose of this study, this was measured as [(Actual 
Net Income – Consensus Net Income Estimate) ÷ Consensus Net Income Estimate x 100]. In simple 
terms, the Actual Net Income is the Net Income reported by each company according to Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for each accounting period, while the Consensus Net Income 
Estimate is a consensus prediction of Net Income made by analysts, which is forecasted to be earned by 
a company during a particular accounting period. It is noteworthy that the Net Income Surprise is a 
percentage measure and it shows to what degree the Actual Net Income as reported by a company 
deviates from the predicted Consensus Net Income Estimates made by analysts for that particular period.  
For the purpose of this study, a general rule was adopted for clearly differentiating between good and 
bad performance results using a 10% rule. The selection of this rule was based on the financial thresholds 
generally accepted by auditors as representing a material difference in enterprise income. Similar to risk 
management principles, there is the need to establish set criteria of probability and magnitude of 
anticipated events (Materialtytracker, 2019). These two indices of probability and materiality are applied 
in deciding the thresholds in materiality judgments. In the context of financial accounting and auditing, 
the determination of an appropriate level of materiality demands the establishment of appropriate base 
level and percentage. Conventionally, several accounting variables are used in the financial community 
as benchmarks, such as net income or earnings before tax, revenue, total assets, among others 
(Materialtytracker, 2019). According to Materialitytracker (2019), the most commonly used base level is 
the net income, while the most commonly used percentages range between 5% and 10%, expressed as 
<5% = immaterial, >10% is material, and 5-10% requires judgment. As there is no existence of a standard 
international guidance on the calculation of materiality to be considered agreed thresholds, this study 
adopted the >10% threshold as the base level of materiality.  
Prior to establishing this rule, it was noted that a negative Net Income Surprise could create a negative 
reaction from the stakeholders of a company towards their investments. Typically, it is expected that 
negative financial information (net income) has greater impact than positive financial information. 
Specifically, it was assumed that, all things being equal, if a company is able to attain or exceed the 
Consensus Net Income Estimate made by analysts, it would have no reason to expect a negative market 
reaction as compared to when it is unable to meet up with analysts’ expectations. With an Actual Net 
Income exceeding the Consensus Net Income Estimate, a positive Net Income Surprise is attained. On 
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the other hand, when the Consensus Net Income Estimate is higher than the Actual Net Income reported, 
it results in a negative Net Income Surprise. Nevertheless, as it is almost impossible to earn a Net Income 
that is numerically the same as the Consensus Estimate, there is the likelihood to have some degree of 
variation between the Actual and Estimated Net Income. Accordingly, this is the point where there is the 
need to clearly differentiate between a Net Income Surprise that connotes a good performance and a Net 
Income Surprise that connotes a bad performance for any of the periods under consideration. As 
generally applied here, a negative Net Income Surprise that is more than -10% is considered for a bad 
performance, while a Net Income Surprise that is -10% or less, or positive is considered a good or 
reasonable performance. 
In summary, this chapter elaborated on the aims and objectives of this study, the discussion of the 
research questions, research methodology, research methods used in the collection and selection of 
sample data, and the different tools used in analysing the data collected. Specifically, it discussed the 
different language categories provided by the tools adopted for this study, which form the basis for the 
research propositions discussed in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
With the previous chapters having focused on the relevant literature reviewed for this study and the 
discussion of the research aims and objectives, the research questions, construction of theory and on 
the text analysis tools covered in Chapter Three, this chapter focuses on the development of the different 
hypotheses tested at macro- and micro- levels of analysis. Specifically, eight levels of hypotheses are 
discussed on the language features provided by DICTION, LIWC, Flesch Reading Ease, Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Grades, and the element of Tone in differentiating the language features of the financial 
communications of companies in the two industry groups.  
4.1 Research Hypotheses 
4.1.1 COMMONALITY 
One of the propositions of this study, based on prior research is that the behaviour of an organisation is 
regulated by the logic of the institution in which it belongs (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). Accordingly, an 
organisation is identified by the institutional field to which it belongs. In sum, through the instrumentality 
of common understanding, interactions and exchange, organisations within an institutional field become 
isomorphic in behaviour. This isomorphism becomes manifest in the language they use in communicating 
to their stakeholders. From these insights, this study hypothesises that there will be a level of 
COMMONALITY across organisations within an industry classification, different from those in other 
industries.  
However, the insight from discretion research posits that in high discretion industries, different courses 
of action are available to organisations within such industry; hence, each industry reacts to its 
environment in accordance with its internal locus of control. On the other hand, in low discretion 
industries, the amount of courses of action available to the organisations within the industry is limited 
owing to factors such as institutionalised regulation, low growth rate, among others. The reaction of the 
organisations in the low discretion industry is in accordance with their external locus of control, as 
opposed to the liberation that stems from maximising individual choice. Accordingly, for the purpose of 
measuring COMMONALITY of communications within an industry, this study adopts one of the master 
variables of the text-analysis software, DICTION, to measure COMMONALITY. 
According to Hart and Carroll (2015) COMMONALITY is a measure of “language highlighting the agreed-
upon values of a group and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement” (p. 5). It focuses on terms that 
depict ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Rapport’, and ‘Interaction’, with less emphasis on words that connote 
‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’. In sum, “COMMONALITY seeks to establish mutual 
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understanding and rapport with the target audience by underlining common values” (Patelli & Pedrini, 
2015, p. 8). In the context of business communications, the extent to which two or more organisations 
use the same words, or do the same with similar frequency, provides an indication of COMMONALITY 
across these organisations’ financial communication patterns.  
On the other hand, the rejection of social conventions causes COMMONALITY to decrease, which 
signifies deviation from agreed norms. Therefore, the COMMONALITY in the financial communications 
of organisations in an industry stresses a language directed towards engaging with industry stakeholders 
or participants for the purpose of creating a sense of community and moderating commitment toward 
common objectives. In contrast, managers of organisations tend to engage aggressive financial reporting 
when driven by interests that connotes deviation from commonly-used accounting principles (Patelli & 
Pedrini, 2015). More so, aggressive financial communication is facilitated through unusual accounting 
methodologies that are adopted to attain the goals of an individual organisation as opposed to the value 
of the entire industry. This is likely to manifest through financial restatements and litigations (Dechow, 
Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 2011). Consistent with the literature on isomorphism and the effect of discretion on 
organisational outcomes, the first hypothesis is stated as: 
H1: 
(a) The COMMONALITY level in the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the COMMONALITY level in the financial 
communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD). 
(b) During good or bad times, the COMMONALITY level in the financial communications of 
organisations in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the 
COMMONALITY level in the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion 
industry (HD). 
(c) To emphasise a greater sense of community, the COMMONALITY level in the financial 
communications of organisations with bad performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) 
will be significantly higher than the COMMONALITY level in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results within the same industry (LD). This is expected to 
be the case with a higher level of agreement on prevailing circumstances during bad times than 
in good times. 
(d) To emphasise a greater sense of community, the COMMONALITY level in the financial 
communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) 
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will be significantly higher than the COMMONALITY level in the financial communications of 
organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.1.1 Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the COMMONALITY scores for the two industry 
classifications, the sub-features of COMMONALITY will be analysed using the constituents equation from 
DICTION 7.0. Accordingly, there are sub-features that either increase or decrease the COMMONALITY 
score. These sub-features will be used as testable sub-hypotheses for each of the industry groups.   
In view of the aforementioned statements in H1, this research states the first sub-hypotheses as thus: 
For the sub-features that increase the COMMONALITY score: 
(e) The sub-feature scores for ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ will be significantly higher for 
companies in the low discretion industry (LD) than in the high discretion industry (HD).  
(f) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in 
the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly 
higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in the financial 
communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD). 
(g) To emphasise a greater sense of COMMONALITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Centrality’, 
‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results within the same industry (LD). This is expected to 
be the case with a higher level of agreement on prevailing circumstances during bad times than 
in good times. 
(h) To emphasise a greater sense of COMMONALITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Centrality’, 
‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in the financial communications of organisations with good 
performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
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For the sub-features that decrease the COMMONALITY score: 
(i) The sub-feature scores for ‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry (HD) than in the low discretion industry (LD). 
 
(j) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in 
the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD) will be 
significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(k) To emphasise a greater sense of COMMONALITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Diversity’, 
‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly lower than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results within the same industry (LD). This is expected to 
be the case with a higher level of agreement on prevailing circumstances during bad times than 
in good times. 
(l) To emphasise a greater sense of COMMONALITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Diversity’, 
‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in the financial communications of organisations with good 
performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly lower than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Diversity’, ‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.2 CERTAINTY 
According to Hart and Carroll (2015), CERTAINTY is a measure of “language indicating resoluteness, 
inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra” (p. 6). It focuses on language that 
stresses precision and avoids hesitation. In addition, CERTAINTY conveys tenacity and insistence, and 
reduces ambivalence (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The presence of this master variable in financial 
communications denotes authoritative leadership that is unwilling to compromise, with an accompanying 
sense of assurance, which seeks approval and prides itself on persuasion. The literature on leadership 
posits that resoluteness is a common feature of transactional leaders who emphasise the need for 
contingent rewards and management by exception (Burns, 1978). These leaders use tight control 
mechanisms that undervalues ethical behaviour in exchange for self-interest (Turner, Barling, Epitropaki, 
Butcher, & Milner, 2002). Sama and Shoaf (2008) contend that as transactional leaders focus more on 
transactions and profitability, they are more likely to resort to unethical behaviours. Therefore, the 
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resoluteness of the language used in the financial communications within an industry as captured by 
CERTAINTY could indicate aggressive financial reporting.  
On the other hand, given the constituent language elements of this variable the lack of CERTAINTY in 
the financial communications within an industry could indicate conservative financial reporting. However, 
the assessment of CERTAINTY or uncertainty cannot be universal, it must depend on the specific context 
being examined. Patelli and Pedrini (2013) discuss how economic contexts can influence the period being 
examined – like the world economic meltdown of 2008-2009 – in relation with discourse ethics. They 
suggest that it is inappropriate to emphasise resoluteness and a sense of certainty in an economic 
situation shaped by high level of financial instability. Hence, in environments faced with uncertainty, it 
seems more legitimate to use flexible language for the purpose of seeking understanding rather than 
approval. Therefore, in the context of this study, CERTAINTY appears to align with aggressive 
organisational behaviour, while uncertainty aligns with conservativeness. Based on this, the second 
hypothesis is stated as:        
H2:  
(a) The CERTAINTY level in the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level in the financial 
communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(b) During good or bad times, the CERTAINTY level in the financial communications of organisations 
in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(c) To emphasise a greater sense of assurance and resoluteness, the CERTAINTY level in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level in the financial 
communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (LD). 
(d) To emphasise a greater sense of assurance and resoluteness, the CERTAINTY level in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level in the financial 
communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.2.1 Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the CERTAINTY scores for the two industry classifications, 
the sub-features of CERTAINTY will be analysed using the constituents equation from DICTION 7.0. 
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Accordingly, there are sub-features that either increase or decrease the CERTAINTY score. These sub-
features will be used as testable sub-hypotheses for each of the industry groups.   
In view of the aforementioned statements in H2, this research states the second sub-hypotheses as thus: 
For the sub-features that increase the CERTAINTY score: 
(e) The sub-feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling Terms’, ‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ will be 
significantly higher for companies in the high discretion industry (HD) than in the low discretion 
industry (LD).  
(f) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling Terms’, ‘Collectives’, 
and ‘Insistence’ in the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry 
(HD) will be significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling Terms’, 
‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ in the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion 
industry (LD). 
(g) To emphasise a greater sense of CERTAINTY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling 
Terms’, ‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ in the financial communications of organisations with good 
performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling Terms’, ‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ in the financial 
communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (LD) 
 
(h) To emphasise a greater sense of CERTAINTY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling 
Terms’, ‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ in the financial communications of organisations with good 
performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Leveling Terms’, ‘Collectives’, and ‘Insistence’ in the financial 
communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD) 
For the sub-features that decrease the CERTAINTY score: 
(i) The sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, ‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ will 
be significantly higher for companies in the low discretion industry (LD) than in the high discretion 
industry (HD). 
(j) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, ‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-
reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, 
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‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the financial communications of organisations in 
a high discretion industry (HD). 
(k) To emphasise a greater sense of CERTAINTY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, 
‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the financial communications of organisations 
with good performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly lower than the 
sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, ‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry 
(LD). 
(l) To emphasise a greater sense of CERTAINTY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, 
‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the financial communications of organisations 
with good performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly lower than 
the sub-feature scores for ‘Numerical Terms’, ‘Ambivalence’, ‘Self-reference’, and ‘Variety’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry 
(HD). 
4.1.3 ACTIVITY 
According to Hart and Carroll (2015), ACTIVITY is a measure of “language featuring movement, change, 
the implementation of ideas, and the avoidance of inertia.” (p. 8). It increases with the frequent use of 
language that connotes human competition, forceful action, and personal triumph. Conversely, it 
decreases when communication ranges from neutrality to inactivity. Therefore, ACTIVITY is a 
programmatic language that focuses on accomplishments and carries the traits of narcissistic self-
confidence (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). In the context of this study, ACTIVITY is the language used by 
organisations in their financial communications to emphasise confidence and potentially overconfidence 
in their ability to pioneer change and deliver positive financial results. In the same vein, ACTIVITY reveals 
traits of heroism (Badaracco, 2001), self-confidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), and transformational 
change (Brown & Treviño, 2006). Similar to the standpoint of this study, Badaracco (2001) argues that 
the pursuit of heroism is not the primary focus of ethical leaders, who would seek to establish change 
patiently, carefully, and incrementally.  
Furthermore, Brown and Treviño (2006) argue that when driven by self-confidence, leaders who seek 
transformational change resort to unethical behaviours. Although self-confidence does not create a 
negative impact on organisational practices, yet, overconfidence is what produces self-defeat (Bénabou 
& Tirole, 2002). Subsequently, Schrand and Zechman (2012) reveal that there is a correlation between 
the overconfidence of CEOs and financial restatements. Supported by literature on ethical leadership, 
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overconfidence leads to the search for attention by engaging bold decisions that would otherwise be 
considered as unfeasible by most people (Kets de Vries, 2003). In addition, Chen (2010) shows that 
accounting frauds are more likely to be conducted by overconfident leaders. This study hinges on the 
standpoint that the promise of the delivery of overly high performances by industries with a high level of 
discretion can be understood through their aggressive financial communications. Accordingly, the third 
hypothesis is stated as:    
H3: 
(a) The ACTIVITY level in the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry 
(HD) will be significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level in the financial communications of 
organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(b) During good or bad times, the ACTIVITY level in the financial communications of organisations 
in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(c) To emphasise a greater sense of competition and personal triumph, the ACTIVITY level in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level in the financial communications 
of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (LD). 
(d) To emphasise a greater sense of competition and personal triumph, the ACTIVITY level in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level in the financial communications 
of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.3.1 Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the ACTIVITY scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of ACTIVITY will be analysed using the constituents equation from DICTION 7.0. 
Accordingly, there are sub-features that either increase or decrease the ACTIVITY score. These sub-
features will be used as testable sub-hypotheses for each of the industry groups.   
In view of the aforementioned statements in H3, this research states the third sub-hypotheses as thus: 
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For the sub-features that increase the ACTIVITY score: 
(e) The sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, ‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and ‘Motion’ will 
be significantly higher for companies in the high discretion industry (HD) than in the low discretion 
industry (LD).  
 
(f) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, ‘Accomplishment’, 
‘Communication’, and ‘Motion’, in the financial communications of organisations in a high 
discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, 
‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and ‘Motion’ in the financial communications of 
organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
 
(g) To emphasise a greater sense of ACTIVITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, 
‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and ‘Motion’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly 
higher than the sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, ‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and 
‘Motion’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the 
same industry (LD) 
 
(h) To emphasise a greater sense of ACTIVITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, 
‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and ‘Motion’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly 
higher than the sub-feature scores for ‘Aggression’, ‘Accomplishment’, ‘Communication’, and 
‘Motion’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the 
same industry (HD). 
For the sub-features that decrease the ACTIVITY score: 
(i) The sub-feature scores for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, and ‘Embellishment’ will be significantly higher 
for companies in the low discretion industry (LD) than in the high discretion industry (HD). 
 
(j) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, and ‘Embellishment’ 
in the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD) will be 
significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, and ‘Embellishment’ in the 
financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD). 
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(k) To emphasise a greater sense of ACTIVITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, 
and ‘Embellishment’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance 
results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly lower than the sub-feature scores for 
‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, and ‘Embellishment’ in the financial communications of organisations with 
bad performance results within the same industry (LD).  
(l) To emphasise a greater sense of ACTIVITY, the sub-feature scores for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, 
and ‘Embellishment’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance 
results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly lower than the sub-feature scores 
for ‘Cognition’, ‘Passivity’, and ‘Embellishment’ in the financial communications of organisations 
with bad performance results within the same industry (HD).  
4.1.4 REALISM 
According to Hart and Carroll (2015), REALISM is a measure of “language describing tangible, 
immediate, recognizable matters that affect people’s everyday lives” (p. 9). It other words, it is language 
that seeks to identify what is recognisable in everyday matter from what is considered implausible or 
unfamiliar. Accordingly, the use of concrete and familiar terms increases when there is a growing concern 
for present circumstances. Conversely, it decreases as the user of language communicates using 
complex words, long sentences, and uncommon terminology (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). Hence, the use of 
REALISM captures the ease of reading, which, conventionally, is prone to rhetorical manipulation, based 
on the insight from the literature on impression management theory (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Li 
(2008) stresses that the use of complex language in corporate narratives is a strategy used to deceive 
investors. In the same vein, prior accounting studies on impression management have investigated the 
link between the readability of annual reports and firm performance (e.g., Li, 2008), financial press 
coverage (Courtis, 1998), analyst following (Lehavy, Li, & Merkley, 2011), and corporate risk (Courtis, 
1986).  
In all these studies, they found that readability of annual reports were manipulated to obfuscate and divert 
attention from unfavourable financial performance. Therefore, the use of complex language in the 
financial communications of organisations as captured by low REALISM indicates a high level of financial 
results that are implausible, which is used, in this study, as a proxy for aggressive or hard financial 
communications. Consequently, this study argues, that this is particularly attributable to organisations in 
high discretion industries with firms using technical words that are not easily understood by their 
stakeholders.  This standpoint aligns with the view of Yuthas et al. (2002) that there is a violation of the 
comprehensibility principle of discourse ethics when complex lexicons are used in financial 
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communications. Consistent with the research findings of prior accounting studies and the 
comprehensibility principles of discourse ethics with respect to the readability of financial 
communications, the fourth hypothesis is stated as: 
H4:   
(a) The REALISM level in the financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry 
(LD) will be significantly higher than the REALISM level in the financial communications of 
organisations in a High discretion industry (HD). 
(b) During good or bad times, the REALISM level in the financial communications of organisations 
in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the REALISM level in the financial 
communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD). 
(c) To emphasise a greater sense of familiarity and concreteness, the REALISM level in the financial 
communications of organisations with good performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) 
will be significantly higher than the REALISM level in the financial communications of 
organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (LD). 
(d) To emphasise a greater sense of familiarity and concreteness, the REALISM level in the financial 
communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) 
will be significantly higher than the REALISM level in the financial communications of 
organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.4.1 Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the REALISM scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of REALISM will be analysed using the constituents equation from DICTION 7.0. 
Accordingly, there are sub-features that either increase or decrease the REALISM score. These sub-
features will be used as testable sub-hypotheses for each of the industry groups.   
In view of the aforementioned statements in H4, this research states the fourth sub-hypotheses as thus: 
For the sub-features that increase the REALISM score: 
(e) The sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, 
‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ will be significantly higher for companies in the low 
discretion industry (LD) than in the High discretion industry (HD).  
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(f) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial Terms’, ‘Temporal 
Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, ‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’, in the financial 
communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than 
sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, 
‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ in the financial communications of organisations in a High 
discretion industry (HD) 
 
(g) To emphasise a greater sense of REALISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial 
Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, ‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial 
Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, ‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry 
(LD) 
 
(h) To emphasise a greater sense of REALISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial 
Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, ‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the sub-feature scores for ‘Familiarity’, ‘Spatial 
Terms’, ‘Temporal Terms’, ‘Present Concern’, ‘Human Interest’, and ‘Concreteness’ in the 
financial communications of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry 
(HD) 
For the sub-features that decrease the REALISM score: 
(i) The sub-feature scores for ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry (HD) than in the low discretion industry (LD). 
 
(j) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the 
financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly 
higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the financial 
communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(k) To emphasise a greater sense of implausibility and unfamiliarity, the sub-feature scores for ‘Past 
Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
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feature scores for ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results within the same industry (LD) 
(l) To emphasise a greater sense of implausibility and unfamiliarity, the sub-feature scores for ‘Past 
Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the sub-
feature scores for ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Complexity’ in the financial communications of 
organisations with good performance results within the same industry (HD) 
4.1.5 OPTIMISM 
According to Hart and Carroll (2015), OPTIMISM is a measure of “language endorsing some person, 
group, concept or event or highlighting their positive entailments” (p. 7). It is founded on positive terms 
that portray a sense of praise and satisfaction (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). On the other hand, the use of 
negative communication directed towards emphasising periods of hardship decreases OPTIMISM. In 
accounting literature, the use of optimistic tone has been linked with impression management strategy 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000). Schlenker (1980) views impression management as a conscious or unconscious 
attempt to manipulate management representations and interpretations. Corporate financial 
communications are used to strategically influence the expectations of stakeholders rather than 
communicate performance results in a faithful manner (Bowen et al., 2005).  
Accordingly, the use of aggressive financial communications aims at distorting financial numbers to 
portray a more favourable financial situation (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). In the same vein, Clatworthy and 
Jones (2003) emphasise that the management of impression in corporate financial communications is 
achieved through an optimistic tone that ignores failures and emphasises success. Similarly, Yuthas et 
al. (2002) use a framework to affirm that fundamental accounting principles, which are likely to be 
jeopardised by aggressive financial communications, are understood through the assessment of their 
score for OPTIMISM. However, optimistic tone in financial communications published during periods of 
global economic downturn is sincere based on its alignment with current and future financial performance 
(Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 7). Nevertheless, this study proposes that OPTIMISM is used to advance 
aggressive financial communications, hence, the fifth hypothesis is stated as: 
H5: 
(a) The OPTIMISM level in the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the OPTIMISM level in the financial communications 
of organisations in the low discretion industry (LD). 
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(b) During good or bad times, the OPTIMISM level in the financial communications of organisations 
in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the OPTIMISM level in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
(c) To emphasise a greater sense of satisfaction and positive entailments, the OPTIMISM level in 
the financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a low discretion 
industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the OPTIMISM level in the financial communications 
of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (LD). 
(d) To emphasise a greater sense of satisfaction and positive entailments, the OPTIMISM level in 
the financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the OPTIMISM level in the financial communications 
of organisations with bad performance results within the same industry (HD). 
4.1.5.1 Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the OPTIMISM scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of OPTIMISM will be analysed using the constituents equation from DICTION 7.0. 
Accordingly, there are sub-features that either increase or decrease the OPTIMISM score. These sub-
features will be used as testable sub-hypotheses for each of the industry groups.   
In view of the aforementioned statements in H5, this research states the fifth sub-hypotheses as thus: 
For the sub-features that increase the OPTIMISM score: 
(e) The sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’ will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry (HD) than in the low discretion industry (LD).  
 
(f) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’, in 
the financial communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD) will be 
significantly higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’ in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD). 
 
(g) To emphasise a greater sense of OPTIMISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, 
and ‘Inspiration’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance results 
in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than the sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, 
‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results within the same industry (LD). 
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(h) To emphasise a greater sense of OPTIMISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, 
and ‘Inspiration’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance results 
in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than the sub-feature scores for 
‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad 
performance results within the same industry (HD) 
For the sub-features that decrease the OPTIMISM score: 
(i) The sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, and ‘Denial’ will be significantly higher for 
companies in the low discretion industry (LD) than in the high discretion industry (HD). 
 
(j) During good or bad times, the sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, and ‘Denial’ in the 
financial communications of organisations in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly 
higher than sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, and ‘Denial’ in the financial 
communications of organisations in a high discretion industry (HD). 
(k) To emphasise a greater sense of OPTIMISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, and 
‘Denial’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a low 
discretion industry (LD) will be significantly lower than the sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, 
‘Hardship’, and ‘Denial’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad performance 
results within the same industry (LD).  
(l) To emphasise a greater sense of OPTIMISM, the sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, ‘Hardship’, and 
‘Denial’ in the financial communications of organisations with good performance results in a high 
discretion industry (HD) will be significantly lower than the sub-feature scores for ‘Blame’, 
‘Hardship’, and ‘Denial’ in the financial communications of organisations with bad performance 
results within the same industry (HD).  
4.2 Measurement for Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) – LIWC Language Categories 
As explained in the section above, another textual analysis tool was adopted to validate some of the 
Master Variables and sub-features of DICTION 7. Accordingly, eleven (11) language categories of 
LIWC2015 were selected for this purpose. The language categories are Tone, First Person Singular 
Pronoun, First Person Plural Pronoun, Positive Emotion, Negative Emotion, Certainty, Achievement, 
Risk, Past Focus, Present Focus, and Motion (Pennebaker et al. 2015). With the exception of Tone, the 
other ten (10) language categories were compared side-by-side with those of DICTION 7 owing to the 
similarity in definition of the language categories of LIWC2015 and DICTION 7. The set of hypotheses 
generated for the use of Tone between the high and low discretion industries were structured on the prior 
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study of Henry (2008). Accordingly, the testable hypotheses stated for some of the Master Variables and 
sub-features of DICTION were directly applied to the language categories of LIWC2015 for the purpose 
of matching them together and obtaining validity for the measurement. Table 4.1 below shows the 
matching process. 
Table 4.1 Matching Process for DICTION Sub-features and LIWC Language Category 
No DICTION 7 Master Variable or Sub-Feature LIWC2015 Language Category 
1 Self-Reference First Person Singular Pronoun 
2 Collectives First Person Plural Pronoun 
3 Satisfaction Positive Emotion 
4 Denial  Negative Emotion 
5 CERTAINTY Certainty 
6 Accomplishment Achievement 
7 Ambivalence Risk 
8 Past Concern Past Focus 
9 Present Concern Present Focus 
10 ACTIVITY Motion 
11 None Available in DICTION 7.0 Tone 
 
Accordingly, at all levels of measurement [Macro- and Micro- levels of analysis, during good and bad 
times – within an industry (high or low) and between the two industries (high and low)], these language 
categories of LIWC2015 were predicted to move in the same direction as those of DICTION 7. Therefore, 
the expressions for these would be that at all levels of analysis: 
(a) The measurement for Self-Reference is expected to move in the same direction as First Person 
Singular pronoun. 
(b) The measurement for Collectives is expected to move in the same direction as First Person Plural 
Pronoun. 
(c) The measurement for Satisfaction is expected to move in the same direction as Positive Emotion. 
(d) The measurement for Denial is expected to move in the same direction as Negative Emotion. 
(e) The measurement for CERTAINTY is expected to move in the same direction as Certainty. 
(f) The measurement for Accomplishment is expected to move in the same direction as 
Achievement. 
(g) The measurement for Ambivalence is expected to move in the same direction as Risk. 
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(h) The measurement for Past Concern is expected to move in the same direction as Past Focus. 
(i) The measurement for Present Concern is expected to move in the same direction as Present 
Focus. 
(j) The measurement for ACTIVITY is expected to move in the same direction as Motion.  
With respect to Tone, the prior study of Henry (2008) informed the set of predictions made in the context 
of this study. Henry (2008) introduced a novel approach in the measurement of ‘Tone’ in written text in 
terms of the positivity and negativity of words used by the author of a text. In her study, it was emphasised 
that the level of ‘Tone’ increases as the proportion of positive words exceed negative words in a given 
text. The standpoint of this study is that there is the potential for aggressive reporting in the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry. In the same vein, with a potential high level 
of certainty demonstrated by top managers in such industry towards the delivery of predicted high 
performance results, there is the likelihood for careful selection of positive words that would underline 
their ability to and insistence on delivering such expectations.  
For a higher level of ‘Tone’ to be maintained, there is the potential for the CEOs of companies in a high 
discretion industry to carefully select positive words while avoiding communicating with negative words 
that would otherwise undermine their ability to deliver high performance expectations. In contrast, for 
companies in the low discretion industry, this study posits that there is the potential for their CEOs to 
communicate using less aggressive, or rather conservative language, due to the already known lower 
growth prospects for companies in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the 
CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry to either conservatively use positive words or use more 
negative words to emphasise their performance results in their financial communications, thereby 
resulting in a significantly lower level of ‘Tone’ in comparison to those observed for companies in the high 
discretion industry. Accordingly, the following set of predictions were conducted for the level of Tone in 
the financial communications of companies in the high and low discretion industries. Accordingly, the 
sixth hypothesis is stated as: 
H6: 
(a) At the macro-level of analysis, the level of Tone in the financial communications of companies in 
the financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry will be significantly 
higher than for those in the low discretion industry. 
(b) During good or bad times, the level of Tone in the financial communications of companies in the 
financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly 
higher than for those in the low discretion industry (LD). 
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(c) The level of Tone in the financial communications of companies with good performance results 
in the low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than for those with bad performance 
results within the same industry group.  
(d) The level of Tone in the financial communications of companies with good performance results 
in the high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than for those with bad performance 
results within the same industry group.  
4.3 Measurement for Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Level 
To formulate testable hypothesis for the readability and comprehension indices of the financial 
communication documents of companies in the high and low discretion industries, this study relied on 
one of the sub-features of the REALISM Master Variable of DICTION 7 known as ‘Complexity’. This sub-
feature was applied in the formulation of hypothesis for the REALISM Master Variable in comparing the 
financial communication scores of companies in the high and low discretion industries. At the macro-level 
of analysis, it was hypothesised (H4) that the REALISM score of the financial communication documents 
of companies in the low discretion industry will be significantly higher than for those in the high discretion 
industry. By taking into consideration the sub-features of the Master Variable REALISM, it would mean 
that the sub-features that increase the REALISM score (Familiarity, Spatial Terms, Temporal Terms, 
Present Concern, Human Interest, and Concreteness) will be significantly higher for the financial 
communication documents of companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high discretion 
industry. On the other hand, it would mean that the sub-features that decrease the REALISM score (Past-
Concern, and Complexity) will be significantly higher for the financial communication documents of 
companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry.  
In the context of this study, the sub-feature ‘Complexity’ was adopted in stating the hypotheses for testing 
the readability indices of the financial communication documents of companies in the high and low 
discretion industries. According to Hart and Carroll (2015, p. 9), ‘Complexity’ is a measure of the average-
number of characters-per-word in a given text file. Similarly, Li (2008) stresses that the use of complex 
language in corporate narratives is a strategy used to deceive investors. Several studies on impression 
management have investigated the link between the readability of annual reports and firm performance 
(Li, 2008), financial press coverage (Courtis, 1998), analysts following (Lehavy et al. 2011), and corporate 
risk (Courtis, 1986). In all these studies, they found that readability of annual reports was manipulated to 
obfuscate and divert attention from unfavourable financial performance results. Hence, it is more difficult 
to read and understand annual reports when a company reports unfavourable or bad financial 
performance results than when it reports favourable or good financial performance results. Accordingly, 
the measure of the sub-feature ‘Complexity’ stems from the Reading Ease Scores established in Flesch 
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(1951) which posits that convoluted phrasings make the ideas of a text abstract and with unclear 
implications. 
In view of this, the Flesch Reading Ease indices were adopted in the measurement of the readability 
scores of the financial communication documents of the two industry groupings under consideration. With 
respect to the Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Level, it is a metric based on the length of words and 
length of sentences (McNamara et al. 2014, p. 13). It establishes that the grade level increases as the 
length of words and sentences increases, which is a reasonable psychological standpoint. Furthermore, 
as longer words tend to be less frequent in English language, it is normal that readers have less world 
knowledge of these longer words (McNamara et al. 2014). Consequently, the use of longer sentences 
tends to place a higher demand on the cognitive resources of readers, thereby increasing the 
comprehension difficulty. As grade level is the level of education that would be required to process a text 
file, longer words and sentences will require a higher level of education, especially in the comprehension 
of words that are complex and less frequent in English language.  
On the other hand, the level of education needed for the comprehension of a text file will be lower if the 
length of words and sentences are shorter, especially words that are simple and more frequent in English 
language. It is noteworthy that there is an inverse relationship between Flesch Reading Ease (readability 
score) and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Level (level of education). The higher the readability score 
of a text file, the lower the level of education that would be required to understand it. On the other hand, 
the lower the readability score of a text file, the higher the level of education that would be required to 
understand it. In view of the extant literature on the readability of text, this seventh hypothesis is stated 
as: 
H7:  
(a) The readability score of the financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry 
(LD) will be significantly higher than for companies in the high discretion industry (HD).  
(b) The readability grade level of the financial communications of companies in the high discretion 
industry (HD) will be significantly higher than for companies in the low discretion industry (LD).  
(c) During good or bad times, the readability score of the financial communications of companies in 
the low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than for companies in the high 
discretion industry (HD). 
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(d) During good or bad times, the readability grade level of the financial communications of 
companies in the high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than for those in the 
low discretion industry (LD).  
(e) The readability score of the financial communications of companies with good performance 
results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than for the companies with 
bad performance results within the same industry.  
(f) The readability grade level of the financial communications of companies with bad performance 
results in a low discretion industry (LD) will be significantly higher than for the companies with 
good performance results within the same industry. 
(g) The readability score of the financial communications of companies with good performance 
results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than for the companies with 
bad performance results within the same industry.  
(h) The readability grade level of the financial communications of companies with bad performance 
results in a high discretion industry (HD) will be significantly higher than for the companies with 
good performance results within the same industry. 
According to McNamara et al. (2014), there are many categories of text called genre and this has 
implications for its readability and comprehensibility. Brooks and Warren (1972) divides text genre 
into narrative, expository, persuasive, and descriptive (see also McCarthy, Myers, Briner, Graesser, 
& McNamara, 2009). Text in certain categories are more difficult to read and comprehend than texts 
in other categories. According to McNamara et al. (2014) narrative texts tend to have a higher level 
of readability and comprehension than informational texts. Prior studies estimate that narrative texts 
are read and understood approximately twice as quickly and can be remembered twice as well as 
informational texts (Graesser & Ottati, 1995; Haberlandt & Graesser, 1985).  
In view of this, a potential multidimensional perspective adopted in analysing text for this study was 
to scale the texts in accordance to text dimensions, a method adopted from Biber (1991) and 
Louwerse, McCarthy, McNamara, and Graesser. (2004). For example, a sample text can be scaled 
on the degree to which it is informational versus narrative; print versus oral; decontextualised versus 
interactive with a target audience; academic (formal) versus informal, among others (McNamara et 
al. 2014, p. 14). Biber (1991) developed an analytical scheme that helps to scale the dimension of 
texts, which overlaps into predicating the differences between texts with respect to their ease or 
difficulty in reading and comprehension. McNamara et al. (2014) suggest that informational, print, 
decontextualised, and academic texts are more difficult to read and understand than narrative, oral, 
contextualised and informal texts. Accordingly, the two genres of text adopted for this study are 
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informational, print, and decontextualised text (annual reports), and narrative, transcribed oral 
discussions, contextualised and informal text (analysts’ discussions). The rationale for comparing the 
readability statistics of the two forms of financial communications documents was to test which of 
them has a higher potential to be targeted by top management for rhetorical manipulation especially 
during periods of unfavourable or bad performance results. With the extant theory on text genre, the 
eighth hypothesis is stated as thus: 
H8:  
(a) The readability score of the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion industry (LD) 
will be significantly higher than the readability score of the annual reports of companies within 
the same industry. 
(b) The readability grade level of the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry (LD) 
will be significantly higher than the readability grade level of the analysts’ discussions of 
companies within the same industry.  
(c) The readability score of the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry 
(HD) will be significantly higher than the readability score of the annual reports of companies 
within the same industry. 
(d) The readability grade level of the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry (HD) 
will be significantly higher than the readability grade level of the analysts’ discussions of 
companies within the same industry.  
(e) The aggregate readability score of the analysts’ discussions of companies in both high and low 
discretion industries will be significantly higher than the aggregate readability score of the annual 
reports of companies in both industries.  
(f) The aggregate readability grade level of the annual reports of the companies in both high and 
low discretion industries will be significantly higher than the aggregate readability grade level of 
the analysts’ discussions of companies in both industries.  
In summary, this chapter covered in detail the hypotheses formulated and proposed using different 
language features. These form the basis for the discussion on the next chapter on the results obtained 
from the text analysis tools applied and statistical analysis conducted. It follows with the discussion of the 
results in the light of previous studies.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS CHAPTER 
This chapter presents the results of all hypotheses tested, answering the three levels of research 
questions of this study. It begins with reporting the results obtained from testing the predictive validity of 
the underlying model for measuring overall industry discretion in the context of companies operating in 
the UK. The next line of results are with respect to the eight hypotheses tested using the text analysis 
and statistical analysis tools discussed in the previous sections, for the purpose of differentiating between 
the language features of companies in the two industry groups. It follows with the presentation of results 
obtained from the evaluation of the financial communications of the two industry groups during favourable 
and unfavourable financial periods.  
5.1 Measurement of Industry-level Discretion – In the Context of Companies in the United 
Kingdom 
In the course of testing the applicability of the theory on discretion in the UK context, this study adapted 
and replicated the method empirically established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). In their study, 
they showed that four objective indicators are associated with the individual corporate ratings provided 
by expert analysts on the level of discretion in an industry. The results of their empirical research showed 
that research and development (R&D) intensity, advertising intensity, and market growth are all positively 
associated, while capital intensity is negatively associated with the ratings of experts on industry 
discretion. As a result, they established a linear equation for measuring industry discretion with 
deterministic regression coefficients of the aforementioned four objective indicators of industry discretion.  
Following this novel approach established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995), McClelland et al. (2010) 
adopted these objective indicators to assess the validity of the industry selections in their study in the 
USA. Accordingly, they used Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database to gather relevant data on all 
firms with more than 500 employees in their selected industries. They collected data on: R&D Intensity 
measured as [(R&D expenses ÷ Sales) × 100]; Advertising Intensity measured as [(Advertising expenses 
÷ Sales) × 100]; Capital Intensity measured as [net value of property, plants, and equipment ÷ number 
of employees; and Market Growth measured as the annual sales growth rate for the firms in the relevant 
period of study. Finally, McClelland et al. (2010) used the results of Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) 
study to calculate the overall measure of industry discretion. Accordingly, McClelland et al. (2010) 
calculated the summary measure of industry discretion empirically tested and established in Hambrick 
and Abrahamson’s (1995) by using the intercept and regression coefficients in their multivariate model 
for predicting the perception of experts on industry discretion. Accordingly, overall industry discretion is 
measured as: 
138 | P a g e  
 
Industry discretion = 4.344 + (0.1209 × R&D Intensity) + (0.1519 × Advertising Intensity) 
– (0.004 × Capital Intensity) + (0.0596 × Sales Growth Rate). 
(See McClelland, Liang, and Barker III 2010, p. 1273). 
It is noteworthy that McClelland et al. (2010) added an additional layer of measurement other than the 
dichotomy of high and low discretion industries classification established in Hambrick and Abrahamson 
(1995). McClelland et al. (2010) proposed and tested for differences in selected high-, medium-, and low-
discretion industries (p. 1273) using one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) that tested for differences 
between the various industry groups. In addition, they used Duncan’s multiple range test to examine the 
difference between any two of the groups. The results of their analyses are presented below:  
Table 5.1. Analysis of Variance: Industry Selections and Objective Measures of Discretion 
 
Industry Discretion 
Groups    
Measure of Discretion Higha Mediumb Lowc F -Value D.M.R Sig. Diff.d  
R&D Intensity (n = 323)e 8.49 2.96 1.04 88.78*** High > Medium 
     High > Low 
     Medium > Low 
Advertising Intensity (n = 341) 1.23 0.81 0.64 4.51*** High > Low 
Sales Growth Rate (n = 332) 16.12 11.84 6.82 7.41*** High > Low 
     Medium > Low 
Capital Intensity (n = 433) 30138.91 28734.90 55473.4 26.61*** Low > High 
     Low > Medium 
Industry Discretion (n = 204) 5.19 4.35 2.80 28.98*** High > Medium 
     High > Low 
     Medium > Low 
McClelland et al. (2010, p. 1273)           
 
a. High Discretion firms are those in the computer equipment and electric component industries. 
b. Medium Discretion firms are those in the industrial equipment industries. 
c. Low Discretion firms are those in the furniture, textiles, and primary metals industry.   
d. All reported group differences using Duncan’s multiple range test are significant at p ≤ .05 or smaller. 
e. Sample sizes vary based on missing data. 
**p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.  
With reference to the findings of McClelland et al. (2010), there is a convincing pattern of differences in 
the objective measurement of high-, medium-, and low-discretion industry groups. Accordingly, except 
139 | P a g e  
 
for capital intensity, the mean values of all the variables are in the proper ascending or descending order 
when moving from high discretion to medium discretion to low discretion industries. Furthermore, there 
are significant differences in all the variables, specifically, with the high discretion industry group 
consistently being significantly different from the low discretion industry group. With all the significant 
differences being in the direction of prediction. Interestingly, McClelland et al.’s (2010) overall measure 
of industry discretion adapted from Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) shows that all the three groups 
are significantly different and in the direction of prediction. Therefore, McClelland et al. (2010) affirm that 
the overall pattern of the results adequately operationalised high-, medium-, and low-discretion industries.  
Nevertheless, in the context of this study and as stated in the methodology chapter, the approach adopted 
is same as the one established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) towards the measurement and 
classification of firms into high discretion industry and low discretion industry groups. The rationale for 
adopting and replicating this two-way classification is based on the unavailability of any published 
research work on the predictive validity of the underlying model in the context of companies in the United 
Kingdom. Consequently, it would be inadequate to apply the tripartite classification in McClelland et al. 
(2010) without testing the predictive validity of the model in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) within the 
UK context. It is noteworthy that the selected firms in these two studies are basically companies registered 
on stock exchanges in the United States. More importantly, the analyses conducted in McClelland et al. 
(2010) focused only on three selected industry groups by relying on prior studies that validated the 
classification of firms into high and low discretion industries. With respect to the high discretion industry 
environment, they chose firms in the computer equipment and electrical components industry groups by 
using a firm’s primary four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code as an identifier of industry 
affiliation. In addition, their choice of these firms as representatives of the high discretion industry is 
consistent with prior empirical studies (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
Fredrickson, 1993) that have adopted the computer industry as an archetypal high discretion industry. 
On the other hand, they chose firms in the textile, furniture, and primary metals industries as 
representatives of the low discretion industry environment. Finally, they subjectively selected industrial 
equipment manufacturers as archetypal medium or moderate discretion industry. 
While this study did not aim to discredit the validity of the tripartite classification in McClelland et al. 
(2010), nevertheless, it argues that it will be inadequate to adopt this classification for a UK study without 
first testing the validity of the model in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). Accordingly, the overarching 
aim of testing for the predictive validity of the underlying model is to assess whether the firms registered 
in the UK environment will have the same or similar levels of discretion as those of their counterparts in 
the United States of America. In the context of this study, the classification of firms into high discretion 
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and low discretion industries was based on replicating the selection procedure of companies, using 
Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database. The companies were selected using similar four-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes used in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). It is noteworthy that in 
the context of this study, the SIC codes were not exactly the same as those used in identifying the firms 
in the USA, nonetheless, they produced similar classification of firms as those in Hambrick and 
Abrahamson (1995). In view of this, the companies selected for this study were those with SIC codes in 
the FTSE350 index (reported as active only in the focal industry) in the Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ 
database for the period 2012-2016. As Table 3.4 shows, the group is diverse, with a combination of young 
and old, consumer- and industrial- product, manufacturing, and service industries.   
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the four objective indicators of industry discretion 
established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995). For each of the indicators, this study calculated the 
five-year averages for each firm and then used the median value as a measure of the industry 
characteristic. The average number of Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ firms in either a high or low 
discretion industry was 43.  
Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics on the overall discretion score for each industry. These scores 
were computed using the intercept and regression coefficients in the multivariate model for predicting the 
perception of experts on industry discretion. In order to differentiate between industries as either 
belonging to low discretion or high discretion environment, the median discretion value was computed as 
5.11. Accordingly, any industry with a score below the median value is categorised as a low discretion 
industry, while any industry with a score above the median value is categorised as a high discretion 
industry. For ease of reading and interpretation, industries are listed in the ascending order. As can be 
seen in Table 5.3, all industries ranging from the Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills to Certified Air 
Transportation are in the low discretion industry, while those ranging from Semiconductors to Radio and 
TV Communication Equipment are in the high discretion industry. In total, there are seven (7) industries 
belonging to the low discretion environment, while eight (8) industries are in the high discretion 
environment.  
For the purpose of obtaining statistical significance between the two industry groups based on the median 
scores computed above, a non-parametric test of statistical significance was conducted. Table 5.4 shows 
the analysis of variance between the industry selections. It shows that for Research and Development 
(R&D) Intensity, there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 1.89) between the R&D Intensity 
of high and low discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that the value of R&D (Mean = 6.91, SD = 
5.14) for the companies in high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than for those in the 
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low discretion industry (Mean = 0.03, SD = 0.08). This is in line with prediction and in line with the results 
in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010) to posit that the investment in R&D by 
companies in the high discretion industry is significantly higher than for those in the low discretion 
industry. Similarly, for Sales Growth Rate (SGR), there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.004, d 
= 1.59) between the Sales Growth Rate of high and low discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that 
the value of SGR (Mean = 10.99%, SD = 7%) for the companies in high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry (Mean = 1%, SD = 3%). Again, this is in 
line with prediction and in line with the results in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. 
(2010) who posit that the Sales Growth Rate of companies in the high discretion industry is significantly 
higher than for those in the low discretion industry. 
Furthermore, for Capital Intensity, there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.05, d = 0.65) between 
the Capital Intensity of high and low discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that the value of Capital 
Intensity (Mean = 24811.912, SD = 15087.8) for the companies in a high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly lower than for those in the low discretion industry (Mean = 370077, SD = 746125). Again, 
this is in line with the prediction and in line with the results in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and 
McClelland et al. (2010) who posit that the level of Capital Intensity in the operations of companies in the 
low discretion industry is significantly higher than for those in the high discretion industry. In addition, for 
Advertising Intensity, there is no statistically significant difference (p = 0.307, d = 0) between the 
Advertising Intensity of high and low discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that the value of 
Advertising (Mean = 0, SD = 0) for the companies in high discretion industry is not statistically significantly 
higher than for those in the low discretion industry (Mean = 0, SD = 0). Although the result did not reach 
a level of significance, nonetheless, it is in the direction of the prediction and in line with the direction of 
results in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010) who posit that the investment 
on advertising by companies in the high discretion industry is higher than for those in the low discretion 
industry.  
It is noteworthy that of all the four objective indicators tested in this study, Advertising Intensity is the only 
variable that did not reach a level of significance despite moving in the same direction as those reported 
in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010). Finally, for the overall Industry 
Discretion measurement, there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 3.75) between the 
Industry Discretion scores of high and low discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that the value of 
Industry Discretion (Mean = 5.83, SD = 0.49) for the companies in a high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry (Mean = 4.43, SD = 0.19). Again, this is 
in line with prediction and in line with the results in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et 
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al. (2010) to posit that the level of overall Industry Discretion of companies in the high discretion 
environment is significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry.   
Overall, the results of this study are similar to those in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland 
et al. (2010), although with varying objective indicator scores and accompanying industry discretion 
scores. Interestingly, the industries in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) listed as belonging to the high 
discretion environment are replicated in this study as belonging to the high discretion environment. 
Similarly, the industries listed in the prior study as belonging to the low discretion environment are 
replicated in this study as belonging to the low discretion industry. This shows the validity and reliability 
of both the discretion theory and the model for predicting industry discretion in the UK context. 
Nevertheless, the individual discretion scores are higher for UK companies in the low discretion industry 
as opposed to those reported in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010). This is 
as a result of the level of Capital Intensity in the low discretion industry. The result suggests that the level 
of Capital Intensity in the operations of companies in the low discretion industry is lower than they used 
to be. This study posits that this could be as a result of technological advances, shorter product life cycles 
and the need for companies to move away from significant investments in property, plants, and equipment 
that cannot be easily adapted to meet technological- and demand- driven changes. In sum, the results 
produced in this study show that firms operating in the Computer Equipment, Semiconductor, and 
Pharmaceutical Industries are archetypal of the high discretion environment. This is consistent with 
several past empirical studies (e.g. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Abrahamson 1995; 
Hambrick et al. 1993). On the other hand, it shows that firms operating in the Metals, Trucking, and 
Petroleum and Natural Gas Distribution Industries are archetypal of the low discretion environment. 
Again, this is consistent with several past empirical studies (e.g. Hambrick & Abrahamson 1995; 
McClelland et al. 2010).  
Accordingly, the results of this study provide sufficient predictive validity of the underlying model 
empirically tested in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010) for the purpose of 
establishing the discretion scores of companies operating in the UK environment. This therefore, aids the 
classification of the UK companies as either belonging to the high or low discretion industry. In view of 
this, the overarching aim is to test whether this classification can produce an understanding of the 
psycholinguistic characteristics of the financial communications within each industry group. 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics on the Median Discretion Scores of each Objective Indicator. 
UK Industry 
R&D 
Intensity 
Adv. 
Intensity 
Capital 
Intensity 
Market 
Growth 
         
Blast furnace & Steel Mills 0.222 0 3838.097 -3.66% 
Gold & Silver Ores 0 0 372824.569 -0.92% 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 0 0 2033818.888 0.41% 
Trucking (except local) 0 0 6469.930 2.16% 
Book Publishing 0 0 5721.882 3.03% 
Certified Air Transport 0 0 152175.811 7.06% 
Security Brokers 0 0 15690.832 2.03% 
Computer Equipment 3.610 0 18467.669 10.44% 
Computer Programming 11.177 0 9248.792 3.72% 
Engineering & Scientific Equipment 6.652 0 23082.188 6.01% 
Motion Picture Production 0 0 36353.648 19.16% 
Pharmaceuticals  9.094 0 44227.271 10.44% 
Radio & TV 16.292 0 5808.556 3.45% 
Semiconductors 3.410 0 17079.901 8.81% 
Surgical  5.055 0 44227.271 25.91% 
 
Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics on the Overall Discretion Score per Industry. 
UK Industry Discretion Scores   
Industry Discretion Score 
Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills  4.15 
Gold and Silver Ores 4.29 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 4.36 
Security Brokers 4.46 
Trucking (except local) 4.47 
Book Publishing 4.52 
Certified Air Transportation 4.76 
Semiconductors 5.28 
Computer Equipment 5.40 
Motion Picture Production 5.49 
Engineering and Scientific Equipment 5.51 
Computer Programming 5.92 
Pharmaceuticals 6.07 
Surgical-Medical Instruments 6.50 
Radio & TV communication Equipment 6.52 
Median Discretion Score 5.11 
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Table 5.4. Analysis of Variance: Industry Selections and Objective Measures of Discretion 
  Industry Discretion Groups     
Measure of Discretion High Discretiona Low Discretionb P-Value Kruskal-Wallis Rankingc 
R&D Intensity (n = 430)d 6.91 0.03 0.000*** High > Low 
Advertising Intensity (n = 430) 0.00 0.00 0.307 High ≈ Low 
Sales Growth Rate (n = 430) 10.99 1.00 0.004*** High > Low 
Capital Intensity (n = 430) 24811.91 370077.14 0.050** High < Low 
Industry Discretion (n = 430) 5.83 4.43 0.000*** High > Low 
*p-value ≤ 0.1; **p-value ≤ 0.05; ***p-value ≤ 0.01     
 
a. High Discretion Industry firms are those with discretion score of 5.28 or more. 
b. Low Discretion Industry firms are those with discretion score of 4.76 or less. 
c. Group differences using Kruskal-Wallis Independent Samples test are significant at p ≤ .05 or less. 
d. Sample sizes based on data gathered from all firm years. 
 
Note 
The figures for the column on Advertising Intensity are all reported as zeros. This is owing to the use of 
median as the selection of the industry representative. While some companies had advertising spend, 
however, they are very minimal with most of the companies having no advertising spend in the relevant 
years.    
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5.2 Structure of Results and Analysis – Measures for DICTION, LIWC, and Readability Measures 
In the course of testing the hypotheses for this study, the CEO letters in annual reports (hereafter, the 
annual reports or AR) and CEO contributions in analysts’ discussions (hereafter, analysts’ discussions or 
AD) of sample companies were analysed for linguistic markers highlighted at the hypotheses 
development stage. As noted in the methodology chapter, annual reports are informational, print, and 
decontextualised, while analysts’ discussions are oral, narrative with an audience, contextualised, and 
transcribed. A total of sixty (60) companies were tested in line with the criteria set for their selection. As 
aforementioned, Table 3.6 shows the number of companies with annual reports and analysts’ discussions 
in line with the relevant periods. Specifically, forty-three (43) of the sample companies had annual reports 
and analysts’ discussions covering the periods between 2011 and 2015, while 17 companies had same 
disclosure reports covering the periods between 2014 and 2018. In view of this, the 60 sample companies 
were divided equally between two industry classifications of high discretion industry and low discretion 
industry. Consequently, 30 companies were classified as belonging to the low discretion industry while 
the other 30 companies were classified as belonging to the high discretion industry. For additional clarity, 
Table 5.5 shows the industry composition of both the low and high discretion industries.  
Table 5.5 Industry Composition (Balanced Sample) 
  Low D. Percent High D. Percent 
Blast furnaces and Steel mills  1 1.7   
Gold and silver ores 7 11.7   
Petroleum & Natural Gas 10 16.7   
Security brokers 4 6.7   
Trucking (except local) 2 3.3   
Book publishing 3 5.0   
Certified Air Transportation 3 5.0   
Semiconductors   6 10.0 
Computer Equipment   1 1.7 
Motion picture production   2 3.3 
Engineering and Scientific Equipment   6 10.0 
Computer Programming   2 3.3 
Pharmaceuticals   10 16.7 
Surgical-Medical Instruments   2 3.3 
Radio & TV communication equipment   1 1.7 
Total 30 50 30 50 
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In this study, the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of these companies were analysed using the 
text-analysis software DICTION 7.0 using the five Master Variables of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, 
ACTIVITY, REALISM, and OPTIMISM. These variables were analysed at the macro-level of analysis with 
the purpose of determining if they showed the predicted statistically significant differences between the 
low and high discretion industry levels of classification. Furthermore, additional analysis at the micro-level 
was conducted. This was done in order to understand whether the component elements of each Master 
Variable showed further statistically significant differences between low and high discretion industries. In 
addition, the scores of each industry were compared with standardised DICTION scores (mean and 
standard deviation) using the z-scores computed for each industry, to understand the deviation of each 
industry’s scores from the standardised scores of all the variables at the macro and micro levels of 
analysis.  
Other accompanying analyses were conducted such as how aggressive or conservative these industries 
are with respect to their financial communications. Furthermore, additional analysis was conducted using 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to triangulate the language features of this text 
analysis software with those of DICTION 7.0. This was conducted for the purpose of triangulating and 
gaining internal validity for the results generated using the five Master Variables of DICTION 7.0, and to 
determine the language features that provide results in line with predictions of this study. The eleven (11) 
primary measures of the language categories tested using LIWC, as shown in Table 4.1, are Tone, First-
Person Singular Pronoun, First-Person Plural Pronoun, Positive Emotion, Negative Emotion, Certainty, 
Achievement, Risk, Past Focus, Present Focus, and Motion.  
In addition, computations applying the Flesch Reading Ease (hereafter, Readability Score) and Flesch-
Kincaid Readability Grades (hereafter, Readability Grade) were conducted, to determine the respective 
readability of the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of these industries, and their implications with 
respect to financial communications. In order to critically assess statistical significance for the results 
observed, a non-parametric statistical tool known as Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test was 
conducted to differentiate between the two industries, using appropriate statistical tests. Furthermore, 
Cohen’s d measure of effect size was conducted to understand how different the differences are between 
the p-values of the variables tested for both industries. The rationale for this is to understand the degree 
to which this study could overlay the set of data for low discretion industry with those of the high discretion 
industry. If the value of Cohen’s d is zero (0), then there is a perfect match between the datasets of low 
and high discretion industries. In other words, a value of zero (0) means that the two datasets are not 
different at all.  
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As the value of Cohen’s d increases (shown in Figure 4.1), so does the indication of the difference 
between the datasets of the low and high discretion industries. Conventionally, a relatively well-agreed 
measurement scale has emerged for the interpretation of the Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988). Thus, a d-value 
below 0.2 is considered a small difference (about 85% overlay of data), and values between 0.2 and 0.5 
are considered a moderate difference (an overlay of about 67% of the data). Any d-value above 0.5 is 
considered a large difference; a d-value of 1.0 has a data overlay of about 45% and a d-value of 2.0 has 
data overlay of about 19% (McNamara, Graesser, McCarthy, & Cai, 2014). In the context of this study, 
the focus of analysis is on the results that show statistically significant differences in the financial 
communications of the two industry groups with a Cohen’s d value of 0.2 and above.  
 
Figure 5.1 Cohen’s d Effect Sizes (WordPress, 2019) 
The rationale for this focus is to analyse the results that are statistically significant and which show at 
least moderate difference between the financial communications of the two industry groups. In other 
words, the aim is to assess, beyond chance, whether there is real effect size between the language 
features of the financial communications of the two industry groups. All other results that were either 
approaching or with no statistical significance are reported in the detailed results and analysis section in 
Appendix 7. In addition, some tables were merged to provide complementary results and ease of reading 
in this chapter, while the comprehensive listing of tables are reported in Appendix 8. In view of this, the 
results and analysis of the disclosures of the two industry groups with respect to their annual reports and 
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analysts’ discussions are shown in sections in line with the order of stated hypotheses. The results are 
presented in tables as well as their explanations.  
Results reported in Table 5.6 show the non-parametric statistically significant difference between the 
annual reports of low and high discretion industries. In differentiating between the annual reports of these 
industries, the results show that the coefficients of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, and 
REALISM are statistically significant (p-value < 0.01; p-value < 0.01; p-values < 0.01; p-value < 0.05, 
respectively). Accordingly, Hypotheses 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), and 4(a) are supported by these results. In other 
words, the results were as predicted from the deductive reasoning and theoretical arguments.  
 
5.2.1. COMMONALITY 
It can be seen in Table 5.6 that with respect to the COMMONALITY Master Variable, the significance test 
(p-value = 0.000, d = 0.39) shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the COMMONALITY 
level in the annual reports of organisations in a low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher 
Table 5.6 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion 
Industries (Macro-level Analysis) 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test Mean Values Standard Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.000*** 49.60 48.85 1.67 2.13 
 
0.39 
        
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.000*** 47.39 48.73 4.17 3.73 0.34 
        
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.002*** 49.25 49.90 2.13 2.01 0.31 
        
        
REALISM AR 0.031** 53.88 53.10 2.47 2.78 0.30 
        
       
 
       
 
Readability 
Score AR 0.000*** 30.92 27.44 7.99 7.81 0.44 
        
       
 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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than the COMMONALITY level observed for organisations in a high discretion industry, with the former 
having a mean COMMONALITY score of 49.60 (SD = 1.67) while the mean value for the latter stands at 
48.85 (SD = 2.13).  
This result supports Hypothesis 1(a). Accordingly, the result suggests that the content of the CEO letters 
of organisations in the low discretion industry is indicative of language that conveys institutional 
regularities and/or substantive agreement on core values, behavioural interactions among industry 
participants that result in industry behaviour, and terms that describe the attitudinal similarities among 
the organisations within the low discretion industry. It suggests that the organisations within the low 
discretion industry are more likely to communicate with “language highlighting the agreed-upon values”, 
interaction and cooperation (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 10) within their industry category (z = 0.01), while 
“rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement (p. 10).  
In contrast, this is not so for organisations within the high discretion industry (z = - 0.27). Although the z-
scores of the two industry groups are within the normal range, however, for the high discretion industry, 
the result shows that the content of CEO letters of the organisations within this industry category is more 
likely to be indicative of language that conveys an individual behaviour that seeks to differ from the 
established industry norm, in comparison to the low discretion industry. In view of this, such behaviour is 
indicative of organisational isolation (as opposed to industry engagement), the rejection of industry 
conventions (instead of shared common values), and the maximisation of individual organisation choice 
(Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). 
It is noteworthy that the establishment of mutual understanding and cooperation with the target audience 
is the foundational basis of COMMONALITY. The results suggest that the CEOs of companies in the low 
discretion industry are more likely to use their financial communications to underline shared common 
values with their target audience. They seek engagement with their stakeholders for the purpose of 
creating a sense of community and advancing commitment toward common industry goals. In contrast, 
CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more prone to seek to reject social conventions 
while stressing their individual identity over industry norms. Prior studies emphasise that a deviation from 
shared common values is an indication of neuroticism (Brown & Treviño; 2006), which subsequently 
leads to unethical practices such as deception (Bligh & Hess, 2007; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). According 
to Marsh (2013), seeking to establish mutual understanding, rapport, or engagement is a core value of 
ethical leadership. Consequently, leaders of organisations that emphasise the need for ethical practices 
invest efforts towards building relationships founded on continuous engagement with stakeholders 
(Marsh, 2013). In the same vein, ethical leaders consider the implications of their decisions and actions 
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on their target audience (Reed, Vidaver-Cohen, & Colwell, 2011), as well as establishing themselves as 
“builders of community” and better stewards of shareholder resources (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 8; 
Spears, 1995). 
5.2.2. CERTAINTY 
With respect to the CERTAINTY Master Variable, the level of significance (p = 0.000, d = 0.34) shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the CERTAINTY level in the annual reports of 
organisations in a high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level 
observed for organisations in a low discretion industry, with the former having a mean CERTAINTY score 
48.73 (SD = 3.73, z = - 0.28) while the mean value for the latter stands at 47.39 (SD = 4.17, z = - 0.81). 
This result supports Hypothesis 2(a). Although the z-scores of the two industry groups are within the 
normal range, nonetheless, the result suggests that the content of CEO letters of organisations in the 
high discretion industry is more likely to be indicative of language that conveys “resoluteness, inflexibility, 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra” (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 6).  
Furthermore, the language of CERTAINTY in the CEO letters (as contained in the annual reports) of 
organisations in the high discretion industry is more prone to focus on financial communications that 
stresses precision, unwillingness to compromise, having a sense of assurance through approval and 
persuasion, and avoidance of hesitation in the expected or predicted performances of the organisations 
within the industry. The use of this language in the CEO letters conveys tenacity and insistence on the 
attainment of target performance, while reducing any signal of ambivalence in their communications to 
the shareholders. This study posits that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more 
likely to violate the legitimacy principle of discourse ethics by using language of inflexibility, completeness, 
and assurance in an environment that is not as complete, inflexible, and mature as those in the low 
discretion industry. 
In contrast, the result for the low discretion industry suggests that the CEO letters of organisations within 
this industry are more likely to use language that expresses a lesser level of certainty, which could signal 
the unwillingness or inability of the CEOs to commit to the verbalisation being made. In view of this, the 
language of such CEOs could underline statements of inexactness, restrained possibility, mystery, and 
confusion. According to prior study, “…aggressive accounting practices are reflected in resolute language 
that indicates traits of authoritative and transactional leadership” (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 10). Due to 
the higher likelihood of inflexibility in the annual reports of CEOs in the high discretion industry and a 
focus on self-interest, the result emphasises that the CEOs of companies within this industry are more 
151 | P a g e  
 
prone to set a tone at the top that could advance towards unethical accounting practices. Similarly, Sama 
and Shoaf (2008) argue that transactional leaders are more likely to engage in unethical behaviours due 
to their primary focus on transactions and profitability.  
In line with the findings of Patelli & Pedrini (2015), the “resoluteness of the language used in CEO letters 
as captured by CERTAINTY could indicate poor ethical leadership” (p. 7). Furthermore, the perspective 
from discourse ethics establishes that CERTAINTY in communication is a signal of a language that lacks 
legitimacy relative to the external context (Forester, 1980; Yuthas et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the 
application of the legitimacy principle is not universal, as it must be a function of the specific context under 
consideration. Patelli and Pedrini (2013) discuss the appropriateness of the legitimacy principle in the 
context of the worldwide economic downturn of 2008 and 2009. They suggest that it seems inappropriate 
to use language that conveys resoluteness and a sense of certainty in a context shaped by high financial 
instability. In uncertain environments, a flexible language seems more legitimate in order to seek 
stakeholder understanding rather than approval (Yuthas et al., 2002). In view of this, it seems appropriate 
for CEOs of organisations in the low discretion industry to communicate to their shareholders using more 
uncertain terms owing to many factors that affect their ability to deliver above-average market returns, 
one of which is attributable to the low growth potential experienced in their industry. 
5.2.3. ACTIVITY 
With respect to the ACTIVITY Master Variable, the level of statistical significance (p = 0.002, d = 0.31) 
shows that there is a significant difference between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the ACTIVITY level in the annual reports of organisations 
in a high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level observed for 
organisations in a low discretion industry, with the former having a mean ACTIVITY score of 49.90 (SD 
= 2.01, z = - 0.28) while the mean value for the latter stands at 49.25 (SD = 2.13, z = - 0.43). This result 
supports Hypothesis 3(a). Although the z-scores of the two industry groups are within the normal range, 
nonetheless, the result suggests that the language used in the CEO letters of organisations in the high 
discretion industry is more likely than an organisation in the low discretion industry to be characterised 
by terms that convey movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia. In the 
context of this study, such language embraces industry competition, forceful action, personal triumph, 
the expression of task-completion, and the avoidance of neutrality and inactivity. In view of this, the CEOs 
of companies in a high discretion industry are potentially more likely to place emphasis on their 
accomplishments by conveying narcissistic self-confidence. Specifically, it suggests that these CEOs are 
more prone to use their letters to shareholders to communicate overconfidence in their professional and 
uncompromising competence to deliver positive performance results and to implement strategic change. 
152 | P a g e  
 
Prior studies show that there is a relationship between ACTIVITY and leadership features of heroism 
(Badaracco, 2001), transformational change (Brown & Treviño, 2006), and self-confidence (Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2002). Specifically, Brown and Treviño (2006) explain that there is a tendency for leaders who 
advance transformational change to be engaged in unethical practices, particularly when they are driven 
by self-confidence. Although there is a positive impact of self-confidence on organisational performance 
and practices, yet, it is self-defeating when it advances towards overconfidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) highlight that there is a strong correlation between overconfidence of CEOs 
and financial restatements. Supported by literature on ethical leadership, overconfidence leads to the 
search for attention by engaging bold decisions, that would otherwise, be considered as unfeasible by 
most people (Kets de Vries, 2003). In addition, Chen (2010) shows that accounting frauds are more likely 
to be committed by overconfident leaders. This overconfidence is likely to undermine the fundamental 
credibility and quality of financial reporting (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The standpoint of this study is that 
the promise of the delivery of overly high performances by industries with high level of discretion can be 
understood through their potential aggressive financial communications. 
In contrast, the result for the low discretion industry are more muted and shows that the CEO letters of 
organisations within this industry are more likely to use language that conveys neutrality, lesser levels of 
activity, and the acceptance of inertness, which suggests the potential unwillingness or inability of the 
CEOs to display overconfidence, be forceful, and with less emphasis on their accomplishments. It shows 
that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use this language to 
communicate their potential commitment to status-quo, the unwillingness or inability to drive movement, 
organisational or performance change, and the implementation of ideas (McClelland et al., 2010). Prior 
study shows that ethical leaders are less likely to be driven by heroic representations of their actions and 
decisions (Badaracco, 2001). Notwithstanding, they ensure that their organisations undertake change in 
a patient, careful, and incremental way. Hence, this study emphasises that the CEOs of organisations in 
the low discretion industry understand the dynamics of their industry with respect to growth prospects, 
and are more likely to drive organisational performance in a patient, careful, incremental, and ethical way. 
5.2.4. REALISM 
With respect to the REALISM Master Variable, the test shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.031, d = 0.30) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. 
Furthermore, this result shows that the REALISM level in the annual reports of organisations in a low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the REALISM level observed for organisations 
in a high discretion industry, with the former having a mean REALISM score of 53.88 (SD = 2.47, z = 
1.39) while the mean value for the latter stands at 53.10 (SD = 2.78, z = 1.15). This result supports 
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Hypothesis 4(a). Interestingly, the z-scores of the two industry groups are above the normal range, 
meaning the CEO letters in the annual reports of the two industry groups are not characterised by 
complex language. Nonetheless, the result indicates that the content of the CEO letters of organisations 
in the low discretion industry is more likely to be characterised by language that conveys more tangible, 
immediate, recognisable matters that affect the shareholders’ everyday lives.  
In the context of this study, a lower level of REALISM signifies complexity of the language used by CEOs 
in communicating with shareholders, while a higher value facilitates readability and makes the CEO 
letters readable and understandable. As the REALISM score of the low discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher than the score of the high discretion industry, it suggests that the CEO letters of 
companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to be easily read and understood than those 
disclosed by companies in the high discretion industry. While the REALISM scores for both industry 
groups are significantly higher values than the DICTION mean (49.36) for REALISM, this could be 
attributable to difference in time, place, and regulation that may not be captured by DICTION. 
Nonetheless, this does not detract from the results as they are primarily comparing high and low industry 
groups and not to the DICTION mean.  
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) note that when complex lexicons are used in CEO letters to shareholders, it is 
a significant predictor of potential aggressive financial reporting. Similarly, Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
(2007) posit that the ‘ease of reading’ of a text is an area that is susceptible to rhetorical manipulation by 
using impression management tactics. Furthermore, Li (2008) emphasises that top management can use 
corporate narratives to manipulate and deceive investors when complex language is used in structuring 
those narratives. This is usually the case when they need to divert the attention of shareholders from 
unfavourable performance results (Courtis, 1986, 1998; Lehavy et al. 2011; Li, 2008; Patelli & Pedrini, 
2015). Therefore, familiar and concrete language in CEO letters as highlighted by the REALISM variable 
indicate faithful representation of performance results, while the use of complex lexicons in corporate 
narratives is a violation of the principle of comprehensibility in discourse ethics (Forester, 1980). To 
facilitate the mutual understanding of CEOs and the shareholders, the content of the CEO letters should 
be comprehensible and transparent (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015), a lack of which is a signal of potential ethical 
lapses with accompanying consequences for the financial reporting function (Schaubroeck et al. 2012). 
5.2.5 Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade 
With respect to the annual reports, the readability scores show a non-parametric statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.44) between the readability scores of the annual reports of low and high 
discretion industries. In addition, the mean readability scores of the low and high discretion industries are 
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30.92 (SD = 7.99) and 27.44 (SD = 7.81), respectively. Accordingly, the results mean that it is easier to 
read and understand annual reports published by companies in the low discretion industry than those 
published by companies in the high discretion industry. This result aligns with the stated Hypothesis 7(a). 
However, the readability scores observed for both industries’ annual reports are well below 40.0, a signal 
that both industries potentially make it difficult for their shareholders to read and understand the content 
of CEO letters published in annual reports. 
 
As explained in the methodology chapter on the genre of text, the results in Table 5.7 show that the 
readability score of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 58.54, SD = 6.84) of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 3.71) than those of the annual reports 
(Mean = 30.92, SD = 7.99) disclosed within the same industry category. This is in line with Hypothesis 
8(a). Similarly, the readability grade of the annual reports of companies (Mean = 14.62, SD = 1.97) in the 
low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 2.92) than those of the analysts’ 
 
Table 5.7 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Flesch Index Scores of the Two 
Document Types (Annual Reports vs Analysts' Discussions) 
Flesch Index Scores Document Type Kruskal-Wallis Sig. Test 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
        
Readability Score AR – LD 0.000*** 30.92  7.99 3.71 
 AD – LD 
 58.54  6.84  
  
 
    
Readability Grade AR – LD 0.000*** 14.62  1.97 2.92 
 AD – LD 
 9.49  1.51  
  
 
    
Readability Score AR – HD 0.000*** 27.44  7.81 4.21 
 AD – HD  58.12  6.71 
 
  
 
    
Readability Grade AR – HD 0.000*** 15.15  1.62 3.61 
 AD – HD  9.65  1.42 
 
  
 
   
 
Readability Score Agg.AR - L&H 0.000*** 29.18  8.08 3.91 
 Agg.AD - L&H  58.35  6.78 
 
  
 
   
 
Readability Grade Agg.AR - L&H 0.000*** 14.89  1.82 3.21 
 Agg.AD - L&H 
 9.57  1.47  
  
 
   
 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion 
 
Agg.AR – Aggregated Annual Reports 
Agg.AD – Aggregated Analysts’ Discussions 
 
L&H : L = Low Discretion; H = High Discretion          
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discussions (Mean = 9.49, SD = 1.51) disclosed within the same industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 
8(b). On the other hand, the readability score of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 58.12, SD = 6.71) of 
companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 4.21) than 
those of the annual reports (Mean = 27.44, SD = 7.81) disclosed within the same industry. This is in line 
with Hypothesis 8(c). Similarly, the readability grade of the annual reports of companies (Mean = 15.15, 
SD = 1.62) in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 3.61) than 
those of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 9.65, SD = 1.42) disclosed within the same industry. This is 
in line with Hypothesis 8(d). 
Furthermore, the results show the readability scores and readability grades across the two document 
types - an aggregated readability score of annual reports of high and low discretion industries, in 
comparison with the aggregated score of analysts’ discussions of the two industries. The rationale for 
this approach was to understand the form of financial communication that is more susceptible to potential 
manipulation with respect to the readability and comprehensibility of corporate financial communication. 
The results show that there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 3.91) between the 
aggregated readability scores of CEO letters in annual reports of the two industries in comparison with 
the combined readability scores of the transcripts from analysts’ discussions of the two industries 
combined together. This means that it is easier to read and understand transcripts from analysts’ 
discussions from either of the industries than the CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports of the 
industry groups combined together. This is in line with Hypothesis 8(e). Interestingly, the aggregated 
mean readability scores of analysts’ discussions of the industry groups stand at 58.35 (SD = 6.78) a very 
high score compared with the readability score of 29.18 (SD = 8.08) of the annual reports for both 
industries. 
These results align with the prediction that it is more difficult to read and understand CEO letters to 
shareholders in annual reports than narratives made to analysts in earnings conference calls. This study 
posits that there is the potential for the leadership of a company to make the content of CEO letters to 
shareholders more difficult to read and understand than the information it presents to experienced and 
expert analysts within the same period. Also, it posits that since earnings conference calls are conducted 
as a dialogue between two or more people, emphasis will be placed on the clarity of information provided 
for at least two reasons. 
First, the more difficult it is to read and understand information provided by top management during 
analysts’ discussions, the more it creates the room to be questioned back and forth to provide further 
information to clarify stated points. A situation that creates opportunity for analysts to dig deeper into the 
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affairs of a company - a possibility CEOs would potentially want to inhibit. Second, there would be no 
need to make the information difficult to understand when members of top management are dealing with 
those that have expert understanding of information provided to them. On the other hand, annual reports 
are presented as a monologue with limited opportunity to question certain elements of the CEO letters, 
which may appear difficult to read and understand. Hence, this study posits that top management will 
potentially target annual reports when it needs to obfuscate vital information from the users of this 
document type than it probably would when communicating with expert analysts, a task that can be aided 
by public relations specialists (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
With respect to the aggregated readability grade of the industry groups’ forms of corporative narratives, 
the result shows there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 3.21) between the readability 
grades of the industry groups’ annual reports and analysts’ discussions. The rationale for this approach 
was to test which of the document types would require a higher education level in order to be able to read 
and understand their contents. Furthermore, the results show that the aggregated mean readability 
grades of analysts’ discussions for the industry groups is 9.57 (SD = 1.47), while that of annual reports 
is 14.89 (SD = 1.82). This result aligns with Hypothesis 8(f). Accordingly, it indicates that a higher level 
of education would be required to read and understand the contents of annual reports than those of 
analysts’ discussions. This further supports the reasoning that annual reports have potential to be 
targeted when top management intends to make their corporate narratives less transparent.   
5.3 Micro-level of Analysis Using the Elements of Each Master Variable 
Results reported in Tables 5.8 to 5.12 show the non-parametric statistically significant differences 
between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries, using the 
sub-features of each of the five Master Variables of DICTION. In total, there are 35 sub-features. Some 
of the sub-features increase the scores of each Master Variable, while there are those that reduce the 
scores of each Master Variable. The results observed are explained below for the sub-features of each 
Master Variable. Throughout this section, the notation “zL” is used to denote the z-score of the low 
discretion industry, while “zH” is used to denote the z-score of the high discretion industry. These scores 
are only included for the sub-feature scores that either reached a level of statistical significance at 5% 
and 1%. Furthermore, the notation “zLg” is used to denote the z-score of the low discretion industry during 
good times, while “zLb” is used to denote the z-score during bad times within the same industry. On the 
other hand, the notation “zHg” is used to denote the z-score of the high discretion industry during good 
times, while “zHb” is used to denote the z-score during bad times within the same industry. All the 
calculated z-scores are reported in Appendix 5. Again, the results reported in this section are those that 
are statistically significant and with a Cohen’s d value of 0.2 and above. 
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5.3.1. COMMONALITY 
With respect to the sub-features that increase the COMMONALITY score, the coefficient of Centrality (p 
= 0.003, d = 0.24, zL = 0.49, zH = 0.19) shows a statistically significant difference between the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. Although the z-scores of the two industry groups are within 
the normal range, notwithstanding, the results align with the stated Hypothesis 1(e) that this sub-feature 
score will be significantly higher for companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high 
discretion industry. With respect to the sub-features that decrease the COMMONALITY score, the 
coefficient of ‘Diversity’ shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.006, d = 0.36, zL = - 0.03, zH = 
0.29) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, the result shows 
that the mean ‘Diversity’ scores of the annual reports of low and high discretion industries are 1.89 (SD 
= 1.38) and 2.48 (SD = 1.85), respectively. It indicates this score will be higher for companies in the high 
discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry, towards reducing the COMMONALITY 
score. This aligns with Hypothesis 1(i). With respect to the analysts’ discussions, the result shows the 
level of ‘Cooperation’ is statistically significant (p = 0.03, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.26, zH = - 0.38). This is in line 
with Hypothesis 1(e).  
 
 
 
Table 5.8 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – COMMONALITY Master Variable 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AR 0.003*** 5.92 4.98 3.94 4.00 
 
0.24 
        
 
Cooperation AD 0.030** 3.33 2.85 2.52 2.15 
 
0.21 
        
        
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
 
Diversity AR 0.006*** 1.89 2.48 1.38 1.85 
 
0.36 
       
 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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5.3.2. CERTAINTY 
With respect to the sub-features that increase the CERTAINTY score, the coefficient of ‘Insistence’ shows 
a statistically significant difference (p = 0.01, d = 0.26, zL = 0.18, zH = 0.41) between the annual reports 
of low and high discretion industries. This result aligns with Hypothesis 2(e). This indicates that the 
‘Insistence’ score of the annual reports of the high discretion industry is higher than for the low discretion 
industry. For the analysts’ discussions, the results show that the coefficient of ‘Collectives’ show 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.025, d = 0.23, zL = - 0.81, zH = - 0.94). This result moves contrary 
to the direction of prediction. It indicates that companies in the low discretion industry have a likelihood 
to use more ‘Collectives’ than those in the high discretion industry. With reference to DICTION definition, 
it connotes that CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry use more singular nouns, connoting 
plurality that function to decrease specificity than those in the high discretion industry. With such 
definition, this study posits that this sub-feature (Collectives) is unlikely to affect the overall CERTAINTY 
score (which deals with resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness), if a larger sample is tested. With a 
 
Table 5.9 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – CERTAINTY Master Variable 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
        
Collectives AD 0.025** 5.01 4.34 3.27 2.42 0.23 
        
        
Insistence AR 0.010** 69.39 80.81 43.42 43.93 0.26 
 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AD 0.000*** 13.49 10.89 7.94 6.33 
 
0.36 
        
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.005*** 4.16 3.28 2.91 2.47 0.32 
       
 
 
Self-Reference AR 0.000*** 2.47 1.61 3.19 2.56 0.30 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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larger sample, the inverse score may not produce a higher level of CERTAINY in the analysts’ discussions 
of companies in the low discretion industry than those in the high discretion industry. 
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the CERTAINTY score, the coefficients of ‘Ambivalence’ 
and ‘Self-Reference’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.005, d = 0.32, zL = - 1.37, zH = -1.50; 
p = 0.000, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.66, respectively) between the annual reports of low and high 
discretion industries. The results align with Hypothesis 2(i). Accordingly, it indicates that the scores will 
be higher for CEO letters of companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high discretion 
industry, towards reducing the CERTAINTY score. For the analysts’ discussions, the results show that 
the coefficient of ‘Numerical Terms’ shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.36, zL = 
0.79, zH = 0.44). Again, this result aligns with Hypothesis 2(i).  
5.3.3. ACTIVITY 
With respect to the sub-features that increase the ACTIVITY score, the coefficients of ‘Aggression’ and 
‘Motion’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.023, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.42, zH = - 0. 53; p = 0.045, 
d = 0.27, zL = - 0.15, zH = 0.10, respectively) between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. With the exception of ‘Aggression’, the results align with Hypothesis 3(e). In other words, the 
results show that the sub-feature ‘Motion’ is significantly higher for the annual reports of companies in 
the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. With the inverse movement of 
the result observed for ‘Aggression’, this particularly has significant implication for the standpoint of this 
study that companies in the high discretion industry have the potential to communicate using aggressive 
language when compared with the conservative language used in the low discretion industry. 
Accordingly, this result observed for ‘Aggression’ in annual reports suggests that companies in the low 
discretion industry have the potential to communicate using language signifying competition and forceful 
action, industry domination, company triumph over their competitors, and resistance against external 
forces, when compared with those in the high discretion industry. This does not align with Hypothesis 
3(e). 
With respect to analysts’ discussions, the results show that that the coefficients of ‘Aggression’, 
‘Accomplishment’, and ‘Communication’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.006, d = 0.24, zL 
= - 0.81, zH = - 0.71; p = 0.000, d = 0.29, zL = 0.11, zH = 0.33; p = 0.042, d = 0.25, zL = 0.33, zH = 0.08, 
respectively). With the exception of ‘Communication’, all other sub-feature scores align with the stated 
Hypothesis 3(e). Specifically, the result observed for ‘Aggression’ aligns with the standpoint of this study 
that the financial communications (analysts’ discussions) of companies in the high discretion industry is 
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published using aggressive language when compared with the conservativeness in the corporate 
narratives published in the low discretion industry.  
 
With the inverse result observed for ‘Communication’, this indicates there is a greater use of terms that 
emphasise face-to-face interactions between the company’s executive and its stakeholders for 
companies in the low discretion industry. Although this inverse movement is likely to affect the ACTIVITY 
score in general, yet, it does not undermine the potential aggressive reporting of companies in the high 
discretion industry during analysts’ discussions.  
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the coefficient of ‘Embellishment’ 
shows there is significant statistical difference (p = 0.002, d = 0.27, zL = 0.67, zH = 0.18) between the 
annual reports of low and high discretion industries. Accordingly, it suggests that the CEOs of companies 
in the low discretion industry have the potential to communicate more using inactive language when 
compared to those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with stated Hypothesis 3(i). 
 
Table 5.10 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – ACTIVITY Master Variable 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Aggression AR 0.023** 3.58 3.12 2.11 2.26 0.21 
 AD 0.006*** 1.88 2.35 1.51 2.41 0.24 
        
Accomplishment AD 0.000*** 15.37 17.43 7.13 6.88 0.29 
        
        
Communication AD 0.042** 8.57 7.39 5.67 3.80 0.25 
        
        
Motion AR 0.045** 1.95 2.46 1.53 2.17 0.27 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
       
 
Embellishment AR 0.002*** 0.98 0.74 1.17 0.53 0.27 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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5.3.4. REALISM 
With respect to the sub-features that increase the REALISM score, the coefficient of ‘Concreteness’ 
shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.003, d = 0.34, zL = - 0.54, zH = - 0.74) between the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. This aligns with the Hypothesis 4(e).  
This aligns with the prediction that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate with language that is tangible, material, and recognisable by their shareholders, as opposed 
to those used in the high discretion industry.  
 
With respect to sub-features that decrease the REALISM score, the coefficients of ‘Past Concern’ and 
‘Complexity’ show statistically significant difference (p = 0.005, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.57, zH = - 0.34; p = 
0.000, d = 0.52, zL = 1.53, zH = 1.97, respectively) between the annual reports of the two industries. 
Furthermore, the results observed support the prediction that companies in the high discretion industry 
are more likely to communicate with reference to past concerns, while they also have the potential to use 
the annual reports as a tool to make qualitative information on performance results complex for 
shareholders to read and understand. The results suggest that it is more complex to read and understand 
corporate narratives of companies in the high discretion industry than those in the low discretion industry. 
These results align with Hypothesis 4(i) as well as being similar to results of the Flesch Readability Index 
in Table 5.6. For discussions with analysts, the coefficient of ‘Past Concern’ show statistical significance 
 
Table 5.11 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – REALISM Master Variable 
 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Concreteness AR 0.003*** 14.83 13.03 5.56 4.95 0.34 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.005*** 2.10 2.69 1.30 2.45 0.30 
 AD 0.005*** 3.49 3.99 2.12 2.46 0.22 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.000*** 5.07 5.20 0.23 0.30 0.52 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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(p = 0.005, d = 0.22, zL = - 0.03, zH = 0.16) between the analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion 
industries. This is in line with stated hypothesis as well as the results observed for annual reports.  
5.3.5. OPTIMISM 
For analysts’ discussions, the coefficient of ‘Praise’ shows significant statistical difference (p = 0.000, d 
= 0.24, zL = 0.10, zH = 0.34) between the low and high discretion industries. This is in line with stated 
hypothesis with respect to the sub-features that increase the OPTIMISM score, and similar to the 
observation for annual reports. With respect to the sub-features that decrease the OPTIMISM score, the 
coefficient of ‘Denial’ shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.32, zL = 1.10, zH = - 1.47, 
respectively) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. In other words, the CEOs 
of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use significantly higher level of language 
that connote negative contractions and negative function words in their annual reports to shareholders, 
as opposed to the language used by CEOs in the high discretion industry. This aligns with Hypothesis 
5(i). 
  
 
 
 
Table 5.12 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – OPTIMISM Master Variable 
 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Praise AD 0.000*** 6.51 7.33 3.48 3.38 0.24 
        
        
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
       
 
Denial AR 0.000*** 1.10 0.74 1.16 1.05 0.32 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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5.4 Comparison between the language features of DICTION 7.0 and LIWC 2015 
In order to assess internal validity for the tests conducted using the five Master Variables of DICTION, 
another text analysis software was adopted known as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 2015 (hereafter, 
LIWC). The rationale for this approach was to compare the language features represented across the 
five Master Variables of DICTION 7.0 (hereafter, DICTION) with a set of select language categories in 
LIWC 2015. The selection of the language categories from LIWC was based on their similarity with those 
of DICTION. As shown in Table 4.1, a set of eleven (11) language categories were selected from LIWC 
with the aim of matching them with similar features in DICTION. Similar to the tests conducted using 
DICTION, the comparison was conducted across the two document types – CEO letters in annual reports 
and transcripts of CEO oral statements from analysts’ discussions. 
 
Results reported in Table 5.13 show the descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistically significant 
differences between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries, 
 
Table 5.13 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AR 0.008*** 
79.2
2 
83.5
6 13.96 11.64 0.34 
 AD 0.000*** 
69.9
6 
78.1
9 12.16 10.67 0.72 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.000*** 0.36 0.21 0.45 0.31 0.39 
        
        
Positive Emotion AD 0.000*** 2.98 3.43 0.70 0.71 0.65 
        
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.000*** 0.69 0.48 0.37 0.43 0.52 
 AD 0.000*** 0.55 0.46 0.24 0.24 0.36 
 
Achievement AR 0.000*** 3.62 4.10 1.06 1.04 0.46 
 AD 0.000*** 2.17 2.50 0.70 0.74 0.47 
       
 
Risk AR 0.000*** 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.33 
        
        
Motion AR 0.032** 2.83 3.06 0.73 0.89 0.28 
 AD 0.000*** 2.53 2.78 0.61 0.58 0.42 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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by comparing some sub-features of DICTION with those of LIWC as aforementioned. For the purpose of 
this study, the published Grand Mean and Standard Deviation figures were adopted as representative of 
the standardised scores of LIWC. The results in Table 5.13 shows there is a statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.008, d = 0.34, zL = 1.07, zH = 1.26) between the level of ‘Tone’ - a measure of the 
positivity or negativity of words (Henry (2008), contained in the annual reports of companies in the high 
discretion industry in comparison to those in the low discretion industry. This is line with Hypothesis 6(a). 
Similarly, the results observed for the ‘Tone’ level in the analysts’ discussions show that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.72, zL = 0.68, zH = 1.03) between the ‘Tone’ levels of 
CEO statements of companies in the low and high discretion industries. This is in accord with the results 
observed for the difference in Tone levels in the annual reports of the companies in the low and high 
discretion industries. Accordingly, the results observed for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions 
suggest that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry have the potential to build the element 
of ‘Tone’ in their financial communications with both shareholders and analysts more than the CEOs of 
companies in the low discretion industry. This is particularly so for the high discretion industry with a 
‘Tone’ z-score which is above the normal range during discussions with analysts.   
Henry (2008) introduced a novel approach in the measurement of ‘Tone’ in written text in terms of the 
positivity and negativity of words used by the author of a text. In her study, it was emphasised that the 
level of ‘Tone’ increases as the proportion of positive words exceed negative words in a given text. The 
standpoint of this study is that there is the potential for aggressive reporting in the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry. In the same vein, with a potentially high 
level of certainty demonstrated by top managers in such industry towards the delivery of predicted high 
performance results, there is the likelihood for careful selection of positive words that would underlie their 
ability to and insistence on delivering such expectations. 
For a higher level of ‘Tone’ to be maintained, there is the potential for the CEOs of companies in a high 
discretion industry to carefully select positive words while avoiding communicating with negative words 
that would otherwise undermine their ability to deliver high performance expectations. Contrastingly, for 
companies in the low discretion industry, this study posits that there is the potential for their CEOs to 
communicate using less aggressive, or rather conservative language, due to the already known lower 
growth prospects for companies in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the 
CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry to either conservatively use positive words or use more 
negative words to emphasise their performance results in their financial communications, thereby 
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resulting in a significantly lower level of ‘Tone’ in comparison to those observed for companies in the high 
discretion industry. 
By triangulating ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ language category of LIWC with a sub-feature of 
DICTION Master Variable ‘CERTAINTY’, it is by definition similar to the sub-feature ‘Self-reference’. The 
result shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.39, zL = - 1.88, zH = - 1.94) 
in the use of self-reference between the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries. 
Furthermore, the result indicates that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more 
likely to use ‘First Person Singular Pronouns’ in their annual reports than those in the high discretion 
industry. Similarly, for the results observed using the sub-feature ‘Self-reference’ in DICTION, the result 
also shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.66) 
between the use of ‘Self-reference’ in the annual reports of low and high discretion industries, with the 
former having a higher mean value. This aligns with the prediction made and in line with the results 
observed for the DICTION sub-feature. 
Prior research on deceptive narratives have argued that analysing for the use of self-reference can 
provide indication of deceptive communication and blame shifting (Churyk et al. 2009; Keila and 
Skillicorn, 2005; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Specifically, Bournois and Point (2006) 
contend that it is an important tactical move when there is a sudden transition from the use of the first-
person singular pronouns to the first-person plural pronouns. In the same vein, studies of blame shifting 
have suggested that during the course of unfavourable events, there is likely to be an increase in the use 
of first-person plural pronouns. An individual is “less likely to blame themselves [in such a situation], so 
they speak about their accomplice[s] in addition to themselves” (Morrow, 2008, p. 20). On the other hand, 
Craig et al (2013) found a distinctive result for the use of self-reference in the confession letter of the 
Chairman of the Indian multi-national company, Satyam. They found that in the years prior to the 
revelation of the fraud there had been a sudden increase in the use of first-person plural pronouns from 
44% (2002-2003) to 82% (2003-2004); 89% (2004-2005); 94% (2005-2006); 98% (2006-2007); and to 
90% in 2007-2008 (the period before the revelation of fraud).  
Interestingly, the percentage of first-person plural pronouns in the confession letter of the Chairman 
decreased significantly to 9%, meaning that the percentage of first-person singular pronoun increased to 
91%, a trend that does not move in line with the blame shifting theory. Craig et al. (2013) conclude that 
this unusual transition signalled the Chairman’s tactic in exonerating members of his family –who were 
members of the top management of the company, from the purported fraud, thereby taking the blame for 
the entire top management. It is noteworthy that in the years when the company reported favourable 
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financial performance, the Chairman used more first-person singular pronouns (as evidenced in the 56% 
first-person singular pronoun in 2002-2003), thereby attributing the performance of the company to 
himself. The results from Craig et al. (2013) suggest that it is possible for a single member of top 
management to acclaim both the favourable performance of a company to themselves or take sole 
responsibility for deceptive communication. This, again, is contrary to the blame shifting tactic in the 
transition from the first-person singular pronoun to the first-person plural pronoun.  
In the context of this study, the results observed for the difference in the absolute level of use of ‘Self-
reference’ between the annual reports of low and high discretion industry is not of prime interest. The 
significantly high level of ‘Self-reference’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry 
does not absolutely imply that there is a significantly high level of ‘Collectives’ in the annual reports of 
companies in the high discretion industry. In the same vein, a significantly lower level of ‘Self-reference’ 
in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry does not imply the CEOs of the 
companies in this industry will take collective responsibility when faced with either bad performances or 
allegations of fraudulent reporting. This study emphasises the position of Craig et al. (2013) that rather 
than make any meaning in the absolute level of use in first person pronouns, what should be of prime 
interest is ‘the transition from a preponderance of singular first-person pronouns to plural first-person 
pronouns and vice versa…’ (p. 10).  
In addition, two language categories of LIWC - ‘Positive Emotion’ and ‘Negative Emotion’- are triangulated 
with two sub-features ‘Satisfaction’ and ‘Denial’, respectively. The two sub-features are from the DICTION 
Master Variable ‘OPTIMISM’ and in line with the LIWC definitions for ‘Positive Emotion’ and ‘Negative 
Emotion’, respectively. For ‘Positive Emotion’, the result shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.65, zL = - 0.42, zH = - 0.15) between the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the low and high discretion industries, with the latter having a higher 
mean value. This is in line with the prediction. Accordingly, the result suggests that the CEOs of 
companies in the high discretion industry have the potential to use more ‘Positive Emotion’ words in their 
financial communications than those in the low discretion industry. In comparison to the results observed 
for the sub-feature ‘Satisfaction’, the result moves in the same direction with that of ‘Positive Emotion’, 
although it did not reach a level of significance to distinguish between low and high discretion industries, 
with respect to both annual reports and analysts’ discussions (p = 0.826; p = 0.190, respectively). 
On the other hand, the result for ‘Negative Emotion’ shows that there is statistically significant difference 
(p = 0.000, d = 0.52, zL = - 1.06, zH = - 1.25) between the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries, with the former having a higher mean value. This is in line 
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with the prediction. Furthermore, the result shows that there is a statistically significant difference (p = 
0.000, d =0.36, zL = - 1.18, zH = - 1.27) between the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the analysts’ 
discussions of the low and high discretion industries. This, again, is in line with the prediction. Accordingly, 
the results observed for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions suggest that CEOs of companies 
in the low discretion industry have the potential to use more ‘Negative Emotion’ words in their financial 
communications than those in the high discretion industry. In comparison to the results observed for the 
sub-feature ‘Denial’, the result shows that there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d =0.32, 
zL = - 1.38, zH = - 1.47) between the level of ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of the low and high discretion 
industries, with the former having a higher mean value. This result moves in the same direction as that 
of ‘Negative Emotion’. 
Prior research on the use of positive and negative emotion words suggest that individuals often 
experience emotional reaction when they try to engage in deceptive communication (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Similarly, Craig et al. (2013) contend that it is possible for such emotional 
reaction to be manifest in written communications, a view held in Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012). They 
concluded that in the course of presenting company performance in quarterly earnings conference calls, 
deceptive CEOs used more extreme positive emotion words and fewer extreme negative emotion words 
(Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012). Furthermore, they emphasised that deceptive CEOs are more likely to 
feel very emotional – at least inwardly, while showing signs of guilt and fear of exposure. Similarly, Craig 
et al. (2013) argue that as the level of deception grows in an organisation’s performance results, the CEO 
letters to shareholders would be used to underline the feeling of guilt and desire to protect the blossoming 
reputation of the CEO. This desire will be manifest in the choice of extreme positive words and extreme 
negative words.  
In the context of this study, the prime focus is to assess and differentiate between the use of emotion 
words between the low and high discretion industries. In view of this, this study posits that the pressure 
on companies in the high discretion industry has the potential to create an environment where the CEOs 
are expected to deliver high performance results, specifically due to high growth expectations for 
companies in this industry grouping. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the CEOs of companies in the 
high discretion industry to use all forms of impression management tactics and possible aggressive 
financial reporting measures to signal their ability to deliver market expectations. Indeed, as the scale 
and impact of analysts’ expectations and market pressures increase, the CEOs of companies in the high 
discretion industry have the potential to use more extreme positive emotion words to underline their 
emotional responses to market expectations. On the other hand, due to the already-known lower growth 
prospects for companies in the low discretion industry, this study argues that the level of pressure on 
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companies in the low discretion industry to attain higher-than-normal performance results is not as high 
when compared to the pressure on companies in a high discretion industry. Accordingly, this has the 
potential to create a situation where the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry use more 
extreme negative emotion words to underline their emotional responses to the dynamics of their market 
environment in comparison to companies in the high discretion industry. 
Furthermore, the result for the language of ‘Achievement’ in the financial communications of low and high 
discretion industries was triangulated with the sub-feature ‘Accomplishment’ of the ACTIVITY Master 
Variable of DICTION, due to their similarity in definition. The results show that for both the annual reports 
(p = 0.000, d = 0.46, zL = 2.83, zH = 3.41) and analysts’ discussions (p = 0.000, d = 0.47, zL = 1.06, zH 
= 1.46), there are statistically significant differences in the language of ‘Achievement’ between the low 
and high discretion industries, with the latter having higher mean values. These two results are as 
predicted that companies in the high discretion industry will significantly use more language of 
‘Achievement’ in their financial communications than those in the low discretion industry. Similarly, the 
results for the sub-feature ‘Accomplishment’ shows, for the annual reports, that there is statistically 
significant difference (p = 0.024, d = 0.09, zL = 2.15, zH = 2.25) in the language of ‘Accomplishment’ 
between the low and high discretion industries. Again, the results observed for analysts’ discussions 
show that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.29, zL = 0.11, zH = 0.33) in the 
language of ‘Accomplishment’ between the low and high discretion industries, with the latter having higher 
mean values. These two results are as predicted that companies in the high discretion industry will 
significantly use more language of ‘Accomplishment’ in their financial communications than those in the 
low discretion industry. 
Looking again at Table 5.13, the results for the language of ‘Risk’ in the financial communications of low 
and high discretion industries were compared with the sub-feature ‘Ambivalence’ of the CERTAINTY 
Master Variable of DICTION. For the language of ‘Risk’, the result shows that there is statistically 
significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.33, zL = - 0.05, zH = - 0.32) between the annual reports of low and 
high discretion industries, with the former having a higher mean value. This is in line with the prediction 
that companies in the low discretion industry will significantly use more language of ‘Risk’ in their financial 
communications than those in the high discretion industry). For the sub-feature ‘Ambivalence’, the result 
shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.005, d = 0.32, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.50) between 
the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries, with the former having a higher mean value. 
This, again, is in line with prediction and with the results for the language of ‘Risk’ as measured by LIWC. 
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Lastly, the result for the language of ‘Motion’ (also referred to as LIWC’s ‘Motion’) in the financial 
communications of companies in the low and high discretion industries was compared with the the sub-
feature ‘Motion’ of the ACTIVITY Master Variable of DICTION (also referred to as DICTION’s ‘Motion’). 
With respect to LIWC’s ‘Motion’, the result shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.032, 
d = 0.28, zL = 0.66, zH = 0.88) in the language of ‘Motion’ between the annual reports of the low and high 
discretion industries, with the latter having a higher mean value. This is in line with the prediction that 
there will be a higher level of the language of ‘Motion’ in the annual reports of companies in the high 
discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. In addition, the result also shows that 
there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.42, zL = 0.37, zH = 0.61) in the language of 
‘Motion’ between the analysts’ discussions of the low and high discretion industries. Again, this is in line 
with the prediction that there will be a higher level of the language of ‘Motion’ in the analysts’ discussions 
of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry.  
With respect to the sub-feature ‘Motion’ of the ACTIVITY Master Variable of DICTION, the result shows 
that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.045, d = 0.17, zL = - 0.15, zH = 0.10) in the language 
of ‘Motion’ between the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries, with the latter having a 
higher mean value. This is in line with prediction and also aligns with the results observed for LIWC’s 
‘Motion’ in annual reports. For the analysts’ discussions, the result is in line with the prediction and also 
aligns with the results observed for LIWC’s ‘Motion’ in analysts’ discussions, and was approaching a level 
of significance (p = 0.086, d = 0.10, zL = 0.79, zH = 0.91) to differentiate between the language of ‘Motion’ 
between the analysts’ discussions of the low and high discretion industries. 
5.5 Analysis for the ‘Good and Bad’ Performance Periods 
In this study, additional tests were conducted to determine the language characteristics of companies in 
both low and high discretion industries during periods of good and bad performance results. These tests 
were conducted using all the five DICTION Master Variables and sub-features, Flesch Reading Ease, 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, and some eleven (11) LIWC language categories. This was done for 
the purpose of extracting the language features that help inform how the CEOs of companies in both 
industries engage financial communication strategies towards expressing the performance results of their 
companies during good and bad times. This is particularly useful for auditors, entity risk assessors, 
regulators, and vigilant shareholders in understanding potential financial disasters through the qualitative 
financial information provided by CEOs of companies. 
For the purpose of differentiating between good and bad times, the Actual Net Income of the companies 
in both low and high discretion industries were compared with Consensus Net Income Estimates for each 
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of the relevant periods 2011-2015 (for 43 companies) and 2014-2018 (for 17 companies). The 
comparison between the Actual Net Income and Consensus Net Income Estimates creates another 
measure known as Net Income Surprise. For the purpose of this study, this was measured as [(Actual 
Net Income – Consensus Net Income Estimate) ÷ Consensus Net Income Estimate]. In simple terms, 
the Actual Net Income is the Net Income reported by each company according to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for each accounting period, while the Consensus Net Income Estimate is 
a prediction of Net Income made by analysts, which is expected to be earned by a company during a 
particular accounting period. The Net Income Surprise is a percentage measure and it shows to what 
degree the Actual Net Income as reported by a company deviates from the predicted Consensus Net 
Income Estimates made by analysts for that particular period. For the purpose of this study, a general 
rule was adopted for clearly differentiating between good and bad performance results using a 10% rule, 
which was discussed at the methodology stage.  
The categorisation of the performance of each of the companies for each of the periods into good and 
bad times is shown in Appendix 6. Across the five-year period on either side of the industry groups, a 
total of fifty-three (53) net income reports align to the definition of bad financial performance for 
companies in the low discretion industry, while a total of eight (8) net income reports align to the definition 
of bad financial performance for companies in the high discretion industry. For both industry groups, there 
are 150 annual reports on each side. Furthermore, analysis was conducted at four different levels using 
the five Master Variables of DICTION, the Flesch-Kincaid Readability Measures, all the sub-features of 
the five Master Variables of DICTION, and how some of these sub-features compare to some 11 
language categories of LIWC.  
First, comparison was conducted on how low and high discretion industries communicate during good 
times. Second, how they compare in their financial communications during bad times. Third, how 
companies within the low discretion industry communicate during good and bad times, and to examine 
the average effect size (using Cohen’s d) of the differences in their financial communications between 
the two economic situations. Lastly, how companies in the high discretion industry communicate during 
good and bad times, and to examine the average effect size (using Cohen’s d) of the differences in their 
financial communications between the two economic situations. The rationale for comparing their average 
effect sizes is to analyse for their attentional homogeneity (isomorphism) or heterogeneity. Accordingly, 
the results observed for the financial communications of the low and high discretion industries are 
explained at the Macro level of Analysis, Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, 
Micro-level of Analysis, and 11 LIWC language categories, hereafter. 
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Results reported in Table 5.14 show the descriptive statistics and non-parametric statistically significant 
difference between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries, 
during good times. In differentiating between the annual reports of these two industry groupings, the 
results show that the coefficients of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, and REALISM are 
statistically significant. Accordingly, Hypotheses 1(b), 2(b), 3(b), and 4(b) are supported by these results. 
They were as predicted and similar with those observed without differentiating between good and bad 
times. 
With respect to the Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that there is statistically significant difference 
(p-value = 0.001, d = 0.49) between the readability scores of the annual reports of companies in the low 
and high discretion industries. This is in line with Hypothesis 7(c). Similarly, the results show that for both 
annual reports and analysts’ discussions, there are statistically significant differences (p-value = 0.023, 
d = 0.38; p-value = 0.019, d =0.20, respectively) between the readability grades of the two financial 
communication documents of companies in the low and high discretion industries. Again, this is in line 
with Hypothesis 7(d). Accordingly, the implications of the above results are explained below. 
 
 
Tables 5.14 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Macro-level Analysis) – Good Times  
Master Variable Document Type Kruskal-Wallis Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.002*** 49.55 48.90 1.80 2.15 0.32 
        
 
CERTAINTY AR 0.023** 48.03 48.89 3.61 3.64 0.24 
        
 
ACTIVITY AR 0.002*** 49.12 49.92 2.07 2.03 0.39 
        
 
REALISM AR 0.033** 53.96 53.03 2.54 2.82 0.35 
       
 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.001*** 31.30 27.34 8.24 7.79 0.49 
       
 
 
Readability Grade AR 0.023** 14.46 15.14 2.00 1.49 0.38 
 AD 0.019** 9.40 9.69 1.62 1.43 0.20 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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For COMMONALITY, the result shows that with a net income surprise that is positive and not significantly 
negatively different from the expectations of the market, the level of COMMONALITY in the annual reports 
of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.002, d = 0.32, zL = - 
0.01, zH = - 0.25) than those in the high discretion industries. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(b). During 
good times, the result suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that highlights institutional regularities, substantive agreement on core 
values and group product, in their annual reports than those in the high discretion industry. Accordingly, 
this suggests that companies in the high discretion industry may be more likely to use language that 
signifies deviation from commonly used accounting principles in explaining how they were able to 
individually attain the level of Net Income expected of them by the market. This could have the potential 
to create a culture of aggressively recognising income that could otherwise be reported in periods when 
they become earned.  
For CERTAINTY, the result shows that during good times, the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports 
of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.023, d = 0.24, zL = - 
0.55, zH = - 0.21) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(b). During 
good times, the result suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that indicates resoluteness, completeness, precision, and the avoidance of 
hesitation, which demonstrates their ability to meet or exceed target expectations, in their annual reports 
than those in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, this suggests that companies in the high discretion 
industry have the potential to use language that signifies authoritative leadership that is unwilling to 
compromise, with accompanying sense of assurance, which seeks approval and prides itself on 
persuasion. This is demonstrated through the use of tight control mechanisms that undervalues ethical 
behaviour in exchange for self-interest (Turner et al., 2002). Sama and Shoaf (2008) posit that as 
authoritative leaders focus more on transactions and profitability, they are more likely to resort to unethical 
behaviours. Accordingly, the result observed for the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of the two 
industries suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are potentially more likely to engage in 
unethical recognition of income and unethical financial reporting when communicating how they attain 
the level of income expected of them by the market.  
With respect to ACTIVITY, the result shows that during good times, the level of ACTIVITY in the annual 
reports of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.002, d = 0.39, 
zL = - 0.46, zH = - 0.27) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 3(b). 
During good times, the result suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that indicates competition, forceful action, and the avoidance of inertia, in 
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their annual reports, than those in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, this suggests that companies 
in the high discretion industry have a higher potential to use language that emphasises overconfidence 
in their ability to pioneer change and deliver positive performance results. This language reveals traits of 
heroism (Badaracco, 2001), self-confidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), and transformational change 
(Brown & Treviño, 2006). Specifically, Brown and Treviño note that when driven by self-confidence, 
leaders who seek transformational change can resort to unethical behaviours. In the same vein, 
Badaracco (2001) argues that the pursuit of heroism is not the primary focus of ethical leaders, who would 
seek to establish change patiently, carefully, and incrementally. The result suggests that companies in 
the high discretion industry are more likely to demonstrate a higher level of aggression in their annual 
reports to the extent that it could reveal the potential for companies in this industry to engage in unethical 
practice. 
For REALISM, the result shows that during good times, the level of REALISM in the annual reports of 
companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.033, d = 0.35, zL = 1.41, 
zH = 1.13) than those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 4(b). During good 
times, the result suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to communicate 
using language that seeks to identify what is recognisable to the stakeholders in their industry, as 
opposed to what is considered implausible or unfamiliar to them. On the other hand, the result suggests 
that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to use language that are less likely to depict 
tangible, immediate, and recognisable matters that conform to the reality of things commonly known to 
their stakeholders. This is particularly facilitated through the use of complex terms, long sentences, and 
uncommon terminology (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The emphasis on REALISM reflects the level of ease of 
reading of corporate narratives, which, conventionally, is prone to rhetorical manipulation, based on the 
insight from impression management theory (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Similarly, Li (2008) 
stresses that the use of complex language in corporate narratives is a strategy that has the potential to 
be used in deceiving investors. Hence, the result observed for REALISM in this study suggests that 
companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to rhetorically manipulate the content of annual 
reports than those in the low discretion industry.  
Reflecting on the Flesch Readability Score, the result shows that during good times, the readability score 
of the annual reports is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.001, d = 0.49) for companies in the low 
discretion industry than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 7(c). During 
good times, the result suggests that it is easier to read and understand the annual reports of companies 
in the low discretion industry than those in the high discretion industry. Furthermore, the readability 
grades for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions are statistically significantly higher (p = 0.023, 
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d = 0.38; p = 0.019, d = 0.20, respectively) for companies in the high discretion industry than for those in 
the low discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 7(d). During good times, the result 
suggests that a higher level of education will be required to read and understand the annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion 
industry. 
Table 5.15 shows the results for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion 
industries, during bad times. In differentiating between the annual reports of these two industry groupings, 
the results in Table 5.15 show that that the coefficient of COMMONALITY is statistically significant (p-
value = 0.007, d = 1.17, zL = 0.04, zH = - 0.74) in differentiating between the annual reports of companies 
in the low and high discretion industries. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(b). Similarly, in differentiating 
between the analysts’ discussions of these industries, the coefficient of COMMONALITY shows 
statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.025, d = 0.48, zL = - 0.28, zH = - 0.61) between the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the low and high discretion industries. Again, this is line with Hypothesis 
1(b). With respect to Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that for analysts’ discussions, there is 
statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.041, d = 0.60) between the readability scores of the 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the low and high discretion industries. However, this is contrary to 
the prediction. Accordingly, the implications of the above results are explained below. 
With respect to COMMONALITY, the results show that with a negative net income surprise, the level of 
COMMONALITY in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.007, d = 1.17, zL = 0.04, zH = - 0.74; p-value = 
0.025, d = 0.48, zL = - 0.28, zH = - 0.61, respectively) than those in the high discretion industry. These 
results are in line with Hypothesis 1(b). During bad times, the results suggest that companies in the low 
discretion industry have a higher potential to communicate using language that highlights institutional 
regularities, substantive agreement on core values and group product, in both annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions than those in the high discretion industry. Interestingly, the effect size of the 
difference between the COMMONALITY level in the annual reports during bad times (d = 1.17) is very 
high compared to the effect size during good times (d = 0.32) between the two industry groups. This is 
the similar for discussions with analysts as the effect size for bad times (d = 0.48) is higher than during 
good times (d = 0.07).  
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Specifically, it shows that the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry have a higher mean value of COMMONALITY during bad times (49.68 and 48.81, respectively) 
than in good times (49.55 and 48.07, respectively). In contrast, the annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the high discretion industry have a lower mean value of COMMONALITY 
during bad times (47.56 and 47.92, respectively) than in good times (48.90 and 48.24, respectively). 
Accordingly, this suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use language 
that signifies agreement with using common accounting principles and narratives in explaining the 
common problems they encounter that makes it difficult to collectively attain the level of Net Income 
expected of them by the market, which further advances their isomorphism. On the other hand, it shows 
that during bad times, companies in the high discretion industry have a greater potential to be less 
isomorphic or with a higher likelihood to be heterogeneous, by deviating from using common accounting 
principles and financial narratives commonly available in their industry. 
Considering the Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that during bad times, the readability score of 
the analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.041, d = 0.60) for companies in the high 
discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. This is contrary with Hypothesis 7(c). 
During bad times, the results suggest that it is easier to read and understand the analysts’ discussions 
of companies in the high discretion industry than those in the low discretion industry. This is particularly 
interesting as the readability score for the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion 
industry was lower during good times (Mean = 57.93) in comparison to bad times (Mean = 61.35). On the 
other hand, the readability score of the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion was 
 
Table 5.15 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Macro-level Analysis) – Bad Times  
Master Variable Document Type Kruskal-Wallis Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   
 
Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.007*** 49.68 47.56 1.42 1.60 1.17 
 AD 0.025** 48.81 47.92 2.35 1.22 0.48 
        
        
       
 
Readability Score AD 0.041** 57.69 61.35 6.79 5.23 0.60 
        
       
 
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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higher during good times (Mean = 59.00) in comparison to bad times (M = 57.69). While the latter is in 
line with the prediction, the former is contrary to the prediction.  
Accordingly, this study posits that while it is more difficult to read and understand the corporate narratives 
of companies in the high discretion industry in comparison to companies in the low discretion industry, 
this may likely have a further negative impact on the stakeholder community during bad times. Hence, 
the difficulty in their narratives may need to be reduced in a way that it makes it easier for their 
stakeholders to understand the reasons why they are experiencing bad performance results. 
Furthermore, the results show that for both low and high discretion industries, it is easier to read and 
understand their analysts’ discussions in comparison to their annual reports. While the readability scores 
of the analysts’ discussions of both industries sit in the region of “Easily Understood” on the readability 
scale, those of their annual reports are in the region of “Very Difficult to Read and Understand”. This 
aligns with the initial position that the ease or difficulty of understanding corporate narratives is a function 
of the genre of text and the target audience.   
 
In differentiating between good and bad times, the result in Table 5.16 shows that the level of 
COMMONALITY in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.016, d = 0.34, zLg = - 0.55, zLb = - 0.28) than those with good financial 
results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have a lower level of 
 
Table 5.16 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Macro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry  
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
COMMONALITY AD 0.016** 48.07 48.81 1.95 2.35 0.34 
        
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.006*** 48.03 46.01 3.61 5.09 0.46 
        
 
ACTIVITY AD 0.002*** 50.05 49.46 2.42 2.44 0.25 
        
        
        
Average value     2.66 3.29 0.35 
        
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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COMMONALITY (Mean = 48.07) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 48.81), within the 
same low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(c) to posit that companies in the low 
discretion industry will use more language of COMMONALITY when they experience bad performance 
results to underline a common problem and build a sense of community than when they do experience 
good performance results. Furthermore, the result shows that the level of CERTAINTY in the annual 
reports of companies with good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.006, 
d = 0.46, zLg = - 0.55, zLb = -1.35) than those with bad financial results. 
Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have a higher level of CERTAINTY 
(Mean = 48.03) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 46.01), within the same industry. Again, 
this is in line with Hypothesis 2(c). This is particularly significant as it shows that the z-score of companies 
with bad financial performance sit well below the normal range of CERTAINTY in their annual reports. 
This is useful in investigating any company that uses a high level of the language of CERTAINTY in their 
financial communications during bad times. With respect to ACTIVITY, the result shows that the level of 
ACTIVITY in the analysts’ discussions of companies with good performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.25, zLg = - 0.24, zLb = - 0.38) than those with bad financial 
results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have a higher level of 
ACTIVITY (Mean = 50.05) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 49.46), within the same 
industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 3(c). Taken as a whole, the average d-value of 0.35 shows 
that there is a moderate difference between the financial communications of companies in the low 
discretion industry during good and bad times. This further lends credence to their isomorphic nature, 
regardless of the economic situation.  
Table 5.17 shows that the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies with good performance 
results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.018, d = 0.77, zHg = - 0.21, zHb = - 1.43) than those 
with bad performance results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have 
a higher level of CERTAINTY (Mean = 48.89) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 45.82), 
within the same high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(d). This study posits that the 
low level of CERTAINTY for companies with bad performance results complies with the principle of 
discourse ethics. Patelli and Pedrini (2015) posit that it is inappropriate to emphasise resoluteness and a 
sense of certainty during periods shaped by unfavourable economic situation. Hence, the companies with 
bad performance results use the low level of CERTAINTY to underline the uncertainty attributable to their 
poor performance. 
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Furthermore, the result shows that the level of REALISM in the analysts’ discussions of companies with 
bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.68, zHg = 2.38, zHb = 
3.01) than those with good performance results. Specifically, it shows that companies with bad 
performance results have a higher level of REALISM (Mean = 59.16) than those with good performance 
results (Mean = 57.13), within the same industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(d). It connotes that 
companies with bad financial performance results have the potential to communicate more with a 
language that is familiar to their stakeholders than they would when they report good financial 
performance results.  
In addition, the result for the Readability Grade on analysts’ discussions show that there is statistically 
significant difference (p-value = 0.046, d = 0.54) between the readability grades of companies in the high 
discretion industry during good and bad times. Specifically, it shows that companies with good 
performance results have a higher readability grade (Mean = 9.69) than those with bad performance 
results (Mean = 9.00), within the same industry. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 7(h). This study 
posits that while it is more difficult to read and understand, at any time, the corporate narratives of 
companies in the high discretion industry, it may likely have a further negative impact on the stakeholder 
community during bad times. Therefore, the difficulty in their narratives may need to be reduced in a way 
that it makes it easier to read and understand their corporate narratives during bad times more than in 
 
Table 5.17 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Macro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry  
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.018** 48.89 45.82 3.64 4.31 0.77 
 
        
        
REALISM AD 0.005*** 57.13 59.16 2.69 3.25 0.68 
        
       
 
       
 
Readability Grade AD 0.046** 9.69 9.00 1.43 1.08 0.54 
        
        
Average value     2.59 2.88 0.66 
        
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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good times. Taken as a whole, the average d-value of 0.66 shows that there is a large difference between 
the financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry during good and bad times. 
This further lends credence to their heterogeneous nature. 
5.6 Analysis for the Sub-features of the Five Master Variables during Good and Bad Times  
Tables 5.18 to 5.30 show the results for the sub-features of each Master Variable of DICTION during 
good and bad times. The results are in the same order as those explained above. 
 
During good times, the result in Table 5.18 shows that for companies in the low discretion industry, the 
level of ‘Centrality’ in their annual reports is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.031, d = 0.23, zL 
= 0.52, zH = 0.21) than for companies in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(f) 
to posit that these sub-features will be statistically significantly higher to increase the COMMONALITY 
score of the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the high discretion 
industry. For the sub-features that decrease the COMMONALITY score, the level of ‘Liberation’ in their 
analysts’ discussions shows statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.20; zL = - 0.49, zH 
= - 0.58) although it is contrary to Hypothesis 1(j).   
During bad times, the result in Table 5.19 shows that for companies in the low discretion industry, the 
level of ‘Centrality’ in their analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 
0.68, zL = - 0.29, zH = - 0.67) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 
 
Table 5.18 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY 
Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AR 0.031** 6.02 5.03 4.57 4.09 
 
0.23 
        
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY 
Score       
 
       
 
Liberation AD 0.002*** 0.85 0.63 1.31 0.89 0.20 
        
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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1(f) to posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the COMMONALITY 
score of the financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the 
high discretion industry.  
 
On the other hand, the level of ‘Liberation’ in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.010, d = 0.90, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.13) than for the 
companies in the low discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 1(j) to posit that this sub-
feature will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the COMMONALITY score of the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry, than for those in the low discretion industry. 
Table 5.20 shows the results for the same sub-features of COMMONALITY by taking into consideration 
the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during good times and 
bad times, as predefined. The result shows that the level of ‘Diversity’ in the annual reports of companies 
with good performance results in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.005, d = 0.42, zLg = 0.08, zLb = - 0.22) than for those with bad performance results. Similarly, the level 
of ‘Liberation’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with good performance results in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.007, d = 0.24, zLg = - 0.49, zLb = - 0.60) 
than for those with bad performance results. Again, both results are in line with Hypothesis 1(k).  
 
Table 5.19 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AD 0.005*** 3.43 2.22 2.15 1.33 
 
0.68 
        
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
       
 
Liberation AR 0.010** 0.71 1.79 0.75 1.54 0.90 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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Again, the average d-value of 0.33 shows that there is a moderate difference between the financial 
communications of companies in the low discretion industry during good and bad times. This further lends 
credence to their isomorphic nature. 
 
During good times, the result in Table 5.21 shows that the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.004, 
d = 0.27, zL = 0.70, zH = 0.45) than for those in the high discretion industry. Similarly, the levels of 
 
Table 5.20 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry  
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
 
Diversity AR 0.005*** 2.09 1.52 1.40 1.27 
 
 
0.42 
       
 
       
 
Liberation AD 0.007*** 0.85 0.58 1.31 0.88 0.24 
        
        
Average value     1.36 1.08 0.33 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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Table 5.21 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times  
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Numerical Terms AD 0.004*** 12.85 10.97 7.54 6.37 
 
0.27 
        
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.018** 4.15 3.20 3.03 2.44 0.34 
       
 
 
Self-Reference AR 0.024** 2.05 1.50 2.51 2.50 0.22 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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‘Ambivalence’ and ‘Self-reference’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry are 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.018, d = 0.34, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.52; p-value < 0.024, d = 
0.22, zL = - 0.60, zH = - 0.67, respectively) than for those in the high discretion industry. All of the results 
for these sub-features that reduce the CERTAINTY score are in line with Hypothesis 2(j) to posit that they 
will be statistically significantly higher to reduce the CERTAINTY score of companies in the low discretion 
industry than for those in the high discretion industry. 
 
During bad times, the result in Table 5.22 shows that for companies in the low discretion industry, the 
level of ‘Insistence’ in their analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.026, d = 
0.59, zL = - 0.49, zH = - 0.68) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 
2(f). On the other hand, the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the 
low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 0.72, zL = 0.96, zH = 0.25) 
than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(j) to posit that this sub-
feature will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the CERTAINTY score of the financial 
communications of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the high discretion industry. 
The result in Table 5.23 shows that for companies with good performance results within the low discretion 
industry, the level of ‘Collectives’ in their annual reports is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.035, 
d = 0.40, zLg = - 0.01, zLb = - 0.29) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 2(g) to posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the 
 
Table 5.22 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
        
Insistence AD 0.026** 35.21 25.34 19.08 13.86 0.59 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AD 0.008*** 14.76 9.54 8.60 5.72 
 
0.72 
        
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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CERTAINTY score of the financial communications of companies with good performance results in the 
low discretion industry, than for those with bad financial results within the same industry. 
 
On the other hand, the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad 
performance results in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.040, d = 
0.24, zLg = 0.70, zLb = 0.96) than for those with good performance results. Similarly, the level of ‘Self-
Reference’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.017, d = 0.36, zLg = - 0.60, zLb = - 0.45) than for those with good performance results. 
Again, both results are in line with Hypothesis 2(k) to posit that these sub-features will be statistically 
significantly higher to decrease the CERTAINTY scores of the financial communications of companies 
with bad performance results in the low discretion industry, than for those with good performance results. 
Taken as a whole, the average d-value of 0.33 shows that there is a moderate difference between the 
financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry during good and bad times.  
During good times, the result in Table 5.24 shows that the levels of ‘Aggression’ and ‘Accomplishment’ 
in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry are statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.043, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.81, zH = - 0.72; p-value = 0.000, d = 0.30, zL = 0.11, zH = 
0.33, respectively) than those in the low discretion industry. Similarly, the level of ‘Accomplishment’ in the 
 
Table 5.23 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry  
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
        
Collectives AR 0.035** 9.22 7.74 3.98 3.39 0.40 
        
 
Items that 
Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AD 0.040** 12.85 14.76 7.54 8.60 
 
0.24 
        
       
 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.017** 2.05 3.28 2.51 4.11 0.36 
        
Average value             4.68        5.37    0.33 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.017, d = 0.20, zL = 2.04, zH = 2.25) than for those in the low discretion industry. These results are in 
line with Hypothesis 3(f) to posit that these sub-features will be significantly higher to increase the 
ACTIVITY score for companies in the high discretion than for those in the low discretion industry. 
On the other hand, the level of ‘Embellishment’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.004, d = 0.29, zL = 0.82, zH = 0.20) than for those 
in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 3(j) to posit that this sub-feature will be 
significantly higher to decrease the ACTIVITY score for companies in the low discretion than for those in 
the high discretion industry. 
 
During good times, the result in Table 5.25 shows that the level of ‘Past Concern’ in the annual reports 
of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.012, d = 0.32, 
zL = - 0.58, zH = - 0.33) than those in the low discretion industry. Furthermore, the level of ‘Complexity’ 
in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.51, zL = 1.53, zH = 2.00; p-value = 0.015, d = 0.15, 
zL = - 0.70, zH = - 0.60, respectively) than for those in the low discretion industry. These results are in 
 
Table 5.24 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times  
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Aggression AD 0.043** 1.92 2.30 1.49 2.09 0.21 
       
 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.017** 33.54 35.57 11.13 9.22 0.20 
 AD 0.000*** 15.37 17.52 7.41 6.92 0.30 
        
 
Items that 
Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
       
 
Embellishment AR 0.004*** 1.05 0.75 1.40 0.54 0.29 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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line with Hypothesis 4(j) to posit that they will be significantly higher to reduce the REALISM score of the 
financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry. 
 
 
Table 5.25 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times  
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Decrease  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Past Concern AR 0.012** 2.07 2.71 1.21 2.50 0.32 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.000*** 5.07 5.21 0.24 0.30 0.51 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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Table 5.26 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times  
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Increase  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
        
Present Concern AR 0.008*** 7.11 11.33 3.31 4.12 1.12 
 AD 0.003*** 13.85 17.54 5.12 5.20 0.72 
        
Human Interest AD 0.014** 29.80 35.63 8.14 10.78 0.61 
        
 
Concreteness AD 0.010** 11.47 7.61 6.21 2.51 0.81 
        
 
Items that 
Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
       
 
Complexity AD 0.016** 4.43 4.30 0.18 0.17 0.77 
        
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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During bad times, the result in Table 5.26 shows that for companies in the high discretion industry, the 
level of ‘Present Concern’ in both their annual reports and analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 1.12, zL = - 0.98, zH = - 0.11; p-value = 0.003, d = 0.72, zL = 0.42, zH = 
1.18, respectively) than for those in the low discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(f) and 
particularly interesting, especially with the level of significance produced by the results. It suggests that 
during bad times, companies in the high discretion industry will communicate with more ‘Present Concern’ 
for their bad performance results in comparison to those in the low discretion industry. Similarly, the level 
of ‘Human Interest’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.014, d = 0.61, zL = - 0.15, zH = 0.28) than those in the low discretion 
industry. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 4(f).  
Furthermore, the level of ‘Concreteness’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.010, d = 0.81, zL = - 0.91, zH = - 1.35) than those 
in the high discretion industry. This is in line with prediction. With respect to the sub-feature that decrease 
the REALISM score, the level of ‘Complexity’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.016, d = 0.77, zL = - 0.60, zH = - 1.03) 
than for those in the high discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(j). In addition, it is similar 
to the results observed for Flesch Reading Ease in Table 5.14 when measuring for the readability of 
corporate narratives during bad times.  
 
The result in Table 5.27 for the level of ‘Concreteness’ is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.001, 
d = 0.42, zLg = - 1.17, zLb = - 0.91) for companies with bad performance results than for those with good 
performance results, within the same low discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(g).   
 
Table 5.27 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Increase  
REALISM Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Concreteness AD 0.001*** 9.21 11.47 4.45 6.21 0.42 
        
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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The result suggests that low discretion companies communicate more during bad times with language of 
tangibility and neutrality to explain their financial circumstances than they would normally do when they 
report good performance results. Again, the moderate d-value of 0.42 further lends credence to their 
isomorphism. 
 
The result in Table 5.28 shows that the level of ‘Present Concern’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions of companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.027, d = 0.82, zHg = - 0.78, zHb = - 0.11; p-value = 0.004, d = 0.65, zHg = 0.50, zHb = 1.18) than for 
those with good performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(h). Similarly, the level of ‘Human 
Interest’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 0.49, zHg = - 0.10, zHb = 0.28) than for those with good 
performance results. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 4(h). On the other hand, the level of 
‘Complexity’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with good performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.011, d = 0.73, zHg = - 0.60, zHb = - 1.03) than those with bad performance 
results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(l). Again, the average d-value of 0.67 shows a large difference. 
 
 
Table 5.28 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry  
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
Items that 
Increase  
REALISM Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
        
Present Concern AR 0.027** 8.10 11.33 3.76 4.12 0.82 
 AD 0.004*** 14.23 17.54 5.05 5.20 0.65 
        
Human Interest AD 0.008*** 30.48 35.63 10.05 10.78 0.49 
        
        
 
Items that 
Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
       
 
Complexity AD 0.011** 4.43 4.30 0.18 0.17 0.73 
        
       
 
Average value             4.76        5.07 0.67 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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During good times, the result in Table 5.29 shows that the level of ‘Praise’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.21, 
zLg = 0.13, zHg = 0.35) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 5(f). On 
the other hand, the levels of ‘Blame’ and ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry are statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.23, zLg = - 0.70, zHg = - 0.78; p-value 
= 0.000, d = 0.36, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.48, respectively) than for those in the high discretion industry. The 
two results are in line with Hypothesis 5(j). 
 
Table 5.29 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times  
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
Items that 
Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Praise AD 0.002*** 6.62 7.37 3.63 3.44 0.21 
        
Items that 
Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.005*** 0.68 0.51 0.68 0.76 0.23 
       
 
       
 
Denial AR 0.000*** 1.13 0.70 1.29 1.04 0.36 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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Table 5.30 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry  
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
Items that 
Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
        
Denial AR 0.005*** 0.70 1.49 1.04 0.88 0.81 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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The result in Table 5.30 shows that the level of ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of companies with bad 
performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.81, zHg = - 1.48, zHb = - 
1.28) than those with good performance results, within the same high discretion industry. This is in line 
with the Hypothesis 5(l) to posit that this sub-feature will be significantly higher to reduce the OPTIMISM 
score of companies with bad performance results. Again, the d-value of 0.81 shows a large difference. 
Tables 5.31 to 5.34 show the results with respect to analysis for LIWC. The order of analysis follows the 
same as aforementioned. During good times, the result in Table 5.31 shows that the level of ‘Tone’ in the 
analysts’ discussions is in line with Hypothesis 6(b). Specifically, the level of ‘Tone’ in the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.000, d = 0.56, zLg = 0.76, zHg = 1.02) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 6(b) to posit that the level of ‘Tone’ in the financial communications of companies in the high 
discretion will be significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry. 
 
 
Table 5.31 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) – Good Times  
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AD 0.000*** 71.87 77.95 10.82 10.77 0.56 
        
        
1st Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.018** 0.28 0.20 0.31 0.29 0.26 
        
        
Positive Emotion AD 0.000*** 3.06 3.42 0.65 0.72 0.53 
        
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.000*** 0.66 0.49 0.36 0.43 0.42 
 AD 0.002*** 0.53 0.47 0.23 0.24 0.25 
 
Achievement AR 0.000*** 3.58 4.10 0.93 1.06 0.53 
 AD 0.000*** 2.18 2.52 0.64 0.75 0.49 
       
 
Risk AR 0.002*** 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.26 
        
        
Motion AD 0.000*** 2.58 2.79 0.60 0.58 0.36 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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More importantly, the z-score for the level of ‘Tone’ for high discretion industries is above the normal 
range. Furthermore, the result shows that the level of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports 
of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.018, d = 0.26, 
zLg = - 1.91, zHg = - 1.95) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 
2(j). In addition, the result shows that the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.53, 
zLg = - 0.37, zHg = - 0.15) than for those in the low discretion industry. This is line with Hypothesis 5(f). 
Furthermore, the results show that for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions, the level of 
‘Negative Emotion’ is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.42, zLg = - 1.08, zHg = - 
1.24; p-value = 0.002, d = 0.25, zLg = - 1.20, zHg = - 1.26, respectively) for companies in the low discretion 
industry than for those in the high discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 5(j). 
Similarly, the result shows that the level of ‘Achievement’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.000, d = 0.53, zLg = 2.78, zHg = 3.41; p-value = 0.000, d = 0.49, zLg = 1.07, zHg = 1.49, respectively) 
than for those in the low discretion industry. Again, this is line with Hypothesis 3(f). Furthermore, the result 
shows that the level of ‘Risk’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.26, zLg = - 0.07, zHg = - 0.29) than for those in the 
high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(j). Finally, the result shows that the level of 
‘Motion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.36, zLg = 0.42, zHg = 0.62) than for those in the low discretion industry. 
Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 3(f). 
During bad times, the result in Table 5.32 shows that the level of ‘Tone’ in both the annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-
value = 0.041, d = 1.08, zLb = 0.97, zHb = 1.50; p-value = 0.000, d = 1.42, zLb = 0.52, zHb = 1.21, 
respectively) than for those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 6(b). Similarly, 
the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry 
is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 1.13, zLb = - 0.52, zHb = - 0.03) than for those in 
the low discretion industry. On the other hand, the results show that the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in 
both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 1.19, zLb = - 1.00, zHb = - 1.40; p-value = 0.001, d 
= 1.02, zLb = - 1.15, zHb = - 1.34, respectively) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in 
line with Hypothesis 5(j). Similarly, the level of ‘Risk’ in the annual reports of the companies in the low 
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discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.049, d = 0.84, zLb = 0.00, zHb = - 0.51) 
than for those in the high discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 2(j). 
 
The result in Table 5.33 shows that the level of ‘Tone’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with 
good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.45, zLg = 0.76, zLb = 
0.52) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 6(c). Furthermore, the 
result shows that the level of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports of companies with bad 
performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.001, d = 0.55, zLg = - 1.91, zLb = - 
1.80) than for those with good performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 2(k). On the other 
hand, the result shows that the level of ‘First Person Plural Pronoun’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.37, zLg 
= 5.07, zLb = 5.48) than for those with good performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(g) to 
posit that companies experiencing bad performance results are more likely to use such language to either 
collectively take responsibility or share the blame for bad performance results.  
Furthermore, the result shows that the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies with good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.34, 
zLg = - 0.37, zLb = - 0.52) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 
5(g). In addition, the result for the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies  
 
Table 5.32 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) – Bad Times  
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AR 0.041** 76.88 89.02 15.02 4.75 1.08 
 AD 0.000*** 66.27 82.27 13.75 7.89 1.42 
        
        
Positive Emotion AD 0.000*** 2.82 3.62 0.77 0.63 1.13 
        
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.005*** 0.75 0.31 0.39 0.34 1.19 
 AD 0.001*** 0.59 0.38 0.26 0.15 1.02 
       
 
Risk AR 0.049** 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.84 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.037, d = 0.25, zLg = - 1.20, 
zLb = - 1.15) than for those with good performance results. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 5(k). 
Similarly, the result for the level of ‘Past Focus’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance 
results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.027, d = 0.37, zLg = - 1.33, zLb = - 1.23) than for 
those with good performance results. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 4(k). Again, the moderate d-
value of 0.39 further lends credence to their isomorphism. 
The result in Table 5.34 shows that the level of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports of 
companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.015, d = 0.78, 
zHg = - 1.95, zHb = - 1.82) than for those with good performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 
2(j). Although this is contrary to the direction of prediction, nonetheless, it aligns to the direction of the 
result observed for similar DICTION sub-feature - ‘Self-Reference’.  
 
 
Table 5.33 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (LIWC) – Low 
Discretion Industry 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Tone AD 0.000*** 71.87 66.27 10.82 13.75 0.45 
        
        
1st Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.001*** 0.28 0.55 0.31 0.63 0.55 
        
1st Person Plural 
Pronoun AD 0.002*** 4.93 5.27 0.92 0.92 0.37 
        
        
Positive Emotion AD 0.002*** 3.06 2.82 0.65 0.77 0.34 
        
        
Negative Emotion AD 0.037** 0.53 0.59 0.23 0.26 0.25 
        
        
Past Focus AR 0.027** 1.90 2.10 0.57 0.50 0.37 
        
Average value             2.25 
       
2.81 0.39 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Finally, the level of ‘Present Focus’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance 
results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.021, d = 0.61, zHg = 0.23, zHb = 0.56) than for 
those with good performance results. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 4(h). Although the result is 
contrary to prediction, nevertheless, it aligns to the direction of the result observed for similar DICTION 
sub-feature - ‘Present Concern’, as shown in Table 5.28. Again, the average d-value of 0.70 further lends 
credence to the heterogeneity of companies in the high discretion industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.34 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (LIWC) – High 
Discretion Industry  
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
1st Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.015** 0.20 0.51 0.29 0.49 0.78 
        
        
Present Focus AD 0.021** 10.61 11.54 1.70 1.33 0.61 
        
Average value             1.00 
       
0.91 0.70 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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5.7 Discussion of the Financial Communications of Companies with Outlier Results 
In addition to analysing the financial communications of companies in the two industry groups, this study 
investigated the results of individual companies in the two industry groups with the aim of examining 
outlier results in their financial communications. For the low discretion industry, two (2) companies 
showed outlier results in excess of one standard deviation (i.e. one standard deviation from the mean) in 
some of the language features of their financial communications in comparison to the calculated z-scores 
of industry averages. On the other hand, no company in the high discretion industry showed an abnormal 
outlier result in their financial communications. This could be as a result of the heterogeneous nature of 
the behaviour of companies in the high discretion industry. In addition, analysis shows that while the 
financial communications of all the companies did not show significant deviation from industry average 
during good times, the language features of their financial communications deviated significantly from the 
industry average during bad times. Hence, the focus is on those deviations during bad times. On either 
side, the evaluation was conducted across the five Master Variables of DICTION, eleven (11) language 
categories of LIWC, Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade. Table 5.35 shows the 
companies with these outlier results. 
 
Table 5.35 Companies with Outlier Results  
  Low Discretion High Discretion 
1 Cairn Energy Plc None 
2 Evraz Plc  
   
    
 
With respect to Cairn Energy Plc, the analysis of the financial communications of the company between 
2011 and 2015 shows that the company had significantly lower levels of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, 
and ACTIVITY in its financial communications, in comparison to other companies within the same 
industry. These trends are shown in Figures 4.01 to 4.03. In addition, Figure 4.5 shows that the company 
had significantly higher levels of Tone which is a signal of potential manipulation of the financial position 
of the company. Furthermore, Figures 4.05 and 4.06 show the trends for Positive Emotion and Negative 
Emotion words, with both aligning to the language features expected to be used during bad times as 
stated in the hypothesis phase. 
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Figure 5.2 COMMONALITY Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5.3 CERTAINTY Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
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Figure 5.4 ACTIVITY Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5.5 TONE Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
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Figure 5.6 Positive Emotion Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5.7 Negative Emotion Scores for CAIRN ENERGY between 2011 and 2015. 
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By comparing the language features of Cairn Energy Plc with its published financials, it shows that the 
company had consistently reported net losses between years 2013 and 2015 as shown in Table 5.36. 
Specifically, Figures 4.02 and 4.03 show that in the five-year period, the financial communications of 
Cairn Energy Plc had significantly lower levels of CERTAINTY and ACTIVITY, in comparison with industry 
averages as the company moved from profitable years 2011 and 2012 to loss-making years 2014 and 
2015. This study argues that with significantly lower level of CERTAINTY in its financial communications, 
this aligns with the prevalent economic condition of the company. This aligns to the viewpoint of Yuthas 
et al. (2002) that the use of flexible language in uncertain environments seems to be more legitimate for 
the purpose of seeking understanding of stakeholders rather than their approval. On the other hand, the 
use of resolute language and a sense of certainty by the company in a loss-making year 2013 seem 
inappropriate for an economic context shaped by bad financial performance result (Patelli & Pedrini, 
2013). Similarly, the significantly lower level of ACTIVITY in the financial communications of the company 
between 2013 and 2015 corroborate the findings for the language of CERTAINTY. Specifically, the 
language of the top management of the company between 2013 and 2015 suggests years of neutrality 
and inactivity, thereby signalling lack of accomplishments, lower self-confidence and inability to 
implement change and deliver positive performance results (Patelli & Pedrini, 2013). 
Interestingly, Figures 4.04 and 4.06 show that in the five-year period, the financial communications of the 
company had significantly higher levels of Tone and significantly lower levels of Negative Emotion (except 
for year 2012). While a significantly lower level of Negative Emotion is inappropriate in an economic 
context shaped by financial instability (Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012), the use of significantly higher level 
of Tone is a signal to potential deception (Henry, 2008). Therefore, the findings suggest that the investors 
and assurance providers of Cairn Energy Plc need to be vigilant on the future prospects of the company, 
with the potential threat to its going-concern based on recurring losses. In addition, the result shows that 
the company has the potential for engaging in earnings manipulation and financial statement fraud when 
faced with the pressure on maintaining its going-concern status.  
Table 5.36 Reported Net Income of Cairn Energy Plc 
Year                                                                               Net Income (Loss)        
2011 2,634.80    
2012 44.7    
2013 -335.6    
2014 -244.5    
2015 -349.6    
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With respect to Evraz Plc, the analysis of the financial communications of the company between 2011 
and 2015 shows that the company had significantly higher and lower levels of COMMONALITY and 
CERTAINTY, respectively, in its financial communications, in comparison to other companies in the same 
low discretion industry. These trends are shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8.  
 
Figure 5.8 COMMONALITY Scores for EVRAZ PLC between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5.9 CERTAINTY Scores for EVRAZ PLC between 2011 and 2015 
-0.73
-0.07
-0.41 -0.32
0.48
0.65
1.23
1.77
4.13
2.69
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Z-
sc
o
re
Year
COMMONALITY
Industry Z-Score Company Z-score
-0.16
-0.37
-0.01
-0.39
-0.31
-0.03
-2.38
-0.24
-0.32
-1.87
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Z-
sc
o
re
Year
CERTAINTY
Industry Z-Score Company Z-score
200 | P a g e  
 
In addition, Figures 4.09 and 4.10 show that Evraz Plc had significantly lower levels of Positive Emotion 
and significantly higher levels of Negative Emotion within the relevant period, which align to the 
predictions made at the hypothesis phase. 
 
Figure 5.10 Positive Emotion Scores for EVRAZ PLC between 2011 and 2015. 
 
Figure 5.11 Negative Emotion Scores for EVRAZ PLC between 2011 and 2015. 
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Taken as whole, these trends align to the financial distress experienced by the company within the 
relevant period. Specifically, the company reported consistent net losses from 2012 to 2015 as shown in 
Table 5.37. Furthermore, the lower level of CERTAINTY in the financial communications of Evraz Plc 
align to the economic reality of the company. This is similar with those observed for Cairn Energy Plc. 
With respect to the significantly higher level of Negative Emotion in the financial communications of the 
company, this seems to be appropriate with the economic context of the company, especially with 
reference to year 2014 where it recorded the highest net loss and with accompanying highest z-score of 
4.13 in the five-year period.    
Table 5.37 Reported Net Income of Evraz Plc 
Year                                                                              Net Income (Loss)        
2011 465.00    
2012 -393.00    
2013 -504.00    
2014 -1175.00    
2015 -644.00    
          
In summary, it would appear that for both companies, even in preceding good times, the language 
features in their financial communications seem to be different from the industry. This study posits that 
such differences could reflect a signal of potential bad performance results.  Therefore, such comparison 
may be useful for investigators in the course of conducting the annual audit of company accounts.   
5.8 Discussion of Key Findings 
This study evaluated the psycholinguistic features of financial communications of corporate organisations 
in the context of institutional theory. It assessed whether the language features of the financial 
communications of corporate organisations differ based on the institution to which each belongs. In the 
words of Professor Richard W. Scott, an organisational sociologist globally renowned for his outstanding 
contributions to the field of organisational theory, particularly with emphasis on the relationship between 
organisations and their institutional environments, he noted that there is the need to “…look at each 
institution in specificity, in its granularity and find out why is it as it is, what is exactly going on” (Amarante, 
2016, p. 5). Furthermore, he emphasised that each institution is different from another, with each one 
varying from one country to another, and from one context to another (Amarante, 2016, p.5). Accordingly, 
this study posited that as corporate organisations are classified into different industries, it is important to 
understand their corporate behaviours in the context of the institution to which each belongs, compare 
these behaviours with those of other organisations within the same industry classification and operating 
within similar economic contexts. In the context of this study, the specific behaviours of corporate 
organisations evaluated are those reflected within their financial communications published in the annual 
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reports to shareholders and in their discussions with analysts. To evaluate these financial 
communications in the context of institutions, this study drew on and evaluated insights from research in 
the areas of institutional theory, institutional logic, isomorphism, discretion, and impression management.  
To establish appropriate conceptual and theoretical frameworks, this study adopted the consensus 
recommendation of institutional theory researchers on the need to devote research effort to 
understanding organisations and their behaviours in view of the institutions they are affiliated to, rather 
than considering and evaluating them as independent of their environment (Amarante, 2016; Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2013; Scott, 2014; Thornton & Ocasio, 2013; Meyer, 2013). 
Therefore, there is a shift of focus from the individual organisations to their institutions, with the aim of 
broadly considering organisations as constituent parts of a larger context, which also enables the 
possibility of comparing organisations on the basis of how they differ in different industries (Amarante, 
2016). Although organisations are expected to differ in many ways, however, this study emphasised the 
view of organisational theorists that the main way in which their differences can be evaluated should be 
in the context to which they relate. In the context of this study, to facilitate the evaluation of their 
differences, this study adopted comparative psycholinguistic analysis of the financial communications of 
corporate organisations in the context of the institutional logic and the level of discretion that informs their 
choice of language while communicating their financial performance results to their stakeholders.  
Consequently, this study postulates that it would be incommensurate to evaluate the financial 
communications of a computer technology company operating in a high growth industry with those of an 
oil and gas company operating in a low growth industry. More importantly, this study emphasised that the 
evaluation of psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of a computer technology 
company would be better conducted when compared with those of other competitors or similar companies 
operating within the same industry, rather than comparing their financial communications with those of a 
company that operates in a different industry. The rationale for this approach is due to the need in the 
field of Accounting, particularly Auditing, to assess how computational text analysis techniques can be of 
assistance to shareholders, assurance providers, and regulatory authorities in understanding the financial 
communications of companies in the context of the institutional environment they operate in. This 
approach is important because it provides the potential for measuring outliers in a company’s financial 
communications which are different from those of competitors and/or similar companies operating within 
the same institutional environment. More importantly, it provides the potential for understanding the 
psycholinguistic behaviour of companies when faced with pending financial difficulties, with particular 
emphasis on how easy or difficult it is to read and understand their financial communications during good 
and bad times.       
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Building on the insights from institutional theory and to specifically assess the institutional logic within 
which each corporate organisation operates in, this study adopted the theory on managerial discretion to 
classify organisations into two broad categories of either belonging to the high discretion industry or low 
discretion industry. As reviewed in the literature chapter, the theory on managerial discretion posits that 
organisational outcomes can be shaped by the amount of discretion afforded to an organisation within its 
institutional environment. In the same vein, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that “top managers 
differ significantly in how much discretion, or latitude of action, they possess in shaping organizational 
outcomes” (Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997, p. 514). In addition, they argued that rather than attribute 
as random phenomenon the degree of discretion a top manager possesses, it can be measured as results 
from specifiable industry determinants. Originally, the theory on discretion was introduced by Hambrick 
and Finkelstein in 1987, who found that, overall, the level of industry discretion is significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry.  
Although the theory on discretion has gained a wide scope of research efforts with findings published in 
notable journals, at the time of conducting this study, no known or published work had been conducted 
in operationalising and validating the formula for measuring industry discretion in the context of 
companies resident in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the industry characteristics for measuring 
industry discretion as established in Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) were replicated in this study for 
their applicability, and subsequently, ascertained the reliability and predictive validity of the underlying 
formula for measuring industry discretion in the UK context. Accordingly, for each of the industry 
characteristics, this study computed for five-year averages (between years 2011 and 2015) for each firm, 
the median value was then used as representative of the industry characteristic.  
Of the five industry characteristics (including overall Industry Discretion) empirically validated in Hambrick 
and Abrahamson (1995) and McClelland et al. (2010), the results of replicating the underlying model in 
the context of UK companies showed similar results as those of the two studies aforementioned. With 
the exception of Advertising Intensity which showed no significant differences, the results of this study 
showed that the levels of R&D Intensity and Market Growth are significantly higher for companies in the 
high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. On the other hand, the results showed 
that the level of Capital Intensity is higher for companies in the low discretion industry than for those in 
the high discretion industry. Taken as a whole, the results showed that the amount of Industry Discretion 
is higher for companies in the high discretion than for those in the low discretion industry. Hence, this 
study operationalised, validated, and made reliable the underlying model for measuring industry 
discretion for companies operating in the United Kingdom. In sum, the results are in line with both the 
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literature on discretion (as in Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) and the underlying model for measuring the 
phenomenon (as in Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland, Liang, & Barker III, 2010). 
Consequent on the results obtained from operationalising the measurement of discretion in the UK 
context, this study proceeded with obtaining the financial communications of all the companies that met 
the pre-selection criteria, which is that they must have both annual reports and analysts’ discussions in 
the five-year period. For all companies considered, 43 of them had both annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions between 2011 and 2015, while 17 other companies had the same financial communications 
between 2014 and 2018. On both sides of high and low discretion industry groups, 30 companies each 
were selected in the evaluation their financial communications. To measure the psycholinguistic features 
of the financial communications of these companies, this study adopted a text analysis software known 
as DICTION 7.0 and Language Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). In addition, this study measured the 
readability and comprehensibility of the financial communications of the sample companies using the 
Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades. Accordingly, the results of these 
measurements and how they contribute to the different aspects of the reviewed literature are discussed 
hereafter.  
In the context of this study, the element of DICTION that informs the measurement of the extent of 
agreement to or deviation from common values and norms within a group is the COMMONALITY Master 
Variable. This is because central to the discussion on discretion are the concepts of Isomorphism, 
Institutional Logic, and Attentional Homogeneity. As reviewed in the literature, the theory on Isomorphism 
emphasises that organisations that align themselves to the same or similar institutional logic tend to 
become increasingly similar in their responses when confronted by institutionalised pressures from the 
external environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In the same vein, the concept of Institutional Logic 
explains the view that different organisations within the same institutional environment will be regulated 
by a similar logic, which will be different from the logic that regulates organisations in an entirely different 
institutional environment (Thornton & Ocasio, 2013). In view of this, as organisations in different 
institutional environments are regulated by different institutional logics, their responses to institutional 
pressures are expected to be isomorphic or similar with those of other organisations operating within the 
same institutional environment. In other words, the response of an organisation to the pressures specific 
to its own institutional environment is expected to be different from the responses of other organisations 
in a different institutional environment. As an extension, this study argues that this isomorphism becomes 
manifest in the language corporate organisations use within an institutional environment to communicate 
with their stakeholders, in explaining their peculiar circumstances which may not be applicable to other 
companies in different institutional environments.  
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With respect to Attentional Homogeneity, Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) define it as “the degree of 
similarity in the foci of attention of top managers across organizations” (p. 514). They posit that a 
fundamental factor that affects the degree of attentional homogeneity in an institutional environment is 
the amount of discretion, or latitude of action, present in such institutional environment. Accordingly, the 
level of discretion or latitude of action is widely different from one institution to another (Hambrick & 
Finkestein, 1987). As noted by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987), while some institutions allow a great 
variety and change in the level of discretion, other institutions limit the amount of discretion afforded to 
the top managers of organisations within such institutions. Therefore, this study argued, in line with 
Abrahamson and Finkelstein (1997) and Nelson (1991) that if higher discretion confers options to choose 
among alternative actions to top managers in an industry or institutional environment, then it was logical 
to suggest that the same discretion will confer diversity in the options that managers attend to. In view of 
this, the central argument of this study was that the amount of discretion available in an industry will be 
negatively related to the level of COMMONALITY in their financial communications. As predicted, the 
companies in low discretion industry were expected to have a higher level of COMMONALITY than those 
in the high discretion industry. 
The results of this study showed that companies in the low discretion industry have a significantly higher 
level of COMMONALITY than those in the high discretion industry, a result which is the same across the 
two financial communications channels – annual reports and discussions with analysts. This result is in 
line with the extant literature on the impact of discretion on how homogeneously or heterogeneously firms 
are likely to respond or attend to the pressures from their institutional environments (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland et al., 2010). The results of this study 
advances this position that the more the restrictions corporate organisations have on the level of 
discretion afforded to them, the more they are likely to communicate using language that highlights 
agreed-upon values of their institutional environment and rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement 
(Hart & Carroll, 2015). On the other hand, the more the discretion afforded to corporate organisations the 
more they are allowed greater variety and change in managerial actions (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, 
p. 514), to the extent that it confers diversity in the options that the top managements attend to (Nelson, 
1991).  
Taken as a whole, the results suggest that the top management of companies in the low discretion 
industry are more likely, than those in the high discretion industry, to use their financial communications 
to seek common understanding of the peculiarity of their institutional environment with those of 
competitors or similar companies operating in the same industry and within similar economic contexts. 
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Interestingly, during favourable or unfavourable financial performance periods, the results of this study 
suggest that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to attend homogenously to their 
financial performance circumstances than those in the high discretion industry. In addition, it showed that 
while there is a moderate difference (d = 0.32) in the effect size levels of COMMONALITY between the 
annual reports of the two industry groups during periods of favourable financial performance results, there 
is a large effect size difference (d = 1.17) between the COMMONALITY levels of their annual reports 
during periods of unfavourable financial performance results, with companies in the low discretion 
industry having higher COMMONALITY levels in both economic contexts. This finding supports the 
standpoints of prior studies on the potential consequences of organisational behaviour in deviating from 
the agreed norms of an institutional environment.  
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) conclude that deviation from agreed norms as measured by COMMONALITY 
suggests a non-engaging language, which establishes certain “leadership traits that shape tone at the 
top is associated with unethical accounting practices” (p. 12). In the same vein, Marsh (2013) posits that 
a core value of ethical leadership is engagement with the stakeholder community. In other words, ethical 
leaders prioritise the need to have a common understanding with those they are accountable to (the 
shareholders), those they share similarity with (their competitors), and those that provide oversight 
functions on their performances (auditors and regulators). Furthermore, ethical leaders consider the 
implications of their decisions and actions on their audience by paying attention to the various members 
of the stakeholder community. Spears (1995) provides a description of ethical leaders as builders of 
community and better stewards of shareholder wealth, which follows that organisational leadership that 
undermines the need for ethical considerations leads to placing emphasis on self-interest, with less focus 
on facilitating rapport with shareholders. Similarly, Brown and Treviño (2006) emphasise that neuroticism 
is a fundamental trait of poor ethical leadership, which prioritises self-perceptions above common views.  
Hence, this study posits that with a higher likelihood of the CEOs of companies in the high discretion 
industry demonstrating deviation from common views, they are potentially more likely than those in the 
low discretion industry to engage in unethical leadership such as aggressively recognising the income 
published in their financial communications. Also, companies in a high discretion industry are more likely 
not to be caught out as they have more potential to produce heterogeneous reactions compared to those 
in a low discretion industry, where it would be easier to detect as any differences would be more evident. 
In view of this, this study posits that the deviation by any company in the low discretion industry, during 
any economic situation, could provide the potential for investigating for unethical practices which may 
lead to fraudulent financial reporting. 
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Furthermore, the results of this study showed that companies in a high discretion industry have a 
significantly higher level of CERTAINTY (p = 0.000, d = 0.34) in their annual reports than those in the low 
discretion industry. This result is in the direction of the theory on discretion, the link between non-
engaging language and the tendency to have the emergence of unethical organisational leadership. As 
aforementioned in the discussion on COMMMONALITY in view of the impact of discretion on 
organisational outcomes, there is the potential for the creation of an unethical leadership that is premised 
on the availability of discretion to choose from a greater variety of managerial actions (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997). In view of this, Hart (2000) noted that the measure of CERTAINTY enables the 
understanding of the level of resoluteness, inflexibility, and a potential to speak authoritatively. It follows 
that CERTAINTY denotes a language that focuses on precision and the avoidance of hesitation (Hart, 
2000; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). In view of this, Patelli & Pedrini (2015) posit that understanding the 
language of CERTAINTY in CEO letters to shareholders can provide the signal of an authoritative 
leadership that is unwilling to compromise. This form of leadership emphasises a sense of assurance 
premised on approval and persuasion. In the same vein, Burns (1978) argued that the placement of 
emphasis on resoluteness by an organisational leadership is an inherent trait of transactional leaders, 
whose focus is on obtaining contingent rewards and management by exception. On the other hand, 
organisational leaders that are conscious of the need to maintain engagement with the stakeholder 
community, with more drive towards common goals rather than self-interest, are more likely to promote 
ethical leadership (Turner et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, with more focus on transactions and the pressure to meet target profitability, transactional 
leaders are more likely to resort to unethical behaviours (Sama & Shoaf, 2008), such as corporate 
earnings manipulation. The result of this study on CERTAINTY aligns with these positions. It posits that 
with a higher potential for market or sales growth, pressure to deliver above-average market returns, and 
a higher level of discretion available to the companies operating in the high discretion industry, the CEOs 
of such companies are more likely to communicate to the shareholders using a higher level language of 
CERTAINTY than their counterparts in the low discretion industry. It follows that with such conditions in 
an institutional environment, the top management of companies in a high discretion industry have more 
potential to resort to unethical recognition of income to meet market expectations than those operating in 
an environment that is more mature and with low expectations on growth and profitability, which is the 
case of companies operating in a low discretion environment.   
Nevertheless, the presence of a significantly higher level of CERTAINTY in financial communications 
should also be evaluated in the context of economic circumstances, beyond mere institutional contexts. 
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Yuthas et al. (2002) discuss the language of CERTAINTY in light of the legitimacy principle of discourse 
ethics. According to Forester (1980), legitimacy connotes the appropriateness of use of language in the 
context of environmental circumstances. It is inappropriate to universally assess the legitimacy of 
language without giving consideration to the specific context examined. Patelli and Pedrini (2013) discuss 
certain economic circumstances for evaluating the legitimacy of the language of CERTAINTY. They posit 
that during periods of global economic downturn, resoluteness as measured by the language of 
CERTAINTY is inappropriate for an economic context that is predominantly shaped by high financial 
instability. They suggest that an uncertain language seems to be more appropriate in uncertain 
environments, which makes more legitimate the use of flexible language to communicate to the 
stakeholder community, with the view of seeking understanding rather than approval (Yuthas et al. 2002). 
This theoretical argument aligns with the position of this study in evaluating the language of CERTAINTY 
in economic contexts.  
Taken as a whole, by evaluating the use of the language of CERTAINTY in the light of economic contexts, 
the results of this study showed that on either side of the companies operating in the two industry groups, 
there was a significantly higher level of CERTAINTY in their annual reports during good times than in bad 
times. Specifically, the result showed that for the low discretion industry, there was a significantly higher 
level of CERTAINTY (p = 0.006, d = 0.46, zLg = - 0.55, zLb = -1.35) in the annual reports of companies 
with good financial performance results than those with bad financial performance results within the same 
industry. Similarly, the results showed that for the high discretion industry, there was a significantly higher 
level of CERTAINTY (p = 0.018, d = 0.77, zHg = - 0.21, zHb = - 1.43) in the annual reports of companies 
with good financial performance results than those with bad financial performance results within the same 
industry. In line with the suggestions of Patelli and Pedrini (2015), this study posits that the lower levels 
of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies in the two industry groups during periods of bad 
financial performance results aligns to the legitimacy principle of discourse ethics as emphasised by 
Yuthas et al. (2002). It follows that rather than seeking approval and persuasion during periods of bad 
financial performance, the results suggest that the CEOs of companies in the two industry groups aligned 
themselves with the legitimacy principle of discourse ethics by using a flexible language with the view of 
seeking understanding with their stakeholder community during periods of uncertainty. Returning back to 
these results, this study posits that the deviation from this principle demonstrated by the use of a 
significantly higher level of the language of CERTAINTY preceding and during bad times by any company 
in either of the industry groups could provide the red flag for investigating potential deception in their 
financial communications.  
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With respect to the measurement of the ACTIVITY level in financial communications, the results showed 
that companies in a high discretion industry have a significantly higher level of ACTIVITY (p = 0.002, d = 
0.31) in their annual reports than those in a low discretion industry. According to Hart (2000), the language 
of ACTIVITY provides the measurement for “capturing movement, change, the implementation of an idea, 
and the avoidance of inertia” (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 6). In the same vein, Patelli and Pedrini (2015) 
note that ACTIVITY in language emphasises accomplishments and conveys narcissistic self-confidence. 
Accordingly, as the use of language focuses on communicating forceful actions and personal triumph, 
the level of ACTIVITY in such communications increases while the conveyance of neutrality and a sense 
of inactivity decreases. In view of this, the results of this study on the language of ACTIVITY suggests 
that the CEO letters of companies operating in a high discretion industry are more likely to be 
characterised by terms that convey movement, change, the implementation of ideas, and the avoidance 
of inertia. In the context of this study, such language can be indicative of the presence of persistent 
industry competition, forceful action, personal triumph, the expression of task-completion, and the 
avoidance of neutrality and inactivity. Hence, the CEOs of companies in a high discretion industry are 
more likely to place emphasis on their accomplishments by conveying narcissistic self-confidence. It 
suggests that the CEOs of companies in a high discretion industry are more likely to use their letters to 
shareholders to communicate overconfidence in their professional and uncompromising competence 
towards delivering market expectations and to implement strategic change. It follows suit with the 
discussion on the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies in a high discretion industry. 
This study posits that with a high level of market expectations, high potential for growth, and a high 
amount of discretion, the CEOs of companies in a high discretion environment are more likely to 
communicate their overconfidence in implementing strategic change that will enable the delivery of such 
expectations. 
In the same vein, prior studies show that there is a relationship between the language of ACTIVITY and 
a leadership that is driven by heroic representations (Badaracco, 2001), transformational change (Brown 
& Treviño, 2006), and self-confidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). Similarly, McClelland et al. (2010) 
emphasise that the leaders of organisations operating in a high discretion environment are less likely to 
be committed to existing and established ways of implementing corporate strategy. Therefore, they have 
more potential to actively drive movement and change from established ways to new ways of 
implementing corporate strategy, which becomes manifest in their financial communications. In the same 
vein, Brown and Treviño (2006) posit that leaders who seek transformational change are more likely to 
engage in unethical practices, especially when they are driven by self-confidence. Nevertheless, 
Bénabou and Tirole (2002) argued that although self-confidence has a positive impact on organisational 
210 | P a g e  
 
performance, it is self-defeating when it advances towards over-confidence. Similarly, Schrand and 
Zechman (2012) highlight that there is a strong relationship between overconfidence of CEOs and 
financial restatements. From the perspective of ethical leadership, this overconfidence can lead to 
engaging in bold decisions that would otherwise be considered as not feasible by most people (Kets de 
Vries, 2003). In addition, Chen (2010) shows that accounting frauds are more likely to be committed by 
overconfident leaders, a situation that potentially undermines the fundamental credibility and quality of 
financial reporting (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015).     
On the other hand, for companies in a low discretion environment, the results showed that the letters of 
CEOs to shareholders in the annual reports for a low discretion industry are more likely to convey a sense 
of neutrality, passivity, and the acceptance of inertness, which provides an indication of potential 
unwillingness or inability of the CEOs to display overconfidence, with a lesser emphasis on their 
accomplishments. It follows that the CEOs of companies in a low discretion environment are more likely 
to use this language to communicate their commitment to the status-quo, passivity in driving movement 
or change existing ways of implementing financial performance plans. This position aligns with the 
conclusion of McClelland et al. (2010) that the leaders of companies operating in a low discretion 
environment are more likely to stay committed to existing and established ways of implementing 
corporate strategy, rather than engaging in forceful action towards the implementation of new ideas. 
Badaracco (2001) emphasised that rather than being driven by heroic representations of actions and 
decisions, ethical leaders are more inclined to undertake change in a patient, careful, and incremental 
way. In view of the results from this study and the conclusions of prior studies, this study posits that CEOs 
in a low discretion environment understand the dynamics of their industry with respect to growth 
prospects, and have more potential to implement the financial performance plans of their companies in a 
patient, careful, incremental, and ethical way. 
Returning to the fourth Master Variable REALISM, the result shows that the financial communications of 
companies in the low discretion industry have a significantly higher level of REALISM than for those in 
the high discretion industry. Specifically, both the annual reports (p = 0.031, d = 0.30) and discussions 
with analysts (p = 0.046, d = 0.11) show the language of REALISM is significantly higher for companies 
in the low discretion industry than for those in the high discretion industry. According to Hart and Caroll 
(2015), REALISM is a “language describing tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that affect 
people’s everyday lives” (p. 9). It is a measure of the comprehensibility or difficulty of language in a textual 
information, or as Patelli and Pedrini (2015) puts it, “…it is an inverse measure of the complexity of the 
language” (p. 11), with lower values indicating higher lexical complexity, and vice versa. As a measure 
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of comprehensibility or difficulty, REALISM increases with the frequent use of terms that are concrete 
and familiar, while it reduces with the use of words that are complex, with long sentences, and uncommon 
terminology (Hart & Carroll, 2015; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). By implication, a lower level of REALISM 
creates readability problems for the stakeholder community as it deviates from what is tangible, 
immediate, or recognisable to them. On the other hand, a higher value of REALISM facilitates the reading 
ease of the stakeholder community as it implies they are familiar with the language used in 
communicating to them. 
In the context of this study, a lower REALISM value indicates potential complexity of the language used 
by CEOs in communicating with the users of financial information, while a higher value enables the 
reading ease of the financial communications of corporate organisations. In view of this, as the REALISM 
score of companies in the low discretion industry is significantly higher than those in the high discretion 
industry, it suggests that, taken as a whole, the financial communications of the companies in a high 
discretion environment are less likely to be easily read and understood than those disclosed by 
companies in a low discretion environment. Patelli and Pedrini (2015) point out that a significant predictor 
of potential aggressive financial reporting is when complex lexicons are used in financial communications 
with the stakeholder community. Similarly, Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) posit that ‘ease of reading’ 
of a text is an area that is susceptible to rhetorical manipulation facilitated through impression 
management tactics.  
In addition, Li (2008) emphasises that the leadership of a company can use financial communications to 
manipulate and deceive potential investors when complex language is used in structuring those 
narratives. This is usually the case when they need to divert the attention of the stakeholder community 
from unfavourable financial performance results (Courtis, 1986, 1998; Lehavy et al. 2011; Li, 2008; Patelli 
& Pedrini, 2015). Hence, the use of familiar and concrete words in financial communications measured 
by the REALISM variable suggests faithful representation of financial performance results, while the use 
of complex lexicons in those communications violates the principle of comprehensibility in discourse 
ethics (Forester, 1980). Therefore, the financial communications of companies should be easily 
understood and transparent to aid the mutual understanding of CEOs and the stakeholder community 
(Patelli & Pedrini, 2015), a lack of which provides a signal for potential lapses in discourse ethics with 
accompanying consequences for confidence in the financial reporting function (Schaubroeck et al. 2012). 
In light of seeking to evaluate, in more granular form, the readability of financial communications, this 
study conducted two readability measure tests in differentiating between the ease or difficulty in reading 
and comprehending the financial communications of companies in the two industry groups. The two 
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measures conducted were Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades. Taken as a 
whole, two major levels of analysis for discussion are: the difference between readability measures of the 
financial communications of the two industry groups; and the difference between the readability measures 
of the two forms of financial communications (annual reports and discussions with analysts) in each 
industry group. Specifically, the second level of analysis was conducted to inform shareholders, 
assurance providers, and the regulatory environment on which of the two forms of financial 
communications (annual reports and discussions with analysts) the top management of companies will 
potentially target when they need to rhetorically manipulate the readability of financial communications.      
Accordingly, for the first level of analysis, this study showed that the CEO letters to shareholders as 
contained in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is significantly easier (p = 
0.000, d = 0.44) to read and understand than for those in the high discretion industry. Similarly, in 
comparison to those in a low discretion environment, the result shows that the CEO letters of companies 
in a high discretion environment have the potential (p = 0.059, d = 0.29) to demand a higher level of 
education to be read and understood. This study argues that with a high level of discretion available to 
the top management of companies in a high discretion environment, this has the potential for enabling 
them to choose from a wide variety of actions including the use of uncommon terminologies in their 
financial communications that are unfamiliar to the stakeholder community. In contrast, this study argues 
that with a low level of discretion, the top management of companies in a low discretion environment are 
limited in their choice of actions which could impact their selection of terminologies used in their financial 
communications. This low level of discretion has the potential to constrain the top management of 
companies in a low discretion environment to choosing words that are commonly used in their institutional 
environment which align to the understanding of the stakeholder community.  
In addition, the second layer of analysis on readability measures showed that for companies in the low 
discretion industry, the reading ease of their discussions with analysts is significantly higher (p = 0.000, 
d = 3.71) than those of the letters of CEOs to shareholders within the same accounting period. 
Specifically, it showed that while the reading ease score of discussions with analysts is within the region 
of the ‘Easily Understood’, the score of the reading ease of CEO letters to shareholders is within the 
region of ‘Very Difficult to Read and Understand’. With respect to the level of education required to read 
and understand the financial communications of companies in a low discretion environment, the result 
showed (p = 0.000, d = 2.92) that while it will take 13- to 15-year-old students to read and understand the 
discussions of the CEOs with analysts, it will take a university graduate to read and understand the CEO 
letters to shareholders within the same period.  
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For companies in the high discretion industry, the result showed that the reading ease of their discussions 
with analysts is significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 4.21) than those of the letters of CEOs to shareholders 
within the same accounting period. Specifically, it showed that while the reading ease score of 
discussions with analysts is within the region of the ‘Easily Understood’, the score of the reading ease of 
CEO letters to shareholders is within the region of ‘Very Difficult to Read and Understand’. With respect 
to the level of education required to read and understand the financial communications of companies in 
a high discretion environment, again, the result showed (p = 0.000, d = 3.61) that while it will take 13- to 
15-year-old students to read and understand the discussions of CEOs with analysts, it will take a 
university graduate to read and understand the CEO letters to shareholders within the same period. 
Taken as a whole, the aggregated results showed that while it is significantly easier (p = 0.000, d = 3.91) 
to read and understand the combined CEO discussions with analysts of the two industry groups, it is 
rather difficult to read and understand their combined CEO letters to shareholders within the same 
accounting period. Again, the aggregated results showed (p = 0.000, d = 3.21) that while it will take 13- 
to 15-year-old students to read and understand the combined CEO discussions with analysts of the two 
industry groups, it will take a university graduate to read and understand their combined CEO letters to 
shareholders within the same accounting period. This makes the case for the next line of discussion.  
Prior studies show that the genre of text and medium of communication have implications for readability 
and comprehensibility (Brooks & Warren, 1972; McCarthy, Myers, Briner, Graesser, & McNamara, 2009; 
McNamara, Graesser, McCarthy, & Cai, 2014). Brooks and Warren (1972) differentiated between genres 
of text into narrative, expository, persuasive, and descriptive. Brooks and Warren’s classification of text 
suggests that text in certain categories are more difficult to read and understand than texts in other 
categories. In the same vein, McNamara et al. (2014) posit that narrative texts tend to have a higher level 
of readability and comprehension than informational texts. Similarly, in the studies by Graesser and Ottai 
(1996) and Haberlandt and Graesser (1985), they estimated that narrative texts are read and understood 
approximately twice as quickly and can be remembered twice more than informational texts. Similarly, 
the results of this study, also, showed that the reading ease of the discussions with analysts of companies 
in either of the industry groups are twice as much as those of their CEO letters to shareholders. While 
the CEO letters of companies in the low discretion industry had a mean reading ease score of 30.92, 
their discussions with analysts had a mean reading score of 58.54. Again, while the CEO letters of 
companies in the high discretion industry had a mean reading ease score of 27.44, their discussions with 
analysts had a mean reading score of 58.12.  
In addition, prior studies show that a potential multidimensional perspective for analysing text was to 
scale texts in accordance to text dimensions (Biber, 1991; Louwerse et al., 2004). McNamara et al. (2014) 
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posit that text can be evaluated to the degree to which it is informational versus narrative, print versus 
oral, decontextualised form- versus interactive with- a stakeholder community, formal versus informal, 
among others (p. 14). In view of this, McNamara et al. (2014) suggest that informational, print, 
decontextualised, and formal texts are more difficult to read and understand than narrative, oral, 
contextualised, and informal texts. Accordingly, the results of this study, as discussed above, suggests 
that the informational, print, and decontextualised nature of annual reports make it more difficult to read 
and understand in comparison to discussions with analysts which are in the form of narratives, discussed 
orally and with greater emphasis on context, and in more informal settings. Accordingly, this study posits 
that CEO letters to shareholders have a greater potential to be targeted for rhetorical manipulation than 
they would do in their discussions with analysts. This study suggests two reasons: First, it is less likely 
for CEOs to rhetorically manipulate expert analysts on matters they have the professional expertise to 
read and comprehend than they would do to shareholders drawn from all walks of life, without possessing 
bespoke knowledge and expertise of the industry they invest in. Second, discussions with analysts have 
the potential to be more revealing of the financial position of a company due to the possibility of obtaining 
clarifications in a ‘question and answer’ format.  
Returning back to prior studies, Huff (1990) reviews the strengths and potential weaknesses associated 
with mapping the attention patterns in communications. The main criticisms focus not so much on the 
appropriateness of the method adopted, but rather on the reliability, validity, and completeness of the 
data analysed in building those attention patterns. It follows that different genres of text are targeted to 
specific audiences, and for specific purposes (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 519). Following the 
criticisms of certain textual data by Huff (1990), Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) note some additional 
criticisms of the reliability of CEO letters to shareholders for the purpose of analysing for their language 
features. First, they note that neither the editorial reviewers of CEO letters to shareholders, nor their 
author’s intent are known. Second, it remains unclear whether CEO letters to shareholders are written by 
the CEOs themselves or by public relations specialists communicating for the CEO. Similarly, Bowman 
(1984) emphasised that there is the need to evaluate the validity of annual reports because top 
management “spend considerable time outlining the content of the report, sketching out much of it, and 
proofreading and changing most of it to their taste” (p. 63). Third, Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) 
question whether CEO letters to shareholders reflect the true cognition of CEOs. 
In order to provide anecdotal evidence on the true authors of CEO letters to shareholders, Abrahamson 
and Hambrick (1997) cited evidence from a statement made in the Wall Street Journal that:  
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“The shareholders’ letter bears only one or two signatures, but it is generally a committee project. 
Public relations staffers or consultants, who often write the first draft, are aware that the copy has 
to be reviewed by the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer, the board of directors and 
the legal department” (Wall Street Journal 1982, cited in Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997, p. 519). 
Accordingly, this anecdotal evidence suggests that CEO letters to shareholders get well-edited until they 
become acceptable to the top management of a company, hence, reflecting some form of contributions 
and consensus among various members of a company’s top management team (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997). It follows from a study by Fiol (1995) which reinforces that while non-evaluative 
statements such as discussions with analysts and other internal documents belonging to companies may 
tend to reflect the true state of managerial cognitions, evaluative statements such as CEO letters to 
shareholders may be more likely to convey impression management (Abrahamson & Park, 1994). Hence, 
Fiol (1995) recommended the analysis of non-evaluative statements in order to obtain complementary 
understanding of managers’ cognitions, a result which may not be fully obtained by solely focusing on 
already-edited and contamination-prone CEO letters to shareholders. In view of these criticisms and 
recommendations, this study posits that the exposure of CEO letters to various contributors and, most 
importantly, the possibility of being edited and managed by public relations specialists have the potential 
to reduce the readability and robustness of their content for impression management purposes. On the 
other hand, since discussions with analysts are more spontaneous with the possibility of obtaining, in a 
dialogue setting, answers to arguably unanticipated questions, it suggests that they are less likely to be 
difficult to read in comparison to CEO letters to shareholders predominantly written as a monologue.  
Turning to the fifth Master Variable OPTIMISM, although the language measure of OPTIMISM was higher 
in the financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry, however, no significant 
difference was observed between the two industry groups. This result is similar to those reported in Patelli 
and Pedrini (2015) for which they conclude by emphasising the position of Feldman et al. (2010) that a 
proper evaluation of the language of OPTIMISM would entail analysing for the element of Tone in 
corporate narratives. They posit that this would require considering the importance of adopting a more 
comprehensive approach for measuring the rhetorical features of financial communications with the view 
of detecting the aspects of Tone significantly associated with financial reporting practices. Therefore, the 
next line of discussion focuses on the results obtained from analysing the Tone element of the financial 
communications of the companies in the two industry groups.   
The results for the measurement of the level of Tone in financial communications of companies in the 
high discretion industry is significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry. Specifically, it 
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showed that the level of Tone in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry is 
significantly higher (p = 0.008, d = 0.34, zL = 1.07, zH = 1.26) than for those in the low discretion industry. 
Similarly, the level of Tone in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is 
significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 0.72, zL = 0.68, zH = 1.03) than for those in the low discretion industry. 
In the context of favourable financial performance periods, the results further revealed that the level of 
Tone in the analysts’ discussions of companies in high discretion industry is significantly higher (p = 
0.000, d = 0.56, zLg = 0.76, zHg = 1.02) than for those in the low discretion industry. On the other hand, 
in the context of unfavourable financial performance periods, the results, again, revealed that the level of 
Tone in the annual reports (p = 0.041, d = 1.08, zLb = 0.97, zHb = 1.50) and analysts’ discussions (p = 
0.000, d = 1.42, zLb = 0.52, zHb = 1.21) are significantly higher for companies in the high discretion 
industry than for those in the low discretion industry. Taken as whole, the results showed that at all levels 
of analysis, the level of Tone in the financial communications of companies in a high discretion industry 
is significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry.  
Notably, at all levels, the z-scores for the level of Tone in the financial communications of companies in 
the high discretion industry are all above one standard deviation above the normal range, while those of 
the companies in the low discretion industry were within the normal range. This study posits the high level 
of discretion available to companies in a high discretion industry has the potential to increase the amount 
of Tone afforded to top management of those companies in their financial communications. On the other 
hand, it posits that the constrained level of discretion available to companies in a low discretion industry 
has the potential to limit the amount of Tone afforded to top management of those companies in their 
financial communications. Furthermore, the results revealed that the level of Tone in the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the low discretion industry is significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 0.45, zLg = 
0.76, zLb = 0.52) during periods of favourable financial performance results than during periods of 
unfavourable financial performance results. Overall, the results suggest that the CEOs of companies in 
the high discretion industry have the potential to build the element of ‘Tone’ in their financial 
communications with both shareholders and analysts more than the CEOs of companies in the low 
discretion industry. 
Prior study by Henry (2008) introduced a novel approach for measuring the level of tone in financial 
communications, with respect to the proportion of positive and negative words contained in a text. In her 
study, it was emphasised that as the proportion of positive words exceed negative words, the level of 
Tone contained in a text increases as well. Similarly, Amernic et al. (2010) measured the level of Tone in 
CEO letters to shareholders, Kahveci (2016) assessed Tone as a strategic performance management 
tool, Nelson et al. (2014) assessed Tone as a measure of corporate persona and optimistic language in 
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annual reports, while Goel (2014) adopted Tone as a proxy for examining fraudulent financial reporting. 
In the same vein, Patelli and Pedrini (2015) found significant correlation between the level of Tone in 
financial communications and financial reporting aggressiveness. It follows from the findings of 
Hooghiemstra (2000), who found that the use of optimistic tone is associated with impression 
management strategy, especially when a company experiences periods of financial difficulty. Similarly, 
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) emphasise that the management of impression in corporate financial 
communications is achieved through an optimistic tone that ignores failures and emphasises success. 
Accordingly, this study posits that there is more scope for aggressive financial reporting in the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry, 
owing to the wider perspective of Tone available to the companies in the high discretion industry. In the 
same vein, with a potentially high level of CERTAINTY demonstrated by CEOs in a high discretion 
industry towards the delivery of predicted high financial performance results, there is the likelihood for 
CEOs to aggressively use more positive words that would underlie their ability to and insistence on 
delivering market expectations, while conservatively using negative words that would otherwise 
undermine their competence in delivering those performance results. Furthermore, the results are in the 
direction of prediction to show that companies in a high discretion industry have the potential to use a 
higher level of Tone in their annual reports and analysts’ discussions (p = 0.201, d = 0.64, zHg = 1.25, 
zHb = 1.50; p = 0.121, d = 0.46, zHg = 1.02, zHb = 1.21, respectively) during unfavourable periods than 
they would do in periods of favourable financial performance results. On the other hand, for companies 
in the low discretion industry, this study posits that there is the potential for their CEOs to communicate 
using less aggressive, or rather conservative language, due to the already known lower growth prospects 
for companies in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the CEOs of 
companies in the low discretion industry to either conservatively use positive words or use more negative 
words to emphasise their performance results in their financial communications. This is evident in the 
lower level of Tone in the financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry during 
unfavourable financial performance periods (p = 0.000, d = 0.45, zLg = 0.76, zLb = 0.52) than when they 
had favourable financial performance results.  
In summary, the results of this study showed that the financial communications of companies can better 
be evaluated and understood in the context of the institutional environment to which each belongs and in 
the economic contexts they are faced with. As aforementioned, although organisations are expected to 
differ in many ways, this study emphasises the view of organisational theorists that the main way in which 
their differences can be evaluated should be in the context to which they relate. Rather than comparing 
the financial communications of companies in a generic way, the results of this study suggest that there 
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is the potential for like-for-like comparisons to be revealing of some underlying factors or situations. These 
factors are, but not limited to, the level of discretion available in an institutional environment and prevailing 
economic circumstances, that may influence organisational outcomes, which subsequently, will inform 
the choice of words used in financial communications and enable a deeper contextual analysis of 
language by auditors or regulatory authorities. While the results of this study show linguistic differentiation 
between the financial communications of companies in the two industry groups, however, it does not 
mean that companies in a low discretion industry are less likely to engage in deception. Nonetheless, the 
results suggest that investigation of language in corporate cases needs to be much more contextually 
nuanced, in assessing the potential incidence of earnings management or financial statement fraud.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION CHAPTER 
From the preceding chapter, the results presented show that, taken as a whole, the language features in 
the financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry can be effectively differentiated 
from those in the low discretion industry. Furthermore, the results show that those financial 
communications can be evaluated for differential features during favourable and unfavourable financial 
performance periods. Accordingly, this chapter presents the contributions of this study towards advancing 
the research on differentiating language features in financial communications. It begins with a discussion 
of the implications of the findings for theory, practice, and regulation. As with any research, the approach 
adopted in this study has some limitations. The discussion of these limitations forms the basis for offering 
some recommendations that could provide directions for future research. 
6.1 Contribution to Knowledge and Implications of Findings on Theory, Practice and Regulation 
This study discussed the psycholinguistic features of financial communications in the context of the 
institutional environment that shape the actions of corporate organisations. This was conducted by 
adopting insights from organisational theorists on the need to understand the behaviour of organisations 
in the context of the institutions that regulate such behaviours. Specifically, the behaviours of 
organisations evaluated in this study are those related to their financial communications. To create a form 
of classification of organisations into different institutional groups, this study adopted the theory on 
managerial discretion for differentiating between companies as either belonging to the high discretion 
industry or the low discretion industry, using four objective industry characteristics for measuring overall 
Industry Discretion.  
Accordingly, this study empirically tested the industry characteristics established in prior studies 
(Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClleland et al., 2010) for differentiating between high and low 
discretion industries. Specifically, this study conducted a comparative analysis on the measurement of 
industry discretion in the UK context, with the view of obtaining the predictive validity of the underlying 
model originally tested in the USA (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Taken as a whole, this study found 
evidence that the objective industry characteristics of Research and Development (R&D) Intensity, Sales 
or Market Growth, and Capital Intensity are reliable and valid in differentiating between industries in the 
UK as either belonging to the high discretion industry or low discretion industry.  In the development of 
the hypotheses for this study, it argues that these objective industry characteristics for measuring industry 
discretion provide the basis for evaluating the financial communications of companies in either industry 
groups, with respect to the amount of discretion available to them.  
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In particular, the financial communications of companies in the two industry groups were evaluated for 
their language of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, REALISM, and OPTIMISM. Specifically, the 
language of COMMONALITY provides the basis for evaluating the level of agreement between 
companies in each industry groups and the norms in their respective institutional environments. 
Furthermore, this study assessed the readability of the financial communications (CEO letters to 
shareholders in annual reports and their discussions with analysts) of the companies in the two industry 
groups using standardised Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades. In addition, 
these computational measures were applied in evaluating the financial communications of companies in 
the two industry groups during favourable and unfavourable financial performance periods. The empirical 
findings of this study suggest that these thematic indicators have the potential for differentiating between 
the financial communications of companies in high and low discretion industry groups. More importantly, 
the findings suggest that the psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of companies in 
either of the industry groups are different during favourable and unfavourable financial performance 
periods. Lastly, the findings suggest the form of financial communications that is more susceptible to 
rhetorical manipulations by CEOs. Consequently, the empirical findings of this study have some 
implications for theory, practice, and the regulatory authorities.  
The conclusions of this study contribute to the need to engage in interdisciplinary research by adopting 
theoretical constructs in the fields of Sociology, Psychology, Linguistics, Accounting and Auditing. The 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks of this study stem from the theory on Institutions which is from the 
field of Sociology, theory on Deception as empirically established in Psychology, Linguistics from 
Language Studies, Earnings Manipulation and Financial Statement Fraud which are contemporary areas 
in the Accounting and Auditing research. Accordingly, this study advances the advocacy of engaging in 
research that combines research efforts from different interdisciplinary fields of study (Amarante, 2016). 
Similarly, the conclusions of this study contribute to the need to give more attention to comparative study 
of organisations, with the view of evaluating their behaviours and how they differ from one sector to 
another (Whetten, 2009). In addition, the findings of this study emphasise the submissions of Professor 
Richard Scott (cited in Amarante, 2016, p. 3) on the need to understand how ideas and institutional actors 
behave in different countries and what makes them distinctive. This study contributes to this line of 
thought by adopting, replicating, and validating a predictive model originally developed for measuring 
Industry Discretion in the USA, with the view of assessing the amount of discretion afforded to industries 
in the UK. 
Taken as a whole, this study contributes to the literature regarding institutions and organisations (e.g. 
Amarante, 2016; Boxembaum & Jonsson, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2013; Thronton & Ocasio, 2013; 
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Wooten & Hoffman, 2013) and the influence of discretion on organisational outcomes (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland et al., 2010; Wangrow et al., 2015). The 
empirical findings of this study complement the study by Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) by validating 
the predictive model for measuring Industry Discretion in the UK context, for which no known or published 
research had been conducted for industries in the UK. Furthermore, it complements the study by Patelli 
and Pedrini (2015) who measured the relationship between financial reporting aggressiveness and tone 
at the top using the five Master Variables of DICTION. In the context of this study, the same Master 
Variables were evaluated in view of differentiating between the financial communications of top 
management of industries in high and low industry groups. The findings of this study contribute an 
additional layer of assessing the financial communications of top management as represented by the 
CEO for potential rhetorical manipulations in the context of institutions. This further offers a contribution 
to theory in not limiting the evaluation of financial communications to CEO letters to shareholders, but 
also validates the need to compare the thematic indicators of these letters with the discussions held with 
analysts. This approach contributes to the literature on evaluating different genres of text and scaling 
them in accordance to their readability (e.g. Biber, 1991; Louwerse et al., 2004)   
As shown in prior studies (e.g. Brown & Treviño, 2006; Marsh, 2013; Spears, 1995), the deviation from 
common views and norms within an institution have the potential for financial statement fraud. Hence the 
findings of this study contribute to the research on the detection of potential deception in financial 
communications by revealing predictors of deviation from agreed-upon values by any company within a 
designated institutional environment. Furthermore, the findings of this study extend the prior research on 
the principle of legitimacy of discourse ethics in financial communications (e.g. Amernic et al., 2010; 
Patelli & Pedrini, 2013; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015; Yuthas et al., 2002) by showing that psycholinguistic 
analysis of corporate financial communications can reveal the economic contexts influencing 
organisational outcomes. The findings contribute to the research on how corporate narratives can help 
differentiate the financial communications of companies between periods of favourable and unfavourable 
financial performance results. In the same vein, this study contributes to the research on the need to 
differentiate between evaluative and non-evaluative statements of companies (e.g. Fiol, 1995) by 
showing that the CEO letters to shareholders are more susceptible to rhetorical manipulations than the 
discussions of CEOs with industry analysts. In sum, the findings have implications for both practice and 
regulation. 
Accordingly, the findings and conclusions of this study have relevant practical implications for both 
investors and assurance providers – particularly auditors. Similar to the findings of prior studies (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015), the findings of this study show that thematic indicators 
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based on corporate financial communications provide differential information regarding accounting 
outcomes that can enhance the strategies of investors. Specifically, it provides investors with the 
knowledge of how top management communicates during favourable financial performance periods in 
comparison to periods of unfavourable financial performance results. This provides the potential for 
investors to develop the awareness of the use of language in communicating the economic realities of 
companies, which can aid the economic decisions of investors. Furthermore, it provides the awareness 
for investors on the need to obtain non-evaluative statements other than CEO letters in annual reports 
for comparing what CEOs write as letters to shareholders and the information they disclose to analysts. 
As the findings of this study suggest that there is a higher likelihood for information in CEO letters to 
shareholders to be manipulated in comparison to discussions with analysts, a vigilant investment 
community may have the need to step beyond relying on the content of those letters by obtaining, 
arguably, the more readable, comprehensive, and comprehensible discussions held with analysts.  
With respect to assurance providers, the findings of this study also provide strong empirical evidence in 
line with recommendations by Amernic et al. (2010), Nicolaides, Trafford and Craig (2018) and Patelli 
and Pedrini (2015) for financial auditing. This study reinforces the recommendations from these prior 
studies advocating the incorporation of DICTION and other computational text-analysis approaches to 
enhance the auditing process and sophisticate the evaluation or investigation of the qualitative aspects 
of corporate financial communications. Accordingly, the availability of cost-effective computer-aided text 
analysis tools facilitates a rigorous analysis of the financial communications of companies to be applied 
on an ongoing longitudinal basis, in different institutional and economic contexts with promising 
consequences for the early detection of unethical accounting practices. Although the findings of this study 
do not connote that companies in a low discretion industry are less likely to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting, notwithstanding, the results provide indication to assurance providers on the importance of 
conducting investigation of language in corporate cases in the context of their institutional environment, 
for the purpose of assessing the potential incidence of earnings management or financial statement fraud. 
In addition, the findings of this study is useful for auditors in considering the evaluation of corporate 
communications beyond managed and edited management representations to the evaluation of 
spontaneous disclosures such as discussions with analysts, interviews, among others.  
With respect to the regulatory environment, the findings of this study reinforce the need for policy makers 
to advance policy guidelines on corporate narratives, especially on the need to make information 
available to the stakeholder community in the most transparent and comprehensive way. It is noteworthy 
that the findings of this study show that one of the companies with “very easy to understand” financial 
communications is BP Plc. Interestingly, this same company has all the discussions with its analysts 
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published on its official website under the section designated for investor relations. This suggests a 
culture of transparency in making as much information as possible available to investors to enhance 
sound economic decisions. Regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK can institute 
regulation on this matter by ensuring that companies with analyst coverage should make the original 
transcripts of their discussions with analysts available for access by the stakeholder community. They 
can legislate for the discussions with analysts to be as available as CEO letters to shareholders contained 
in annual reports. Lastly, the findings of this study also support the recent move by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the USA toward the employment of computer-aided text analysis programmes 
to enhance its enforcement activity (Eaglesham, 2013), for which their counterparts in the UK can take 
initiative from this approach.   
6.2 Limitations of Study and Recommendations 
Although this study produced some significant and potentially important findings, there were limitations. 
First, the findings of this study may be limited to publicly traded companies based in the United Kingdom. 
Although similar findings were reported for measuring industry discretion in the USA, nonetheless, the 
results may neither be generalisable for firms beyond these two jurisdictions. Furthermore, it may be 
more difficult to generalise and extend the methodology of this study to companies operating in multiple 
exchanges across different countries, owing to differences in financial reporting requirements. However, 
the global presence of both the USA and UK in different economies of the world could influence their 
industry characteristics and financial reporting requirements, which may enable the generalisability of the 
results of this study to the extent to which they have similar industry characteristics and financial reporting 
structures. Furthermore, the sample industries used in this study included no moderate-discretion 
industry as conducted in McClelland et al. (2010), which may further limit the generalisability of the 
findings of this study. Future research will look into the aspects of companies in the moderate-discretion 
industry sector.  
Second, as with the limitations acknowledged in prior studies, the measurement of discretion as it affects 
managers is not limited to industry factors alone (e.g. Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987). Specifically, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argued that other influences such as 
organisational- and individual-level factors affect managerial discretion. Although industry-level factors 
influence the overall amount of discretion afforded to managers within an industry, nonetheless, the 
degree to which the discretion of a single manager deviates from the industry tendency is a function of 
individual factors such as a manager’s cognitive complexity or political shrewdness (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997, p. 515). In addition, various organisational determinants such as age, size, or availability 
of resources may affect the level of discretion available to managers (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
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Thus, as Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) contended, discretion is not absolute, owing to the position 
that although industry and organisational factors may greatly shape a manager’s discretion, however, 
discretion also functions in part within a manager (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). In similar vein, the 
results of this study are limited to the industry factors that determine discretion without considering the 
effect of individual cognitive characteristics of the CEOs. Future research could look into these two 
aspects of organisational- and individual-level factors in determining the level of discretion available to 
managers. 
Third, the main computational text analysis tool adopted in this study, DICTION, is limited to a set of 
predefined set of thematic indicators. Although validity was obtained for its use in this study by comparing 
it with another text-analysis tool, LIWC, nevertheless, the use of other text analyses tools could provide 
potential for discovering more indicators associated with financial communications.  
Fourth, as emphasised by Fiol (1995) that non-evaluative statements of managers such as discussions 
with analysts may tend to reflect managerial cognitions more than evaluative statements such as CEO 
letters to shareholders, yet, the non-evaluative statements analysed in this study are limited to those 
authored by the CEOs. In this study, no analyses were conducted for the statements authored by other 
board members such as the Chief Financial Officer, the Chairman, among others. Although this study 
limited the analysis of financial communications to those authored by the CEO, nonetheless, it controlled 
for the possibility of multiple-authorship of CEO letters by obtaining the actual contributions of CEOs in 
discussions with analysts. Future research can look into evaluating the contributions of other board 
members in annual reports and discussions with analysts, to aid the robust understanding of corporate 
communications.  
6.3 Other Recommendations and Directions for Future Research  
Future research will focus on developing the industry classifications into high-, medium-, and low-
discretion industries. In view of this, it will seek to incorporate other factors that may affect industry 
discretion such as empirical measures for how regulation, organisational and individual cognitive factors 
may affect the level of discretion available to top management. In addition, the findings of this study 
provide the potential for incorporating the aspects of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning towards 
developing algorithms for the tasks of psycholinguistic analysis of the financial communications of 
companies in different economic, industry, and geographical contexts. In similar vein, the algorithms can 
help with the task of automatically updating the dictionaries to meet contemporary use of words and help 
analyse the financial communications of companies for specific language features.  
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Furthermore, since there are other authors and contributors to narratives in annual reports and 
discussions with analysts, future research will seek to evaluate their contributions for comprehensive 
understanding of the corporate culture of companies with respect to financial communications. In addition, 
future research will focus on evaluating the “Question and Answer” sections of discussions with analysts 
as separate from the managed informational elements which are prepared in advance of those 
discussions with analysts. This could help in obtaining evidence on the differences in the psycholinguistic 
features of managed and spontaneous financial communications.  
In conclusion, while further research is needed, this study demonstrates that the evaluation of the 
psycholinguistic features of the financial communications of companies with respect to industry and 
economic contexts is possible. Such possibility can provide the means for assessing the financial 
communications of individual organisations in comparison to sector competitors, for the purpose of 
analysing any irregular behaviour which may indicate potential deception in financial communications. 
The major results of this study certainly provide sufficient evidence that this institutional approach for 
evaluating financial communications is viable and that this paradigm can be further explored as an 
assessment of corporate narratives in the context of the discretion afforded to them, and in light of the 
industry they belong to. Furthermore, there have been no previous investigations of how text genres 
affect the readability of financial communications. Therefore, this study provides the potential for scaling 
financial communications according to their respective text genres, and for evaluating the readability of 
corporate communications in light of those that have greater potential for rhetorical manipulations, 
especially during periods of unfavourable financial performance results.  
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3. Details on LIWC and DICTION 
3a. LIWC 
As with other textual analysis tools, there is both internal and external validity for the use of LIWC2015. 
With respect to internal validity, Pennebaker and Francis (1996) conducted one of the first tests to validate 
this tool and its measurement scales. An extensive writing test was conducted on college students to 
assess emotional content and included a control sample using unemotional language. After completing 
the writing phase of the experiment, the essays of the participants were rated by four judges on various 
emotional, cognitive, content, and composition dimensions structured to align to the selected scales of 
LIWC Dictionary (Pennebaker et al. 2015, p. 8).  
By comparing the ratings of the judges and LIWC output, Pearson correlational analyses were computed 
to ascertain the validity of LIWC. The results suggested that LIWC successfully measures positive and 
negative affective processes, a number of cognitive processes, different types of thematic content, and 
several language composition elements (Pennebaker et al. 2015). As such, the level of agreement 
between the ratings of judges and LIWC’s objective word count strategy provides sufficient evidence for 
the internal validity of LIWC. More importantly, the variables of another textual analysis known as Coh-
Metrix has been proved to share some overlap with LIWC variables (McNamara et al. 2014). In a previous 
research, Duran, Hall, McCarthy, & McNamara (2010) successfully replicated a deception study that was 
originally conducted by the LIWC team. While both LIWC and Coh-Metrix share comparable descriptive 
variables, however, they slightly vary in their respective goals. Specifically, while LIWC establishes the 
extent to which a given language construct is present in a given text, Coh-Metrix assesses a text for 
indices on readability and comprehension (McNamara et al. 2014, p. 171). 
With respect to the external validity, LIWC is widely accepted in the discourse community. With the 
presence of many alternative textual analysis tool, LIWC arguably has the most comparable history, 
availability, and breadth of interest to the discourse community. Accordingly, LIWC is considered to be 
the most suitable representative of alternative textual analysis tools (McNamara et al. 2014). The 
contribution of LIWC to both the discourse community and Automated Natural Language Processing 
(ANLP) studies cannot be overemphasised. While it may be considered to lack the sophisticated 
computations of more contemporary measures, its findings offer a formidable list of achievements 
(McNamara et al. 2014, p.171). Since the introduction of the first version of LIWC, several hundreds of 
studies have found the LIWC language categories to be valid, across many psychological domains 
(Pennebaker et al. 2015). Some of them are studies on First Person Singular Pronouns (Alexander-
Emery, Cohen, & Prensky, 2005; Arguello, Butler, Joyce, Kraut, Ling, Rosé et al., 2006; Baddeley & 
Singer, 2008; Baikie, Wilhelm, Johnson, Boskovic, Wedgwood, Finch et al., 2006; Guastella & Dadds, 
2006). Studies on First-Person Plural Pronouns (Alexander-Emery et al., 2005; Baddeley & Singer, 2008; 
Boals & Klein, 2005; Burke & Dollinger, 2005; Groom & Pennebaker, 2003). Studies on Cognitive 
Complexity (Arguello, Butler, Joyce, Kraut, Ling, Rosé et al., 2006; Barnes, Lawal-Solarin, & Lester, 2007; 
Hancock, Landrigan, & Silver, 2007; Heberlein, Adolphs, Pennebaker, & Tranel, 2003). Studies on 
Positive Emotion (Alvarez-Conrad, Zoellner, & Foa, 2001; Arguello, et al., 2006; Baddeley & Singer, 2008; 
Baikie, et al., 2006; Bantum & Owen, 2009; Batten, Follette, Hall, & Palm, 2002). Studies on Negative 
Emotion (Alvarez-Conrad, Zoellner, & Foa, 2001; Arguello, et al., 2006; Baddeley & Singer, 2008; Bantum 
& Owen, 2009; Beevers & Scott, 2001). Study on Certainty (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 
2007). Studies on Past Focus and Present Focus (Alexander-Emery, et al., 2005; Boals & Klein, 2005; 
Guastella & Dadds, 2006; Hamilton-West & Quine, 2007). Studies on Motion (Bond & Lee, 2005; 
Hamilton-West & Quine, 2007; Oliver, Markland, Hardy, & Petherick, 2008), and Achievement (Guastella 
& Dadds, 2006; Lieberman, 2008; Sharp & Hargrove, 2004). 
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3b. DICTION 
Furthermore, DICTION is capable of reading documents in different text formats, long documents and 
documents that contain a combination of both text and graphics, such as pdf-formatted company annual 
reports (Hart & Carroll, 2015). It uses a built-in database consisting of 50,000 previously analysed texts. 
In addition, text data can be processed using general norms or specified by the user, which can be 
selected from among thirty-six sub-categories, including newspaper editorials, poetry, business reports, 
speeches, among others, to get a comparative view of the results. The overall norms are classified into 
six groups – Business, Daily Life, Entertainment, Journalism, Literature, Politics, and Scholarship, which 
are then sub-divided into thirty-six distinct categories (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 47). The results produced 
can be compared against the total normative database of the forty scores, built on a 50,000-item sample 
of discourse, or any of the thirty-six sub-categories aforementioned. This is to ensure a more fine-grained 
comprehension of a given text or group of texts (Hart & Carroll, 2015). For the purpose of this study, the 
class ‘Business’ was selected as the norm, while ‘Corporate Financial Reports’ was selected as the sub-
category. All the texts used in the creation of the DICTION software were produced in the United States 
between 1950 and 2000. Nonetheless, this software has been used in UK studies extensively and does 
not create any disparity in analysis between the differing American and UK spellings, which is allowed for 
within the software. 
Subsequently, the results from DICTION are written to numeric files for onward statistical analysis. The 
output results are provided in a variety of options including raw totals, standardised scores, character and 
word counts, and percentages, thereby providing alternative ways of comprehending the text being 
processed. In addition to the sophisticated indices provided by DICTION, it also provides researchers 
with a range of conventional textual measures such as total words analysed, total characters analysed, 
average word size, and unique words. 
Several studies have validated the use of DICTION indices most notably the reliability and validity in 
automated content analysis (Soroka, 2014). DICTION has also been used to assist in establishing a 
wealth of evidence on a variety of text analysis studies. These studies range from books and monographs 
on topic such as measuring and assessing tone at the top using CEO letters in annual reports (Amernic 
& Tourish, 2010). In some book chapters, DICTION was used in measuring the tone of annual reports as 
a strategic performance management tool (Kahveci, 2016), exploring signs of hubris in CEO language 
(Craig & Amernic, 2014), linguistic certainty in managerial announcements (Demers & Yu, 2014), fraud 
detection and corporate filings (Goel, 2014), executives’ use of emotional language and investor reactions 
(Guo, 2014), measuring the tone of accounting and financial narrative (Henry & Leone, 2014). Others 
include corporate persona and optimistic language in annual reports (Nelson, Wang, Smith, & Blackford, 
2014).  
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) demonstrated that DICTION was an effective tool in detecting the association 
between tone at the top and financial reporting aggressiveness. Bozzolan, Cho, and Michelon (2015) 
used DICTION to measure impression management in the context of organisational audiences. Craig et 
al. (2013) used DICTION to explore top management language for signals of possible deception. Craig 
and Brennan (2012) used DICTION to explore the relationship between language choice in CEO letters 
to shareholders and corporate reputation. In addition, Cecchini et al. (2010) used DICTION to assess the 
predictability of financial events through the contents of financial text. Other DICTION studies include 
protecting value during post-earnings announcement conference calls (Jancenelle, Storrud-Barnes, 
Iaquinto, & Buccieri, 2016), natural language processing in accounting, auditing and finance (Fisher, 
Garnsey, & Hughes, 2016), disclosure outlets and corporate financial communication (Mayew, 2012), 
mining the annual reports for hidden cues indicative of financial statement fraud (Goel & Gangolly, 2012), 
management’s tone change, post-earnings announcement drift and accruals (Feldman et al., 2010), 
predicting firm reputation through content analysis of shareholders’ letters (Geppert & Lawrence, 2008), 
market reaction to verbal components of earnings press releases (Henry, 2006).  
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4. DICTION discussion on the key variables 
From the macro-level of analysis, it is expected that the linguistic cues across the five DICTION master 
variables will be significantly different between high level-discretion industries and low-level discretion 
industries. As such, the research questions are stated thus per master variable. 
(a) COMMONALITY  
Definition: COMMONALITY is language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and rejecting 
idiosyncratic modes of engagement.  
Formula: [Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport] – [Diversity + Exclusion + Liberation] 
Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the COMMONALITY scores for the two industry 
classifications, the sub-features of COMMONALITY will be analysed using the equation from DICTION 
7.0: 
Formula: [Centrality + Cooperation + Rapport] – [Diversity + Exclusion + Liberation]. 
Features that increase COMMONALITY score 
Centrality: This research will compute scores for terms denoting institutional regularities and/or 
substantive agreement on core values. Included are indigenous terms (native, basic, innate) and 
designations of legitimacy (orthodox, decorum, constitutional, ratified), systematicity (paradigm, 
bureaucratic, ritualistic), and typicality (standardised, matter-of-fact, regularity). Also included are terms 
of congruence (conformity, mandate, unanimous), predictability (expected, continuity, reliable), and 
universality (womankind, perennial, landmarks). 
Cooperation: Also, computation will be conducted for terms designating behavioural interactions among 
people that often result in a group product. Included are designations of formal work relations (unions, 
schoolmates, caucus), and informal associations (chum, partner, cronies), to more intimate interactions 
(sisterhood, friendship, comrade). Also included are neutral interactions (consolidate, mediate, 
alignment), job-related tasks (network, détente, exchange), personal involvement (teamwork, sharing, 
contribute), and self-denial (public-spirited, care-taking, self-sacrifice).  
Rapport: Also to be computed are scores for terms that describe attitudinal similarities among groups of 
people. Included are terms of affinity (congenial, camaraderie, companion), assent (approve, vouched, 
warrants), deference (tolerant, willing, permission), and id identity (equivalent, resemble, consensus).  
The features highlighted above increase the score for the Master Variable COMMONALITY. By drawing 
from the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
COMMONALITY will be more manifest in companies in low discretion industry category than in 
companies in high discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Centrality, Cooperation, and Rapport will be significantly higher for 
companies in the low discretion industry than in the high discretion industry.  
Features that decrease COMMONALITY score 
Diversity: This research will compute scores for words describing individuals or groups of individuals 
differing from the norm. Such distinctiveness may be comparatively neutral (inconsistent, contrasting, 
non-conformist) but it can also be positive (exceptional, unique, individualistic) and negative (illegitimate, 
rabble-rouser, extremist). Functionally, heterogeneity can be an asset (far-flung, dispersed, diffuse) or a 
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liability (factionalism, deviancy, quirky) as can its characterisations: rare vs. queer, variety vs. jumble, 
distinctive vs. disobedient.  
Exclusion: Also, computation will be conducted for terms describing the sources and effects of social 
isolation. Such seclusion can be phrased passively (displaced, sequestered) as well as positively (self-
contained, self-sufficient) and negatively (outlaws, repudiated). Moreover, it can result from voluntary 
forces (secede, privacy) and involuntary forces (ostracise, forsake, discriminate) and from both 
personality factors (smallmindedness, loneliness) and political factors (right-wingers, nihilism). Exclusion 
is often a dialectical concept: hermit vs. derelict, refugee vs. pariah, discard vs. spurn 
Liberation: Also to be computed are scores for terms describing the maximising of individual choice 
(autonomous, open-minded, options) and rejection of social conventions (unencumbered, radical, 
released). Liberation is motivated by both personality factors (eccentric, impetuous, flighty) and political 
forces (suffrage, liberty, freedom, emancipation) and may produce dramatic outcomes (exodus, riotous, 
deliverance) or subdued effects (loosen, disentangle, outpouring). Liberatory terms also admit to rival 
characterisations: exemption vs. loophole, elope vs. abscond, uninhibited vs. outlandish.  
The features highlighted above decrease the score for the Master Variable COMMONALITY. By drawing 
from the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
COMMONALITY will be more manifest in companies in high discretion industry category than in 
companies in low discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Diversity, Exclusion, and Liberation will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion industry.  
(b) CERTAINTY 
Definition: Certainty is language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness and a tendency 
to speak ex cathedra.  
Formula: [Tenacity + Levelling Terms + Collectives + Insistence] – [Numerical Terms + Ambivalence + 
Self Reference + Variety] 
Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the CERTAINTY scores for the two industry classifications, 
the sub-features of CERTAINTY will be analysed using the equation from DICTION 7.0: 
Formula: [Tenacity + Levelling Terms + Collectives + Insistence] – [Numerical Terms + Ambivalence + 
Self Reference + Variety] 
Features that increase CERTAINTY score 
Tenacity:  This research will compute scores for all uses of verb to be (is, am, will, shall), three definitive 
verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated contraction’s (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t). 
These verbs connote confidence and totality.  
Leveling Terms: Also to be computed are words used to ignore individual differences and to build a 
sense of completeness and assurance. Included are totalising items (everybody, anyone, each, fully), 
adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), and resolute objectives 
(unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut).  
Collectives: Also to be computed are scores for singular nouns connoting plurality that function to 
decrease specificity. These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of thought. Included are 
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social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task groups (army, congress, legislature, staff) and 
geographical entities (county, world, kingdom, republic). 
Insistence: Further, scores will be computed for words used for code-restriction and semantic 
contentedness. The assumption is that repetition of key terms indicates a preference for a limited, ordered 
world. 
The features highlighted above increase the score for the Master Variable CERTAINTY. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
CERTAINTY will be more manifest in companies in high discretion industry category than in companies 
in low discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Tenacity, Leveling Terms, Collectives, and Insistence will be 
significantly higher for companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion 
industry.  
Features that decrease CERTAINTY score 
Numerical Terms: Computation will be made for any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a given 
case. Diction dictionary treats each isolated integer as a single word and each separate group of integers 
as a single word. In addition, the dictionary contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, 
hundred, zero) as well as terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, multiply, percentage) 
and quantitative topics (digitise, tally, mathematics). The presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper-
specify a claim, thus detracting from its universality.  
Ambivalence: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a speaker’s inability or unwillingness 
to commit to the verbalisation being made. Included are hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements 
of inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and confusion (baffled, puzzling, hesitate). 
Also included are words of restrained possibility (could, would, he’d) and mystery (dilemma, guess, 
suppose, seems).  
Self-reference: Computations will be made for all first-person references, including I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, I’ve, 
me, mine, my, myself. Self-references are treated as acts of indexing whereby the locus of action appears 
to reside in the speaker and not in the world at large, thereby implicitly acknowledging the speaker’s 
limited vision. 
Variety: This measure conforms to Wendell Johnson’s (1946) Type-token Ratio which divides the 
number of different words in a passage by the passage’s total words. A high score indicates a speaker’s 
avoidance of overstatement and a preference for precise, molecular statements.  
The features highlighted above decrease the score for the Master Variable CERTAINTY. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
CERTAINTY will be more manifest in companies in low discretion industry category than in companies 
in high discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Numerical Terms, Ambivalence, Self-reference, and Variety will be 
significantly lower for companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion 
industry.  
(c) ACTIVITY 
Definition: Activity is language featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the 
avoidance of inertia. 
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Formula: [Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion] – [Cognition + Passivity + 
Embellishment] 
Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the ACTIVITY scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of ACTIVITY will be analysed using the equation from DICTION 7.0: 
Formula: [Aggression + Accomplishment + Communication + Motion] – [Cognition + Passivity + 
Embellishment] 
Features that increase ACTIVITY score 
Aggression: Computation will be made for words embracing human competition and forceful action. Its 
terms connote physical energy (blast, crash, explode, collide), social domination (conquest, attacking, 
dictatorships, violation), and goal-directedness (crusade, commanded, challenging, overcome). In 
addition, words associated with personal triumph (mastered, rambunctious, pushy), excess human 
energy (prod, poke, pound, shove), disassembly (dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto), and resistance 
(prevent, reduce, defend, curbed) are included. 
Accomplishment: Also to be assessed are words expressing task-completion (establish, finish, 
influence, proceed) and organised human behaviour (motivated, influence, leader, manage). Includes 
capitalistic terms (buy, produce, employees, sell), modes of expansion (grow, increase, generate, 
construction) and general functionality (handling, strengthen, succeed, outputs). Also included is 
programmatic language: agenda, enacted, working, leadership.  
Communication: Also to be computed are terms referring to social interaction, both face-to-face (listen, 
interview, read, speak), and mediated (film, videotape, telephone, e-mail). The dictionary includes both 
modes of intercourse (translate, quote, scripts, broadcast) and moods of intercourse (chat, declare, 
flatter, demand). Other terms refer to social actors (reporter, spokesperson, advocates, preacher) and 
a variety of social purposes (hint, rebuke, respond, persuade). 
Motion: Also to be computed are terms connoting human movement (bustle, job, lurch, leap), physical 
purposes (circulate, momentum, revolve, twist), journeys (barnstorm, jaunt, wandering, travels), speed 
(lickety-split, nimble, zip, whistle-stop), and modes of transit (ride, fly, glide, swim). 
The features highlighted above increase the score for the Master Variable ACTIVITY. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
ACTIVITY will be more manifest in companies in high discretion industry category than in companies in 
low discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Aggression, Accomplishment, Communication, and Motion will be 
significantly higher for companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion 
industry.  
Features that decrease ACTIVITY score 
Cognition: Computation will be made words referring to cerebral processes, both functional and 
imaginative. Included are modes of discovery (learn, deliberate, consider, compare) and domains of 
study (biology, psychology, logic, economics). The dictionary includes mental challenges (question, 
forget, re-examine, paradoxes), institutional learning practices (graduation, teaching, classrooms), as 
well as three forms of intellection: intuitional (invent, perceive, speculate, interpret), rationalistic 
(estimate, examine, reasonable, strategies), and calculative (diagnose, analyse, software, fact-finding). 
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Passivity: Also to be computed are words ranging from neutrality to inactivity. It includes terms of 
compliance (allow, tame, appeasement), docility (submit, contented, sluggish), and cessation 
(arrested, capitulate, refrain, yielding). Also contains tokens of inertness (backward, immobile, silence, 
inhibit) and disinterest (unconcerned, nonchalant, stoic), as well as tranquillity (quietly, sleepy, vacation). 
Embellishment: A selective ratio of adjectives to verbs based on David Boder’s (1940) conception that 
heavy modification slows down a verbal passage by the de-emphasising human and material action.  
The features highlighted above decrease the score for the Master Variable ACTIVITY. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
ACTIVITY will be more manifest in companies in low discretion industry category than in companies in 
high discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Cognition, Passivity, and Embellishment will be significantly lower for 
companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion industry.  
(d) REALISM 
Definition: Realism is language describing tangible, immediate, recognisable matters that affect people’s 
everyday lives.  
Formula: [Familiarity + Spatial Terms + Temporal Terms + Present Concern + Human Interest + 
Concreteness] – [Past Concern + Complexity] 
Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the REALISM scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of REALISM will be analysed using the equation from DICTION 7.0: 
Formula: [Familiarity + Spatial Terms + Temporal Terms + Present Concern + Human Interest + 
Concreteness] – [Past Concern + Complexity] 
Features that increase REALISM score 
Familiarity: This consists of a selected number of C.K. Ogden’s (1968) operation words which he 
calculates to be the most common words in the English Language. Included are common prepositions 
(across, over, through), demonstrative pronouns (this, that) and interrogative pronouns (who, what), a 
variety of particles, conjunctions and connectives (a, for, so). 
Spatial Terms: To be computed are terms referring to geographical entities, physical distances, and 
modes of measurement. Included are general geographical terms (abroad, elbow-room, locale, 
outdoors) as well as specific ones (Ceylon, Kuwait, Poland). Also included are politically defined 
locations (county, fatherland, municipality, ward), points on the compass (east, southwest) and the 
globe (latitude, coastal, border, snowbelt), as well as terms of scale (kilometre, map, spacious), quality 
(vacant, out-of-the-way, disoriented) and change (pilgrimage, migrated, frontier). 
Temporal Terms: Terms that fix a person, idea, or event within a specific time-interval, thereby signalling 
a concern for concrete and practical matters. The dictionary designates literal time (century, instant, mid-
morning) as well as metaphorical designations (lingering, seniority, nowadays). Also, included are 
calendrical terms (autumn, year-round, weekend), elliptical terms (spontaneously, postpone, 
transitional), and judgmental terms (premature, obsolete, punctual).  
Present Concern: A selective list of present-tense verbs extrapolated from C.K Ogden’s list of general 
and picturable terms, all of which occur with great frequency in standard American English. The dictionary 
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is not topic-specific but points instead to general physical activity (cough, taste, sing, take), social 
operations (canvass, touch, govern, meet), and task-performance (make, cook, print, paint). 
Human Interest: An adaptation of Rudolph Flesch’s notion that concentrating on people and their 
activities gives discourse a life-like quality. Included are standard personal pronouns (he, his, 
ourselves, them), family members and relations (cousin, wife, grandchild, uncle), and generic terms 
(friend, baby, human, persons). 
Concreteness: A large dictionary possessing no thematic unity other than tangibility and neutrality. 
Included are sociological units (peasants, African-Americans, Catholics), occupational groups 
(carpenter, manufacturer, policewoman), and political alignments (Communists, Congressman, 
Europeans). Also incorporated are physical structures (courthouse, temple, store), forms of diversion 
(television, football, CD-ROM), terms of accountancy (mortgage, wages, finances), and modes of 
transportation (airplane, ship, bicycle). In addition, the dictionary includes body parts (stomach, eyes, 
lips), articles of clothing (slacks, pants, shirt), household animals (cat, insects, horse), and foodstuffs 
(wine, grain, sugar) and general elements of nature (oil, silk, sand). 
The features highlighted above increase the score for the Master Variable REALISM. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
REALISM will be more manifest in companies in low discretion industry category than in companies in 
high discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Familiarity, Spatial Terms, Temporal Terms, Present Concern, Human 
Interest, and Concreteness will be significantly higher for companies in the low discretion 
industry than in the high discretion industry. 
Features that decrease REALISM score 
Past Concern: The past-tense forms of the verbs contained in the Present Concern dictionary. 
Complexity: A simple measure of the average number of characters-per-word in a given input file. 
Borrows Rudolph Flesch’s (1951) notion that convoluted phrasings make a text’s ideas abstract and its 
implications unclear.  
The features highlighted above decrease the score for the Master Variable REALISM. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
REALISM will be more manifest in companies in high discretion industry category than in companies in 
low discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Past Concern and Complexity will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion industry. 
(e) OPTIMISM 
Definition: Optimism is language endorsing some person, group, concept, or event or highlighting their 
positive entailments.   
Formula: [Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] – [Blame + Hardship + Denial] 
Micro-level analysis 
In the course of performing the analysis on the OPTIMISM scores for the two industry classifications, the 
sub-features of OPTIMISM will be analysed using the equation from DICTION 7.0: 
Formula: [Praise + Satisfaction + Inspiration] – [Blame + Hardship + Denial] 
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Features that increase OPTIMISM score 
Praise: Words that are used in the affirmation of person, group, or abstract entity. Included are terms 
isolating important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical qualities (mighty, handsome, 
beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, vigilant, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities 
(successful, conscientious, renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, good, noble). All terms in this 
dictionary are adjectives. 
Satisfaction: Terms associated with positive affective states (cheerful, passionate, happiness), with 
moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, welcome) and pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky), 
or moments of triumph (celebrating, pride, auspicious). Also, included are words of nurturance 
(healing, courage, secure, relieved). 
Inspiration: Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the terms in this dictionary are nouns 
isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, honesty, self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal 
qualities (courage, dedication, wisdom, mercy). Social and political ideas are also included (patriotism, 
success, education, justice). 
The features highlighted above increase the score for the Master Variable OPTIMIISM. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
OPTIMISM will be more manifest in companies in high discretion industry category than in companies in 
low discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Praise, Satisfaction, and Inspiration will be significantly higher for 
companies in the high discretion industry than in the low discretion industry. 
Features that decrease OPTIMISM score 
Blame: Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naïve, sloppy, stupid), as well as 
downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) compose this dictionary. In addition, 
adjectives describing unfortunate circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned 
vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The dictionary also contains outright 
denigrations (cruel, illegitimate, offensive, miserly).  
Hardship: This dictionary, contains natural disasters (earthquake, starvation, tornado, pollution), 
hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, vices) and censurable human behaviour (infidelity, 
despots, betrayal). It also includes unsavoury political outcomes (injustice, slavery, exploitation, 
rebellion) as well as normal human fears (grief, unemployment, died, apprehension) and in capacities 
(error, cop-outs, weakness).  
Denial: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren’t shouldn’t, don’t), negative 
function words (nor, not, nay), and terms designating null sets (nothing, nobody, none).  
The features highlighted above decrease the score for the Master Variable OPTIMISM. By drawing from 
the insights on isomorphism and discretion, this research proposes that the above sub-features of 
OPTIMISM will be more manifest in companies in low discretion industry category than in companies in 
high discretion industry category. Accordingly, this research states that: 
The sub-feature scores for Blame, Hardship, and Denial will be significantly higher for companies 
in the low discretion industry than in the high discretion industry. 
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5. The Tables on Z-Scores 
 
 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 49.60 0.01 48.85 -0.27
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 47.39 -0.81 48.73 -0.28
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.25 -0.43 49.90 -0.28
REALISM 49.36 3.26 53.88 1.39 53.10 1.15
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.52 1.77 54.76 1.85
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.33 -0.46 48.22 -0.50
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 39.62 -3.88 38.28 -4.41
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.85 -0.29 49.88 -0.28
REALISM 49.36 3.26 57.56 2.52 57.24 2.42
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.43 1.74 54.85 1.88
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 5.92 0.49 4.98 0.19
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 6.93 0.63 7.58 0.79
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.62 -0.38 1.49 -0.44
Diversity 1.94 1.87 1.89 -0.03 2.48 0.29
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 2.61 0.22 3.15 0.47
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.75 -0.53 0.89 -0.48
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 3.17 -0.37 2.82 -0.48
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 3.33 -0.26 2.85 -0.38
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.31 -0.54 1.36 -0.51
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.25 0.17 2.44 0.27
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 1.75 -0.18 1.81 -0.15
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.76 -0.53 0.64 -0.58
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 20.58 -1.33 20.00 -1.40
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 4.82 -1.05 4.64 -1.10
Collectives 9.25 5.21 8.67 -0.11 8.31 -0.18
Insistence 60.15 51.00 69.39 0.18 80.81 0.41
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 24.00 2.22 21.20 1.84
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 4.16 -1.37 3.28 -1.50
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 2.47 -0.55 1.61 -0.66
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.55 1.50 0.55 1.50
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 41.06 1.16 40.58 1.10
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 10.05 0.30 10.23 0.35
Collectives 9.25 5.21 5.01 -0.81 4.34 -0.94
Insistence 60.15 51.00 35.69 -0.48 33.32 -0.53
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 13.49 0.79 10.89 0.44
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 20.04 1.13 21.06 1.29
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 8.44 0.18 9.26 0.28
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.53 1.00 0.52 0.75
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 3.58 -0.42 3.12 -0.53
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 34.57 2.15 35.55 2.25
Communication 7.00 4.79 2.21 -1.00 2.62 -0.91
Motion 2.26 2.09 1.95 -0.15 2.46 0.10
Cognition 9.35 4.92 7.51 -0.37 7.21 -0.43
Passivity 5.09 2.99 8.26 1.06 7.62 0.85
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.98 0.67 0.74 0.18
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 1.88 -0.81 2.35 -0.71
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 15.37 0.11 17.43 0.33
Communication 7.00 4.79 8.57 0.33 7.39 0.08
Motion 2.26 2.09 3.92 0.79 4.16 0.91
Cognition 9.35 4.92 11.66 0.47 12.46 0.63
Passivity 5.09 2.99 4.69 -0.13 4.13 -0.32
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.75 0.20 0.84 0.39
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 125.14 -0.50 123.55 -0.61
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.11 -0.37 8.38 -0.46
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 15.36 0.04 15.77 0.10
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 7.87 -0.82 8.27 -0.74
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 25.19 -0.48 26.23 -0.41
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 14.83 -0.54 13.03 -0.74
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 2.10 -0.57 2.69 -0.34
Complexity 4.61 0.30 5.07 1.53 5.20 1.97
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 129.53 -0.20 131.46 -0.07
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.02 -0.38 9.06 -0.38
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 16.85 0.26 15.99 0.13
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 14.38 0.53 14.42 0.54
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 31.21 -0.04 30.77 -0.08
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 9.97 -1.08 9.36 -1.15
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 3.49 -0.03 3.99 0.16
Complexity 4.61 0.30 4.41 -0.67 4.42 -0.63
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 5.58 -0.18 5.54 -0.19
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 3.32 0.01 3.36 0.03
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 7.64 0.27 8.28 0.41
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.62 -0.73 0.51 -0.78
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.34 -0.98 1.60 -0.93
Denial 6.46 3.89 1.10 -1.38 0.74 -1.47
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 6.51 0.10 7.33 0.34
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 6.09 1.00 6.23 1.05
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 2.92 -0.72 3.16 -0.67
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.95 -0.57 0.98 -0.55
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.25 -1.00 1.32 -0.99
Denial 6.46 3.89 5.75 -0.18 5.73 -0.19
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
283 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 79.22 1.07 83.56 1.26
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 0.36 -1.88 0.21 -1.94
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.26 4.27 4.53 4.59
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.88 0.13 3.97 0.18
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.69 -1.06 0.48 -1.25
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.05 -0.43 1.00 -0.50
Achievement 1.30 0.82 3.62 2.83 4.10 3.41
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.45 -0.05 0.34 -0.32
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 1.97 -1.30 1.95 -1.31
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 5.21 -1.70 5.19 -1.70
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.83 0.66 3.06 0.88
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion z score High Discretion z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 69.96 0.68 78.19 1.03
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 1.35 -1.48 1.44 -1.44
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 5.04 5.20 4.96 5.11
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 2.98 -0.42 3.43 -0.15
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.55 -1.18 0.46 -1.27
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.34 -0.01 1.39 0.06
Achievement 1.30 0.82 2.17 1.06 2.50 1.46
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.28 -0.46 0.27 -0.49
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.80 -0.89 2.82 -0.88
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 10.63 0.24 10.66 0.25
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.53 0.37 2.78 0.61
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 49.55 -0.01 48.90 -0.25
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 48.03 -0.55 48.89 -0.21
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.12 -0.46 49.92 -0.27
REALISM 49.36 3.26 53.96 1.41 53.03 1.13
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.70 1.83 54.72 1.84
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.07 -0.55 48.24 -0.49
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 39.15 -4.06 38.29 -4.40
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 50.05 -0.24 49.86 -0.29
REALISM 49.36 3.26 57.58 2.52 57.13 2.38
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.65 1.82 54.71 1.84
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 49.68 0.04 47.56 -0.74
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 46.01 -1.35 45.82 -1.43
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.52 -0.36 49.51 -0.37
REALISM 49.36 3.26 53.75 1.35 54.27 1.51
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.28 1.69 55.38 2.06
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.81 -0.28 47.92 -0.61
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 40.45 -3.55 38.09 -4.48
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.46 -0.38 50.24 -0.20
REALISM 49.36 3.26 57.53 2.51 59.16 3.01
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 53.94 1.57 57.14 2.66
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 49.55 -0.01 49.68 0.04
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 48.03 -0.55 46.01 -1.35
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.12 -0.46 49.52 -0.36
REALISM 49.36 3.26 53.96 1.41 53.75 1.35
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.70 1.83 54.28 1.69
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.07 -0.55 48.81 -0.28
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 39.15 -4.06 40.45 -3.55
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 50.05 -0.24 49.46 -0.38
REALISM 49.36 3.26 57.58 2.52 57.53 2.51
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.65 1.82 53.94 1.57
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.90 -0.25 47.91 -0.61
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 48.89 -0.21 45.82 -1.43
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.92 -0.27 49.51 -0.37
REALISM 49.36 3.26 53.03 1.13 54.27 1.51
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.72 1.84 55.38 2.06
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
COMMONALITY 49.57 2.71 48.24 -0.49 47.92 -0.61
CERTAINTY 49.43 2.53 38.29 -4.40 38.09 -4.48
ACTIVITY 51.11 4.37 49.86 -0.29 50.24 -0.20
REALISM 49.36 3.26 57.13 2.38 59.16 3.01
OPTIMISM 49.31 2.94 54.71 1.84 57.14 2.66
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 6.02 0.52 5.03 0.21
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 7.37 0.74 7.63 0.80
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.63 -0.37 1.48 -0.45
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.09 0.08 2.09 0.08
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 2.74 0.28 3.17 0.47
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.77 -0.53 0.84 -0.50
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 3.03 -0.42 2.86 -0.47
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 3.36 -0.26 2.87 -0.38
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.16 -0.61 1.36 -0.51
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.31 0.20 2.45 0.27
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 1.76 -0.18 1.83 -0.14
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.85 -0.49 0.63 -0.58
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 5.65 0.41 4.12 -0.08
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 6.16 0.44 6.64 0.55
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.57 -0.40 1.67 -0.35
Diversity 1.94 1.87 1.52 -0.22 2.41 0.25
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 2.36 0.10 2.70 0.26
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.71 -0.55 1.79 -0.13
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 3.43 -0.29 2.22 -0.67
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 3.24 -0.29 2.46 -0.48
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.61 -0.38 1.23 -0.58
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.16 0.12 2.32 0.20
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 1.73 -0.19 1.52 -0.29
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.58 -0.60 0.82 -0.51
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 6.02 0.52 5.65 0.41
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 7.37 0.74 6.16 0.44
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.63 -0.37 1.57 -0.40
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.09 0.08 1.52 -0.22
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 2.74 0.28 2.36 0.10
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.77 -0.53 0.71 -0.55
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 3.03 -0.42 3.43 -0.29
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 3.36 -0.26 3.24 -0.29
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.16 -0.61 1.61 -0.38
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.31 0.20 2.16 0.12
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 1.76 -0.18 1.73 -0.19
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.85 -0.49 0.58 -0.60
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 5.03 0.21 4.96 0.19
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 7.63 0.80 7.15 0.68
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.48 -0.45 1.32 -0.53
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.48 0.29 2.62 0.36
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 3.17 0.47 3.16 0.47
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.84 -0.50 0.91 -0.47
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Centrality 4.36 3.18 2.86 -0.47 2.22 -0.67
Cooperation 4.40 4.04 2.87 -0.38 2.46 -0.48
Rapport 2.34 1.92 1.36 -0.51 1.23 -0.58
Diversity 1.94 1.87 2.45 0.27 2.32 0.20
Exclusion 2.14 2.17 1.83 -0.14 1.52 -0.29
Liberation 2.13 2.59 0.63 -0.58 0.82 -0.51
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 20.56 -1.34 21.41 -1.23
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 4.91 -1.03 4.64 -1.10
Collectives 9.25 5.21 9.22 -0.01 8.38 -0.17
Insistence 60.15 51.00 73.19 0.26 81.05 0.41
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 24.22 2.25 21.41 1.86
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 4.15 -1.37 3.20 -1.52
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 2.05 -0.60 1.50 -0.67
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.55 1.50 0.55 1.50
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 41.72 1.24 40.51 1.09
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 9.80 0.24 10.17 0.33
Collectives 9.25 5.21 4.91 -0.83 4.36 -0.94
Insistence 60.15 51.00 36.00 -0.47 33.80 -0.52
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 12.85 0.70 10.97 0.45
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 20.38 1.18 20.87 1.26
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 8.71 0.21 9.27 0.28
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.53 1.00 0.52 0.75
Analysts' Discussions 
Annual Reports
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 20.77 -1.31 19.33 -1.49
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 4.65 -1.10 4.54 -1.12
Collectives 9.25 5.21 7.74 -0.29 7.15 -0.40
Insistence 60.15 51.00 61.75 0.03 76.68 0.32
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 23.59 2.16 17.39 1.32
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 4.16 -1.37 4.65 -1.29
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 3.28 -0.45 3.46 -0.43
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.56 1.75 0.55 1.50
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 39.78 1.00 41.74 1.24
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 10.48 0.41 11.29 0.62
Collectives 9.25 5.21 5.21 -0.78 4.09 -0.99
Insistence 60.15 51.00 35.21 -0.49 25.34 -0.68
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 14.76 0.96 9.54 0.25
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 19.25 1.01 24.11 1.77
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 7.91 0.12 9.12 0.27
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.52 0.75 0.51 0.50
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 20.56 -1.34 20.77 -1.31
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 4.91 -1.03 4.65 -1.10
Collectives 9.25 5.21 9.22 -0.01 7.74 -0.29
Insistence 60.15 51.00 73.19 0.26 61.75 0.03
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 24.22 2.25 23.59 2.16
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 4.15 -1.37 4.16 -1.37
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 2.05 -0.60 3.28 -0.45
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.55 1.50 0.56 1.75
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 41.72 1.24 39.78 1.00
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 9.80 0.24 10.48 0.41
Collectives 9.25 5.21 4.91 -0.83 5.21 -0.78
Insistence 60.15 51.00 36.00 -0.47 35.21 -0.49
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 12.85 0.70 14.76 0.96
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 20.38 1.18 19.25 1.01
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 8.71 0.21 7.91 0.12
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.53 1.00 0.52 0.75
Annual Reports
Analysts' Discussions 
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 20.04 -1.40 19.70 -1.44
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 4.64 -1.10 4.61 -1.11
Collectives 9.25 5.21 8.38 -0.17 8.47 -0.15
Insistence 60.15 51.00 81.05 0.41 82.33 0.43
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 21.41 1.86 22.42 2.00
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 3.20 -1.52 3.07 -1.54
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 1.50 -0.67 1.53 -0.67
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.55 1.50 0.54 1.25
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tenacity 31.54 8.22 40.51 1.09 41.74 1.24
Levelling Terms 8.89 3.87 10.17 0.33 11.29 0.62
Collectives 9.25 5.21 4.36 -0.94 4.09 -0.99
Insistence 60.15 51.00 33.80 -0.52 25.34 -0.68
Numerical Terms 7.67 7.37 10.97 0.45 9.54 0.25
Ambivalence 12.85 6.36 20.87 1.26 24.11 1.77
Self-Reference 6.96 8.14 9.27 0.28 9.12 0.27
Variety 0.49 0.04 0.52 0.75 0.51 0.50
Analysts' Discussions 
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 3.31 -0.49 3.12 -0.53
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 33.54 2.04 35.57 2.25
Communication 7.00 4.79 2.34 -0.97 2.63 -0.91
Motion 2.26 2.09 2.10 -0.08 2.49 0.11
Cognition 9.35 4.92 7.52 -0.37 7.16 -0.45
Passivity 5.09 2.99 8.24 1.05 7.63 0.85
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 1.05 0.82 0.75 0.20
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 1.92 -0.81 2.30 -0.72
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 15.37 0.11 17.52 0.33
Communication 7.00 4.79 8.51 0.32 7.41 0.09
Motion 2.26 2.09 3.95 0.81 4.21 0.93
Cognition 9.35 4.92 11.75 0.49 12.51 0.64
Passivity 5.09 2.99 4.28 -0.27 4.17 -0.31
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.60 -0.10 0.86 0.43
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 4.04 -0.32 3.24 -0.50
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 36.32 2.33 35.25 2.22
Communication 7.00 4.79 1.97 -1.05 2.32 -0.98
Motion 2.26 2.09 1.68 -0.28 1.79 -0.22
Cognition 9.35 4.92 7.43 -0.39 8.12 -0.25
Passivity 5.09 2.99 8.19 1.04 7.30 0.74
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.81 0.33 0.59 -0.12
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 1.80 -0.83 3.15 -0.52
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 15.36 0.11 15.80 0.15
Communication 7.00 4.79 8.69 0.35 7.03 0.01
Motion 2.26 2.09 3.83 0.75 3.36 0.53
Cognition 9.35 4.92 11.48 0.43 11.59 0.46
Passivity 5.09 2.99 5.47 0.13 3.42 -0.56
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 1.06 0.84 0.47 -0.37
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 3.31 -0.49 4.04 -0.32
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 33.54 2.04 36.32 2.33
Communication 7.00 4.79 2.34 -0.97 1.97 -1.05
Motion 2.26 2.09 2.10 -0.08 1.68 -0.28
Cognition 9.35 4.92 7.52 -0.37 7.43 -0.39
Passivity 5.09 2.99 8.24 1.05 7.43 0.78
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 1.05 0.82 0.81 0.33
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 1.92 -0.81 1.80 -0.83
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 15.37 0.11 15.36 0.11
Communication 7.00 4.79 8.51 0.32 8.69 0.35
Motion 2.26 2.09 3.95 0.81 3.83 0.75
Cognition 9.35 4.92 11.75 0.49 11.48 0.43
Passivity 5.09 2.99 4.28 -0.27 5.47 0.13
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.60 -0.10 1.06 0.84
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 3.12 -0.53 2.96 -0.57
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 35.57 2.25 35.72 2.27
Communication 7.00 4.79 2.63 -0.91 2.72 -0.89
Motion 2.26 2.09 2.49 0.11 2.72 0.22
Cognition 9.35 4.92 7.16 -0.45 7.51 -0.37
Passivity 5.09 2.99 7.63 0.85 7.72 0.88
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.75 0.20 0.77 0.24
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Aggression 5.43 4.36 2.30 -0.72 3.15 -0.52
Accomplishment 14.37 9.41 17.52 0.33 15.80 0.15
Communication 7.00 4.79 7.41 0.09 7.03 0.01
Motion 2.26 2.09 4.21 0.93 3.36 0.53
Cognition 9.35 4.92 12.51 0.64 11.59 0.46
Passivity 5.09 2.99 4.17 -0.31 3.42 -0.56
Embellishment 0.65 0.49 0.86 0.43 0.47 -0.37
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 124.34 -0.56 123.56 -0.61
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.27 -0.35 8.44 -0.46
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 15.59 0.07 15.79 0.10
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 8.33 -0.73 8.10 -0.78
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 25.22 -0.48 26.04 -0.42
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 14.19 -0.61 13.10 -0.73
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 2.07 -0.58 2.71 -0.33
Complexity 4.61 0.30 5.07 1.53 5.21 2.00
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 128.78 -0.26 131.16 -0.09
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.11 -0.37 9.19 -0.36
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 16.81 0.26 15.87 0.12
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 14.66 0.59 14.23 0.50
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 31.90 0.01 30.48 -0.10
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 9.21 -1.17 9.47 -1.14
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 3.64 0.02 4.02 0.17
Complexity 4.61 0.30 4.40 -0.70 4.43 -0.60
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 126.62 -0.40 123.31 -0.63
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 8.84 -0.40 7.39 -0.59
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 14.99 -0.01 15.42 0.05
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 7.11 -0.98 11.33 -0.11
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 25.08 -0.49 29.71 -0.15
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 15.81 -0.43 11.88 -0.87
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 2.16 -0.54 2.35 -0.47
Complexity 4.61 0.30 5.06 1.50 5.14 1.77
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 131.17 -0.09 136.45 0.27
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 8.85 -0.40 6.98 -0.64
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 16.92 0.27 17.88 0.41
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 13.85 0.42 17.54 1.18
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 29.80 -0.15 35.63 0.28
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 11.47 -0.91 7.61 -1.35
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 3.21 -0.14 3.47 -0.04
Complexity 4.61 0.30 4.43 -0.60 4.30 -1.03
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 124.34 -0.56 126.62 -0.40
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.27 -0.35 8.84 -0.40
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 15.59 0.07 14.99 -0.01
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 8.33 -0.73 7.11 -0.98
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 25.22 -0.48 25.08 -0.49
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 14.19 -0.61 15.81 -0.43
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 2.07 -0.58 2.16 -0.54
Complexity 4.61 0.30 5.07 1.53 5.06 1.50
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 128.78 -0.26 131.17 -0.09
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.11 -0.37 8.85 -0.40
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 16.81 0.26 16.92 0.27
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 14.66 0.59 13.85 0.42
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 31.90 0.01 29.80 -0.15
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 9.21 -1.17 11.47 -0.91
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 3.64 0.02 3.21 -0.14
Complexity 4.61 0.30 4.40 -0.70 4.43 -0.60
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 123.56 -0.61 123.31 -0.63
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 8.44 -0.46 7.39 -0.59
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 15.79 0.10 15.42 0.05
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 8.10 -0.78 11.33 -0.11
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 26.04 -0.42 29.71 -0.15
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 13.10 -0.73 11.88 -0.87
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 2.71 -0.33 2.35 -0.47
Complexity 4.61 0.30 5.21 2.00 5.14 1.77
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Familiarity 132.53 14.66 131.16 -0.09 136.45 0.27
Spatial Terms 12.01 7.84 9.19 -0.36 6.98 -0.64
Temporal Terms 15.09 6.73 15.87 0.12 17.88 0.41
Present Concern 11.84 4.82 14.23 0.50 17.54 1.18
Human Interest 31.81 13.68 30.48 -0.10 35.63 0.28
Concreteness 19.60 8.90 9.47 -1.14 7.61 -1.35
Past Concern 3.58 2.61 4.02 0.17 3.47 -0.04
Complexity 4.61 0.30 4.43 -0.60 4.30 -1.03
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 5.93 -0.07 5.47 -0.21
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 3.57 0.10 3.31 0.01
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 7.46 0.23 8.29 0.41
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.68 -0.70 0.51 -0.78
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.47 -0.95 1.56 -0.93
Denial 6.46 3.89 1.13 -1.37 0.70 -1.48
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 6.62 0.13 7.37 0.35
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 6.34 1.09 6.01 0.97
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 3.11 -0.68 3.21 -0.65
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.95 -0.57 0.99 -0.55
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.30 -0.99 1.31 -0.99
Denial 6.46 3.89 5.84 -0.16 5.70 -0.20
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 4.97 -0.35 6.69 0.15
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 2.90 -0.14 4.29 0.36
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 8.03 0.35 8.06 0.36
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.53 -0.77 0.44 -0.81
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.10 -1.03 2.32 -0.77
Denial 6.46 3.89 1.04 -1.39 1.49 -1.28
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 6.29 0.03 6.69 0.15
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 5.56 0.81 10.01 2.40
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 2.54 -0.79 2.36 -0.83
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.94 -0.57 0.81 -0.63
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.15 -1.02 1.38 -0.97
Denial 6.46 3.89 5.55 -0.23 6.29 -0.04
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 5.93 -0.07 4.97 -0.35
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 3.57 0.10 2.90 -0.14
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 7.46 0.23 8.03 0.35
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.68 -0.70 0.53 -0.77
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.47 -0.95 1.10 -1.03
Denial 6.46 3.89 1.13 -1.37 1.04 -1.39
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 6.62 0.13 6.29 0.03
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 6.34 1.09 5.56 0.81
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 3.11 -0.68 2.54 -0.79
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.95 -0.57 0.94 -0.57
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.30 -0.99 1.15 -1.02
Denial 6.46 3.89 5.84 -0.16 5.55 -0.23
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DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 5.47 -0.21 6.69 0.15
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 3.31 0.01 4.29 0.36
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 8.29 0.41 8.06 0.36
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.51 -0.78 0.44 -0.81
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.56 -0.93 2.32 -0.77
Denial 6.46 3.89 0.70 -1.48 1.49 -1.28
DICTION Mean DICTION STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Praise 6.18 3.41 7.37 0.35 6.69 0.15
Satisfaction 3.28 2.81 6.01 0.97 10.01 2.40
Inspiration 6.34 4.78 3.21 -0.65 2.36 -0.83
Blame 2.11 2.05 0.99 -0.55 0.81 -0.63
Hardship 5.87 4.61 1.31 -0.99 1.38 -0.97
Denial 6.46 3.89 5.70 -0.20 6.29 -0.04
Analysts' Discussions 
Annual Reports
295 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 80.57 1.13 83.25 1.25
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 0.28 -1.91 0.20 -1.95
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.19 4.18 4.51 4.57
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.93 0.16 3.96 0.18
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.66 -1.08 0.49 -1.24
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.04 -0.44 1.00 -0.50
Achievement 1.30 0.82 3.58 2.78 4.10 3.41
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.44 -0.07 0.35 -0.29
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 1.90 -1.33 1.96 -1.30
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 5.25 -1.68 5.15 -1.72
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.91 0.74 3.08 0.90
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (G) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 71.87 0.76 77.95 1.02
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 1.37 -1.47 1.43 -1.45
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.93 5.07 4.93 5.07
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.06 -0.37 3.42 -0.15
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.53 -1.20 0.47 -1.26
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.36 0.01 1.39 0.06
Achievement 1.30 0.82 2.18 1.07 2.52 1.49
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.27 -0.49 0.27 -0.49
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.86 -0.86 2.83 -0.88
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 10.57 0.22 10.61 0.23
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.58 0.42 2.79 0.62
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LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 76.88 0.97 89.02 1.50
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 0.55 -1.80 0.51 -1.82
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.37 4.40 4.91 5.05
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.81 0.09 4.14 0.29
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.75 -1.00 0.31 -1.40
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.07 -0.40 1.03 -0.46
Achievement 1.30 0.82 3.71 2.94 4.05 3.35
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.47 0.00 0.26 -0.51
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.10 -1.23 1.79 -1.38
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 5.21 -1.70 5.85 -1.47
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.69 0.52 2.73 0.56
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (B) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 66.27 0.52 82.27 1.21
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 1.31 -1.50 1.51 -1.41
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 5.27 5.48 5.37 5.60
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 2.82 -0.52 3.62 -0.03
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.59 -1.15 0.38 -1.34
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.32 -0.04 1.52 0.24
Achievement 1.30 0.82 2.13 1.01 2.17 1.06
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.29 -0.44 0.29 -0.44
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.70 -0.94 2.55 -1.01
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 10.74 0.28 11.54 0.56
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.42 0.26 2.56 0.40
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LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 80.57 1.13 76.88 0.97
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 0.28 -1.91 0.55 -1.80
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.19 4.18 4.37 4.40
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.93 0.16 3.81 0.09
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.66 -1.08 0.75 -1.00
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.04 -0.44 1.07 -0.40
Achievement 1.30 0.82 3.58 2.78 3.71 2.94
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.44 -0.07 0.47 0.00
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 1.90 -1.33 2.10 -1.23
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 5.25 -1.68 5.21 -1.70
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.91 0.74 2.69 0.52
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev Low Discretion (G) z score Low Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 71.87 0.76 66.27 0.52
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 1.37 -1.47 1.31 -1.50
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.93 5.07 5.27 5.48
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.06 -0.37 2.82 -0.52
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.53 -1.20 0.59 -1.15
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.36 0.01 1.32 -0.04
Achievement 1.30 0.82 2.18 1.07 2.13 1.01
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.27 -0.49 0.29 -0.44
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.86 -0.86 2.70 -0.94
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 10.57 0.22 10.74 0.28
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.58 0.42 2.42 0.26
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LIWC Mean LIWC STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 83.25 1.25 89.02 1.50
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 0.20 -1.95 0.51 -1.82
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.51 4.57 4.91 5.05
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.96 0.18 4.14 0.29
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.49 -1.24 0.31 -1.40
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.00 -0.50 1.03 -0.46
Achievement 1.30 0.82 4.10 3.41 4.05 3.35
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.35 -0.29 0.26 -0.51
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 1.96 -1.30 1.79 -1.38
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 5.15 -1.72 5.85 -1.47
Motion 2.15 1.03 3.08 0.90 2.73 0.56
LIWC Mean LIWC STDev High Discretion (G) z score High Discretion (B) z score
Tone 54.22 23.27 77.95 1.02 82.27 1.21
First Person Sing. 4.99 2.46 1.43 -1.45 1.51 -1.41
First Person Plur. 0.72 0.83 4.93 5.07 5.37 5.60
Positive Emotion 3.67 1.63 3.42 -0.15 3.62 -0.03
Negative Emotion 1.84 1.09 0.47 -1.26 0.38 -1.34
Certainty 1.35 0.70 1.39 0.06 1.52 0.24
Achievement 1.30 0.82 2.52 1.49 2.17 1.06
Risk 0.47 0.41 0.27 -0.49 0.29 -0.44
Past Focus 4.64 2.06 2.83 -0.88 2.55 -1.01
Present Focus 9.96 2.80 10.61 0.23 11.54 0.56
Motion 2.15 1.03 2.79 0.62 2.56 0.40
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6. Summary of Good and Bad Times 
6a. Summary of Good and Bad times using Net Income Surprise – Low Discretion Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (Bloomberg categorisation)
Low Discretion Industry Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Acacia Mining plc -5.35% -25.84% 61.90% -0.85% -67.86%
Antofagasta plc 8.26% 3.62% -21.00% -13.83% -94.07%
Cairn Energy PLC -47.27% -46.88% -158.92% -60.31% -29.63%
Centamin plc -8.35% 7.56% 4.16% -6.60% 11.52%
Connect Group PLC 4.06% 12.81% 4.87% 1.25% -32.33%
easyJet Plc 26.19% 4.04% 5.65% -1.27% 0.81%
EnQuest PLC -6.63% 86.56% 92.67% 11.78% 440.00%
Evraz Plc -40.23% -12.74% -281.03% 12.27% -49.29%
Fresnillo PLC -11.79% -10.50% -7.73% -32.97% -36.82%
Hochschild Mining plc -5.40% -3.16% -95.77% -8.57% -269.23%
Informa plc 1.15% 2.55% -0.29% 1.11% 4.39%
International Consolidated Airlines Group 79.67% -220.60% -14.07% 53.74% -1.04%
Investec plc -11.21% 28.32% -8.61% -0.24% -6.94%
London Stock Exchange Group plc 17.10% 6.98% 8.81% 8.95% 2.40%
NEX Group plc 1.48% 4.71% 2.83% 4.32% 3.47%
Nostrum Oil & Gas PLC -20.74% -757.45% -19.02% -378.21% -126.75%
Pearson plc 2.92% 1.35% -2.19% 0.76% 1.56%
Petropavlovsk PLC -24.44% 51.70% -19.41% 114.29% -135.47%
Premier Oil plc -11.74% -0.17% 6.17% -523.41% 2.61%
RELX PLC -46.24% 0.18% 1.07% -0.50% -0.04%
Royal Dutch Shell plc 16.68% -1.49% 4.24% -8.61% -4.14%
Royal Mail plc -30.59% 27.57% -9.29% 6.02% 8.31%
TP ICAP plc 7.88% -10.40% 3.00% -0.76% 2.14%
Tullow Oil plc -5.36% -14.19% 514.20% -4.88% -20.15%
Vedanta Resources plc -18.48% -4.34% -3.32% -27.14% -2800.00%
Wizz Air Holdings Plc - 11.99% -1.14% -4.68% -4.90%
BP Plc -3.65% -11.16% -20.87% 6.97% 2.04%
Hunting Plc -40.17% -244.88% -9.06% -17.61% 41.05%
Lamprell Plc 3.10% -2.50% -89.08% -288.78% -10.17%
John Wood Group Plc -2.70% -14.96% -11.27% -52.22% -58.55%
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6b. Summary of Good and Bad times using Net Income Surprise – High Discretion Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry (Bloomberg categorisation)
High Discretion Industry Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
AstraZeneca PLC -3.03% 4.25% 6.91% -7.04% -3.14%
AVEVA Plc 3.57% 1.06% -4.34% -0.93% 64.39%
Chemring Group Plc 0.37% 3.44% -2.56% -5.49% 15.44%
Cineworld Group plc 18.60% 11.29% -5.27% -19.67% -1.30%
Consort Medical plc 2.96% 6.01% 11.07% 10.80% 0.32%
Dechra Pharmaceuticals plc 0.44% -5.08% 0.30% 15.03% 2.32%
Essentra plc 0.19% -0.30% 0.35% -13.80% 2.23%
Dialight plc -0.83% 67.65% -6.33% -5.00% 0.00%
Genus plc 1.14% 8.45% 7.79% 15.57% 9.52%
GlaxoSmithKline plc 0.44% 1.63% -0.98% 1.58% -0.02%
Hikma Pharmaceuticals 6.25% 12.24% 3.73% -6.15% 13.45%
Indivior PLC 5.58% 3.14% -10.21% 4.07% 7.59%
ITV plc 8.47% 3.11% -16.63% 2.80% -9.23%
Meggit Plc 2.33% 10.37% 4.80% 1.68% 2.27%
Microfocus Int'l Plc 6.99% 6.59% -1.94% 5.44% 29.48%
Mitie Group plc 11.10% 0.89% -0.24% 0.92% 0.68%
Oxford BioMedica plc -33.80% -1.16% -10.00% -14.47% -6.47%
Playtech plc 20.92% 0.07% 10.82% 4.27% -5.97%
Porvair plc - 2.94% 8.33% - 1.01%
QinetiQ Group Plc -0.64% -15.21% 7.15% 7.77% 7.80%
Renishaw Plc 21.50% 7.88% 12.36% 20.23% 9.75%
Rotork plc 1.84% 0.96% 2.36% 3.82% 2.73%
Shire plc -0.42% 1.52% 8.61% -5.57% -1.28%
Smith & Nephew plc -1.66% 3.48% 8.23% 3.69% -1.79%
Smiths Group Plc 4.76% 0.58% 4.87% -2.27% 2.19%
Spectris plc 4.19% 5.29% 1.16% 1.72% 0.44%
Spirent Communications Plc 3.76% 58.47% -3.39% 4.85% 0.58%
The Sage Group Plc 16.44% 0.71% 3.42% 1.26% -0.81%
TT Electronics plc -6.82% -0.71% 2.60% 4.27% 5.22%
Vectura Group plc 14.80% - 15.40% -18.40% 281.40%
Net Income Surprise (%)
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7. Detailed Results and Analysis 
Structure of Results and Analysis – Measures for DICTION, LIWC, and Readability Measures 
In the course of testing the hypotheses for this study, the CEO letters in annual reports (hereafter, the 
annual reports or AR) and CEO contributions in analysts’ discussions (hereafter, analysts’ discussions or 
AD) of sample companies were analysed for linguistic markers highlighted at the hypotheses 
development stage. As noted in the methodology chapter, annual reports are informational, print, and 
decontextualised, while analysts’ discussions are oral, narrative with an audience, contextualised, and 
transcribed. A total of sixty (60) companies were tested in line with the criteria set for their selection. 
Accordingly, Table 10.1 (in Appendix 10a) shows the number of companies with annual reports covering 
the pre-defined accounting periods, while Table 10.2 (in Appendix 10b) shows the number of companies 
with analysts’ discussions in line with the relevant periods. Specifically, forty-three (43) of the sample 
companies had annual reports and analysts’ discussions covering the periods between 2011 and 2015, 
while 17 companies had same disclosure reports covering the periods between 2014 and 2018. In view 
of this, the 60 sample companies were divided equally between two industry classifications of high 
discretion industry and low discretion industry. Consequently, 30 companies were classified as belonging 
to the low discretion industry while the other 30 companies were classified as belonging to the high 
discretion industry. For additional clarity, Table 5.5 shows the industry composition of both the low and 
high discretion industries.  
In this study, the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of these companies were analysed using text-
analysis software DICTION 7.0 using the five Master Variables of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, 
ACTIVITY, REALISM, and OPTIMISM. These variables were analysed at the macro-level of analysis with 
the purpose of determining if they showed the predicted statistically significant differences between the 
low and high discretion industry levels of classification. Furthermore, additional analysis at the micro-level 
was conducted. This was done in order to understand whether the component elements of each Master 
Variable showed further statistically significant differences between low and high discretion industries. In 
addition, the scores of each industry were compared with standardised DICTION scores (mean and 
standard deviation) using the z-scores computed for each industry, to understand the deviation of each 
industry’s scores from all the standardised scores of all the variables at the macro and micro levels of 
analysis.  
Other accompanying analyses were conducted such as how aggressive or conservative these industries 
are with respect to their financial communications. Furthermore, additional analysis was conducted using 
Language Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to triangulate the language features of this text analysis 
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software with those of DICTION 7.0. This was conducted for the purpose of triangulating and gaining 
internal validity for the results generated using the five Master Variables of DICTION 7.0, and to determine 
the language features that provide results in line with predictions of this study. The eleven (11) primary 
measures of the language categories tested using LIWC, as shown in Table 4.1, are Tone, First-Person 
Singular Pronoun, First-Person Plural Pronoun, Positive Emotion, Negative Emotion, Certainty, 
Achievement, Risk, Past Focus, Present Focus, and Motion.  
In addition, computations applying the Flesch Reading Ease (hereafter, Readability Score) and Flesch-
Kincaid Readability Grades (hereafter, Readability Grade) were conducted, to determine the respective 
readability of the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of these industries, and their implications with 
respect to financial communications. In order to critically assess statistical significance for the results 
observed, a non-parametric statistical tool known as Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test was 
conducted to differentiate between the two industries, using appropriate statistical tests. Furthermore, 
Cohen’s d measure of effect size was conducted to understand how different the differences are between 
the p-values of the variables tested for both industries. The rationale for this is to understand the degree 
to which this study could overlay the set of data for low discretion industry with those of the high discretion 
industry. If the value of Cohen’s d is zero (0), then there is a perfect match between the datasets of low 
and high discretion industries. In other words, a value of zero (0) means that the two datasets are not 
different at all.  
As the value of Cohen’s d increases, so does the indication of the difference between the datasets of the 
low and high discretion industries. Conventionally, a relatively well-agreed measurement scale has 
emerged for the interpretation of the Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988). Thus, a d-value below 0.2 is considered 
a small difference (about 85% overlay of data), and values between 0.2 and 0.5 are considered a 
moderate difference (an overlay of about 67% of the data). Any d-value above 0.5 is considered a large 
difference; a d-value of 1.0 has a data overlay of about 45% and a d-value of 2.0 has data overlay of 
about 19% (McNamara, Graesser, McCarthy, & Cai, 2014). Accordingly, the results and analysis of the 
disclosures of these industries with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ discussions are shown 
in sections in line with the order of stated hypotheses. The results are presented in tables with explanation 
of the results.  
Table 5.74 in appendix 11 shows the descriptive statistics of each industry group’s scores on the five 
DICTION Master Variables with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ disclosures covered in the 
relevant period. It shows the maximum, minimum, mean, median, and standard deviation scores of the 
financial communication documents of each industry. The maximum and minimum scores reported in 
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Table 5.74 are not the standardised DICTION scores for each Master Variable but the calculated scores 
derived from applying DICTION on each disclosure document. Results in Table 5.75 in appendix 11 show 
the descriptive statistics of the calculated scores derived from applying DICTION on each disclosure 
document against the standardised DICTION scores for each Master Variable. Similarly, Tables 5.74 and 
5.75 show the Flesch Readability Scores and Grades of the two industries’ annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions using Microsoft Windows-based computational tool.  
Results reported in Table 5.38 in appendix 8 show the non-parametric statistically significant difference 
between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries. In 
differentiating between the annual reports of these industries, the results show that the coefficients of 
COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, and REALISM are statistically significant (p-value < 0.01; p-
value < 0.01; p-values < 0.01; p-value < 0.05, respectively). The result for OPTIMISM was in the direction 
of the prediction although it did not reach a level of significance. Accordingly, Hypotheses 1(a), 2(a), 3(a), 
and 4(a) are supported by these results. They were as predicted from the deductive reasoning and 
theoretical arguments. Similarly, in differentiating between the analysts’ discussions of these industries, 
the results show that the coefficients of COMMONALITY and REALISM are statistically significant (p = 
0.05 and 0.046, respectively), with the coefficient of OPTIMISM being in the direction predicted and 
approaching significance (p = 0.071). The result for ACTIVITY was again in the direction predicted, 
although it did not reach a level of significance.  Accordingly, Hypotheses 1(a), 4(a), and 5(a) are 
supported by these results.  
7.2.1. COMMONALITY 
It can be seen in Table 5.38 that with respect to the COMMONALITY Master Variable, the significance 
test (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.39) shows that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the COMMONALITY 
level in the annual reports of organisations in a low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher 
than the COMMONALITY level observed for organisations in a high discretion industry, with the former 
having a mean COMMONALITY score of 49.60 (SD = 1.67) while the mean value for the latter stands at 
48.85 (SD = 2.13). This result supports Hypothesis 1(a). Although the z-scores of the two industry groups 
are within the normal range, nonetheless, the result suggests that the content of the CEO letters of 
organisations in the low discretion industry is indicative of language that conveys institutional regularities 
and/or substantive agreement on core values, behavioural interactions among industry participants that 
result in industry behaviour, and terms that describe the attitudinal similarities among the organisations 
within the low discretion industry. Consequently, the organisations within the low discretion industry are 
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more likely to communicate with “language highlighting the agreed-upon values”, interaction and 
cooperation (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p. 10) within their industry category (z = 0.01), while “rejecting 
idiosyncratic modes of engagement (p. 10). In contrast, this is not so for organisations within the high 
discretion industry (z = - 0.27). For the high discretion industry, the result shows that the content of CEO 
letters of the organisations within this industry category is more likely to be indicative of language that 
conveys an individual behaviour that seeks to differ from the established industry norm. In view of this, 
such behaviour advances organisational isolation (as opposed to industry engagement), the rejection of 
industry conventions (instead of shared common values), and the maximisation of individual organisation 
choice (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015).  
Similarly, the results in Table 5.38 show the non-parametric statistically significant difference between 
the analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries. In differentiating between the analysts’ 
discussions of these industries, the results show that the coefficient of COMMONALITY is statistically 
significant (p = 0.05, d = 0.05), with mean COMMONALITY values of 48.33 (SD = 2.12, z = - 0.46) and 
48.22 (SD = 2.46, z = - 0.50) for the low and high discretion industries, respectively. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 1(a) also is supported by this result. The interpretation of the impact of this result in financial 
communications is the same as the one discussed with respect to CEO letters in annual reports. It is 
noteworthy that the establishment of mutual understanding and cooperation with target audience is the 
foundational basis of COMMONALITY. The results suggest that the CEOs of companies in the low 
discretion industry are more likely to use both annual reports and analysts’ discussions to underline 
shared common values with their target audience. They seek engagement to shareholders and analysts 
for the purpose of creating a sense of community and advancing commitment toward common industry 
goals.  
In contrast, CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more prone to seek to reject social 
conventions while stressing their individual identity over industry norms. Prior studies emphasise that a 
deviation from shared common values is an indication of neuroticism (Brown & Treviño; 2006), which 
subsequently leads to unethical practices such as deception (Bligh & Hess, 2007; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). 
According to Marsh (2013), seeking to establish mutual understanding, rapport, or engagement is a core 
value of ethical leadership. The leaders of organisations that emphasise the need for ethical practices 
invest efforts towards building relationships founded on continuous engagement with stakeholders 
(Marsh, 2013). In the same vein, ethical leaders consider the implications of their decisions and actions 
on their target audience (Reed, Vidaver-Cohen, & Colwell, 2011), as well as establishing themselves as 
“builders of community” and better stewards of shareholder resources (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 8; 
Spears, 1995).  
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7.2.2. CERTAINTY 
With respect to the CERTAINTY Master Variable, the level of significance (p = 0.000, d = 0.34) shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the CERTAINTY level in the annual reports of 
organisations in a high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the CERTAINTY level 
observed for organisations in a low discretion industry, with the former having a mean CERTAINTY score 
48.73 (SD = 3.73, z = - 0.28) while the mean value for the latter stands at 47.39 (SD = 4.17, z = - 0.81). 
This result supports Hypothesis 2(a). Although the z-scores of the two industry groups are within the 
normal range, nonetheless, the result suggests that the content of CEO letters of organisations in the 
high discretion industry is more likely to be indicative of language that conveys “resoluteness, inflexibility, 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra” (Hart & Carroll, 2015, p.6). Furthermore, the 
language of CERTAINTY in the CEO letters (as contained in the annual reports) of organisations in the 
high discretion industry is more prone to focus on financial communications that stresses precision, 
unwillingness to compromise, having a sense of assurance through approval and persuasion, and 
avoidance of hesitation in the expected or predicted performances of the organisations within the industry. 
The use of this language in the CEO letters conveys tenacity and insistence on the attainment of target 
performance, while reducing any signal of ambivalence in their communications to the shareholders. This 
study posits that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to violate the 
legitimacy principle of discourse ethics by using language of inflexibility, completeness, and assurance 
in an environment that is not as complete, inflexible, and mature as those in the low discretion industry.  
In contrast, the result for the low discretion industry suggests that the CEO letters of organisations within 
this industry are more likely to use language that expresses a lesser level of certainty, which could signal 
the unwillingness or inability of the CEOs to commit to the verbalisation being made. In view of this, the 
language of such CEOs could underline statements of inexactness, restrained possibility, mystery, and 
confusion. According to prior study, “…aggressive accounting practices are reflected in resolute language 
that indicates traits of authoritative and transactional leadership” (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015, p. 10). Due to 
the higher likelihood of inflexibility in the annual reports of CEOs in the high discretion industry and a 
focus on self-interest, the result emphasises that the CEOs of companies within this industry are more 
prone to set a tone at the top that could advance towards unethical accounting practices. Similarly, Sama 
and Shoaf (2008) argue that transactional leaders are more likely to engage in unethical behaviours due 
to their primary focus on transactions and profitability.  
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In line with the findings of Patelli & Pedrini (2015), the “resoluteness of the language used in CEO letters 
as captured by CERTAINTY could indicate poor ethical leadership” (p. 7). Furthermore, the perspective 
from discourse ethics establishes that CERTAINTY in communication is a signal of a language that lacks 
legitimacy relative to the external context (Forester, 1980; Yuthas et al., 2002). Nevertheless, the 
application of the legitimacy principle is not universal, as it must be a function of the specific context under 
consideration. Patelli and Pedrini (2013) discuss the appropriateness of the legitimacy principle in the 
context of the worldwide economic downturn of 2008 and 2009. They suggest that it seems inappropriate 
to use language that conveys resoluteness and a sense of certainty in a context shaped by high financial 
instability. As such, a flexible language seems more legitimate in uncertain environments, in order to seek 
stakeholder understanding rather than approval (Yuthas et al., 2002). In view of this, it seems appropriate 
for CEOs of organisations in the low discretion industry to communicate to their shareholders using more 
uncertain terms owing to many factors that affect their ability to deliver above-average market returns, 
one of which is attributable to the low growth potential experienced in their industry.  
In addition to the results observed for the annual reports, the results in Table 5.38 show the statistically 
significant difference between the analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries. In 
differentiating between the analysts’ discussions of these industries, the results show that the coefficient 
of CERTAINTY is approaching significance (p = 0.054, d = 0.18), with mean CERTAINTY values of 39.62 
(SD = 7.39, z = - 3.88) and 38.28 (SD = 7.85, z = - 4.41) for the low and high discretion industries, 
respectively. This result is contrary to that predicted and does not provide empirical support for 
Hypothesis 2(a). Although, the result is approaching a statistically significant difference between the two 
industry groups, it is an inverse of Hypothesis 2(a), as the mean values show that there is a higher level 
of CERTAINTY in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion industry than in the high 
discretion industry. This suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use 
words in their analysts’ discussions that indicate resoluteness, inflexibility, completeness, and assurance 
in the attainment of expected or predicted organisational performance results within their industry group 
than those of companies in the high discretion industry.  
This finding suggests that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to apply 
this communication style due to the peculiarity of both their industry and the target audience – specialist 
analysts. In view of this, this study posits that with a known and persistent low growth rate in a low 
discretion industry environment with accompanying high regulatory environment, managed profitability 
and known business model, the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate with analysts using language that emphasises inflexibility and assurance in attaining the 
known and expected level of performance for companies operating in a mature environment. The CEO 
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could do this by communicating to expert analysts their authoritative leadership that is unwilling to 
compromise, with a sense of completeness and assurance, as opposed to the CEOs of companies 
operating in a high discretion environment with flexible business model. Hence, the findings of this study 
emphasise that the use of words in analysts’ discussions that convey CERTAINTY by CEOs in the low 
discretion industry is in line with the legitimacy principle of discourse ethics in an environment with 
already-expected or known low levels of profitability and growth.   
7.2.3. ACTIVITY 
With respect to the ACTIVITY Master Variable, the statistically significant (p = 0.002, d = 0.31) shows 
that there is a statistically significant difference between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. Furthermore, this result shows that the ACTIVITY level in the annual reports of organisations 
in a high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the ACTIVITY level observed for 
organisations in a low discretion industry, with the former having a mean ACTIVITY score of 49.90 (SD 
= 2.01, z = - 0.28) while the mean value for the latter stands at 49.25 (SD = 2.13, z = - 0.43). This result 
supports Hypothesis 3(a). Although the z-scores of the two industry groups are within the normal range, 
nonetheless, the result suggests that the language used in the CEO letters of organisations in the high 
discretion industry is more likely than an organisation in the low discretion industry to be characterised 
by terms that convey movement, change, the implementation of ideas and the avoidance of inertia. In the 
context of this study, such language embraces industry competition, forceful action, personal triumph, 
the expression of task-completion, and the avoidance of neutrality and inactivity. In view of this, the CEOs 
of companies in a high discretion industry are potentially more likely to place emphasis on their 
accomplishments by conveying narcissistic self-confidence. Specifically, it suggests that these CEOs are 
more prone to use their letters to shareholders to communicate overconfidence in their professional and 
uncompromising competence to deliver positive performance results and to implement strategic change.  
Prior studies show that there is a relationship between ACTIVITY and leadership features of heroism 
(Badaracco, 2001), transformational change (Brown & Treviño, 2006), and self-confidence (Bénabou & 
Tirole, 2002). Specifically, Brown and Treviño (2006) explain that there is a tendency for leaders who 
advance transformational change to be engaged in unethical practices, particularly when they are driven 
by self-confidence. Although there is a positive impact of self-confidence on organisational performance 
and practices, yet, it is self-defeating when it advances towards overconfidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). 
Schrand and Zechman (2012) highlight that there is a strong correlation between overconfidence of CEOs 
and financial restatements. Supported by literature on ethical leadership, overconfidence leads to the 
search for attention by engaging bold decisions, that would otherwise, be considered as unfeasible by 
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most people (Kets de Vries, 2003). In addition, Chen (2010) shows that accounting frauds are more likely 
to be committed by overconfident leaders. This overconfidence is likely to undermine the fundamental 
credibility and quality of financial reporting (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The standpoint of this study is that 
the promise of the delivery of overly high performances by industries with high level of discretion can be 
understood through their potential aggressive financial communications. 
In contrast, the result for the low discretion industry are more muted and shows that the CEO letters of 
organisations within this industry are more likely to use language that conveys neutrality, lesser level of 
activity, and the acceptance of inertness, which suggests the potential unwillingness or inability of the 
CEOs to display overconfidence, be forceful, and with less emphasis on their accomplishments. It shows 
that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use this language to 
communicate their potential commitment to status-quo, the unwillingness or inability to drive movement, 
organisational or performance change, and the implementation of ideas (McClelland et al., 2010). Prior 
study shows that ethical leaders are less likely to be driven by heroic representations of their actions and 
decisions (Badaracco, 2001). Notwithstanding, they ensure that their organisations undertake change in 
a patient, careful, and incremental way. Hence, this study emphasises that the CEOs of organisations in 
the low discretion industry understand the dynamics of their industry with respect to growth prospects, 
and are more likely to drive organisational performance in a patient, careful, incremental, and ethical way. 
With respect to the result observed for analysts’ discussions, whilst in the direction predicted it did not 
reach a level of statistical significance between the ACTIVITY level in the analysts’ discussions of low 
and high discretion industries.  
7.2.4. REALISM 
With respect to the REALISM Master Variable, the test shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.031, d = 0.30) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. 
Furthermore, this result shows that the REALISM level in the annual reports of organisations in a low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher than the REALISM level observed for organisations 
in a high discretion industry, with the former having a mean REALISM score of 53.88 (SD = 2.47, z = 
1.39) while the mean value for the latter stands at 53.10 (SD = 2.78, z = 1.15). This result supports 
Hypothesis 4(a). Interestingly, the z-scores of the two industry groups are above the normal range, 
meaning the CEO letters in the annual reports of the two industry groups are not characterised by 
complex language. Nonetheless, the result indicates that the content of the CEO letters of organisations 
in the low discretion industry is more likely to be characterised by language that conveys more tangible, 
immediate, recognisable matters that affect the shareholders’ everyday lives.  
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With the discussion at the hypotheses development phase, REALISM is a measure of the complexity of 
language in a textual information, “…it is an inverse measure of the complexity of the language” (Patelli 
and Pedrini, 2015, p. 11). REALISM increases with a frequent use of terms that are concrete and familiar, 
while it reduces with the use of words that are complex, with long sentences, and uncommon terminology 
(Hart & Carroll, 2015; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The REALISM score of any textual information can inform 
two things: a lower value indicates higher lexical complexity, while a higher value indicates lower lexical 
complexity (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). As such, when the REALISM level is low, it creates readability 
problems for the target audience as it deviates from what is tangible, immediate, or recognisable to them. 
In contrast, a higher REALISM level ensures that the target audience is familiar with the language used 
in describing a subject matter.  
In the context of this study, a lower level of REALISM signifies complexity of the language used by CEOs 
in communicating with shareholders, while a higher value facilitates readability and makes the CEO 
letters readable and understandable. As the REALISM score of the low discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher than the score of the high discretion industry, it suggests that the CEO letters of 
companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to be easily read and understood than those 
disclosed by companies in the high discretion industry. While the REALISM scores for both industry 
groups are significantly higher values than the DICTION mean (49.36) for REALISM, this could be 
attributable to difference in time, place, and regulation that may not be captured by DICTION. 
Nonetheless, this does not detract from the results as they are primarily comparing high and low industry 
groups and not to DICTION.  
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) note that when complex lexicons are used in CEO letters to shareholders, it is 
a significant predictor of potential aggressive financial reporting. Similarly, Merkl-Davies and Brennan 
(2007) posit that the ‘ease of reading’ of a text is an area that is susceptible to rhetorical manipulation by 
using impression management tactics. Furthermore, Li (2008) emphasises that top management can use 
corporate narratives to manipulate and deceive investors when complex language is used in structuring 
those narratives. This is usually the case when they need to divert the attention of shareholders from 
unfavourable performance results (Courtis, 1986, 1998; Lehavy et al. 2011; Li, 2008; Patelli & Pedrini, 
2015). Therefore, familiar and concrete language in CEO letters as highlighted by the REALISM variable 
indicate faithful representation of performance results, while the use of complex lexicons in corporate 
narratives is a violation of the principle of comprehensibility in discourse ethics (Forester, 1980).  
To facilitate the mutual understanding of CEOs and the shareholders, the content of the CEO letters 
should be comprehensible and transparent (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015), a lack of which is a signal of potential 
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ethical lapses with accompanying consequences for the financial reporting function (Schaubroeck et al. 
2012). With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result is in line with the explanation for annual reports. 
It shows there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.046) between the REALISM scores of the 
analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries, with the former having a mean REALISM 
score of 57.56 (SD = 2.80, z = 2.52) while the mean value for the latter stands at 57.24 (SD = 2.76, z = 
2.42). This result supports Hypothesis 4(a). As explained for annual reports, the result shows that the 
CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to use more complex language when 
discussing their performance results with analysts, while their counterparts in the low discretion industry 
are more prone to use more tangible, familiar, and concrete language. This study posits that with the 
level of knowledge, expertise, and experience of analysts that cover the performance results of 
companies, it is most likely for the CEOs’ scheme of using complex language to be unsuccessful, while 
trying to manipulate the understanding of the analysts with respect to performance results.  
7.2.5. OPTIMISM 
With respect to the OPTIMISM Master Variable, the result (p = 0.286) shows that whilst there is no 
statistically significant difference between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries, the 
result is in the direction predicted. However, between the analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion 
industries the difference is approaching significance (p = 0.071, d = 0.07). Furthermore, this result shows 
that the OPTIMISM level in the analysts’ discussions of organisations in a high discretion industry is 
higher than the OPTIMISM level observed for organisations in a low discretion industry, with the former 
having a mean OPTIMISM score of 54.85 (SD = 5.67, z = 1.88), while the mean value for the latter stands 
at 54.43 (SD = 5.90, z = 1.74). This result supports Hypothesis 5(a). Accordingly, the result indicates that 
the financial communications of CEOs of organisations in the high discretion industry have more potential 
to convey words that are used to endorse some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting their 
positive entailments, than the words used by their counterparts in the low discretion industry. OPTIMISM 
increases when emphasis is placed on positive terms that are used to convey a sense of praise and 
satisfaction. On the other hand, it decreases with the use of words that express hardships (Hart & Carroll, 
2015). In view of this, Hooghiemstra (2000) suggests that the use of optimistic tone in corporate 
communications is a form of impression management.  
According to Patelli & Pedrini (2015), the distortion of financial reports towards depicting a more 
favourable financial situation is within the scope of aggressive financial reporting. This agrees with the 
view of Clatworthy and Jones (2003) that for impression management to be achieved using corporate 
narratives, top management will communicate using optimistic tone that tends to obfuscate failures and 
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emphasises successes. Similarly, Loughran and McDonald (2011) find a significant correlation between 
optimistic tone and material weaknesses of financial statements, however, this was found in the context 
of annual reports. Furthermore, the framework of Yuthas et al. (2002) shows that the fundamental 
elements of truth and sincerity in accounting narratives become jeopardised with aggressive financial 
reporting that stems from an optimistic tone, which could be a potential signal of unethical practices. 
Nonetheless, the need for a context-based approach for assessing the optimistic tone is essential to the 
understanding of the sincerity of corporate narratives during periods of general failure in the macro-
economy. Patelli and Pedrini (2013) conclude that during the economic crisis of 2008-2009, it was 
expected for CEO letters to be dominated by optimistic tone, to create an assurance of firm survival in an 
uncertain situation. This, they conclude, is in congruence with interim and future financial performance. 
Hence, the findings of this study on OPTIMISM support the views of prior studies on this element of text 
analysis.   
7.2.6 Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade 
As explained in the methodology chapter, these index scores (shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3) measure the 
ease-of-reading textual information, using average length of a sentence (a proxy used for the number of 
words in a sentence) and the average number of syllables per word in a sentence. The index scores are 
of two types – the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesh-Kincaid Readability Grade. Accordingly, Table 5.38 
in appendix 8 shows the Flesch Reading Ease (hereafter, readability score) and Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Grade (hereafter, readability grade) of the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of both 
low and high discretion industries. With respect to the annual reports, the readability scores show a non-
parametric statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.44) between the readability scores of the 
annual reports of low and high discretion industries. In addition, the mean readability scores of the low 
and high discretion industries are 30.92 (SD = 7.99) and 27.44 (SD = 7.81), respectively. Accordingly, 
the results mean that it is easier to read and understand annual reports published by companies in the 
low discretion industry than those published by companies in the high discretion industry. This result 
aligns with the stated Hypothesis 7(a).  
However, the readability scores observed for both industries’ annual reports are well below 40.0, a signal 
that both industries potentially make it difficult for their shareholders to read and understand the content 
of CEO letters published in annual reports. Furthermore, the result observed for the readability grades 
show that there is a statistical difference approaching significance (p = 0.059, d = 0.29) between the 
readability grades of annual reports of low and high discretion industries, while their mean grades are 
14.62 (SD = 1.97) and 15.15 (SD = 1.62), respectively. This suggests that a lower level of education is 
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required to read and understand the CEO letters of companies in the low discretion industry, while a 
higher level of education is required to comprehend those published by companies in the high discretion 
industry. This result is in the direction of the stated Hypothesis 7(b).  
With respect to the analysts’ discussions, the readability scores [mean values (Low = 58.54; High = 
58.12)] and readability grades [mean values (Low = 9.49; High = 9.65)] of both industries are in the 
direction predicted in Hypotheses 7 (a & b), although they did not reach any level of significance. 
However, the readability scores of the analysts’ discussions across the industries are very high, 
compared with those observed for CEO letters in annual reports. Despite the lack of statistical significant 
difference, the mean readability scores show that the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry (mean value = 58.54, SD = 6.84) are easier to read and understand compared to those 
in the high discretion industry (mean value = 58.12, SD = 6.71). In addition, and as expected, the 
readability grade of the analysts’ discussions is lower than readability grade of CEO letters in the annual 
reports. Accordingly, this study posits that the nature of an audience is a critical factor when the leadership 
of a company tries to disclose financial communications that are difficult to understand. The audience in 
earnings conference calls are expert analysts, hence, this limits the possibility of presenting ‘not easy-to-
read’ communications as they potentially would to the target audience of annual reports – the 
shareholders.  
As explained in the methodology chapter on the genre of text, the results in Table 5.7 show that the 
readability score of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 58.54, SD = 6.84) of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 3.71) than those of the annual reports 
(Mean = 30.92, SD = 7.99) disclosed within the same industry category. This is in line with Hypothesis 
8(a). Similarly, the readability grade of the annual reports of companies (Mean = 14.62, SD = 1.97) in the 
low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 2.92) than those of the analysts’ 
discussions (Mean = 9.49, SD = 1.51) disclosed within the same industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 
8(b). On the other hand, the readability score of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 58.12, SD = 6.71) of 
companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 4.21) than 
those of the annual reports (Mean = 27.44, SD = 7.81) disclosed within the same industry. This is in line 
with Hypothesis 8(c). Similarly, the readability grade of the annual reports of companies (Mean = 15.15, 
SD = 1.62) in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.000, d = 3.61) than 
those of the analysts’ discussions (Mean = 9.65, SD = 1.42) disclosed within the same industry. This is 
in line with Hypothesis 8(d).   
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Furthermore, the results in Table 5.7 show the readability scores and readability grades across the two 
document types - an aggregated readability score of annual reports of high and low discretion industries, 
in comparison with the aggregated score of analysts’ discussions of the two industries. The rationale for 
this approach was to understand the form of financial communication that is more susceptible to potential 
manipulation with respect to the readability and comprehensibility of corporate financial communication. 
The results show that there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 3.91) between the 
aggregated readability scores of CEO letters in annual reports of the two industries in comparison with 
the combined readability scores of the transcripts from analysts’ discussions of the two industries 
combined together. This means that it is easier to read and understand transcripts from analysts’ 
discussions from either of the industries than the CEO letters to shareholders in annual reports of the 
industry groups combined together. This is in line with Hypothesis 8(e). Interestingly, the aggregated 
mean readability scores of analysts’ discussions of the industry groups stand at 58.35 (SD = 6.78) a very 
high score compared with the readability score of 29.18 (SD = 8.08) of the annual reports for both 
industries.  
In addition, the maximum and minimum readability scores (shown in Table 5.76 in Appendix 11) of the 
industry groups’ analysts’ discussions are 80.00 and 36.60, respectively. On the other hand, the 
maximum and minimum readability scores of both industry groups’ annual reports are 57.00 and 9.50, 
respectively. These results align with the prediction that it is more difficult to read and understand CEO 
letters to shareholders in annual reports than narratives made to analysts in earnings conference calls. 
This study posits that there is the potential for the leadership of a company to make the content of CEO 
letters to shareholders more difficult to read and understand than the information it presents to 
experienced and expert analysts within the same period. Also, it posits that since earnings conference 
calls are conducted as a dialogue between two or more people, emphasis will be placed on the clarity of 
information provided for at least two reasons.  
First, the more difficult it is to read and understand information provided by top management during 
analysts’ discussions, the more it creates the room to be questioned back and forth to provide further 
information to clarify stated points. A situation that creates opportunity for analysts to dig deeper into the 
affairs of a company - a possibility CEOs would potentially want to inhibit. Second, there would be no 
need to make the information difficult to understand when members of top management are dealing with 
those that have expert understanding of information provided to them. On the other hand, annual reports 
are presented as a monologue with limited opportunity to question certain elements of the CEO letters, 
which may appear difficult to read and understand. Hence, this study posits that top management will 
potentially target annual reports when it needs to obfuscate vital information from the users of this 
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document type than it probably would when communicating with expert analysts, a task that can be aided 
by public relations specialists (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997). 
With respect to the aggregated readability grade of the industry groups’ forms of corporative narratives, 
the result shows there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 3.21) between the readability 
grades of the industry groups’ annual reports and analysts’ discussions. The rationale for this approach 
was to test which of the document types would require a higher education level in order to be able to read 
and understand their contents. Furthermore, the results show that the aggregated mean readability 
grades of analysts’ discussions for the industry groups is 9.57 (SD = 1.47), while that of annual reports 
is 14.89 (SD = 1.82). In addition, the maximum and minimum readability grades of the industry groups’ 
analysts’ discussions are 13.5 and 4.8, respectively. On the other hand, the maximum and minimum 
readability grades of the industry groups’ annual reports are 20.6 and 6.6, respectively. This result aligns 
with Hypothesis 8(f). Accordingly, it indicates that a higher level of education would be required to read 
and understand the contents of annual reports than those of analysts’ discussions. This further supports 
the reasoning that annual reports have potential to be targeted when top management intends to make 
their corporate narratives less transparent.    
7.3 Micro-level of analysis using the elements of each Master Variable 
Results reported in Tables 4.09 to 4.13 show the non-parametric statistically significant differences 
between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries, using the 
sub-features of each of the five Master Variables of DICTION. In total, there are 35 sub-features. Some 
of the sub-features increase the scores of each Master Variable, while there are those that reduce the 
scores of each Master Variable. The results observed are explained below for the sub-features of each 
Master Variable. Throughout this section, the notation “zL” is used to denote the z-score of the low 
discretion industry, while “zH” is used to denote the z-score of the high discretion industry. These scores 
are only included for the sub-feature scores that either reached a level of statistical significance at 5% 
and 1% or those approaching a level of significance. Furthermore, the notation “zLg” is used to denote 
the z-score of the low discretion industry during good times, while “zLb” is used to denote the z-score 
during bad times within the same industry. On the other hand, the notation “zHg” is used to denote the z-
score of the high discretion industry during good times, while “zHb” is used to denote the z-score during 
bad times within the same industry. 
7.3.1. COMMONALITY 
For the COMMONALITY Master Variable, three sub-features increase the COMMONALITY score, while 
three other sub-features decrease the same, as shown in Table 5.8. With respect to the sub-features that 
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increase the COMMONALITY score, the coefficients of Centrality (p = 0.003, d = 0.24, zL = 0.49, zH = 
0.19) and Rapport (p = 0.031, d = 0.09, zL = - 0.38, zH = - 0.44) show statistically significant difference 
between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. The results align with the stated 
Hypothesis 1(e) that these sub-features scores will be significantly higher for companies in the low 
discretion industry than for those in the high discretion industry. With respect to the sub-feature 
‘Cooperation’, the result is contrary to the stated hypothesis and was approaching a level of significance 
(p = 0.096, d = 0.19). The result shows that this sub-feature – ‘Cooperation’ - will be higher for the annual 
reports of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. With 
reference to the DICTION definition of this sub-feature, this suggests that the language used in the annual 
reports in the high discretion industry will show more group behavioural interactions among the 
companies in this industry, when compared to the language of ‘Cooperation’ among companies in the 
low discretion industry. Specifically, the language of ‘Cooperation’ measures terms that imply work 
relations, informal associations, intimate and neutral interactions, job-related tasks, personal 
involvement, and self-denial (Hart & Carrol, 2015, p. 10).  
Although ‘Cooperation’ is a critical component of COMMONALITY, yet the core sub-feature that 
measures the substantive agreement on core values, legitimacy, congruence, predictability, as well as 
institutional regularities is the sub-feature ‘Centrality’ (p = 0.003, d = 0.24, zL = 0.49, zH = 0.19). Similarly, 
the sub-feature ‘Rapport’ (p = 0.031, d = 0.09, zL = - 0.38, zH = - 0.44) measures attitudinal similarities 
among groups of people such as affinity, assent, deference, and id entity (Hart & Carrol, 2015, p. 10). In 
the context of this study, the language of ‘Cooperation’ as defined by DICTION does not carry as much 
weight as the language of ‘Centrality’ and ‘Rapport’ in the measure of COMMONALITY towards 
distinguishing between the annual reports of high and low discretion industries. With respect to the 
analysts’ discussions, the results show both ‘Centrality’ (p = 0.002, d = 0.15, zL = - 0.37, zH = - 0.48) and 
‘Cooperation’ (p = 0.03, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.26, zH = - 0.38) scores are statistically significant. This is in 
line with Hypothesis 1(e). This indicates that both sub-features are statistically significantly higher to 
increase the COMMONALITY score of companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high 
discretion industry.  
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the COMMONALITY score, the coefficient of ‘Diversity’ 
shows statistical significant difference (p = 0.006, d = 0.36, zL = - 0.03, zH = 0.29) between the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, the result shows that the mean ‘Diversity’ 
scores of the annual reports of low and high discretion industries are 1.89 (SD = 1.38) and 2.48 (SD = 
1.85), respectively. It indicates this score will be higher for companies in the high discretion industry than 
for those in the low discretion industry, towards reducing the COMMONALITY score. This aligns with 
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Hypothesis 1(i). Although the mean values of ‘Exclusion’ and ‘Liberation’ (3.15 and 0.89, respectively) 
are higher for the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry, yet, they do not show 
statistically significant difference from those in the low discretion industry (2.61 and 0.75, respectively).  
With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result shows that the score for ‘Diversity’ is statistically 
significant (p = 0.04, d = 0.10, zL = 0.17, zH = 0.27) between the analysts’ discussions of low and high 
discretion industries. While the score for ‘Diversity’ aligns with Hypothesis 1(i) in concluding that this score 
will be statistically significantly higher for the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion 
industry, the inverse was observed for the sub-feature ‘Liberation’ (although at a significance level of p = 
0.065, d = 0.11). The score for ‘Liberation’ is higher for companies in the low discretion industry [mean 
score (Low=0.76; High=0.64)]. With reference to DICTION on the definition of ‘Liberation’, it suggests 
that, during analysts’ discussions, companies in the low discretion industry will be keener to use language 
that connote the maximisation of individual choice as well as the rejection of industry conventions, in 
comparison with the companies in the high discretion industry. This study posits that although this result 
was approaching significance (p = 0.065, d = 0.11), it is not as significant as the result observed for 
‘Diversity’ (p = 0.04, d = 0.10, zL = 0.17, zH = 0.27), to cause significant change in the overall difference 
in COMMONALITY scores of the two industries’ analysts’ discussions.  
7.3.2. CERTAINTY 
For the CERTAINTY Master Variable, four sub-features increase the CERTAINTY score, while four other 
sub-features decrease the same, as shown in Table 5.9. With respect to the sub-features that increase 
the CERTAINTY score, the coefficient of ‘Insistence’ shows a statistically significant difference (p = 0.01, 
d = 0.26, zL = 0.18, zH = 0.41) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. This 
result aligns with Hypothesis 2(e). This indicates that the ‘Insistence’ score of the annual reports of the 
high discretion industry is higher than for the low discretion industry. On the other hand, the statistically 
insignificant scores observed for ‘Tenacity’, ‘Levelling Terms’, and ‘Collectives’, all move in an inverse 
direction against the stated hypothesis. In other words, they show higher scores for the annual reports of 
companies in the low discretion than for those in the high discretion industry.  
For the analysts’ discussions, the results show that ‘Levelling Terms’ and ‘Collectives’ both reflect a level 
of statistically significant difference (p = 0.065, d = 0.03, zL = 0.30, zH = 0.35; p = 0.025, d = 0.23, zL = - 
0.81, zH = - 0.94, respectively). Although the former aligns with the stated hypothesis and was 
approaching significance in the direction of the prediction, the latter moves in the opposite direction. It 
indicates that companies in the low discretion industry have a likelihood to use more ‘Collectives’ than 
those in the high discretion industry. With reference to DICTION definition, it connotes that CEOs of 
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companies in the low discretion industry use more singular nouns, connoting plurality that function to 
decrease specificity than those in the high discretion industry. With such definition, this study posits that 
this sub-feature (Collectives) is unlikely to affect the overall CERTAINTY score (which deals with 
resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness), if a larger sample is tested. As such, with a larger sample, 
the inverse score may not produce a higher level of CERTAINY in the analysts’ discussions of companies 
in the low discretion industry than those in the high discretion industry. 
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the CERTAINTY score, the coefficients of  ‘Ambivalence’ 
and ‘Self-Reference’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.005, d = 0.32, zL = - 1.37, zH = -1.50; 
p = 0.000, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.66, respectively) between the annual reports of low and high 
discretion industries, although the coefficient of ‘Numerical Terms’ (p = 0.052, d = 0.21) was approaching 
significance and in line with the prediction. The results align with Hypothesis 2(i). Accordingly, it indicates 
that the scores will be higher for CEO letters of companies in the low discretion industry than for those in 
the high discretion industry, towards reducing the CERTAINTY score. For the analysts’ discussions, the 
results show that ‘Numerical Terms’ and ‘Self-Reference’ both show statistically significant differences (p 
= 0.000, d = 0.36, zL = 0.79, zH = 0.44; p = 0.033, d = 0.17, zL = 0.18, zH = 0.28, respectively). Although 
the former aligns with Hypothesis 2(i), the latter moves in an opposite direction. It suggests that the CEOs 
of companies in the high discretion industry will make more reference to themselves during discussions 
with analysts than those in the low discretion industries. This is particularly useful in understanding blame 
shifting when CEOs report unfavourable performance results. By cross-referencing this to the result 
observed for ‘Collectives’, it indicates that during discussions with analysts, CEOs of companies in the 
high discretion industry are more likely to attribute the performance of their companies to themselves. On 
the other hand, those in the low discretion industry are more likely to share the responsibility of such 
performance results with other members of management. These results are very useful when considering 
the transition from first-person singular pronoun to first-person plural pronoun during periods of 
unfavourable performance results, as well as when making deceptive corporate narratives.  
7.3.3. ACTIVITY 
For the ACTIVITY Master Variable, four sub-features increase the ACTIVITY score, while three other 
sub-features decrease the same, as shown in Table 5.10. With respect to the sub-features that increase 
the ACTIVITY score, the coefficients of ‘Aggression’, ‘Accomplishment’, and ‘Motion’ all show statistically 
significant differences (p = 0.023, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.42, zH = - 0. 53; p = 0.024, d = 0.09, zL = 2.15, zH = 
2.25; p = 0.045, d = 0.27, zL = - 0.15, zH = 0.10, respectively) between the annual reports of low and 
high discretion industries. With the exception of ‘Aggression’, the results align with Hypothesis 3(e). The 
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results show that the sub-features ‘Accomplishment’ and ‘Motion’ are significantly higher for the annual 
reports of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. With the 
inverse movement of the result observed for ‘Aggression’, this particularly has significant implication for 
the standpoint of this study that companies in the high discretion industry have the potential to 
communicate using aggressive language when compared with the conservative language used in the low 
discretion industry.  
Accordingly, this result observed for ‘Aggression’ in annual reports suggests that companies in the low 
discretion industry have the potential to communicate using language signifying competition and forceful 
action, industry domination, company triumph over their competitors, and resistance against external 
forces, when compared with those in the high discretion industry. This does not align with Hypothesis 
3(e). With respect to analysts’ discussions, the results show that that the coefficients of ‘Aggression’, 
‘Accomplishment’, and ‘Communication’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.006, d = 0.24, zL 
= - 0.81, zH = - 0.71; p = 0.000, d = 0.29, zL = 0.11, zH = 0.33; p = 0.042, d = 0.25, zL = 0.33, zH = 0.08, 
respectively). The sub-variable ‘Motion’ (p = 0.086, d =0.10, zL = 0.79, zH = 0.91) reflects a result in the 
direction predicted and was approaching significance. With the exception of ‘Communication’, all other 
sub-feature scores align with the stated Hypothesis 3(e). Specifically, the result observed for ‘Aggression’ 
aligns with the standpoint of this study that the financial communications (analysts’ discussions) of 
companies in the high discretion industry is published using aggressive language when compared with 
the conservativeness in the corporate narratives published in the low discretion industry. With the inverse 
result observed for ‘Communication’, this indicates there is a greater use of terms that emphasise face-
to-face interactions between the company’s executive and its stakeholders for companies in the low 
discretion industry. Although this inverse movement is likely to affect the ACTIVITY score in general, yet, 
it does not undermine the potential aggressive reporting of companies in the high discretion industry 
during analysts’ discussions.  
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the coefficients of ‘Passivity’ and 
‘Embellishment’ show there is some significant statistical difference (p = 0.059, d = 0.18, zL = 1.06, zH = 
0.85; p = 0.002, d = 0.27, zL = 0.67, zH = 0.18, respectively) between the annual reports of low and high 
discretion industries. Accordingly, it suggests that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry 
have the potential to communicate more in passive language when compared to those in the high 
discretion industry. This is in line with stated Hypothesis 3(i). For discussions with analysts, the 
coefficients of ‘Cognition’ and ‘Passivity’ show statistically significant difference (p = 0.003, d = 0.15, zL 
= 0.47, zH = 0.63; p = 0.008, d = 0.17, zL = - 0.13, zH = - 0.32, respectively). While the result of the latter 
aligns with stated hypothesis as well as with the observation for annual reports, the result of the former 
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is an inverse of the stated hypothesis. It indicates that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion 
industry are more likely to communicate with analysts using a higher level of rationalistic, calculative, and 
intuitional language, when compared to those in the low discretion industry. This does not align with the 
stated hypothesis.   
7.3.4. REALISM 
For the REALISM Master Variable, six sub-features increase the REALISM score, while two other sub-
features decrease the same, as shown in Table 5.11. With respect to the sub-features that increase the 
REALISM score, the coefficient of ‘Concreteness’ shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.003, d 
= 0.34, zL = - 0.54, zH = - 0.74) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. This 
aligns with the Hypothesis 4(e). The result for ‘Present Concern’ (p = 0.074, d = 0.08, zL = - 0.82, zH = - 
0.74) was approaching significance and moves in the opposite direction. It indicates that companies in 
the high discretion category demonstrate significantly higher emphasis on matters of ‘Present Concern’ 
than those in the low discretion industry. This does not align with stated hypothesis. Nonetheless, the 
result observed for ‘Concreteness’ aligns with the standpoint that companies in the low discretion industry 
are more likely to communicate with language that is tangible, material, and recognisable by their 
shareholders, as opposed to those used in the high discretion industry. With respect to CEO discussions 
with analysts, the coefficient of ‘Temporal Terms’ (p = 0.070, d = 0.13, zL = 0.26, zH = 0.13) was 
approaching significance and moves in the direction of that predicted to differentiate between the 
analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, it suggests that the CEOs of 
companies in the low discretion industry have the potential to communicate more with language that 
signals concern for concrete and practical matters, when compared to those in the high discretion 
industry. This is similar with the observation for ‘Concreteness’ and it also aligns with stated Hypothesis 
4(e).   
With respect to sub-features that decrease the REALISM score, the coefficients of ‘Past Concern’ and 
‘Complexity’ show statistical significant difference (p = 0.005,  d = 0.30, zL = - 0.57, zH = - 0.34; p = 0.000, 
d = 0.52, zL = 1.53, zH = 1.97, respectively) between the annual reports of the two industries. 
Furthermore, the results observed support the prediction that companies in the high discretion industry 
are more likely to communicate with reference to past concerns, while they also have the potential to use 
the annual reports as a tool to make qualitative information on performance results complex for 
shareholders to read and understand. The results suggest that it is more complex to read and understand 
corporate narratives of companies in the high discretion industry than those in the low discretion industry. 
These results align with Hypothesis 4(i) as well as being similar to results of the Flesch Readability Index 
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in Tables 4.06 and 4.07. For discussions with analysts, the coefficient of ‘Past Concern’ show statistical 
significance (p = 0.005, d = 0.22, zL = - 0.03, zH = 0.16) between the analysts’ discussions of low and 
high discretion industries. This is in line with stated hypothesis as well as the results observed for annual 
reports.  
7.3.5. OPTIMISM 
For the OPTIMISM Master Variable, three sub-features increase the OPTIMISM score, while three other 
sub-features decrease the same, as shown in Table 5.12. With respect to the sub-features that increase 
the REALISM score, the coefficient of ‘Inspiration’ shows statistically significant difference (p = 0.030, d 
=0.13, zL = 0.27, zH = 0.41) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. It suggests 
that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to demonstrate a significantly 
higher level of language of ‘Inspiration’ in delivering target performance results. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 5(e). For analysts’ discussions, the coefficients of ‘Praise’ and ‘Inspiration’ show significant 
statistical differences (p = 0.000, d = 0.24, zL = 0.10, zH = 0.34; p = 0.019, d =0.08, zL = - 0.72, zH = - 
0.67, respectively) between the low and high discretion industries. This is in line with stated hypothesis 
and similar to the observation for annual reports. 
With respect to the sub-features that decrease the OPTIMISM score, the coefficients of ‘Blame’ and 
‘Denial’ show statistically significant differences (p = 0.010, d = 0.16, zL = - 0.73, zH = - 0.78; p = 0.000, 
d = 0.32, zL = 1.10, zH = - 1.47, respectively) between the annual reports of low and high discretion 
industries. It shows that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use 
significantly higher level of language that connote unfortunate circumstances, unplanned vicissitudes, 
negative contractions, and negative function words in their annual reports to shareholders, as opposed 
to the language used by CEOs in the high discretion industry. This aligns with Hypothesis 5(i). For 
discussions with analysts, no sub-feature produced a statistically significant difference between the two 
industries.   
7.4 Comparison between the language features of DICTION 7.0 and LIWC 2015 
In order to gain internal validity for the tests conducted using the five Master Variables of DICTION, 
another text analysis software was adopted known as Language Inquiry and Word Count 2015 (hereafter, 
LIWC). The rationale for this approach was to compare the language features represented across the 
five Master Variables of DICTION 7.0 (hereafter, DICTION) with a set of select language categories in 
LIWC 2015. The selection of the language categories from LIWC was based on their similarity with those 
of DICTION. Accordingly, a set of eleven (11) language categories were selected from LIWC with the aim 
of matching them with similar features in DICTION. Similar to the tests conducted using DICTION, the 
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comparison was conducted across the two document types – CEO letters in annual reports and 
transcripts of CEO oral statements from analysts’ discussions. Specifically, the language categories 
selected from LIWC are measures for ‘Tone’, ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’, ‘First Person Plural 
Pronoun’, ‘Positive Emotion’, ‘Negative Emotion’, ‘Certainty’, ‘Achievement’, ‘Risk’, ‘Past Focus’, ‘Present 
Focus’, and ‘Motion’. The results observed are explained below. 
The results in Table 5.77 in appendix 11 show the descriptive statistics of the language categories tested 
using LIWC. In addition, Table 5.45 in appendix 8 complements the results in Table 5.77 by comparing 
the calculated scores obtained from testing the documents with standardised LIWC scores. For the 
purpose of this study, the Grand Mean and Standard Deviation figures were adopted as representative 
of the standardised scores of LIWC. Furthermore, Table 5.13 adds to the analysis by presenting the 
results of the non-parametric test of statistically significant difference between the financial 
communications of the low and high discretion industries. Lastly, Table 5.13 reports the values of Cohen’s 
d, with the aim of understanding the effect sizes of the datasets used in testing for the differences between 
the financial communications of the low and high discretion industries across the eleven (11) language 
features of LIWC. The results in Table 5.13 inform the discussions hereafter. 
The results in Table 5.13 shows there is a statistically significant difference (p = 0.008, d = 0.34, zL = 
1.07, zH = 1.26) between the level of ‘Tone’ - a measure of the positivity or negativity of words (Henry 
(2008), contained in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry in comparison to 
those in the low discretion industry. Specifically, it shows that while the mean value of ‘Tone’ for 
companies in the high discretion industry stands at 83.56 (SD = 11.64), the mean value of ‘Tone’ for 
companies in the low discretion industry stands at 79.22 (SD = 13.96). This is line with Hypothesis 6(a). 
Similarly, the results observed for the ‘Tone’ level in the analysts’ discussions show that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.72, zL = 0.68, zH = 1.03) between the ‘Tone’ levels of 
CEO statements of companies in the low and high discretion industries. While the former has a mean 
‘Tone’ value of 69.96 (SD = 12.16), the latter has a mean ‘Tone’ value of 78.19 (SD = 10.67). This is in 
accord with the results observed for the difference in Tone levels in the annual reports of the companies 
in the low and high discretion industries. Accordingly, the results observed for both annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions suggest that the CEOs of companies in the high discretion industry have the 
potential to build the element of ‘Tone’ in their financial communications with both shareholders and 
analysts more than the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry.  
Henry (2008) introduced a novel approach in the measurement of ‘Tone’ in written text in terms of the 
positivity and negativity of words used by the author of a text. In her study, it was emphasised that the 
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level of ‘Tone’ increases as the proportion of positive words exceed negative words in a given text. The 
standpoint of this study is that there is the potential for aggressive reporting in the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry. In the same vein, with a potentially high 
level of certainty demonstrated by top managers in such industry towards the delivery of predicted high 
performance results, there is the likelihood for careful selection of positive words that would underlie their 
ability to and insistence on delivering such expectations. For a higher level of ‘Tone’ to be maintained, 
there is the potential for the CEOs of companies in a high discretion industry to carefully select positive 
words while avoiding communicating with negative words that would otherwise undermine their ability to 
deliver high performance expectations. Contrastingly, for companies in the low discretion industry, this 
study posits that there is the potential for their CEOs to communicate using less aggressive, or rather 
conservative language, due to the already known lower growth prospects for companies in the low 
discretion industry. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the CEOs of companies in the low discretion 
industry to either conservatively use positive words or use more negative words to emphasise their 
performance results in their financial communications, thereby resulting in a significantly lower level of 
‘Tone’ in comparison to those observed for companies in the high discretion industry.   
In addition, Table 5.13 shows the results for tests conducted for ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ and ‘First 
Person Plural Pronoun’. By triangulating these two LIWC categories with two sub-features of DICTION 
Master Variable ‘CERTAINTY’, they are by definition similar to the sub-features ‘Self-reference’ and 
‘Collectives’, respectively. For ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’, the results show that there is statistically 
significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.39, zL = - 1.88, zH = - 1.94) in the use of self-reference between 
the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, the results show that the low 
discretion industry has a mean value of 0.36 (SD = 0.45), while the mean value for the high discretion 
industry is 0.21 (SD = 0.31). The result indicates that the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry 
are more likely to use ‘First Person Singular Pronouns’ in their annual reports than those in the high 
discretion industry. For the results observed using the sub-feature ‘Self-reference’ in DICTION, the result 
also shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.66) 
between the use of ‘Self-reference’ in the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. For the 
DICTION sub-feature, the low discretion industry has a mean value of 2.47 (SD = 3.19), while the high 
discretion industry has a mean value of 1.61 (SD = 2.56). This aligns with the prediction made and in line 
with the results observed for the DICTION sub-feature.  
Prior research on deceptive narratives have argued that analysing for the use of self-reference can 
provide indication of deceptive communication and blame shifting (Churyk et al. 2009; Keila and 
Skillicorn, 2005; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 2004). Specifically, Bournois and Point (2006) 
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contend that it is an important tactical move when there is a sudden transition from the use of the first-
person singular pronoun to the first-person plural pronoun. In the same vein, studies of blame shifting 
have suggested that during the course of unfavourable events, there is likely to be an increase in the use 
of first-person plural pronoun. An individual is “less likely to blame themselves [in such a situation], so 
they speak about their accomplice[s] in addition to themselves” (Morrow, 2008, p. 20). On the other hand, 
Craig et al (2013) found a distinctive result for the use of self-reference in the confession letter of the 
Chairman of the Indian multi-national company, Satyam. They found that in the years prior to the 
revelation of the fraud there had been a sudden increase in the use of first-person plural pronouns from 
44% (2002-2003) to 82% (2003-2004); 89% (2004-2005); 94% (2005-2006); 98% (2006-2007); and to 
90% in 2007-2008 (the period before the revelation of fraud).  
Interestingly, the percentage of first-person plural pronoun in the confession letter of the Chairman 
decreased significantly to 9%, meaning that the percentage of first-person singular pronoun increased to 
91%, a trend that does not move in line with the blame shifting theory. Craig et al. (2013) conclude that 
this unusual transition signalled the Chairman’s tactic in exonerating members of his family –who were 
members of the top management of the company, from the purported fraud, thereby taking the blame for 
the entire top management. It is noteworthy that in the years when the company reported favourable 
financial performance, the Chairman used more of first-person singular pronoun (as evidenced in the 
56% first-person singular pronoun in 2002-2003), thereby attributing the performance of the company to 
himself. The results from Craig et al. (2013) suggest that it is possible for a single member of top 
management to acclaim both the favourable performance of a company to themselves or take sole 
responsibility for deceptive communication. This, again, is contrary to the blame shifting tactic in the 
transition from the first-person singular pronoun to the first-person plural pronoun.  
In the context of this study, the results observed for the difference in the absolute level of use of ‘Self-
reference’ between the annual reports of low and high discretion industry is not of prime interest. Hence, 
the significantly high level of ‘Self-reference’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry does not absolutely imply that there is a significantly high level of ‘Collectives’ in the annual 
reports of companies in the high discretion industry. In the same vein, a significantly lower level of ‘Self-
reference’ in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry does not imply the CEOs of 
the companies in this industry will take collective responsibility when faced with either bad performances 
or allegations of fraudulent reporting. This study emphasises the position of Craig et al. (2013) that rather 
than make any meaning in the absolute level of use in first person pronouns, what should be of prime 
interest is ‘the transition from a preponderance of singular first-person pronouns to plural first-person 
pronouns and vice versa…’ (p. 10).  
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With respect to the use of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in analysts’ discussions, the result is in the 
direction of prediction, although it did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.245, d =0.14). Similarly, the 
result observed for the use of ‘First Person Plural Pronoun’ is in line with prediction (p = 0.287, d = 0.14), 
it does not show any statistically significant difference between the annual reports of low and high 
discretion industries. On the other hand, although the result for the use of ‘First Person Plural Pronoun’ 
in analysts’ discussions is contrary to that predicted, it does not show a statistically significant difference 
between the two industries.   
Returning to Table 5.13 and the results for the use of ‘Positive Emotion’ and ‘Negative Emotion’ in the 
financial communications of low and high discretion industries. These two language categories of LIWC 
are triangulated with two sub-features ‘Satisfaction’ and ‘Denial’, respectively. The two sub-features are 
from the DICTION Master Variable ‘OPTIMISM’ and in line with the LIWC definitions for ‘Positive Emotion’ 
and ‘Negative Emotion’, respectively. For ‘Positive Emotion’, the result is line with that predicted although 
it did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.324, d = 0.08) to differentiate between the annual reports of 
low and high discretion industries. With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.65, zL = - 0.42, zH = - 0.15) between the level of 
‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low and high discretion industries. In 
addition, the mean value of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of the low discretion industry 
is 2.98 (SD = 0.70), while that of the high discretion industry is 3.43 (SD = 0.71). This is in line with the 
prediction.  
The results observed for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions suggest that the CEOs of 
companies in the high discretion industry have the potential to use more ‘Positive Emotion’ words in their 
financial communications than those in the low discretion industry. In comparison to the results observed 
for the sub-feature ‘Satisfaction’, the result moves in the same direction with that of ‘Positive Emotion’, 
although it did not reach a level of significance to distinguish between low and high discretion industries, 
with respect to both annual reports and analysts’ discussions (p = 0.826; p = 0.190, respectively). 
Specifically, the mean value of ‘Satisfaction’ in the annual reports of low discretion industry is 3.32 (SD = 
3.03), while that of the high discretion industry is 3.36 (SD = 2.82). With respect to analysts’ discussions, 
the mean values of ‘Satisfaction’ are 6.09 (SD = 6.88) and 6.23 (SD = 6.70) for the low and high discretion 
industries, respectively.  
On the other hand, the result for ‘Negative Emotion’ shows that there is statistically significant difference 
(p = 0.000, d = 0.52, zL = - 1.06, zH = - 1.25) between the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the annual 
reports of low and high discretion industries. In addition, the mean value of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the 
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annual reports of the low discretion industry is 0.69 (SD = 0.37), while that of the high discretion industry 
is 0.48 (SD = 0.43). This is in line with the prediction. Furthermore, the result shows that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d =0.36, zL = - 1.18, zH = - 1.27) between the level of 
‘Negative Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of the low and high discretion industries. In addition, the 
mean value of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of the low discretion industry is 0.55 (SD 
= 0.24), while that of the high discretion industry is 0.46 (SD = 0.24). This, again, is in line with the 
prediction.  
Accordingly, the results observed for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions suggest that CEOs 
of companies in the low discretion industry have the potential to use more ‘Negative Emotion’ words in 
their financial communications than those in the high discretion industry. In comparison to the results 
observed for the sub-feature ‘Denial’, the result shows that there is a statistically significant difference (p 
= 0.000, d =0.32, zL = - 1.48, zH = - 1.28) between the level of ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of the low 
and high discretion industries. Specifically, the mean value of the level of ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of 
companies in the low discretion industry is 1.10 (SD = 1.16), while that of the high discretion industry is 
0.74 (SD = 1.05). This result moves in the same direction as that of ‘Negative Emotion’. With respect to 
analysts’ discussions, the result observed for ‘Denial’ is in line with prediction, although it did not reach a 
level of significance (p = 0.725, d = 0.00), with mean values of 5.75 (SD = 3.47) and 5.73 (SD = 3.60) for 
the low and high discretion industries, respectively.   
Prior research on the use of positive and negative emotion words suggest that individuals often 
experience emotional reaction when they try to engage in deceptive communication (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). Similarly, Craig et al. (2013) contend that it is possible for such emotional 
reaction to be manifest in written communications, a view held in Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012). They 
concluded that in the course of presenting company performance in quarterly earnings conference calls, 
deceptive CEOs used more extreme positive emotion words and fewer extreme negative emotion words 
(Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2012). Furthermore, they emphasised that deceptive CEOs are more likely to 
feel very emotional – at least inwardly, while showing signs of guilt and fear of exposure. Similarly, Craig 
et al. (2013) argue that as the level of deception grows in an organisation’s performance results, the CEO 
letters to shareholders would be used to underline the feeling of guilt and desire to protect the blossoming 
reputation of the CEO. This desire will be manifest in the choice of extreme positive words and extreme 
negative words.  
In the context of this study, the prime focus is to assess and differentiate between the use of emotion 
words between the low and high discretion industries. In view of this, this study posits that the pressure 
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on companies in the high discretion industry has the potential to create an environment where the CEOs 
are expected to deliver high performance results, specifically due to high growth expectations for 
companies in this industry grouping. Accordingly, there is the likelihood for the CEOs of companies in the 
high discretion industry to use all forms of impression management tactics and possible aggressive 
financial reporting measures to signal their ability to deliver market expectations. Indeed, as the scale 
and impact of analysts’ expectations and market pressures increase, the CEOs of companies in the high 
discretion industry have the potential to use more extreme positive emotion words to underline their 
emotional responses to market expectations. On the other hand, due to the already-known lower growth 
prospects for companies in the low discretion industry, this study argues that the level of pressure on 
companies in the low discretion industry to attain higher-than-normal performance results is not as high 
when compared to the pressure on companies in a high discretion industry. Accordingly, this has the 
potential to create a situation where the CEOs of companies in the low discretion industry use more 
extreme negative emotion words to underline their emotional responses to the dynamics of their market 
environment in comparison to companies in the high discretion industry.  
Furthermore, Table 5.13 shows the LIWC results of ‘Certainty’ in the financial communications of low and 
high discretion industries. This language category of LIWC was triangulated with the CERTAINTY Master 
Variable of DICTION, due to their similarity in definition. The results show that for both the annual reports 
and analysts’ discussions, there is no statistically significant difference between the level of ‘Certainty’ in 
the financial communications of low and high discretion industries. For the annual reports, the result 
observed is contrary to the prediction although it did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.275, d = 0.13). 
On the other hand, for the analysts’ discussions, the result is in the direction of the prediction, although it 
did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.229, d = 0.13). For the CERTAINTY Master Variable of 
DICTION, the result shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.34) between 
the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of low and high discretion industries.  
Furthermore, the results show that the mean value of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies in 
the low discretion industry is 47.39 (SD = 4.17), while the mean value for companies in the high discretion 
industry is 48.73 (SD = 3.73). This is line with the prediction that companies in the high discretion industry 
will have a significantly higher level of CERTAINTY than those in the low discretion industry. With respect 
to analysts’ discussions, the result was approaching a level of significance (p = 0.054, d = 0.18, zL = - 
0.01, zH = 0.06), but contrary to the prediction. Combined together, the results for the annual reports 
using DICTION’s CERTAINTY and the analysts’ discussions using LIWC’s ‘Certainty’ are in line with the 
prediction, with the result of DICTION showing statistically significant difference between the low and 
high discretion industries, while that of LIWC was approaching a level of significance.  
325 | P a g e  
 
In addition, Table 5.13 shows the result for the language of ‘Achievement’ in the financial communications 
of low and high discretion industries. This language category of LIWC was triangulated with the sub-
feature ‘Accomplishment’ of the ACTIVITY Master Variable of DICTION, due to their similarity in 
definition. The results show that for both the annual reports (p = 0.000, d = 0.46, zL = 2.83, zH = 3.41) 
and analysts’ discussions (p = 0.000, d = 0.47, zL = 1.06, zH = 1.46), there are statistically significant 
differences in the language of ‘Achievement’ between the low and high discretion industries. Specifically, 
the mean value of ‘Achievement’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry group 
is 3.62 (SD = 1.06), while that of companies in the high discretion industry group is 4.10 (SD = 1.04). With 
respect to analysts’ discussions, the mean values of ‘Achievement’ for the low and high discretion 
industries are 2.17 (SD = 0.70) and 2.50 (SD = 0.74), respectively. These two results are as predicted 
that companies in the high discretion industry will significantly use more language of ‘Achievement’ in 
their financial communications than those in the low discretion industry.  
Similarly, the results for the sub-feature ‘Accomplishment’ shows, for the annual reports, that there is 
statistically significant difference (p = 0.024, d = 0.09, zL = 2.15, zH = 2.25) in the language of 
‘Accomplishment’ between the low and high discretion industries. Again, the results observed for 
analysts’ discussions show that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.29, zL = 0.11, 
zH = 0.33) in the language of ‘Accomplishment’ between the low and high discretion industries. 
Specifically, the mean value of ‘Accomplishment’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry is 34.57 (SD = 13.40), while that of companies in the high discretion industry is 35.55 (SD = 
9.13). With respect to analysts’ discussions, the mean values of ‘Accomplishment’ for the low and high 
discretion industries are 15.37 (SD = 7.13) and 17.43 (SD = 6.88), respectively. These two results are as 
predicted that companies in the high discretion industry will significantly use more language of 
‘Accomplishment’ in their financial communications than those in the low discretion industry.  
Looking again at Table 5.13 it shows the results for the language of ‘Risk’ in the financial communications 
of low and high discretion industries. This language category of LIWC was triangulated with the sub-
feature ‘Ambivalence’ of the CERTAINTY Master Variable of DICTION, due to their similarity in definition. 
For the language of ‘Risk’, the result shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 
0.33, zL = - 0.05, zH = - 0.32) between the annual reports of low and high discretion industries. 
Furthermore, the results show that the mean value of ‘Risk’ in the annual reports of companies in the low 
discretion industry is 0.45 (SD = 0.29), while that of companies in the high discretion industry is 0.34 (SD 
= 0.34). This is in line with the prediction that companies in the low discretion industry will significantly 
use more language of ‘Risk’ in their financial communications than those in the high discretion industry.  
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With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result is in line with the prediction although it did not reach a 
level of significance (p = 0.194, d = 0.06). For the sub-feature ‘Ambivalence’, the result shows that there 
is statistically significant difference (p = 0.005, d = 0.32, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.50) between the annual 
reports of the low and high discretion industries. Specifically, it shows that while the mean value of 
‘Ambivalence’ for companies in the low discretion industry stands at 4.16 (SD = 2.91), the mean value of 
‘Ambivalence’ for companies in the high discretion industry stands at 3.28 (SD = 2.47). This, again, is in 
line with prediction and with the results for the language of ‘Risk’ as measured by LIWC. The results 
observed for the language of ‘Ambivalence’ in analysts’ discussions is contrary to the prediction, although 
it did not reach a level of significance.  
In addition, Table 5.13 shows the results for ‘Past Focus’ and ‘Present Focus’ in the financial 
communications of low and high discretion industries. Due to their similarities in definitions, these two 
language categories of LIWC were triangulated with the sub-features ‘Past Concern’ and ‘Present 
Concern’, respectively, for which both are of the REALISM Master Variable of DICTION. For ‘Past Focus’, 
the result is contrary to the prediction, although it did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.658, d = 
0.03) to differentiate between the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries, with respect to 
the language of ‘Past Focus’. Specifically, the mean value of ‘Past Focus’ for the low discretion industry 
is 1.97 (SD = 0.56), while that of the high discretion industry is 1.95 (SD = 0.78). With respect to the 
analysts’ discussions, the result is in line with the prediction, although it did not reach a level of 
significance (p = 0.332, d = 0.03) to differentiate between the analysts’ discussions of the low and high 
discretion industries, with respect to the language of ‘Past Focus’. Specifically, the mean value of ‘Past 
Focus’ for the low discretion industry is 2.80 (SD = 0.85), while that of the high discretion industry is 2.82 
(SD = 0.65). For the sub-feature ‘Past Concern’, the result shows that there is statistically significant 
difference (p = 0.005, d = 0.30, zL = - 0.57, zH = - 0.34) between the language of ‘Past Concern’ in the 
annual reports of the low and high discretion industries. Furthermore, it shows that the mean value of 
‘Past Concern’ in the annual reports of the low discretion industry is 2.10 (SD = 1.30), while that of the 
high discretion industry is 2.69 (SD = 2.45). This is in line with the prediction that the annual reports of 
companies in the high discretion industry will have a significantly higher level of ‘Past Concern’ than for 
those in the high discretion industry.  
Similarly, the result for the analysts’ discussions shows that there is statistically significant difference (p 
= 0.005, d = 0.22, zL = - 0.03, zH = 0.16) between the language of ‘Past Concern’ in the analysts’ 
discussions of the low and high discretion industries. In addition, it shows that the mean value of ‘Past 
Concern’ in the analysts’ discussions of the low discretion industry is 3.49 (SD = 2.12), while that of the 
high discretion industry is 3.99 (SD = 2.46). Again, this is in line with the prediction and the analysts’ 
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discussions of companies in the high discretion industry will have a significantly higher level of ‘Past 
Concern’ than for those in the low discretion industry. With respect to the language of ‘Present Focus’, 
the result is in line with the prediction, although it did not reach a level of significance (p = 0.7, d = 0.02) 
to differentiate between the annual reports of companies in the low and high discretion industries. 
Specifically, the mean value of ‘Present Focus’ for the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry is 5.21 (SD = 1.38), while that of the high discretion industry is 5.19 (SD = 1.47). With respect to 
analysts’ discussions, the result is contrary to the prediction, although it did not reach a level of 
significance (p = 0.659, d = 0.02). For the sub-feature ‘Present Concern’, the results are contrary to the 
prediction for both annual reports and analysts’ discussion, although neither reached a level of 
significance. However, the result of the annual reports was approaching significance (p = 0.074, d = 0.08, 
zL = - 0.82, zH = - 0.74) to differentiate between the language of ‘Present Concern’ in the annual reports 
of the low and high discretion industries. 
Lastly, Table 5.13 shows the result for the language of ‘Motion’ in the financial communications of 
companies in the low and high discretion industries. This language category of LIWC (also referred to as 
LIWC’s ‘Motion’) was triangulated with the sub-feature ‘Motion’ of the ACTIVITY Master Variable of 
DICTION (also referred to as DICTION’s ‘Motion’), based on their similarity in definition. With respect to 
LIWC’s ‘Motion’, the result shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.032, d = 0.28), zL 
= 0.66, zH = 0.88 in the language of ‘Motion’ between the annual reports of the low and high discretion 
industries. Specifically, the mean value of LIWC’s ‘Motion’ for the annual reports of companies in the low 
discretion industry is 2.83 (SD = 0.73), while that of companies in the high discretion industry is 3.06 (SD 
= 0.89). This is in line with the prediction that there will be a higher level of the language of ‘Motion’ in the 
annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. 
In addition, the result also shows that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.000, d = 0.42, zL = 
0.37, zH = 0.61) in the language of ‘Motion’ between the analysts’ discussions of the low and high 
discretion industries. Specifically, the mean value of ‘Motion’ for the analysts’ discussions of companies 
in the low discretion is 2.53 (SD = 0.61), while that of companies in the high discretion industry is 2.78 
(SD = 0.58). Again, this is in line with the prediction that there will be a higher level of the language of 
‘Motion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low 
discretion industry.  
With respect to the sub-feature ‘Motion’ of the ACTIVITY Master Variable of DICTION, the result shows 
that there is statistically significant difference (p = 0.045, d = - 0.15, zL = 0.17, zH = 0.10) in the language 
of ‘Motion’ between the annual reports of the low and high discretion industries. Specifically, the mean 
value of DICTION’s ‘Motion’ for the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is 1.95 (SD 
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= 1.53), while that of the companies in the high discretion industry is 2.46 (SD = 2.17). This is in line with 
prediction and also aligns with the results observed for LIWC’s ‘Motion’ in annual reports. For the analysts’ 
discussions, the result is in line with the prediction and also aligns with the results observed for LIWC’s 
‘Motion’ in analysts’ discussions, and was approaching a level of significance (p = 0.086, d = 0.10, zL = 
0.79, zH = 0.91) to differentiate between the language of ‘Motion’ between the analysts’ discussions of 
the low and high discretion industries.  
7.5 Analysis for the ‘Good and Bad’ Performance Periods 
In this study, additional tests were conducted to determine the language characteristics of companies in 
both low and high discretion industries during periods of good and bad performance results. These tests 
were conducted using all the five DICTION Master Variables and sub-features, Flesch Reading Ease, 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, and some eleven (11) LIWC language categories. This was done for 
the purpose of extracting the language features that help inform how the CEOs of companies in both 
industries engage financial communication strategies towards expressing the performance results of their 
companies during good and bad times. This is particularly useful for auditors, entity risk assessors, 
regulators, and vigilant shareholders in understanding potential financial disasters through the qualitative 
financial information provided by CEOs of companies.  
For the purpose of differentiating between good and bad times, the Actual Net Income of the companies 
in both low and high discretion industries were compared with Consensus Net Income Estimates for each 
of the relevant periods 2011-2015 (for 43 companies) and 2014-2018 (for 17 companies). The 
comparison between the Actual Net Income and Consensus Net Income Estimates creates another 
measure known as Net Income Surprise. For the purpose of this study, this was measured as [(Actual 
Net Income – Consensus Net Income Estimate) ÷ Consensus Net Income Estimate]. In simple terms, 
the Actual Net Income is the Net Income reported by each company according to Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) for each accounting period, while the Consensus Net Income Estimate is 
a prediction of Net Income made by analysts, which is expected to be earned by a company during a 
particular accounting period. It is noteworthy that the Net Income Surprise is a percentage measure and 
it shows to what degree the Actual Net Income as reported by a company deviates from the predicted 
Consensus Net Income Estimates made by analysts for that particular period. For the purpose of this 
study, a general rule was adopted for clearly differentiating between good and bad performance results 
using a 10% rule, which was covered at the methodology stage.  
The categorisation of the performance of each of the companies for each of the periods into good and 
bad times is shown in Appendix 6. Across the five-year period on either side of the industry groups, a 
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total of seventy (70) quarterly reports align to the definition of bad financial performance for companies 
in the low discretion industry, while a total of thirty-five (35) quarterly reports align to the definition of bad 
financial performance for companies in the high discretion industry. For both industry groups, there are 
150 quarterly reports on each side. Furthermore, analysis was conducted at four different levels using 
the five Master Variables of DICTION, the Flesch-Kincaid Readability Measures, all the sub-features of 
the five Master Variables of DICTION, and how some of these sub-features compare to some 11 
language categories of LIWC. First, comparison was conducted on how low and high discretion industries 
communicate during good times. Second, how they compare in their financial communications during 
bad times. Third, how companies within the low discretion industry communicate during good and bad 
times. Lastly, how companies in the high discretion industry communicate during good and bad times. 
Accordingly, the results observed for the financial communications of the low and high discretion 
industries are explained at the Macro level of Analysis, Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Grade, Micro-level of Analysis, and 11 LIWC language categories, hereafter.  
Table 5.78 in appendix 11 shows the descriptive statistics of each industry’s scores on the five DICTION 
Master Variables with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ discussions during good times. It 
shows the maximum, minimum, mean, median, and standard deviation scores of the financial 
communication documents of each industry when they reported good performance results, in accordance 
with the pre-defined measure of good times. Similarly, Table 5.78 shows the Flesch Reading Ease and 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades of the two industry groups’ annual reports and analysts’ discussions. 
Furthermore, results reported in Table 5.46 in appendix 8 show the non-parametric statistically significant 
difference between the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries 
during good times. During good times, in differentiating between the annual reports of these two industry 
groupings, the results show that the coefficients of COMMONALITY, CERTAINTY, ACTIVITY, and 
REALISM are statistically significant (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.32, zL = - 0.01, zH = - 0.25; p-value = 0.023, 
d =0.24, zL = - 0.55, zH = - 0.21; p-values = 0.002, d = 0.39, zL = - 0.46, zH = - 0.27; p-value = 0.033, d 
=0.35, zL = 1.41, zH = 1.13, respectively). The result for OPTIMISM was in the direction of the prediction 
although it did not reach a level of significance (p-value = 0.679, d = 0.01). Accordingly, Hypotheses 1(b), 
2(b), 3(b), and 4(b) are supported by these results. They were as predicted and similar with those 
observed without differentiating between good and bad times.  
Similarly, in differentiating between the analysts’ discussions of these industries, the result for REALISM 
is in the direction of prediction and was approaching a level of significance (p = 0.062, d = 0.16, zL = 
2.52, zH = 2.38). With respect to the Flesch Reading Ease, the results show that for both annual reports 
and analysts’ discussions there are statistically significant differences (p-value = 0.001, d = 0.49; p-value 
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= 0.02, d =0.16, respectively) between the readability scores of the two financial communication 
documents of companies in the low and high discretion industries. This is in line with Hypothesis 7(c). 
Similarly, the results show that for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions, there are statistically 
significant differences (p-value = 0.023, d = 0.38; p-value = 0.019, d =0.20, respectively) between the 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades of the two financial communication documents of companies in the 
low and high discretion industries. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 7(d). Accordingly, the implications 
of the above results are explained below.   
With respect to COMMONALITY, the result shows that with a net income surprise that is positive and not 
significantly negatively different from the expectations of the market, the level of COMMONALITY in the 
annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.002, d 
= 0.32, zL = - 0.01, zH = - 0.25) than those in the high discretion industries. This is in line with Hypothesis 
1(b). During good times, the result suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely 
to communicate using language that highlights institutional regularities, substantive agreement on core 
values and group product, in their annual reports than those in the high discretion industry. Accordingly, 
this suggests that companies in the high discretion industry may be more likely to use language that 
signifies deviation from commonly used accounting principles in explaining how they were able to 
individually attain the level of Net Income expected of them by the market. This could have the potential 
to create a culture of aggressively recognising income that could otherwise be reported in periods when 
they become earned.  
For CERTAINTY, the result shows that during good times, the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports 
of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.023, d = 0.24, zL = - 
0.55, zH = - 0.21) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(b). During 
good times, the result suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that indicates resoluteness, completeness, precision, and the avoidance of 
hesitation, which demonstrates their ability to meet or exceed target expectations, in their annual reports 
than those in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, this suggests that companies in the high discretion 
industry have the potential to use language that signifies authoritative leadership that is unwilling to 
compromise, with accompanying sense of assurance, which seeks approval and prides itself on 
persuasion. As such, this is demonstrated through the use of tight control mechanisms that undervalues 
ethical behaviour in exchange for self-interest (Turner et al., 2002). Sama and Shoaf (2008) posit that as 
authoritative leaders focus more on transactions and profitability, they are more likely to resort to unethical 
behaviours. Accordingly, the result observed for the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of the two 
industries suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are potentially more likely to engage in 
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unethical recognition of income and unethical financial reporting when communicating how they attain 
the level of income expected of them by the market.  
With respect to ACTIVITY, the result shows that during good times, the level of ACTIVITY in the annual 
reports of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.002, d = 0.39, 
zL = - 0.46, zH = - 0.27) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 3(b). 
During good times, the result suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that indicates competition, forceful action, and the avoidance of inertia, in 
their annual reports, than those in the low discretion industry. Accordingly, this suggests that companies 
in the high discretion industry have a higher potential to use language that emphasises overconfidence 
in their ability to pioneer change and deliver positive performance results. This language reveals traits of 
heroism (Badaracco, 2001), self-confidence (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002), and transformational change 
(Brown & Treviño, 2006). Specifically, Brown and Treviño note that when driven by self-confidence, 
leaders who seek transformational change resort to unethical behaviours. In the same vein, Badaracco 
(2001) argues that the pursuit of heroism is not the primary focus of ethical leaders, who would seek to 
establish change patiently, carefully, and incrementally. The result suggests that companies in the high 
discretion industry are more likely to demonstrate a higher level of aggression in their annual reports to 
the extent that it could reveal the potential for companies in this industry to engage in unethical practice.  
With respect to REALISM, the result shows that during good times, the level of REALISM in the annual 
reports of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.033, d = 0.35, 
zL = 1.41, zH = 1.13) than those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 4(b). During 
good times, the result suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to 
communicate using language that seeks to identify what is recognisable to the stakeholders in their 
industry, as opposed to what is considered implausible or unfamiliar to them. On the other hand, the 
result suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to use language that are 
less likely to depict tangible, immediate, and recognisable matters that conform to the reality of things 
commonly known to their stakeholders. This is particularly facilitated through the use of complex terms, 
long sentences, and uncommon terminology (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015). The emphasis on REALISM 
reflects the level of ease of reading of corporate narratives, which, conventionally, is prone to rhetorical 
manipulation, based on the insight from impression management theory (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
Similarly, Li (2008) stresses that the use of complex language in corporate narratives is a strategy that 
has the potential to be used in deceiving investors. Hence, the result observed for REALISM in this study 
suggests that companies in the high discretion industry are more likely to rhetorically manipulate the 
content of annual reports than those in the low discretion industry.  
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Reflecting on the Flesch Readability Score, the results show that during good times, the readability scores 
for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions are statistically significantly higher (p = 0.001, d = 0.49; 
p = 0.02, d = 0.16, respectively) for companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high 
discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 7(c). During good times, the result suggests that it is 
easier to read and understand the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry than those in the high discretion industry. Furthermore, the results show that the 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions are statistically 
significantly higher (p = 0.023, d = 0.38; p = 0.019, d = 0.20, respectively) for companies in the high 
discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 7(d). 
During good times, the result suggests that a higher level of education will be required to read and 
understand the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry than 
for those in the low discretion industry. 
Table 5.79 in appendix 11 shows the descriptive statistics of each industry’s scores on the five DICTION 
Master Variables with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ discussions during bad times. It shows 
the maximum, minimum, mean, median, and standard deviation scores of the financial communication 
documents of each industry when they reported bad performance results, in accordance with the pre-
defined measure of bad times. Similarly, Table 5.14 shows the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid 
Readability Grades of the two industries’ annual reports and analysts’ discussions. Furthermore, results 
reported in Table 5.15 show the non-parametric statistically significant difference between the annual 
reports and analysts’ discussions of low and high discretion industries during bad times. During bad times, 
in differentiating between the annual reports of these two industries, the results show that the coefficient 
of COMMONALITY is statistically significant (p-value = 0.007, d = 1.17, zL = 0.04, zH = - 0.74) in 
differentiating between the annual reports of companies in the low and high discretion industries. This is 
in line with Hypothesis 1(b). Furthermore, the result for OPTIMISM is in the direction of the prediction 
although it did not reach a level of significance (p-value = 0.164, d = 0.39).  
Similarly, in differentiating between the analysts’ discussions of these industries, the coefficient of 
COMMONALITY shows statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.025, d = 0.48, zL = - 0.28, zH = - 
0.61) between the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low and high discretion industries. Again, 
this is line with Hypothesis 1(b). Although the result for REALISM was approaching a level of significance 
(p-value = 0.06, d = 0.54, zL = 2.51, zH = 3.01), it is contrary to the prediction. With respect to Flesch 
Reading Ease, the result shows that for analysts’ discussions, there is statistically significant difference 
(p-value = 0.041, d = 0.60) between the readability scores of the analysts’ discussions of companies in 
the low and high discretion industries. However, this is contrary to the prediction. Similarly, the result for 
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the Readability Grade was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.065, d = 0.50) and contrary 
to the prediction. Accordingly, the implications of the above results are explained below. 
With respect to COMMONALITY, the results show that with a negative net income surprise, the level of 
COMMONALITY in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.007, d = 1.17, zL = 0.04, zH = - 0.74; p-value = 
0.025, d = 0.48, zL = - 0.28, zH = - 0.61, respectively) than those in the high discretion industry. These 
results are in line with Hypothesis 1(b). During bad times, the results suggest that companies in the low 
discretion industry have a higher potential to communicate using language that highlights institutional 
regularities, substantive agreement on core values and group product, in both annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions than those in the high discretion industry. Interestingly, the effect size of the 
difference between the COMMONALITY level in the annual reports during bad times (d = 1.17) is very 
high compared to the effect size during good times (d = 0.32) between the two industry groups. This is 
the similar for discussions with analysts as the effect size for bad times (d = 0.48) is higher than during 
good times (d = 0.07).  
Specifically, it shows that the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry have a higher mean value of COMMONALITY during bad times (49.68 and 48.81, respectively) 
than in good times (49.55 and 48.07, respectively). In contrast, the annual reports and analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the high discretion industry have a lower mean value of COMMONALITY 
during bad times (47.56 and 47.92, respectively) than in good times (48.90 and 48.24, respectively). 
Accordingly, this suggests that companies in the low discretion industry are more likely to use language 
that signifies agreement with using common accounting principles and narratives in explaining the 
common problems they encounter that makes it difficult to collectively attain the level of Net Income 
expected of them by the market, which further advances their isomorphism. On the other hand, it shows 
that during bad times, companies in the high discretion industry have a greater potential to be less 
isomorphic or with a higher likelihood to be heterogeneous, by deviating from using common accounting 
principles and financial narratives commonly available in their industry. 
Considering the Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that during bad times, the readability score of 
the analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p = 0.041, d = 0.60) for companies in the high 
discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. This is contrary with Hypothesis 7(c). 
During bad times, the results suggest that it is easier to read and understand the analysts’ discussions 
of companies in the high discretion industry than those in the low discretion industry. This is particularly 
interesting as the readability score for the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion 
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industry was lower during good times (Mean = 57.93) in comparison to bad times (Mean = 61.35). On the 
other hand, the readability score of the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion was 
higher during good times (Mean = 59.00) in comparison to bad times (M = 57.69). While the latter is in 
line with the prediction, the former is contrary to the prediction.  
Accordingly, this study posits that while it is more difficult to read and understand the corporate narratives 
of companies in the high discretion industry in comparison to companies in the low discretion industry, 
this may likely have a further negative impact on the stakeholder community during bad times. Therefore, 
the difficulty in their narratives may need to be reduced in a way that it makes it easier for their 
stakeholders to understand the reasons why they are experiencing bad performance results. 
Furthermore, the results show that for both low and high discretion industries, it is easier to read and 
understand their analysts’ discussions in comparison to their annual reports. While the readability scores 
of the analysts’ discussions of both industries sit in the region of “Easily Understood” on the readability 
scale, those of their annual reports are in the region of “Very Difficult to Read and Understand”. This 
aligns with the initial position that the ease or difficulty of understanding corporate narratives is a function 
of the genre of text and the target audience.   
Table 5.80 in appendix 11 shows the descriptive statistics of the low discretion industry’s scores on the 
five DICTION Master Variables with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ discussions during good 
and bad times. It shows the maximum, minimum, mean, median, and standard deviation scores of the 
financial communication documents of the companies in the low discretion industry when they reported 
good and bad performance results, in accordance with the pre-defined measures of good and bad times. 
Similarly, Table 5.80 shows the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades of the 
industry’s annual reports and analysts’ discussions during good and bad times. Furthermore, results 
reported in Table 5.16 show the non-parametric statistically significant difference between good and bad 
times, with respect to how companies in the low discretion industry communicate in their annual reports 
and analysts’ discussions. In differentiating between good and bad times, the result shows that the level 
of COMMONALITY in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.016, d = 0.34, zLg = - 0.55, zLb = - 0.28) than those with good financial 
results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have a lower level of 
COMMONALITY (Mean = 48.07) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 48.81), within the 
same industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(c) to posit that companies in the low discretion industry 
will use more language of COMMONALITY when they experience bad performance results to underline 
a common problem and build a sense of community than when they do experience good performance 
results.  
335 | P a g e  
 
Furthermore, the result shows that the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies with good 
performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.006, d = 0.46, zLg = - 0.55, zLb = -
1.35) than those with bad financial results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance 
results have a higher level of CERTAINTY (Mean = 48.03) than those with bad performance results (Mean 
= 46.01), within the same industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 2(c). This is particularly significant 
as it shows that the z-score of companies with bad financial performance sit well below the normal range 
of CERTAINTY in their annual reports. This is useful in investigating any company that uses a high level 
of the language of CERTAINTY in their financial communications during bad times.  
With respect to ACTIVITY, the result shows that the level of ACTIVITY in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies with good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.25, 
zLg = - 0.24, zLb = - 0.38) than those with bad financial results. Specifically, it shows that companies with 
good performance results have a higher level of ACTIVITY (Mean = 50.05) than those with bad 
performance results (Mean = 49.46), within the same industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 3(c). 
With respect to Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that for analysts’ discussions, there is statistically 
significant difference (p-value = 0.035, d = 0.19) between the readability scores of the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the low discretion industry during good and bad times. Specifically, it shows 
that companies with good performance results have a higher readability score (Mean = 59.00) than those 
with bad performance results (Mean = 57.69), within the same industry. Again, this is in line with 
Hypothesis 7(e). In addition, the result for the Readability Grade on analysts’ discussions was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.063, d = 0.17) and in line with Hypothesis 7(f). 
Accordingly, the implications of the above results are explained below. 
With respect to COMMONALITY, the results show that the level of COMMONALITY in the analysts’ 
discussions of companies in the low discretion industry between the good and bad times is statistically 
significantly different as shown above. This is in line with the prediction. Specifically, the result suggests 
that companies with bad performance results in the low discretion industry communicate more using 
language that highlights substantive agreement on group product or experience than those who 
experience good financial results. Accordingly, this suggests that companies experiencing bad financial 
results in the low discretion industry are more likely to use language that signifies agreement with using 
common accounting principles and narratives in explaining the common problems they encounter that 
makes it difficult to collectively attain the level of Net Income expected of them by the market.  
With respect to CERTAINTY, the results show that the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of 
companies in the low discretion industry between the good and bad times is statistically significantly 
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different as shown above. This is in line with the prediction. Specifically, the result shows that companies 
with good performance results in the low discretion industry communicate with a higher level of 
CERTAINTY than those with bad financial results. It suggests that companies with good performance 
results communicate more using language that indicates resoluteness, completeness, precision, and the 
avoidance of hesitation, which demonstrates their ability to meet or exceed target expectations, in their 
annual reports than those with bad performance results. This study posits that the low level of 
CERTAINTY for companies with bad performance results complies with the principle of discourse ethics. 
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) posit that it is inappropriate to emphasise resoluteness and a sense of certainty 
during periods shaped by unfavourable economic situation. Hence, the result suggests that companies 
with bad performance results are more likely to use the low level of CERTAINTY to underline the 
uncertainty attributable to their poor results. 
With respect to the Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that the readability score of the analysts’ 
discussions of companies with bad financial results is statistically significantly lower (p-value = 0.035, d 
= 0.19) than those with good financial results. This is in line with the prediction. The result suggests that 
it is easier to read and understand the analysts’ discussions of companies with good financial results than 
those with bad financial results. Simply put, it implies it is more difficult to read and understand the 
analysts’ discussions of companies when they produce bad performance results. In the same vein, prior 
accounting studies found that companies that experienced unfavourable financial performance results 
manipulated the readability of their annual reports (Courtis, 1998; Lehavy et al., 2011; Li, 2008). 
Specifically, prior studies stress that the use of complex language (Li, 2008; Patelli & Pedrini, 2015), long 
sentences and uncommon terminology (Patelli & Pedrini, 2015) in corporate narratives are strategies 
used by top management to manipulate investors’ understanding of the performance of their organisation. 
Interestingly, the results show that for both good and bad times, it is easier to read and understand the 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion industry than the annual reports published by 
them in the same period. Specifically, the result shows that it is easier to read and understand the 
analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results than the annual reports published by 
them within the same period. While the readability scores of their analysts’ discussions (Mean = 57.69) 
during bad times sit in the region of “Easily Understood” on the readability scale, the readability score of 
their annual reports (Mean = 30.29) is in the region of “Very Difficult to Read and Understand”. Again, 
this aligns with the initial position that the ease or difficulty of understanding corporate narratives is a 
function of the genre of text and the target audience. 
Table 5.81 in appendix 11 shows the descriptive statistics of the high discretion industry’s scores on the 
five DICTION Master Variables with respect to their annual reports and analysts’ discussions during good 
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and bad times. It shows the maximum, minimum, mean, median, and standard deviation scores of the 
financial communication documents of the companies in the high discretion industry when they reported 
good and bad performance results, in accordance with the pre-defined measures of good and bad times. 
Again, Table 5.81 shows the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grades of the 
industry’s annual reports and analysts’ discussions during good and bad times. Furthermore, results 
reported in Table 5.17 shows the non-parametric statistically significant difference between good and bad 
times, with respect to how companies in the high discretion industry communicate in their annual reports 
and analysts’ discussions. In differentiating between good and bad times, the result shows that the level 
of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of companies with good performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.018, d = 0.77, zHg = - 0.21, zHb = - 1.43) than those with bad performance 
results. Specifically, it shows that companies with good performance results have a higher level of 
CERTAINTY (Mean = 48.89) than those with bad performance results (Mean = 45.82), within the same 
industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(d).  
Furthermore, the result shows that the level of REALISM in the analysts’ discussions of companies with 
bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.68, zHg = 2.38, zHb = 
3.01) than those with good performance results. Specifically, it shows that companies with bad 
performance results have a higher level of REALISM (Mean = 59.16) than those with good performance 
results (Mean = 57.13), within the same industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(d). With respect to the 
Flesch Reading Ease, the result shows that for analysts’ discussions, the result was approaching a level 
of significance and contrary to Hypothesis 7(g) (p-value = 0.054, d = 0.57) to differentiate between the 
readability scores of the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry during good 
and bad times. In addition, the result for the Readability Grade on analysts’ discussions show that there 
is statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.046, d = 0.54) between the readability grades of 
companies in the high discretion industry during good and bad times. Specifically, it shows that 
companies with good performance results have a higher readability grade (Mean = 9.69) than those with 
bad performance results (Mean = 9.00), within the same industry. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 
7(h). Accordingly, the implications of the above results are explained below. 
Reviewing CERTAINTY, the results show that the level of CERTAINTY in the annual reports of 
companies in the high discretion industry between good and bad times is statistically significantly different 
(p-value = 0.018, d = 0.77, zHg = - 0.21, zHb = - 1.43). This is in line with the prediction. Specifically, the 
result suggests that companies with good performance results in the high discretion industry 
communicate with a higher level of CERTAINTY than those with bad performance results. It suggests 
that companies with good performance results communicate more using language that indicates 
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resoluteness, completeness, precision, and avoidance of hesitation, which demonstrates their ability to 
meet or exceed target expectations, in their annual reports than those with bad performance results. This 
study posits that the low level of CERTAINTY for companies with bad performance results complies with 
the principle of discourse ethics. Patelli and Pedrini (2015) posit that it is inappropriate to emphasise 
resoluteness and a sense of certainty during periods shaped by unfavourable economic situation. Hence, 
the companies with bad performance results use the low level of CERTAINTY to underline the uncertainty 
attributable to their poor performance. 
Turning to the Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade, the result shows that the readability grade of the 
analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly lower (p = 
0.046, d = 0.54) in comparison to those with good performance results. This is contrary to the prediction. 
During bad times, the result suggests that a lower level of education is required to read and understand 
the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results than those with good performance 
results. This is particularly interesting as the readability score also reveals that it is easier to read and 
understand analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results. This study posits that while 
it is more difficult to read and understand, at any time, the corporate narratives of companies in the high 
discretion industry, it may likely have a further negative impact on the stakeholder community during bad 
times. Hence, the difficulty in their narratives may need to be reduced in a way that it makes it easier to 
read and understand their corporate narratives during bad times much more than in good times. 
Furthermore, while the readability score of the annual reports during bad times sit in the region of “Very 
Difficult to Read and Understand” (Mean = 29.21), those of analysts’ discussions sit in the region of 
“Easily Understood” (Mean = 61.35) on the readability scale. This aligns with the initial position that the 
ease or difficulty of understanding corporate narratives is a function of the genre of text and the target 
audience. 
7.6 Analysis for the Sub-features of the Five Master Variables during Good and Bad Times  
Table 5.18 shows the results for the sub-features of COMMONALITY Master Variable of DICTION with 
the purpose of analysing for their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and high 
discretion industries. With respect to the first Master Variable – COMMONALITY, the sub-features that 
increase its score are ‘Centrality’, ‘Cooperation’, and ‘Rapport’, while those that reduce it are ‘Diversity’, 
‘Exclusion’, and ‘Liberation’. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each 
sub-feature during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that for 
companies in the low discretion industry, the levels of ‘Centrality’ and ‘Rapport’ in their annual reports are 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.031, d = 0.23, zL = 0.52, zH = 0.21; p-value = 0.033, d = 0.11, 
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zL = - 0.37, zH = - 0.45, respectively) than for companies in the high discretion industry. This is in line 
with Hypothesis 1(f) to posit that these sub-features will be statistically significantly higher to increase the 
COMMONALITY score of the financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry, than 
for those in the high discretion industry. Similarly, the result for the level of ‘Cooperation’ in the analysts’ 
discussion is in line with Hypothesis 1(f), and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.05, d 
= 0.21, zL = - 0.26, zH = - 0.38). For the sub-features that decrease the COMMONALITY score, the level 
of ‘Diversity’ in the analysts’ discussions of the two industry groups was approaching a level of 
significance (p-value = 0.093, d = 0.07, zL = 0.20, zH = 0.27) and in the direction of Hypothesis 1(j). 
Lastly, the result for ‘Liberation’ in their analysts’ discussions shows statistically significant difference (p-
value = 0.002, d = 0.20; zL = - 0.49, zH = - 0.58) although it is contrary to Hypothesis 1(j).   
Table 5.19 shows the results for the same sub-features of COMMONALITY by taking into consideration 
the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low and high discretion industries during bad times, 
as pre-defined. During bad times, the result shows that for companies in the low discretion industry, the 
level of ‘Centrality’ in their analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 
0.68, zL = - 0.29, zH = - 0.67) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 
1(f) to posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the COMMONALITY 
score of the financial communications of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the 
high discretion industry. Similarly, the result for the level of ‘Centrality’ in the annual reports is in the 
direction of Hypothesis 1(f), and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.084, d = 0.72, zL = 
0.41, zH = - 0.08). On the other hand, the level of ‘Liberation’ in the annual reports of companies in the 
high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.010, d = 0.90, zL = 0.71, zH = - 
0.13) than for the companies in the low discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 1(j) to 
posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the COMMONALITY score 
of the financial communications of companies in the high discretion industry, than for those in the low 
discretion industry. 
Table 5.20 shows the results for the same sub-features of COMMONALITY by taking into consideration 
the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during good times and 
bad times, as predefined. The result shows that for companies with good performance results, the level 
of ‘Centrality’ in their analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly lower (p-value = 0.016, d = 0.18, 
zLg = - 0.42, zLb = - 0.29) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 
1(g) to posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the COMMONALITY 
score of the financial communications of companies with bad performance results in the low discretion 
industry, than for those with good financial results within the same industry. This is similar to the results 
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for the COMMONALITY scores in Table 5.16. For the level of ‘Cooperation’, the result for annual reports 
was approaching a level of significance and contrary to Hypothesis 1(g) (p-value = 0.073, d = 0.36, zLg 
= 0.74, zLb = 0.44).  
On the other hand, the level of ‘Diversity’ in the annual reports of companies with good performance 
results in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.42, zLg = 
0.08, zLb = - 0.22) than for those with bad performance results. Similarly, the level of ‘Liberation’ in the 
analysts’ discussions of companies with good performance results in the low discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.007, d = 0.24, zLg = - 0.49, zLb = - 0.60) than for those with 
bad performance results. Again, both results are in line with Hypothesis 1(k) to posit that these sub-
features will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the COMMONALITY scores of the financial 
communications of companies with good performance results in the low discretion industry, than for those 
with bad performance results.  
Table 5.53 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of COMMONALITY by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the high discretion industry alone during 
good times and bad times, as predefined. The result shows that for companies with good performance 
results, the level of ‘Liberation’ in their annual reports is statistically significantly lower (p-value = 0.023, 
d = 0.07, zHg = - 0.50, zHb = - 0.47) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 1(l) to posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the 
COMMONALITY score of the financial communications of companies with bad performance results in 
the high discretion industry, than for those with good financial results within the same industry. Similarly, 
the result for the level of ‘Liberation’ in the analysts’ discussions was approaching a level of significance 
(p-value = 0.086, d = 0.23, zHg = - 0.58, zHb = - 0.51) and in the direction of prediction.  
With respect to the CERTAINTY Master Variable of DICTION, Table 5.21 shows the results for its sub-
features with the aim of analysing their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and 
high discretion industries. In addition, the sub-features that increase or decrease the CERTAINTY score 
are shown in the table. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each sub-
feature during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that the level of 
‘Collectives’ in both annual reports and analysts’ discussions of both industries was approaching a level 
of significance (p-value = 0.058, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.01, zH = - 0.17; p-value = 0.059, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.83, 
zH = - 0.94, respectively) and contrary to Hypothesis 2(f). For the sub-features that decrease the 
CERTAINTY score, the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.004, d = 0.27, zL = 0.70, zH = 0.45) than 
341 | P a g e  
 
for those in the high discretion industry. Similarly, the levels of ‘Ambivalence’ and ‘Self-reference’ in the 
annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry are statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.018, d = 0.34, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.52; p-value < 0.024, d = 0.22, zL = - 0.60, zH = - 0.67, respectively) 
than for those in the high discretion industry. All of the results for these sub-features that reduce the 
CERTAINTY score are in line with Hypothesis 2(j) to posit that they will be statistically significantly higher 
to reduce the CERTAINTY score of companies in the low discretion industry than for those in the high 
discretion industry. 
Table 5.22 shows the results for the same sub-features of CERTAINTY by taking into consideration the 
use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low and high discretion industries during bad times, as 
pre-defined. During bad times, the result shows that for companies in the low discretion industry, the level 
of ‘Insistence’ in their analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.026, d = 0.59, 
zL = - 0.49, zH = - 0.68) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 2(f). 
On the other hand, the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 0.72, zL = 0.96, zH = 0.25) than 
for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(j) to posit that this sub-feature 
will be statistically significantly higher to decrease the CERTAINTY score of the financial communications 
of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the high discretion industry. 
Table 5.23 shows the results for the same sub-features of CERTAINTY by taking into consideration the 
use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during good times and bad 
times, as pre-defined. With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result for the level of ‘Tenacity’ was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.066, d = 0.23, zLg = 1.24, zLb = 1.00) and in line with 
Hypothesis 2(g). Furthermore, it shows that for companies with good performance results, the level of 
‘Collectives’ in their annual reports is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.035, d = 0.40, zLg = - 
0.01, zLb = - 0.29) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(g) to 
posit that this sub-feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the CERTAINTY score of the 
financial communications of companies with good performance results in the low discretion industry, than 
for those with bad financial results within the same industry.  
On the other hand, the level of ‘Numerical Terms’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad 
performance results in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.040, d = 
0.24, zLg = 0.70, zLb = 0.96) than for those with good performance results. Similarly, the level of ‘Self-
Reference’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.017, d = 0.36, zLg = - 0.60, zLb = - 0.45) than for those with good performance results. 
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Again, both results are in line with Hypothesis 2(k) to posit that these sub-features will be statistically 
significantly higher to decrease the CERTAINTY scores of the financial communications of companies 
with bad performance results in the low discretion industry, than for those with good performance results. 
Nonetheless, with respect to analysts’ discussions, the results for ‘Ambivalence’ and ‘Self-Reference’ are 
contrary to Hypothesis 2(k) and were approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.091, d = 0.15, zLg 
= 1.18, zLb = 1.01; p-value = 0.090, d = 0.17, zLg = 0.21, zLb = 0.12, respectively).  
Table 5.57 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of CERTAINTY by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the high discretion industry alone during 
good and bad times, as predefined. For the sub-features that increase the CERTAINTY score, the result 
shows that for companies with good performance results, the level of ‘Insistence’ in their analysts’ 
discussions was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.089, d = 0.47, zHg = - 0.52, zHb = - 
0.68) and in line with Hypothesis 2(h). For the sub-features that decrease the CERTAINTY score, the 
result shows that for companies with bad performance results, the level of ‘Self-Reference’ in their annual 
reports is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.020, d = 0.01, zHg = - 0.67, zHb = - 0.67) than for 
those with good performance result. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(l) to posit that this sub-feature will 
be statistically significantly higher to decrease the CERTAINTY score of the financial communications of 
companies with bad performance results in the high discretion industry, than for those with good 
performance results within the same industry. 
With respect to the ACTIVITY Master Variable of DICTION, Table 5.24 shows the results for its sub-
features with the aim of analysing their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and 
high discretion industries. In addition, the sub-features that increase or decrease the ACTIVITY score are 
shown in the table. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each sub-feature 
during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that the levels of 
‘Aggression’ and ‘Accomplishment’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion 
industry are statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.043, d = 0.21, zL = - 0.81, zH = - 0.72; p-value = 
0.000, d = 0.30, zL = 0.11, zH = 0.33, respectively) than those in the low discretion industry. Similarly, 
the level of ‘Accomplishment’ in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.017, d = 0.20, zL = 2.04, zH = 2.25) than for those in the low 
discretion industry. These results are in line with Hypothesis 3(f) to posit that these sub-features will be 
significantly higher to increase the ACTIVITY score for companies in the high discretion than for those in 
the low discretion industry.  
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The result for the level of ‘Communication’ in their analysts’ discussions is contrary to Hypothesis 3(f) and 
was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.077, d = 0.23, zL = 0.32, zH = 0.09). For the sub-
features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the level of ‘Cognition’ in the analysts’ discussions is 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.008, d = 0.14, zL = 0.49, zH = 0.64) but contrary to Hypothesis 3(j). 
Nevertheless, the level of ‘Embellishment’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.004, d = 0.29, zL = 0.82, zH = 0.20) than for those 
in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 3(j) to posit that this sub-feature will be 
significantly higher to decrease the ACTIVITY score for companies in the low discretion than for those in 
the high discretion industry. Lastly, the level of ‘Passivity’ in the annual reports is in the direction of 
Hypothesis 3(j) and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.081, d = 0.17, zL = 1.05, zH = 
0.85).  
Table 5..59 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of ACTIVITY by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low and high discretion industries 
during bad times, as pre-defined. During bad times, none of the sub-features that increase the ACTIVITY 
score reached a level of significance to differentiate between the companies in the low and high discretion 
industries. Nevertheless, for the sub-features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the levels of ‘Passivity’ 
and ‘Embellishment’ in their analysts’ discussions and annual reports, respectively, are in the direction of 
Hypothesis 3(j) and were approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.095, d = 0.67, zL = 0.13, zH = 
- 0.56; p-value = 0.073, d = 0.63, zL = 0.33, zH = - 0.12, respectively). 
Table 5.60 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of ACTIVITY by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during 
good and bad times, as pre-defined. With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result for the level of 
‘Aggression’ was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.081, d = 0.33, zLg = - 0.81, zLb = - 
0.83) and contrary to Hypothesis 3(g). In addition, the level of ‘Communication’ in their annual reports 
was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.077, d = 0.18, zL = - 0.97, zH = - 1.05) and in the 
direction of Hypothesis 3(g) to posit that this sub-feature will be higher to increase the ACTIVITY score 
for companies with good performance results than for those with bad performance results. For the sub-
features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the level of ‘Passivity’ in their analysts’ discussions was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.081, d = - 0.27, zLg = 0.17, zLb = - 0.13) and in the 
direction of Hypothesis (k) to posit that this sub-feature will be higher for companies with bad performance 
results than for those with good performance results. This means that companies with bad performance 
results are more likely to be passive in their communications with analysts, in comparison to those with 
good performance results.  
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Table 5.61 shows the results for the same sub-features of ACTIVITY by taking into consideration the use 
of each sub-feature by the companies in the high discretion industry alone during good and bad times, 
as pre-defined. For the sub-features that increase the ACTIVITY score, none of the sub-features reached 
a level of significance to differentiate between the companies with good and bad performance results. 
Nevertheless, for the sub-features that decrease the ACTIVITY score, the level of ‘Embellishment’ in the 
analysts’ discussions of the companies was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.070, d = 
0.25, zHg = 0.43, zHb = - 0.37) and contrary to Hypothesis 3(l). 
With respect to the REALISM Master Variable of DICTION, Table 5.25 shows the results for its sub-
features with the aim of analysing their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and 
high discretion industries. In addition, the sub-features that increase or decrease the REALISM score are 
shown in the table. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each sub-feature 
during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that the level of 
‘Concreteness’ in the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is higher than those in 
the high discretion industry and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.051, d = 0.22, zL = 
- 0.61, zH = - 0.73). This is in line with Hypothesis 4(f). For the sub-features that decrease the REALISM 
score, the level of ‘Past Concern’ in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.012, d = 0.32, zL = - 0.58, zH = - 0.33) than those in the low 
discretion industry. Similarly, with respect to analysts’ discussion, the result for the level of ‘Past Concern’ 
was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.068, d = 0.16) and in line with Hypothesis 4(j). 
Furthermore, the level of ‘Complexity’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies 
in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.51, zL = 1.53, zH 
= 2.00; p-value = 0.015, d = 0.15, zL = - 0.70, zH = - 0.60, respectively) than for those in the low discretion 
industry. In sum, all the results for the sub-features that decrease the REALISM score are in line with 
Hypothesis 4(j) to posit that they will be significantly higher to reduce the REALISM score of the financial 
communications of companies in the high discretion industry.  
Table 5.26 shows the results for the same sub-features of REALISM by taking into consideration the use 
of each sub-feature by the companies in the low and high discretion industries during bad times, as pre-
defined. During bad times, the result shows that for companies in the high discretion industry, the level 
of ‘Present Concern’ in both their annual reports and analysts’ discussions is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 1.12, zL = - 0.98, zH = - 0.11; p-value = 0.003, d = 0.72, zL = 0.42, zH = 
1.18, respectively) than for those in the low discretion industry. This is contrary to Hypothesis 4(f) and 
particularly interesting, especially with the level of significance produced by the results. It suggests that 
during bad times, companies in the high discretion industry will communicate with more ‘Present Concern’ 
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for their bad performance results in comparison to those in the low discretion industry. Similarly, the level 
of ‘Human Interest’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.014, d = 0.61, zL = - 0.15, zH = 0.28) than those in the low discretion 
industry. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 4(f).  
Furthermore, the level of ‘Concreteness’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.010, d = 0.81, zL = - 0.91, zH = - 1.35) than those 
in the high discretion industry. Similarly, the result for the annual reports, with respect to ‘Concreteness’ 
is line with Hypothesis 4(f) and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.098, d = 0.82, zL = - 
0.43, zH = - 0.87). With ‘Concreteness’, the results are in line with the prediction to posit that this sub-
feature will be statistically significantly higher to increase the REALISM score of the financial 
communications of companies in the low discretion industry, than for those in the high discretion industry. 
With respect to the sub-feature that decrease the REALISM score, the level of ‘Complexity’ in the 
analysts’ discussions of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-
value = 0.016, d = 0.77, zL = - 0.60, zH = - 1.03) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is 
contrary to Hypothesis 4(j). In addition, it is similar to the results observed for Flesch Reading Ease in 
Table 5.14 when measuring for the readability of corporate narratives during bad times. This study posits 
that while it is more complex to read and understand the corporate narratives of companies in the high 
discretion industry in comparison to companies in the low discretion industry, this may likely have a further 
negative impact on the stakeholder community during bad times. Accordingly, the difficulty in their 
narratives may need to be reduced in a way that it makes it easier for their stakeholders to understand 
the reasons why they are experiencing bad performance results.  
Table 5.27 shows the results for the same sub-features of REALISM by taking into consideration the use 
of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during good times and bad 
times, as pre-defined. With respect to analysts’ discussions, the result for the level of ‘Concreteness’ is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.001, d = 0.42, zLg = - 1.17, zLb = - 0.91) for companies with 
bad performance results than for those with good performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 
4(g). The result suggests that low discretion companies communicate more during bad times with 
language of tangibility and neutrality to explain their financial circumstances than they would normally do 
when they report good performance results. With respect to the sub-features that decrease the REALISM 
score, the level of ‘Past Concern’ in the analysts’ discussions was approaching as level of significance 
(p-value = 0.091, d = 0.21, zLg = 0.02, zLb = - 0.14) and contrary to Hypothesis (k). In addition, the level 
of ‘Complexity’ in the annual reports is in the direction of prediction and was approaching a level of 
significance (p-value = 0.066, d = 0.19, zLg = 1.53, zLb = 1.50). It shows that there is a higher level of 
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complexity in the analysts’ discussions of low discretion companies with bad performance results than 
those with good performance results.  
Table 5.28 shows the results for the same sub-features of REALISM by taking into consideration the use 
of each sub-feature by the companies in the high discretion industry alone during good and bad times, 
as pre-defined. For the sub-features that increase the REALISM score, the level of ‘Present Concern’ in 
both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance results is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.027, d = 0.82, zHg = - 0.78, zHb = - 0.11; p-value = 0.004, d 
= 0.65, zHg = 0.50, zHb = 1.18) than for those with good performance results. This is contrary to 
Hypothesis 4(h). Similarly, the level of ‘Human Interest’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with 
bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.008, d = 0.49, zHg = - 0.10, zHb 
= 0.28) than for those with good performance results. Again, this is contrary to Hypothesis 4(h). For the 
level of ‘Concreteness’ in the analysts’ discussions, the result is in line with prediction and was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.091, d = 0.49, zHg = - 1.14 zHb = - 1.35). With respect 
to the sub-features that decrease the REALISM score, the level of ‘Complexity’ in the analysts’ 
discussions of companies with good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 
0.011, d = 0.73, zHg = - 0.60, zHb = - 1.03) than those with bad performance results. This is contrary to 
Hypothesis 4(l). This study posits that while it is complex to read and understand the corporate narratives 
of companies in the high discretion industries in comparison to companies in the low discretion industry, 
doing so when they are faced with bad performance results may likely have a further negative impact on 
the stakeholder community. Hence, the complexity in their narratives may need to be reduced in a way 
that it makes it easier for their stakeholders to understand the reasons why they are experiencing bad 
performance results. 
With respect to the OPTIMISM Master Variable of DICTION, Table 5.29 shows the results for its sub-
features with the aim of analysing their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and 
high discretion industries. In addition, the sub-features that increase or decrease the OPTIMISM score 
are shown in the table. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each sub-
feature during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that the level of 
‘Praise’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly 
higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.21, zLg = 0.13, zHg = 0.35) than those in the low discretion industry. 
Similarly, the level of ‘Inspiration’ in the annual reports of companies in the high discretion industry is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.027, d = 0.18, zLg = 0.23, zHg = 0.41) than those in the low 
discretion industry. The two results are in line with Hypothesis 5(f) to posit that both ‘Praise’ and 
‘Inspiration’ will be significantly higher to increase the OPTIMISM score for companies in the high 
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discretion industry than for those in the low discretion industry. For the sub-features that decrease the 
OPTIMISM score, the levels of ‘Blame’ and ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of companies in the low 
discretion industry are statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.23, zLg = - 0.70, zHg = - 
0.78; p-value = 0.000, d = 0.36, zL = - 1.37, zH = - 1.48, respectively) than for those in the high discretion 
industry. The two results are in line with Hypothesis 5(j) to posit that both ‘Blame’ and ‘Denial’ will be 
statistically significantly higher to reduce the OPTIMISM score for companies in the low discretion industry 
in comparison to those in the high discretion industry.  
Table 5.67 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of OPTIMISM by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low and high discretion industries 
during bad times, as pre-defined. During bad times, the results show that the sub-features that increase 
the OPTIMISM score are in the direction of the predictions made for them although they did not reach 
any level of significance. The results for ‘Praise’, ‘Satisfaction’, and ‘Inspiration’ (excluding that of 
analysts’ discussions) are higher for companies in the high discretion industry than for those in the low 
discretion industry. With respect to the sub-features that decrease the OPTIMISM score, the level of 
‘Hardship’ in the analysts’ discussions is contrary to Hypothesis 5(j) and was approaching a level of 
significance (p-value = 0.095, d = 0.24, zLb = - 1.02, zHb = - 0.97). During bad times, the level of 
‘Hardship’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is higher than for those 
in the low discretion industry. This is contrary to the prediction.  
Table 5.68 in appendix 8 shows the results for the same sub-features of OPTIMISM by taking into 
consideration the use of each sub-feature by the companies in the low discretion industry alone during 
good and bad times, as pre-defined. With respect to annual reports, the result for the level of ‘Praise’ is 
in the direction of Hypothesis 5(g) and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.057, d = 0.33, 
zLg = - 0.07, zLb = - 0.35). Similarly, the result for the level of ‘Inspiration’ in their analysts’ discussions 
is in the direction of Hypothesis 5(g) and was approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.052, d = 
0.21, zLg = - 0.68, zLb = - 0.79). For both sub-features, the results suggest that both will be higher for 
companies with good performance results than those with bad performance results.  
Table 5.30 shows the results for the same sub-features of OPTIMISM by taking into consideration the 
use of each sub-feature by the companies in the high discretion industry alone during good and bad 
times, as pre-defined. For the sub-features that increase the OPTIMIISM score, none of the sub-features 
shows any level of statistically significant difference in their use between companies with good and bad 
performance results. With respect to the sub-features that decrease the OPTIMISM score, the result 
shows that the level of ‘Denial’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance results is 
348 | P a g e  
 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 0.81, zHg = - 1.48, zHb = - 1.28) than those with 
good performance results. This is in line with the Hypothesis 5(l) to posit that this sub-feature will be 
significantly higher to reduce the OPTIMISM score of companies with bad performance results. Similar 
result was observed for the analysts’ discussions although it did not reach a level of significance (p-value 
= 0.643, d = 0.15).  
With respect to analysis for LIWC, Table 5.31 shows the results for the select 11 language categories 
with the aim of analysing for their use in the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of the low and high 
discretion industries. The analysis was conducted by taking into consideration the use of each language 
category during good and bad times, as pre-defined. During good times, the result shows that the level 
of ‘Tone’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions are in the line with Hypothesis 6(b), although 
the former did not reach a level of significance (p-value = 0.134, d = 0.21). Specifically, the level of ‘Tone’ 
in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher 
(p-value = 0.000, d = 0.56, zLg = 0.76, zHg = 1.02) than those in the low discretion industry. This is in 
line with Hypothesis 6(b) to posit that the level of ‘Tone’ in the financial communications of companies in 
the high discretion will be significantly higher than for those in the low discretion industry. Furthermore, 
the result shows that the level of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports of companies in 
the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.018, d = 0.26, zLg = - 1.91, zHg 
= - 1.95) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(j) to posit that the 
level of ‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ will be significantly higher for companies in the low discretion 
industry than for those in the high discretion industry. 
In addition, the result shows that the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies 
in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.53, zLg = - 0.37, 
zHg = - 0.15) than for those in the low discretion industry. This is line with Hypothesis 5(f). Furthermore, 
the results show that for both annual reports and analysts’ discussions, the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.42, zLg = - 1.08, zHg = - 1.24; p-value = 0.002, d 
= 0.25, zLg = - 1.20, zHg = - 1.26, respectively) for companies in the low discretion industry than for those 
in the high discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 5(j). Similarly, the result shows that 
the level of ‘Achievement’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the high 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.53, zLg = 2.78, zHg = 3.41; 
p-value = 0.000, d = 0.49, zLg = 1.07, zHg = 1.49, respectively) than for those in the low discretion 
industry. Again, this is line with Hypothesis 3(f). Furthermore, the result shows that the level of ‘Risk’ in 
the annual reports of companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value 
= 0.002, d = 0.26, zLg = - 0.07, zHg = - 0.29) than for those in the high discretion industry. This is in line 
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with Hypothesis 2(j). Finally, the result shows that the level of ‘Motion’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies in the high discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.36, 
zLg = 0.42, zHg = 0.62) than for those in the low discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 
3(f). 
Table 5.32 shows the results for the same language categories and their use by companies in the low 
and high discretion industries during bad times, as pre-defined. During bad times, the results show that 
the level of ‘Tone’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion 
industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.041, d = 1.08, zLb = 0.97, zHb = 1.50; p-value = 
0.000, d = 1.42,  zLb = 0.52, zHb = 1.21, respectively) than for those in the low discretion industry. This 
is in line with Hypothesis 6(b). Similarly, the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in both the annual reports and 
analysts’ discussions are in line with Hypothesis 5(f). Specifically, it shows that the level of ‘Positive 
Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies in the high discretion industry is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 1.13, zLb = - 0.52, zHb = - 0.03) than for those in the low 
discretion industry. Again, this is in line with the prediction. On the other hand, the results show that the 
level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions of companies in the low 
discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.005, d = 1.19, zLb = - 1.00, zHb = - 1.40; 
p-value = 0.001, d = 1.02, zLb = - 1.15, zHb = - 1.34, respectively) than for those in the high discretion 
industry. This is in line with Hypothesis 5(j). Similarly, the level of ‘Risk’ in the annual reports of the 
companies in the low discretion industry is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.049, d = 0.84, zLb 
= 0.00, zHb = - 0.51) than for those in the high discretion industry. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 
2(j). Furthermore, the results for both ‘Past Focus’ and ‘Present Focus’ were approaching a level of 
significance (p-value = 0.96, d = 0.74, zLb = - 1.23, zHb = - 1.38; p-value = 0.075, d = 0.47, zLb = 0.28, 
zHb = 0.56, respectively) and contrary to Hypotheses 4(j) and 4(f), respectively. Although the two 
language categories are contrary to the prediction, however, the result for ‘Present Focus’ aligns to the 
direction of the result observed for similar DICTION sub-feature - ‘Present Concern’, as shown in Table 
5.26. 
Table 5.33 shows the results for the same language categories and their use by companies in the low 
discretion industry alone during good and bad times, as pre-defined. The result shows that the level of 
‘Tone’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions are in line with Hypothesis 6(c), although the 
former did not reach a level of significance (p-value = 0.149, d = 0.26). Specifically, the result shows that 
the level of ‘Tone’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with good performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.000, d = 0.45, zLg = 0.76, zLb = 0.52) than for those with bad performance 
results. This is in line with Hypothesis 6(c). Furthermore, the result shows that the level of ‘First Person 
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Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance results is statistically 
significantly higher (p-value = 0.001, d = 0.55, zLg = - 1.91, zLb = - 1.80) than for those with good 
performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 2(k). On the other hand, the result shows that the 
level of ‘First Person Plural Pronoun’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies with bad performance 
results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.37, zLg = 5.07, zLb = 5.48) than for those 
with good performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 2(g) to posit that companies experiencing 
bad performance results are more likely to use such language to either collectively take responsibility or 
share the blame for bad performance results.  
Furthermore, the result shows that the level of ‘Positive Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies with good performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.002, d = 0.34, 
zLg = - 0.37, zLb = - 0.52) than for those with bad performance results. This is in line with Hypothesis 
5(g). In addition, the result for the level of ‘Negative Emotion’ in the analysts’ discussions of companies 
with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.037, d = 0.25, zLg = - 1.20, 
zLb = - 1.15) than for those with good performance results. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 5(k). 
Similarly, the result for the level of ‘Past Focus’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance 
results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.027, d = 0.37, zLg = - 1.33, zLb = - 1.23) than for 
those with good performance results. Again, this is in line with Hypothesis 4(k). Finally, the result for the 
level of ‘Motion’ in the analysts’ discussions is in line with Hypothesis 3(g) and was approaching a level 
of significance (p-value = 0.052, d = 0.25, zLg = 0.42, zLb = 0.26). Specifically, it shows that the level of 
‘Motion’ in both the annual reports and analysts’ discussions is higher for companies with good 
performance results than for those with bad performance results.  
Table 5.34 shows the results for the same language categories and their use by companies in the high 
discretion industry alone during good and bad times, as pre-defined. The result shows that the level of 
‘First Person Singular Pronoun’ in the annual reports of companies with bad performance results is 
statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.015, d = 0.78, zHg = - 1.95, zHb = - 1.82) than for those with 
good performance results. This is contrary to Hypothesis 2(j). Although this is contrary to the direction of 
prediction, nonetheless, it aligns to the direction of the result observed for similar DICTION sub-feature - 
‘Self-Reference’, as shown in Table 5.57 in appendix 8. On the other hand, the result for the level of ‘First 
Person Plural Pronoun’ in the analysts’ discussions is in the direction of Hypothesis 2(g) and was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.093, d = 0.43, zHg = 5.07, zHb = 5.60). Specifically, it 
shows that companies experiencing bad performance results are more likely to use such language that 
suggests either collective responsibility or sharing the blame for bad performance results. Furthermore, 
the level of ‘Achievement’ in the analysts’ discussions is in the direction of the prediction and was 
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approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.066, d = 0.57, zHg = 1.49, zHb = 1.06). Specifically, it 
suggests that companies with good performance results are more likely to communicate with the 
language of achievement of their target results than those with bad performance results. This is in line 
with Hypothesis 3(h). In addition, the result for the level of ‘Past Focus’ in the analysts’ discussions was 
approaching a level of significance (p-value = 0.072, d = 0.49, zHg = - 0.88, zHb = - 1.01) and contrary 
to the direction of Hypothesis 4(l). Finally, the level of ‘Present Focus’ in the analysts’ discussions of 
companies with bad performance results is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.021, d = 0.61, 
zHg = 0.23, zHb = 0.56) than for those with good performance results. Again, this is contrary to 
Hypothesis 4(h). Although the result is contrary to prediction, nevertheless, it aligns to the direction of the 
result observed for similar DICTION sub-feature - ‘Present Concern’, as shown in Table 5.28. 
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8. Tables of Results Comprehensive Listing 5.38 to 5.73 
 
  
 
Tables 5.38 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Macro-level Analysis) 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.000*** 49.60 48.85 1.67 2.13 
 
0.39 
 AD 0.050** 48.33 48.22 2.12 2.46 0.05 
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.000*** 47.39 48.73 4.17 3.73 0.34 
 AD 0.054* 39.62 38.28 7.39 7.85 0.18 
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.002*** 49.25 49.90 2.13 2.01 0.31 
 AD 0.344 49.85 49.88 2.43 2.36 0.26 
        
REALISM AR 0.031** 53.88 53.10 2.47 2.78 0.30 
 AD 0.046** 57.56 57.24 2.80 2.76 0.11 
       
 
OPTIMISM AR 0.286 54.52 54.76 3.40 3.26 0.07 
 AD 0.071* 54.43 54.85 5.90 5.67 0.07 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.000*** 30.92 27.44 7.99 7.81 0.44 
 AD 0.246 58.54 58.12 6.84 6.71 0.06 
       
 
Readability Grade AR 0.059* 14.62 15.15 1.97 1.62 0.29 
 AD 0.177 9.49 9.65 1.51 1.42 0.11 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.39 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Flesch Index Scores of the Two 
Document Types (Annual Reports vs Analysts' Discussions) 
 
Flesch Index Scores Document Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
        
Readability Score AR – LD 0.000*** 30.92  7.99 3.71 
 AD – LD 
 58.54  6.84  
  
 
    
Readability Grade AR – LD 0.000*** 14.62  1.97 2.92 
 AD – LD 
 9.49  1.51  
  
 
    
Readability Score AR – HD 0.000*** 27.44  7.81 4.21 
 AD – HD  58.12  6.71 
 
  
 
    
Readability Grade AR – HD 0.000*** 15.15  1.62 3.61 
 AD – HD  9.65  1.42 
 
  
 
   
 
Readability Score Agg.AR - L&H 0.000*** 29.18  8.08 3.91 
 Agg.AD - L&H  58.35  6.78 
 
  
 
   
 
Readability Grade Agg.AR - L&H 0.000*** 14.89  1.82 3.21 
 Agg.AD - L&H 
 9.57  1.47  
  
 
   
 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion 
 
Agg.AR – Aggregated Annual Reports 
Agg.AD – Aggregated Analysts’ Discussions 
 
L&H : L = Low Discretion; H = High Discretion          
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Table 5.40 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AR 0.003*** 5.92 4.98 3.94 4.00 
 
0.24 
 AD 0.002*** 3.17 2.82 2.26 2.36 0.15 
        
Cooperation AR 0.096* 6.93 7.58 3.60 3.44 0.19 
 AD 0.03** 3.33 2.85 2.52 2.15 0.21 
        
Rapport AR 0.031** 1.62 1.49 1.13 1.50 0.09 
 AD 0.559 1.31 1.36 1.63 2.76 0.02 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
 
Diversity AR 0.006*** 1.89 2.48 1.38 1.85 
 
0.36 
 AD 0.040** 2.25 2.44 1.92 1.91 0.10 
       
 
Exclusion AR 0.173 2.61 3.15 1.89 2.97 0.22 
 AD 0.166 1.75 1.81 1.80 1.63 0.04 
       
 
Liberation AR 0.746 0.75 0.89 0.70 0.96 0.17 
 AD 0.065* 0.76 0.64 1.19 0.88 0.11 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.41 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Tenacity AR 0.297 20.58 20.00 6.52 5.99 
 
0.09 
 AD 0.533 41.06 40.58 8.36 8.30 0.06 
        
Levelling terms AR 0.386 4.82 4.64 2.51 3.00 0.07 
 AD 0.065* 10.05 10.23 8.03 4.78 0.03 
        
Collectives AR 0.275 8.67 8.31 3.85 3.87 0.07 
 AD 0.025** 5.01 4.34 3.27 2.42 0.23 
        
Insistence AR 0.010** 69.39 80.81 43.42 43.93 0.26 
 AD 0.357 35.69 33.32 24.36 20.88 0.10 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AR 0.052* 24.00 21.20 13.31 13.14 0.21 
 AD 0.000*** 13.49 10.89 7.94 6.33 0.36 
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.005*** 4.16 3.28 2.91 2.47 0.32 
 AD 0.695 20.04 21.06 7.27 10.47 0.11 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.000*** 2.47 1.61 3.19 2.56 0.30 
 AD 0.033** 8.44 9.26 4.96 4.99 0.16 
        
Variety AR 0.492 0.55 0.55 0.07 0.06 0.00 
 AD 0.650 0.53 0.52 0.07 0.07 0.14 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.42 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Aggression AR 0.023** 3.58 3.12 2.11 2.26 0.21 
 AD 0.006*** 1.88 2.35 1.51 2.41 0.24 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.024** 34.57 35.55 13.40 9.13 0.09 
 AD 0.000*** 15.37 17.43 7.13 6.88 0.29 
        
Communication AR 0.270 2.21 2.62 2.06 2.93 0.16 
 AD 0.042** 8.57 7.39 5.67 3.80 0.25 
        
Motion AR 0.045** 1.95 2.46 1.53 2.17 0.27 
 AD 0.086* 3.92 4.16 2.42 2.29 0.10 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
 
Cognition AR 0.426 7.51 7.21 3.61 3.87 
 
0.08 
 AD 0.003*** 11.66 12.46 5.61 4.73 0.15 
       
 
Passivity AR 0.059* 8.26 7.62 3.47 3.64 0.18 
 AD 0.008*** 4.69 4.13 3.13 3.62 0.17 
       
 
Embellishment AR 0.002*** 0.98 0.74 1.17 0.53 0.27 
 AD 0.431 0.75 0.84 1.62 2.18 0.05 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.43 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Familiarity AR 0.205 125.14 123.55 14.05 12.52 0.12 
 AD 0.273 129.53 131.46 14.67 11.84 0.14 
        
Spatial Terms AR 0.173 9.11 8.38 4.92 4.95 0.15 
 AD 0.421 9.02 9.06 4.54 8.26 0.00 
        
Temporal Terms AR 0.633 15.36 15.77 4.99 5.53 0.07 
 AD 0.070* 16.85 15.99 6.91 6.37 0.13 
        
Present Concern AR 0.074* 7.87 8.27 6.12 3.84 0.08 
 AD 0.534 14.38 14.42 5.48 5.11 0.00 
        
Human Interest AR 0.280 25.19 26.23 11.06 12.87 0.09 
 AD 0.733 31.21 30.77 16.52 10.14 0.03 
 
Concreteness AR 0.003*** 14.83 13.03 5.56 4.95 0.34 
 AD 0.209 9.97 9.36 5.20 4.61 0.12 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.005*** 2.10 2.69 1.30 2.45 0.30 
 AD 0.005*** 3.49 3.99 2.12 2.46 0.22 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.000*** 5.07 5.20 0.23 0.30 0.52 
 AD 0.144 4.41 4.42 0.20 0.18 0.05 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.44 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Praise AR 0.897 5.58 5.54 2.96 3.05 0.01 
 AD 0.000*** 6.51 7.33 3.48 3.38 0.24 
        
Satisfaction AR 0.826 3.32 3.36 3.03 2.82 0.02 
 AD 0.190 6.09 6.23 6.88 6.70 0.02 
        
Inspiration AR 0.030** 7.64 8.28 5.44 4.24 0.13 
 AD 0.019** 2.92 3.16 2.75 2.61 0.08 
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.010** 0.62 0.51 0.67 0.74 0.16 
 AD 0.690 0.95 0.98 1.40 1.36 0.02 
       
 
Hardship AR 0.267 1.34 1.60 1.43 1.61 0.17 
 AD 0.841 1.25 1.32 1.28 1.72 0.04 
       
 
Denial AR 0.000*** 1.10 0.74 1.16 1.05 0.32 
 AD 0.725 5.75 5.73 3.47 3.60 0.00 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.45 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) 
 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis Sig. 
Test 
Mean 
Values 
Standard 
Deviation 
Cohen's 
d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AR 0.008*** 
79.2
2 
83.5
6 13.96 11.64 0.34 
 AD 0.000*** 
69.9
6 
78.1
9 12.16 10.67 0.72 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.000*** 0.36 0.21 0.45 0.31 0.39 
 AD 0.245 1.35 1.44 0.56 0.73 0.14 
        
First Person Plural 
Pronoun AR 0.287 4.26 4.53 1.71 2.17 0.14 
 AD 0.184 5.04 4.96 0.93 1.05 0.08 
        
Positive Emotion AR 0.324 3.88 3.97 1.02 0.93 0.08 
 AD 0.000*** 2.98 3.43 0.70 0.71 0.65 
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.000*** 0.69 0.48 0.37 0.43 0.52 
 AD 0.000*** 0.55 0.46 0.24 0.24 0.36 
 
Certainty AR 0.275 1.05 1.00 0.38 0.37 0.13 
 AD 0.229 1.34 1.39 0.38 0.39 0.13 
 
Achievement AR 0.000*** 3.62 4.10 1.06 1.04 0.46 
 AD 0.000*** 2.17 2.50 0.70 0.74 0.47 
       
 
Risk AR 0.000*** 0.45 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.33 
 AD 0.194 0.28 0.27 0.16 0.17 0.06 
        
Past Focus AR 0.658 1.97 1.95 0.56 0.78 0.03 
 AD 0.332 2.80 2.82 0.85 0.65 0.03 
        
Present Focus AR 0.7 5.21 5.19 1.38 1.47 0.02 
 AD 0.659 
10.6
3 
10.6
6 1.68 1.70 0.02 
        
Motion AR 0.032** 2.83 3.06 0.73 0.89 0.28 
 AD 0.000*** 2.53 2.78 0.61 0.58 0.42 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.46 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Macro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.002*** 49.55 48.90 1.80 2.15 0.32 
 AD 0.623 48.07 48.24 1.95 2.51 0.07 
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.023** 48.03 48.89 3.61 3.64 0.24 
 AD 0.264 39.15 38.29 7.03 7.88 0.12 
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.002*** 49.12 49.92 2.07 2.03 0.39 
 AD 0.678 50.05 49.86 2.42 2.37 0.08 
        
REALISM AR 0.033** 53.96 53.03 2.54 2.82 0.35 
 AD 0.062* 57.58 57.13 2.83 2.96 0.16 
       
 
OPTIMISM AR 0.679 54.70 54.72 3.57 3.30 0.01 
 AD 0.163 54.65 54.71 6.34 5.14 0.01 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.001*** 31.30 27.34 8.24 7.79 0.49 
 AD 0.02** 59.00 57.93 6.83 6.75 0.16 
       
 
Readability Grade AR 0.023** 14.46 15.14 2.00 1.49 0.38 
 AD 0.019** 9.40 9.69 1.62 1.43 0.20 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.47 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Macro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   
 
Low High Low High  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.007*** 49.68 47.56 1.42 1.60 1.17 
 AD 0.025** 48.81 47.92 2.35 1.22 0.48 
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.609 46.01 45.82 5.09 4.31 0.04 
 AD 0.355 40.45 38.09 7.98 7.51 0.31 
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.896 49.52 49.51 2.23 1.72 0.00 
 AD 0.263 49.46 50.24 2.44 2.18 0.34 
        
REALISM AR 0.528 53.75 54.27 2.39 1.60 0.26 
 AD 0.06* 57.53 59.16 2.75 3.25 0.54 
       
 
OPTIMISM AR 0.164 54.28 55.38 3.04 2.53 0.39 
 AD 0.47 53.94 57.14 4.90 11.37 0.37 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.794 30.29 29.21 7.70 8.54 0.13 
 AD 0.041** 57.69 61.35 6.79 5.23 0.60 
       
 
Readability Grade AR 0.836 14.92 15.26 1.93 1.55 0.18 
 AD 0.065* 9.66 9.00 1.86 1.08 0.50 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.48 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Macro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   
 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.609 49.55 49.68 1.80 1.42 0.08 
 AD 0.016** 48.07 48.81 1.95 2.35 0.34 
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.006*** 48.03 46.01 3.61 5.09 0.46 
 AD 0.115 39.15 40.45 7.03 7.98 0.17 
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.443 49.12 49.52 2.07 2.23 0.19 
 AD 0.002*** 50.05 49.46 2.42 2.44 0.25 
        
REALISM AR 0.946 53.96 53.75 2.54 2.39 0.00 
 AD 0.42 57.58 57.53 2.83 2.75 0.02 
       
 
OPTIMISM AR 0.437 54.70 54.28 3.57 3.04 0.13 
 AD 0.62 54.65 53.94 6.34 4.90 0.13 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.636 31.30 30.29 8.24 7.70 0.13 
 AD 0.035** 59.00 57.69 6.83 6.79 0.19 
       
 
Readability Grade AR 0.131 14.46 14.92 2.00 1.93 0.23 
 AD 0.063* 9.40 9.66 1.49 1.55 0.17 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.49 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Macro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Master Variable 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   
 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
COMMONALITY AR 0.135 48.90 47.91 2.15 1.60 0.52 
 AD 0.336 48.24 47.92 2.51 1.22 0.16 
        
CERTAINTY AR 0.018** 48.89 45.82 3.64 4.31 0.77 
 AD 0.954 38.29 38.09 7.88 7.51 0.03 
        
ACTIVITY AR 0.503 49.92 49.51 2.03 1.72 0.22 
 AD 0.783 49.86 50.24 2.37 2.18 0.17 
        
REALISM AR 0.201 53.03 54.27 2.82 1.60 0.54 
 AD 0.005*** 57.13 59.16 2.69 3.25 0.68 
       
 
OPTIMISM AR 0.434 54.72 55.38 3.30 2.53 0.22 
 AD 0.991 54.71 57.14 5.14 11.37 0.28 
       
 
Readability Score AR 0.581 27.34 29.21 7.79 8.54 0.23 
 AD 0.054* 57.93 61.35 6.75 5.23 0.57 
       
 
Readability Grade AR 0.894 15.14 15.26 1.62 1.86 0.07 
 AD 0.046** 9.69 9.00 1.43 1.08 0.54 
        
         
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.50 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AR 0.031** 6.02 5.03 4.57 4.09 
 
0.23 
 AD 0.124 3.03 2.86 2.31 2.40 0.07 
        
Cooperation AR 0.531 7.37 7.63 3.85 3.49 0.07 
 AD 0.050* 3.36 2.87 2.54 2.18 0.21 
        
Rapport AR 0.033** 1.63 1.48 1.17 1.52 0.11 
 AD 0.999 1.16 1.36 1.04 2.84 0.10 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
 
Diversity AR 0.175 2.09 2.09 1.40 1.85 
 
0.00 
 AD 0.093* 2.31 2.45 2.00 1.93 0.07 
       
 
Exclusion AR 0.396 2.74 3.17 2.07 3.04 0.17 
 AD 0.169 1.76 1.83 1.84 1.65 0.04 
       
 
Liberation AR 0.608 0.77 0.84 0.68 0.90 0.08 
 AD 0.002*** 0.85 0.63 1.31 0.89 0.20 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.51 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Centrality AR 0.084* 5.65 4.12 2.37 1.86 
 
0.72 
 AD 0.005*** 3.43 2.22 2.15 1.33 0.68 
        
Cooperation AR 0.587 6.16 6.64 2.94 2.26 0.18 
 AD 0.243 3.24 2.46 2.47 1.59 0.39 
        
Rapport AR 0.853 1.57 1.67 1.07 1.13 0.10 
 AD 0.937 1.61 1.23 2.39 0.93 0.21 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
 
Diversity AR 0.199 1.52 2.41 1.27 1.88 
 
0.57 
 AD 0.506 2.16 2.32 1.76 1.57 0.10 
       
 
Exclusion AR 0.296 2.36 2.70 1.48 1.22 0.26 
 AD 0.951 1.73 1.52 1.72 1.23 0.14 
       
 
Liberation AR 0.010** 0.71 1.79 0.75 1.54 0.90 
 AD 0.110 0.58 0.82 0.88 0.75 0.29 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
366 | P a g e  
 
 
  
 
Table 5.52 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Centrality AR 0.545 6.02 5.65 4.57 2.37 
 
0.10 
 AD 0.016** 3.03 3.43 2.31 2.15 0.18 
        
Cooperation AR 0.073* 7.37 6.16 3.85 2.94 0.36 
 AD 0.717 3.36 3.24 2.54 2.47 0.04 
        
Rapport AR 0.880 1.63 1.57 1.17 1.07 0.05 
 AD 0.167 1.16 1.61 1.04 2.39 0.25 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score       
 
 
Diversity AR 0.005*** 2.09 1.52 1.40 1.27 
 
0.42 
 AD 0.837 2.31 2.16 2.00 1.76 0.08 
       
 
Exclusion AR 0.532 2.74 2.36 2.07 1.48 0.21 
 AD 0.952 1.76 1.73 1.84 1.72 0.01 
       
 
Liberation AR 0.227 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.75 0.09 
 AD 0.007*** 0.85 0.58 1.31 0.88 0.24 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.53 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
COMMONALITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
COMMONALITY Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Centrality AR 0.469 5.03 4.12 4.09 1.86 
 
0.01 
 AD 0.308 2.86 2.22 2.40 1.33 0.33 
        
Cooperation AR 0.429 7.63 6.64 3.49 2.26 0.15 
 AD 0.595 2.87 2.46 2.18 1.59 0.22 
        
Rapport AR 0.400 1.48 1.67 1.52 1.13 0.12 
 AD 0.659 1.36 1.23 2.84 0.93 0.07 
        
 
Items that Decrease  
COMMONALITY Score        
 
Diversity AR 0.766 2.09 2.41 1.85 1.88 
 
0.07 
 AD 0.970 2.45 2.32 1.93 1.57 0.07 
        
Exclusion AR 0.897 3.17 2.70 3.04 1.22 0.00 
 AD 0.625 1.83 1.52 1.65 1.23 0.21 
        
Liberation AR 0.023** 0.84 1.79 0.90 1.54 0.07 
 AD 0.086* 0.63 0.82 0.89 0.75 0.23 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.54 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Tenacity AR 0.370 20.56 21.41 6.25 6.13 
 
0.14 
 AD 0.128 41.72 40.51 8.34 8.22 0.15 
        
Levelling terms AR 0.325 4.91 4.64 2.67 3.07 0.09 
 AD 0.241 9.80 10.17 4.60 4.74 0.08 
        
Collectives AR 0.058* 9.22 8.38 3.98 3.90 0.21 
 AD 0.059* 4.91 4.36 2.80 2.42 0.21 
        
Insistence AR 0.108 73.19 81.05 45.63 44.45 0.17 
 AD 0.895 36.00 33.80 26.66 21.15 0.09 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AR 0.131 24.22 21.41 14.06 13.36 0.20 
 AD 0.004*** 12.85 10.97 7.54 6.37 0.27 
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.018** 4.15 3.20 3.03 2.44 0.34 
 AD 0.626 20.38 20.87 6.86 10.27 0.06 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.024** 2.05 1.50 2.51 2.50 0.22 
 AD 0.191 8.71 9.27 5.12 4.98 0.11 
        
Variety AR 0.590 0.55 0.55 0.07 0.06 0.10 
 AD 0.740 0.53 0.52 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.55 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Tenacity AR 0.473 20.77 19.33 7.02 2.60 
 
0.27 
 AD 0.236 39.78 41.74 8.33 9.75 0.22 
        
Levelling terms AR 0.896 4.65 4.54 2.23 1.54 0.06 
 AD 0.100 10.48 11.29 12.35 5.42 0.08 
        
Collectives AR 0.672 7.74 7.15 3.39 3.40 0.18 
 AD 0.243 5.21 4.09 4.07 2.46 0.33 
        
Insistence AR 0.151 61.75 76.68 38.54 35.64 0.40 
 AD 0.026** 35.21 25.34 19.08 13.86 0.59 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AR 0.164 23.59 17.39 12.03 8.02 0.61 
 AD 0.008*** 14.76 9.54 8.60 5.72 0.72 
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.609 4.16 4.65 2.73 2.77 0.18 
 AD 0.152 19.25 24.11 7.93 13.37 0.44 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.579 3.28 3.46 4.11 3.14 0.05 
 AD 0.409 7.91 9.12 4.61 5.28 0.24 
        
Variety AR 0.957 0.56 0.55 0.07 0.03 0.17 
 AD 0.227 0.52 0.51 0.08 0.08 0.23 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.56 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Tenacity AR 0.816 20.56 20.77 6.25 7.02 
 
0.03 
 AD 0.066* 41.72 39.78 8.34 8.33 0.23 
        
Levelling terms AR 0.609 4.91 4.65 2.67 2.23 0.11 
 AD 0.316 9.80 10.48 4.60 12.35 0.07 
        
Collectives AR 0.035** 9.22 7.74 3.98 3.39 0.40 
 AD 1.000 4.91 5.21 2.80 4.07 0.09 
        
Insistence AR 0.110 73.19 61.75 45.63 38.54 0.27 
 AD 0.324 36.00 35.21 26.66 19.08 0.03 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AR 0.975 24.22 23.59 14.06 12.03 0.05 
 AD 0.040** 12.85 14.76 7.54 8.60 0.24 
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.626 4.15 4.16 3.03 2.73 0.01 
 AD 0.091* 20.38 19.25 6.86 7.93 0.15 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.017** 2.05 3.28 2.51 4.11 0.36 
 AD 0.090* 8.71 7.91 5.12 4.61 0.17 
        
Variety AR 0.789 0.55 0.56 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 AD 0.696 0.53 0.52 0.07 0.08 0.04 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.57 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
CERTAINTY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
CERTAINTY Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Tenacity AR 0.950 21.41 19.70 6.13 5.35 
 
0.05 
 AD 0.305 40.51 41.74 8.22 9.75 0.14 
        
Levelling terms AR 0.783 4.64 4.61 3.07 2.67 0.01 
 AD 0.353 10.17 11.29 4.74 5.42 0.22 
        
Collectives AR 0.271 8.38 8.47 3.90 4.07 0.02 
 AD 0.442 4.36 4.09 2.42 2.46 0.11 
        
Insistence AR 0.980 81.05 82.33 44.45 45.21 0.03 
 AD 0.089* 33.80 25.34 21.15 13.86 0.47 
 
Items that Decrease  
CERTAINTY Score       
 
 
Numerical Terms AR 0.578 21.41 22.42 13.36 14.28 0.07 
 AD 0.253 10.97 9.54 6.37 5.72 0.24 
       
 
Ambivalence AR 0.120 3.20 3.07 2.44 2.22 0.06 
 AD 0.325 20.87 24.11 10.27 13.37 0.27 
       
 
Self-Reference AR 0.020** 1.50 1.53 2.50 2.07 0.01 
 AD 0.652 9.27 9.12 4.98 5.28 0.03 
        
Variety AR 0.675 0.55 0.54 0.06 0.06 0.09 
 AD 0.100 0.52 0.51 0.07 0.08 0.23 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.58 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Aggression AR 0.212 3.31 3.12 1.88 2.21 0.10 
 AD 0.043** 1.92 2.30 1.49 2.09 0.21 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.017** 33.54 35.57 11.13 9.22 0.20 
 AD 0.000*** 15.37 17.52 7.41 6.92 0.30 
        
Communication AR 0.883 2.34 2.63 2.14 2.99 0.11 
 AD 0.077* 8.51 7.41 5.47 3.86 0.23 
        
Motion AR 0.121 2.10 2.49 1.74 2.21 0.20 
 AD 0.147 3.95 4.21 2.34 2.33 0.11 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
 
Cognition AR 0.309 7.52 7.16 3.59 3.93 
 
0.10 
 AD 0.008*** 11.75 12.51 5.92 4.80 0.14 
       
 
Passivity AR 0.081* 8.24 7.63 3.40 3.67 0.17 
 AD 0.117 4.28 4.17 2.35 3.71 0.03 
       
 
Embellishment AR 0.004*** 1.05 0.75 1.40 0.54 0.29 
 AD 0.489 0.60 0.86 0.89 2.24 0.15 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.59 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   Low High Low High  
 
Aggression AR 0.263 4.04 3.24 2.43 3.24 0.28 
 AD 0.326 1.80 3.15 1.54 5.50 0.34 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.648 36.32 35.25 16.88 7.80 0.08 
 AD 0.496 15.36 15.80 6.61 6.08 0.07 
        
Communication AR 0.296 1.97 2.32 1.91 1.56 0.20 
 AD 0.558 8.69 7.03 6.10 2.65 0.35 
        
Motion AR 0.744 1.68 1.79 1.00 1.00 0.12 
 AD 0.883 3.83 3.36 2.57 1.21 0.24 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
 
Cognition AR 
0.249 
7.43 8.12 3.67 2.31 
 
0.22 
 AD 0.409 11.48 11.59 4.98 3.30 0.03 
       
 
Passivity AR 0.460 8.19 7.30 3.58 3.44 0.25 
 AD  0.095* 5.47 3.42 4.15 1.18 0.67 
       
 
Embellishment AR  0.073* 0.81 0.59 0.47 0.20 0.63 
 AD 0.312 1.06 0.47 2.50 0.27 0.33 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.60 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Aggression AR  0.081* 3.31 4.04 1.88 2.43 0.33 
 AD 0.305 1.92 1.80 1.49 1.54 0.08 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.309 33.54 36.32 11.13 16.88 0.19 
 AD 0.743 15.37 15.36 7.41 6.61 0.00 
        
Communication AR  0.077* 2.34 1.97 2.14 1.91 0.18 
 AD 0.950 8.51 8.69 5.47 6.10 0.03 
        
Motion AR 0.550 2.10 1.68 1.74 1.00 0.30 
 AD 0.424 3.95 3.83 2.34 2.57 0.05 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
 
Cognition AR 0.596 7.52 7.43 3.59 3.67 
 
0.02 
 AD 0.841 11.75 11.48 5.92 4.98 0.05 
        
Passivity AR 0.749 8.24 7.43 3.40 3.58 0.23 
 AD  0.081* 4.28 5.47 2.35 4.15 0.35 
        
Embellishment AR 0.600 1.05 0.81 1.40 0.47 0.23 
 AD 0.624 0.60 1.06 0.89 2.50 0.24 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.61 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
ACTIVITY 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
ACTIVITY Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Aggression AR 0.792 3.12 2.96 2.21 2.07 0.07 
 AD 0.851 2.30 3.15 2.09 5.50 0.20 
        
Accomplishment AR 0.993 35.57 35.72 9.22 8.46 0.02 
 AD 0.473 17.52 15.80 6.92 6.08 0.26 
        
Communication AR 0.894 2.63 2.72 2.99 3.19 0.03 
 AD 0.933 7.41 7.03 3.86 2.65 0.11 
        
Motion AR 0.567 2.49 2.72 2.21 2.29 0.10 
 AD 0.193 4.21 3.36 2.33 1.21 0.46 
 
Items that Decrease  
ACTIVITY Score       
 
 
Cognition AR 0.245 7.16 7.51 3.93 3.95 
 
0.09 
 AD 0.647 12.51 11.59 4.80 3.30 0.22 
        
Passivity AR 0.767 7.63 7.72 3.67 3.64 0.02 
 AD 0.641 4.17 3.42 3.71 1.18 0.27 
        
Embellishment AR 0.525 0.75 0.77 0.54 0.56 0.04 
 AD 0.070* 0.86 0.47 2.24 0.27 0.25 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.62 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Familiarity AR 0.631 124.34 123.56 12.83 12.78 0.06 
 AD 0.160 128.78 131.16 14.53 11.66 0.18 
        
Spatial Terms AR 0.185 9.27 8.44 5.25 5.01 0.16 
 AD 0.400 9.11 9.19 4.34 8.48 0.01 
        
Temporal Terms AR 0.927 15.59 15.79 4.90 5.64 0.04 
 AD 0.109 16.81 15.87 6.99 6.10 0.14 
        
Present Concern AR 0.422 8.33 8.10 7.18 3.76 0.04 
 AD 0.782 14.66 14.23 5.65 5.05 0.08 
        
Human Interest AR 0.484 25.22 26.04 12.14 13.17 0.06 
 AD 0.814 31.90 30.48 19.40 10.05 0.09 
 
Concreteness AR 0.051* 14.19 13.10 5.01 5.05 0.22 
 AD 0.546 9.21 9.47 4.45 4.69 0.06 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.012** 2.07 2.71 1.21 2.50 0.32 
 AD 0.068* 3.64 4.02 2.18 2.47 0.16 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.000*** 5.07 5.21 0.24 0.30 0.51 
 AD 0.015** 4.40 4.43 0.21 0.18 0.15 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.63 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Familiarity AR 0.297 126.62 123.31 16.23 6.97 0.27 
 AD 0.247 131.17 136.45 14.86 14.03 0.36 
        
Spatial Terms AR 0.487 8.84 7.39 4.33 3.86 0.35 
 AD 0.220 8.85 6.98 4.94 1.91 0.50 
        
Temporal Terms AR 0.777 14.99 15.42 5.22 3.11 0.10 
 AD 0.829 16.92 17.88 6.80 9.96 0.11 
        
Present Concern AR 0.008*** 7.11 11.33 3.31 4.12 1.12 
 AD 0.003*** 13.85 17.54 5.12 5.20 0.72 
        
Human Interest AR 0.185 25.08 29.71 8.93 4.13 0.67 
 AD 0.014** 29.80 35.63 8.14 10.78 0.61 
 
Concreteness AR 0.098* 15.81 11.88 6.25 2.75 0.82 
 AD 0.010** 11.47 7.61 6.21 2.51 0.81 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.421 2.16 2.35 1.47 1.21 0.14 
 AD 0.560 3.21 3.47 1.96 2.19 0.12 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.312 5.06 5.14 0.22 0.22 0.35 
 AD 0.016** 4.43 4.30 0.18 0.17 0.77 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.64 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Familiarity AR 0.190 124.34 126.62 12.83 16.23 0.16 
 AD 0.129 128.78 131.17 14.53 14.86 0.16 
        
Spatial Terms AR 0.514 9.27 8.84 5.25 4.33 0.09 
 AD 0.317 9.11 8.85 4.34 4.94 0.06 
        
Temporal Terms AR 0.516 15.59 14.99 4.90 5.22 0.12 
 AD 0.839 16.81 16.92 6.99 6.80 0.02 
        
Present Concern AR 0.392 8.33 7.11 7.18 3.31 0.22 
 AD 0.387 14.66 13.85 5.65 5.12 0.15 
        
Human Interest AR 0.946 25.22 25.08 12.14 8.93 0.01 
 AD 0.676 31.90 29.80 19.40 8.14 0.14 
 
Concreteness AR 0.190 14.19 15.81 5.01 6.25 0.29 
 AD 0.001*** 9.21 11.47 4.45 6.21 0.42 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.948 2.07 2.16 1.21 1.47 0.06 
 AD 0.091* 3.64 3.21 2.18 1.96 0.21 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.867 5.07 5.06 0.24 0.22 0.06 
 AD 0.066* 4.40 4.43 0.21 0.18 0.19 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.65 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
REALISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
REALISM Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Familiarity AR 0.967 123.56 123.31 12.78 6.97 0.02 
 AD 0.134 131.16 136.45 11.66 14.03 0.41 
        
Spatial Terms AR 0.570 8.44 7.39 5.01 3.86 0.23 
 AD 0.122 9.19 6.98 8.48 1.91 0.36 
        
Temporal Terms AR 0.910 15.79 15.42 5.64 3.11 0.08 
 AD 0.636 15.87 17.88 6.10 9.96 0.24 
        
Present Concern AR 0.027** 8.10 11.33 3.76 4.12 0.82 
 AD 0.004*** 14.23 17.54 5.05 5.20 0.65 
        
Human Interest AR 0.694 26.04 29.71 13.17 4.13 0.38 
 AD 0.008*** 30.48 35.63 10.05 10.78 0.49 
 
Concreteness AR 0.676 13.10 11.88 5.05 2.75 0.30 
 AD 0.091* 9.47 7.61 4.69 2.51 0.49 
 
Items that Decrease  
REALISM Score       
 
 
Past Concern AR 0.953 2.71 2.35 2.50 1.21 0.18 
 AD 0.345 4.02 3.47 2.47 2.19 0.23 
       
 
Complexity AR 0.610 5.21 5.14 0.30 0.22 0.27 
 AD 0.011** 4.43 4.30 0.18 0.17 0.73 
       
 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.66 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Good Times 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Praise AR 0.300 5.93 5.47 3.09 3.00 0.15 
 AD 0.002*** 6.62 7.37 3.63 3.44 0.21 
        
Satisfaction AR 0.596 3.57 3.31 3.27 2.80 0.09 
 AD 0.423 6.34 6.01 7.54 5.81 0.05 
        
Inspiration AR 0.027** 7.46 8.29 4.91 4.19 0.18 
 AD 0.130 3.11 3.21 2.80 2.65 0.03 
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.005*** 0.68 0.51 0.68 0.76 0.23 
 AD 0.411 0.95 0.99 1.05 1.39 0.03 
       
 
Hardship AR 0.760 1.47 1.56 1.59 1.59 0.06 
 AD 0.752 1.30 1.31 1.37 1.76 0.01 
       
 
Denial AR 0.000*** 1.13 0.70 1.29 1.04 0.36 
 AD 0.463 5.84 5.70 3.48 3.57 0.04 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.67 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(Micro-level Analysis) – Bad Times 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   Low High Low High  
 
Praise AR 0.240 4.97 6.69 2.62 3.96 0.51 
 AD 0.403 6.29 6.69 3.17 2.21 0.14 
        
Satisfaction AR 0.174 2.90 4.29 2.48 3.25 0.48 
 AD 0.131 5.56 10.01 5.35 15.08 0.39 
        
Inspiration AR 0.983 8.03 8.06 6.37 5.29 0.01 
 AD 0.848 2.54 2.36 2.62 1.85 0.08 
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.684 0.53 0.44 0.66 0.48 0.16 
 AD 0.886 0.94 0.81 1.94 0.75 0.09 
       
 
Hardship AR 0.132 1.10 2.32 1.07 2.01 0.76 
 AD 0.095* 1.15 1.38 1.09 0.81 0.24 
       
 
Denial AR 0.157 1.04 1.49 0.90 0.88 0.51 
 AD 0.544 5.55 6.29 3.45 4.17 0.19 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.68 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – Low Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Praise AR  0.057* 5.93 4.97 3.09 2.62 0.33 
 AD 0.700 6.62 6.29 3.63 3.17 0.09 
        
Satisfaction AR 0.242 3.57 2.90 3.27 2.48 0.23 
 AD 0.545 6.34 5.56 7.54 5.35 0.12 
        
Inspiration AR 0.692 7.46 8.03 4.91 6.37 0.10 
 AD  0.052* 3.11 2.54 2.80 2.62 0.21 
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.174 0.68 0.53 0.68 0.66 0.22 
 AD 0.286 0.95 0.94 1.05 1.94 0.01 
       
 
Hardship AR 0.207 1.47 1.10 1.59 1.07 0.27 
 AD 0.471 1.30 1.15 1.37 1.09 0.12 
       
 
Denial AR 0.638 1.13 1.04 1.29 0.90 0.08 
 AD 0.322 5.84 5.55 3.48 3.45 0.08 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.69 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (Micro-level 
Analysis) – High Discretion Industry 
 
Sub-features of 
OPTIMISM 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
Items that Increase  
OPTIMISM Score   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Praise AR 0.410 5.47 6.69 3.00 3.96 0.35 
 AD 0.564 7.37 6.69 3.44 2.21 0.24 
        
Satisfaction AR 0.427 3.31 4.29 2.80 3.25 0.32 
 AD 0.343 6.01 10.01 5.81 15.08 0.35 
        
Inspiration AR 0.667 8.29 8.06 4.19 5.29 0.05 
 AD 0.120 3.21 2.36 2.65 1.85 0.37 
        
Items that Decrease  
OPTIMISM Score       
 
 
Blame AR 0.825 0.51 0.44 0.76 0.48 0.12 
 AD 0.986 0.99 0.81 1.39 0.75 0.16 
       
 
Hardship AR 0.269 1.56 2.32 1.59 2.01 0.42 
 AD 0.130 1.31 1.38 1.76 0.81 0.05 
       
 
Denial AR 0.005*** 0.70 1.49 1.04 0.88 0.81 
 AD 0.643 5.70 6.29 3.57 4.17 0.15 
        
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
384 | P a g e  
 
 
  
 
Table 5.70 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) – Good Times 
 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AR 0.134 80.57 83.25 13.33 11.85 0.21 
 AD 0.000*** 71.87 77.95 10.82 10.77 0.56 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.018** 0.28 0.20 0.31 0.29 0.26 
 AD 0.507 1.37 1.43 0.58 0.73 0.10 
        
First Person Plural Pronoun AR 0.308 4.19 4.51 1.85 2.21 0.16 
 AD 0.880 4.93 4.93 0.92 1.05 0.01 
        
Positive Emotion AR 0.722 3.93 3.96 0.97 0.94 0.03 
 AD 0.000*** 3.06 3.42 0.65 0.72 0.53 
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.000*** 0.66 0.49 0.36 0.43 0.42 
 AD 0.002*** 0.53 0.47 0.23 0.24 0.25 
 
Certainty AR 0.426 1.04 1.00 0.39 0.37 0.12 
 AD 0.707 1.36 1.39 0.37 0.38 0.07 
 
Achievement AR 0.000*** 3.58 4.10 0.93 1.06 0.53 
 AD 0.000*** 2.18 2.52 0.64 0.75 0.49 
       
 
Risk AR 0.002*** 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.26 
 AD 0.347 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.17 0.03 
        
Past Focus AR 0.527 1.90 1.96 0.30 0.35 0.09 
 AD 0.619 2.86 2.83 0.15 0.17 0.03 
        
Present Focus AR 0.488 5.25 5.15 1.33 1.48 0.07 
 AD 0.716 10.57 10.61 1.50 1.70 0.02 
        
Motion AR 0.187 2.91 3.08 0.73 0.87 0.21 
 AD 0.000*** 2.58 2.79 0.60 0.58 0.36 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.71 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Low & High Discretion Industries 
(LIWC) – Bad Times 
 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values 
Standard 
Deviation Cohen's d 
 
   Low High Low High  
 
Tone AR 0.041** 76.88 89.02 15.02 4.75 1.08 
 AD 0.000*** 66.27 82.27 13.75 7.89 1.42 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.870 0.55 0.51 0.63 0.49 0.06 
 AD 0.299 1.31 1.51 0.53 0.68 0.32 
        
First Person Plural Pronoun AR 0.350 4.37 4.91 1.44 1.12 0.42 
 AD 0.948 5.27 5.37 0.92 0.99 0.11 
        
Positive Emotion AR 0.171 3.81 4.14 1.13 0.48 0.37 
 AD 0.000*** 2.82 3.62 0.77 0.63 1.13 
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.005*** 0.75 0.31 0.39 0.34 1.19 
 AD 0.001*** 0.59 0.38 0.26 0.15 1.02 
 
Certainty AR 0.836 1.07 1.03 0.38 0.41 0.09 
 AD 0.128 1.32 1.52 0.40 0.48 0.45 
 
Achievement AR 0.178 3.71 4.05 1.28 0.65 0.34 
 AD 0.445 2.13 2.17 0.80 0.43 0.06 
       
 
Risk AR 0.049** 0.47 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.84 
 AD 0.926 0.29 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.00 
        
Past Focus AR 0.096* 2.10 1.79 0.50 0.32 0.74 
 AD 0.487 2.70 2.55 0.83 0.51 0.22 
        
Present Focus AR 0.240 5.21 5.85 1.49 1.07 0.49 
 AD 0.075* 10.74 11.54 1.99 1.33 0.47 
        
Motion AR 0.712 2.69 2.73 0.73 1.26 0.04 
 AD 0.338 2.42 2.56 0.62 0.56 0.24 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.72 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (LIWC) – Low 
Discretion Industry 
 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad) 
Low 
(Good) 
Low 
(Bad)  
 
Tone AR 0.149 80.57 76.88 13.33 15.02 0.26 
 AD 0.000*** 71.87 66.27 10.82 13.75 0.45 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.001*** 0.28 0.55 0.31 0.63 0.55 
 AD 0.421 1.37 1.31 0.58 0.53 0.09 
        
First Person Plural 
Pronoun AR 0.602 4.19 4.37 1.85 1.44 0.11 
 AD 0.002*** 4.93 5.27 0.92 0.92 0.37 
        
Positive Emotion AR 0.454 3.93 3.81 0.97 1.13 0.11 
 AD 0.002*** 3.06 2.82 0.65 0.77 0.34 
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.127 0.66 0.75 0.36 0.39 0.24 
 AD 0.037** 0.53 0.59 0.23 0.26 0.25 
 
Certainty AR 0.516 1.04 1.07 0.39 0.38 0.06 
 AD 0.238 1.36 1.32 0.37 0.40 0.10 
 
Achievement AR 0.717 3.58 3.71 0.93 1.28 0.12 
 AD 0.443 2.18 2.13 0.64 0.80 0.06 
       
 
Risk AR 0.253 0.44 0.47 0.30 0.27 0.13 
 AD 0.601 0.27 0.29 0.15 0.17 0.09 
        
Past Focus AR 0.027** 1.90 2.10 0.57 0.50 0.37 
 AD 0.189 2.86 2.70 0.84 0.83 0.19 
        
Present Focus AR 0.866 5.25 5.21 1.33 1.49 0.03 
 AD 0.625 10.57 10.74 1.50 1.99 0.09 
        
Motion AR 0.115 2.91 2.69 0.73 0.73 0.30 
 AD 0.052* 2.58 2.42 0.60 0.62 0.25 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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Table 5.73 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Significance between Good & Bad Times (LIWC) – High 
Discretion Industry 
 
LIWC Category 
Document 
Type 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sig. Test Mean Values Standard Deviation 
Cohen'
s d 
 
   
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad) 
High 
(Good) 
High 
(Bad)  
 
Tone AR 0.201 83.25 89.02 11.85 4.75 0.64 
 AD 0.121 77.95 82.27 10.77 7.89 0.46 
        
First Person Singular 
Pronoun AR 0.015** 0.20 0.51 0.29 0.49 0.78 
 AD 0.751 1.43 1.51 0.73 0.68 0.11 
        
First Person Plural 
Pronoun AR 0.625 4.51 4.91 2.21 1.12 0.23 
 AD 0.093* 4.93 5.37 1.05 0.99 0.43 
        
Positive Emotion AR 0.342 3.96 4.14 0.94 0.48 0.24 
 AD 0.258 3.42 3.62 0.72 0.63 0.29 
        
Negative Emotion AR 0.167 0.49 0.31 0.43 0.34 0.46 
 AD 0.132 0.47 0.38 0.24 0.15 0.46 
 
Certainty AR 0.584 1.00 1.03 0.37 0.41 0.08 
 AD 0.317 1.39 1.52 0.38 0.48 0.30 
 
Achievement AR 0.792 4.10 4.05 1.06 0.65 0.06 
 AD 0.066* 2.52 2.17 0.75 0.43 0.57 
       
 
Risk AR 0.563 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.32 
 AD 0.650 0.27 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.11 
        
Past Focus AR 0.514 1.96 1.79 0.35 0.32 0.29 
 AD 0.072* 2.83 2.55 0.17 0.51 0.49 
        
Present Focus AR 0.114 5.15 5.85 1.48 1.07 0.54 
 AD 0.021** 10.61 11.54 1.70 1.33 0.61 
        
Motion AR 0.191 3.08 2.73 0.87 1.26 0.32 
 AD 0.141 2.79 2.56 0.58 0.56 0.40 
 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
 
AR = Annual Report  
AD = Analysts’ Discussion           
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9. Panel Ratings 
9a. Panel Ratings – Academics and Industry Analysts 
Table 9.1 Overall Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa 
Variable  Mean St.Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Discretion, academic panel 4.52 1.80        
Discretion, security analysts 4.75 1.23   0.83***       
R&D Intensity 0.04 0.04   0.48***   0.57*      
Advertising Intensity 0.01 0.02   0.34*** 0.29  0.00     
Capital Intensity 66.60 113.74 -0.44*** -0.31 -0.40 -0.23    
Market Growth 0.10 0.08   0.40***   0.53*  0.30  0.02 -0.18   
Demand Instability 0.12 0.08    -0.14 -0.12 -0.25  0.02  0.22 -0.04  
Regulation 0.18 0.13    -0.07 -0.11  0.40 -0.30  0.02  0.07 -0.30 
aCorrelations involving the academic panel's discretion ratings are based on an N of 221; all others are based on an N of 17 
p-value < 0.01***; p-value < 0.05**; p-value < 0.1* 
Extracted from Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995, p. 1436)         
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9a. Panel Ratings – Academics and Industry Analysts 
Table 9.2 Results of Multiple Regression Analyses 
  Academic Panel, Model 1   Academic Panel, Model 2b   Security Analysts, Model 3 
 b s.e  b s.e  b s.e 
Independent Variablea                 
Intercept 4.284*** 0.470  4.344*** 0.386     4.286*** 0.568 
R&D Intensity 12.107*** 2.604  12.090*** 2.499  11.300 6.646 
Advertising Intensity 16.785*** 4.573  15.186*** 4.358  16.790 7.279 
Capital Intensity  -0.003*** 0.001  -0.004*** 0.001  -0.002 0.002 
Market Growth 5.835*** 1.292  5.960*** 1.281  5.329 3.604 
Demand Instability -0.997 1.308       
Regulation 0.808 0.800       
R2 0.492***  0.487***  0.477 
F                           9.903                           11.034  2.511 
aDummy variables for each panelist not reported in the study 
bModel 2 omits the two variables that were insignificant in model 1 
p-value < 0.001*** 
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10. Sample Companies 
10a. Sample of Companies with Annual Reports 
Table 10.1                                               Sample of Companies with Annual Reports   
  Industry Total No. of Companies Total No. of Annual Reports 
 Low Discretion High Discretion   
FTSE350 30 30 60  
Missing Data - - -  
Total Balanced Sample 30 30 60  
Firm Years 5 5   
Total No. of Annual Reports 150 150   300 
 
 
 
10b. Sample of Companies with Analysts' Discussions 
Table 10.2                                               Sample of Companies with Analysts' Discussions  
  Industry 
Total No. of 
Companies 
Total No. of Analysts' 
Discussions 
 
Low 
Discretion 
High 
Discretion   
FTSE350 30 30 60  
Firm Years 5 5 -  
Total Unbalanced Sample 344 299 60  
Missing Data - -   
Total No. of Analysts' Discussions 344 299   643 
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11. Summary Results and Analysis 
Table 5.74                                                     Descriptive Statistics         
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
 DICTION   Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
             
COMMONALITY Low Discretion 54.91 45.23 49.60 49.71 1.67  65.93 37.92 48.33 48.49 2.12 
 High Discretion 57.41 43.08 48.85 48.75 2.13  77.70 41.10 48.22 48.22 2.46 
             
CERTAINTY Low Discretion 53.84 27.44 47.39 48.00 4.17  81.30 40.06 39.62 40.09 7.39 
 High Discretion 54.25 27.40 48.73 49.89 3.73  52.80 41.72 38.28 39.54 7.85 
             
ACTIVITY Low Discretion 59.07 42.65 49.25 49.11 2.13  66.04 33.92 49.85 49.90 2.43 
 High Discretion 57.87 43.74 49.90 49.76 2.01  57.50 37.73 49.88 50.02 2.36 
             
REALISM Low Discretion 60.99 44.30 53.88 53.71 2.47  78.99 45.14 57.56 57.39 2.80 
 High Discretion 58.38 38.12 53.10 53.16 2.78  73.99 50.98 57.24 57.05 2.76 
             
OPTIMISM Low Discretion 68.82 46.36 54.52 54.06 3.40  97.88 36.46 54.43 53.23 5.90 
 High Discretion 70.67 47.47 54.76 54.24 3.26  97.68 43.26 54.85 53.71 5.67 
             
Flesch Readability Score Low Discretion 57.00 9.50 30.92 30.15 7.99  80.00 36.60 58.54 59.50 6.84 
 High Discretion 48.20 11.30 27.44 27.20 7.81  73.20 37.70 58.12 58.20 6.71 
             
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Low Discretion 20.60 6.60 14.62 14.90 1.97  13.30 4.80 9.49 9.50 1.51 
  High Discretion 20.20 11.90 15.15 15.00 1.62   13.50 6.30 9.65 9.70 1.42 
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Table 5.75                                                    Descriptive Statistics (Calculated scores versus DICTION scores)   
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports Analysts' Discussions 
    Mean  S.Dev.  DICTION Mean  DICTION S.Dev  Mean  S.Dev.  DICTION Mean  
DICTION 
S.Dev  
          
COMMONALITY Low Discretion 49.60 1.67 
49.57 2.71 
48.33 2.12 
49.57 2.71 
 High Discretion 48.85 2.13 48.22 2.46 
          
CERTAINTY Low Discretion 47.39 4.17 
49.43 2.53 
39.62 7.39 
49.43 2.53 
 High Discretion 48.73 3.73 38.28 7.85 
          
ACTIVITY Low Discretion 49.25 2.13 
51.11 4.37 
49.85 2.43 
51.11 4.37 
 High Discretion 49.90 2.01 49.88 2.36 
          
REALISM Low Discretion 53.88 2.47 
49.36 3.26 
57.56 2.80 
49.36 3.26 
 High Discretion 53.10 2.78 57.24 2.76 
          
OPTIMISM Low Discretion 54.52 3.40 
49.31 2.94 
54.43 5.90 
49.31 2.94 
 High Discretion 54.76 3.26 54.85 5.67 
          
Flesch Readability Score Low Discretion 30.92 7.99   58.54 6.84   
 High Discretion 27.44 7.81   58.12 6.71   
          
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Low Discretion 14.62 1.97   9.49 1.51   
  High Discretion 15.15 1.62     9.65 1.42     
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Table 5.76 Non-Parametric Test of Statistical Sig. between Flesch Index Scores of the Two Document Types 
(Annual Reports vs Analysts' Discussions)           
Flesch Index Scores Document Type Kruskal-Wallis Sig. Test Mean  S.Dev Max Min 
Cohen's 
d 
Flesch Readability Score Annual Reports - LD 
0.000*** 
30.92 7.99 57.00 9.50 3.71 
Flesch Readability Score Analysts' Discussions -LD 58.54 6.84 80.00 36.60  
        
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Annual Reports - LD 
0.000*** 
14.62 1.97 20.60 6.60 2.92 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Analysts' Discussions - LD 9.49 1.51 13.30 4.80  
        
Flesch Readability Score Annual Reports - HD 
0.000*** 
27.44 7.81 48.20 11.30 
4.21 
Flesch Readability Score Aggregated (Analysts' Discussions) -HD 58.12 6.71 73.20 37.70 
        
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Annual Reports - HD 
0.000*** 
15.15 1.62 20.20 11.90 
3.61 
Flesch-Kincaid Readability Grade Analysts' Discussions - HD 9.65 1.42 13.50 6.30 
        
Flesch Readability Score Aggregated (Annual Reports) -LD & HD 
0.000*** 
29.18 8.08 57.00 9.50 
3.91 
Flesch Readability Score Aggregated (Analysts' Discussions) -LD & HD 58.35 6.78 80.00 36.60 
        
Flesch Readability Grade Aggregated (Annual Reports) -LD & HD 
0.000*** 
14.89 1.82 20.60 6.60 
3.21 
Flesch Readability Grade Aggregated (Analysts' Discussions) -LD & HD 9.57 1.47 13.50 4.80 
*p-value < 0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01 
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Table 5.77                                                     Descriptive Statistics (Language Inquiry and Word Count - LIWC)         
LIWC Category Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
    Max  Min Mean  Median Std. Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
Tone Low Discretion 99.00 30.15 79.22 81.71 13.96  98.45 33.88 69.96 70.05 12.16 
  High Discretion 99.00 23.25 83.56 85.96 11.64   97.54 35.48 78.19 79.45 10.67 
First Person Singular Pronoun Low Discretion 3.26 0.00 0.36 0.27 0.45  3.69 0.21 1.35 1.24 0.56 
  High Discretion 1.90 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.31   6.40 0.06 1.44 1.30 0.73 
First Person Plural Pronoun Low Discretion 7.81 0.00 4.26 4.49 1.71  7.90 2.68 5.04 5.03 0.93 
  High Discretion 10.08 0.08 4.53 4.82 2.17   8.39 1.69 4.96 4.91 1.05 
Positive Emotion Low Discretion 7.65 1.65 3.88 3.77 1.02  5.82 0.78 2.98 2.88 0.70 
  High Discretion 6.57 1.98 3.97 3.85 0.93   5.43 1.50 3.43 3.41 0.71 
Negative Emotion Low Discretion 2.08 0.00 0.69 0.66 0.37  1.48 0.04 0.55 0.53 0.24 
  High Discretion 2.82 0.00 0.48 0.37 0.43   1.28 0.00 0.46 0.44 0.24 
Certainty Low Discretion 2.45 0.26 1.05 1.00 0.38  2.71 0.53 1.34 1.34 0.38 
  High Discretion 2.05 0.13 1.00 0.96 0.37   2.44 0.42 1.39 1.33 0.39 
Achievement Low Discretion 8.18 0.84 3.62 3.40 1.06  5.41 0.19 2.17 2.08 0.70 
  High Discretion 7.12 1.67 4.10 4.08 1.04   5.13 1.01 2.50 2.36 0.74 
Risk Low Discretion 1.91 0.00 0.45 0.41 0.29  0.91 0.00 0.28 0.25 0.16 
  High Discretion 2.04 0.00 0.34 0.24 0.34   1.18 0.00 0.27 0.22 0.17 
Past Focus Low Discretion 3.19 0.68 1.97 1.94 0.56  7.49 0.82 2.80 2.75 0.85 
  High Discretion 4.94 0.29 1.95 1.92 0.78   5.10 0.36 2.82 2.84 0.65 
Present Focus Low Discretion 9.48 1.80 5.21 5.14 1.38  14.58 6.07 10.63 10.68 1.68 
  High Discretion 11.01 2.26 5.19 5.10 1.47   15.30 5.10 10.66 10.71 1.70 
Motion Low Discretion 4.85 1.44 2.83 2.71 0.73  4.59 0.77 2.53 2.46 0.61 
 High Discretion 5.63 1.18 3.06 2.88 0.89  4.54 1.51 2.78 2.76 0.58 
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Table 5.78                                                    Descriptive Statistics - During Good Times         
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
    Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
             
COMMONALITY Low Discretion 54.91 45.23 49.55 49.71 1.80  53.67 37.92 48.07 48.36 1.95 
 High Discretion 57.41 43.08 48.90 48.86 2.15  77.70 41.10 48.24 48.24 2.51 
             
CERTAINTY Low Discretion 53.84 36.91 48.03 48.88 3.61  51.25 -9.94 39.15 39.57 7.03 
 High Discretion 54.25 27.40 48.89 49.95 3.64  52.80 -8.28 38.29 39.47 7.88 
             
ACTIVITY Low Discretion 54.49 42.65 49.12 49.08 2.07  66.04 33.92 50.05 50.10 2.42 
 High Discretion 57.87 43.74 49.92 49.77 2.03  55.20 37.73 49.86 50.02 2.37 
             
REALISM Low Discretion 60.99 47.12 53.96 53.66 2.54  78.99 48.98 57.58 57.27 2.83 
 High Discretion 58.38 38.12 53.03 53.02 2.82  73.99 50.98 57.13 56.99 2.69 
             
OPTIMISM Low Discretion 68.82 46.36 54.70 54.50 3.57  97.88 44.03 54.65 53.19 6.34 
 High Discretion 70.67 47.47 54.72 54.17 3.30  87.21 43.26 54.71 53.74 5.14 
             
Flesch Readability Score Low Discretion 57.00 9.50 31.30 30.40 8.24  80.00 36.60 59.00 60.20 6.83 
 High Discretion 48.20 11.30 27.34 27.30 7.79  73.20 37.70 57.93 58.05 6.75 
             
Flesch Readability Grade Low Discretion 20.60 6.60 14.46 14.80 2.00  13.30 4.80 9.40 9.40 1.49 
  High Discretion 20.20 11.90 15.14 14.95 1.62   13.50 6.30 9.69 9.70 1.43 
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Table 5.79                                                     Descriptive Statistics - During Bad Times         
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
    Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
             
COMMONALITY Low Discretion 52.81 46.40 49.68 49.57 1.42  65.93 42.74 48.81 48.72 2.35 
 High Discretion 50.56 46.08 47.91 47.56 1.60  51.08 44.69 47.92 47.78 1.22 
             
CERTAINTY Low Discretion 51.97 27.44 46.01 46.67 5.09  81.30 14.16 40.45 41.00 7.98 
 High Discretion 50.42 36.56 45.82 45.88 4.31  47.77 22.27 38.09 40.63 7.51 
             
ACTIVITY Low Discretion 59.07 45.94 49.52 49.36 2.23  56.19 34.81 49.46 49.24 2.44 
 High Discretion 52.71 46.98 49.51 49.59 1.72  57.50 47.92 50.24 50.16 2.18 
             
REALISM Low Discretion 60.17 44.30 53.75 53.83 2.39  66.80 45.14 57.53 57.52 2.75 
 High Discretion 57.21 52.05 54.27 54.33 1.60  69.30 55.26 59.16 58.94 3.25 
             
OPTIMISM Low Discretion 64.91 49.70 54.28 53.77 3.04  75.52 36.46 53.94 53.27 4.90 
 High Discretion 59.10 50.88 55.38 55.66 2.53  97.68 49.92 57.14 53.04 11.37 
             
Flesch Readability Score Low Discretion 43.20 11.40 30.29 30.15 7.70  74.20 38.80 57.69 58.15 6.79 
 High Discretion 44.80 16.30 29.21 27.10 8.54  71.20 54.60 61.35 61.40 5.23 
             
Flesch Readability Grade Low Discretion 20.20 8.70 14.92 14.90 1.93  13.00 6.00 9.66 9.80 1.55 
  High Discretion 18.80 12.40 15.26 15.35 1.86   10.60 7.00 9.00 9.30 1.08 
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Table 5.80                                                   Descriptive Statistics - Good vs Bad Times (Low Discretion Industry)         
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
    Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
             
COMMONALITY Low Discretion (G) 54.91 45.23 49.55 49.71 1.80  53.67 37.92 48.07 48.36 1.95 
 Low Discretion (B) 52.81 46.40 49.68 49.57 1.42  65.93 42.74 48.81 48.72 2.35 
             
CERTAINTY Low Discretion (G) 53.84 36.91 48.03 48.88 3.61  51.25 -9.94 39.15 39.57 7.03 
 Low Discretion (B) 51.97 27.44 46.01 46.67 5.09  81.30 14.16 40.45 41.00 7.98 
             
ACTIVITY Low Discretion (G) 54.49 42.65 49.12 49.08 2.07  66.04 33.92 50.05 50.10 2.42 
 Low Discretion (B) 59.07 45.94 49.52 49.36 2.23  56.19 34.81 49.46 49.24 2.44 
             
REALISM Low Discretion (G) 60.99 47.12 53.96 53.66 2.54  78.99 48.98 57.58 57.27 2.83 
 Low Discretion (B) 60.17 44.30 53.75 53.83 2.39  66.80 45.14 57.53 57.52 2.75 
             
OPTIMISM Low Discretion (G) 68.82 46.36 54.70 54.50 3.57  97.88 44.03 54.65 53.19 6.34 
 Low Discretion (B) 64.91 49.70 54.28 53.77 3.04  75.52 36.46 53.94 53.27 4.90 
             
Flesch Readability Score Low Discretion (G) 57.00 9.50 31.30 30.40 8.24  80.00 36.60 59.00 60.20 6.83 
 Low Discretion (B) 43.20 11.40 30.29 30.15 7.70  74.20 38.80 57.69 58.15 6.79 
             
Flesch Readability Grade Low Discretion (G) 20.60 6.60 14.46 14.80 2.00  13.30 4.80 9.40 9.40 1.49 
  Low Discretion (B) 20.20 8.70 14.92 14.90 1.93   13.00 6.00 9.66 9.80 1.55 
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Table 5.81                                                    Descriptive Statistics - Good vs Bad Times (High Discretion Industry)         
Master Variable Industry Annual Reports  Analysts' Discussions 
    Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  Max  Min Mean  Median 
Std. 
Dev.  
             
COMMONALITY High Discretion (G) 57.41 43.08 48.90 48.86 2.15  77.70 41.10 48.24 48.24 2.51 
 High Discretion (B) 50.56 46.08 47.91 47.56 1.60  51.08 44.69 47.92 47.78 1.22 
             
CERTAINTY High Discretion (G) 54.25 27.40 48.89 49.95 3.64  52.80 -8.28 38.29 39.47 7.88 
 High Discretion (B) 50.42 36.56 45.82 45.88 4.31  47.77 22.27 38.09 40.63 7.51 
             
ACTIVITY High Discretion (G) 57.87 43.74 49.92 49.77 2.03  55.20 37.73 49.86 50.02 2.37 
 High Discretion (B) 52.71 46.98 49.51 49.59 1.72  57.50 47.92 50.24 50.16 2.18 
             
REALISM High Discretion (G) 58.38 38.12 53.03 53.02 2.82  73.99 50.98 57.13 56.99 2.69 
 High Discretion (B) 57.21 52.05 54.27 54.33 1.60  69.30 55.26 59.16 58.94 3.25 
             
OPTIMISM High Discretion (G) 70.67 47.47 54.72 54.17 3.30  87.21 43.26 54.71 53.74 5.14 
 High Discretion (B) 59.10 50.88 55.38 55.66 2.53  97.68 49.92 57.14 53.04 11.37 
             
Flesch Readability Score High Discretion (G) 48.20 11.30 27.34 27.30 7.79  73.20 37.70 57.93 58.05 6.75 
 High Discretion (B) 44.80 16.30 29.21 27.10 8.54  71.20 54.60 61.35 61.40 5.23 
             
Flesch Readability Grade High Discretion (G) 20.20 11.90 15.14 14.95 1.62  13.50 6.30 9.69 9.70 1.43 
  High Discretion (B) 18.80 12.40 15.26 15.35 1.86   10.60 7.00 9.00 9.30 1.08 
 
